THE  MORAL  LAW 


OR    THE 


THEORY  AND   PRACTICE 


OF 


DUTY 

AN  ETHICAL  TEXT-BOOK 


BY 

EDWARD  JOHN   HAMILTON,  D.D., 

Late    Professor  of  Philosophy   in    the   State    University   of   Washington,    Author  of 

"  The  Human  Mind,'"  "  The  Perception  alist,"  "  The  Modalist"  "  A  New 

Analysis  in  Fundamental  Morals,1'  etc. 


FUNK  AND  WAGNALLS  COMPANY. 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
IQ02 


COPYRIGHT,  1902 

BY  EDWARD  JOHN  HAMILTON 
[Registered  at  Stationers'  Hall,  London,  England] 

PRINTED   IN  THE   UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

Published  in  March,  1902 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGB 

I.  Ethics  and  its  Problems 1 

II.  Pleasure,  Happiness,  and  Good 10 

III.  The  Rational  Pursuit  of  Good , 25 

IV.  The  Right  and  Obligatory 39 

V.  The  Moral  Reason 51 

VI.  Moral  Actions 58 

II.  Ends  or  Final  Causes 67 

.  The  Lower  Motivities 75 

IX.  The  Higher  Motivities 86 

X.  Modifiers  of  Motivity 97 

XI.  Motivity  as  Subjectively  Related 109 

XII.  The  Emotions 118 

XIII.  Ethical  Methods 128 

XIV.  Utilitarianism 136 

XV.  Perfectionism 146 

XVI.  Motivity  Ethics 160 

XVII.  Authority  Ethics  (Stated) 177 

XVIII.  Authority  Ethics  (Discussed) 190 

XIX.  Duty  Ethics 205 

XX.  Immutable  Morality 224 

XXI.  The  Moral  Law 235 

XXII.  Moral  Goodness..  .  248 


ill 


105628 


iv  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXIII.  Regulative  Righteousness 258 

XXIV.  Moral  Esteem  and  Causative  Righteousness 277 

XXV.  Virtue  the  Summum  Bonum 286 

XXVI.  Punitive  Justice 300 

XXVII.  Absolute  Good  and  the  Right 313 

XXVIII.  Free  Agency,  or  Free  Will 32G 

XXIX.  Personality 346 

XXX.  The  Conflict  of  Duties 357 

XXXI.  Rules  of  Casuistry 368 

XXXII.  Social  Ethics 382 

XXXIII.  Economic  Ethics 397 

XXXIV.  Morality  and  the  State 413 

XXXV.  The  Ethical  Aspect  of  Religion 430 

XXXVI.  A  Philosophy  of  Life 444 


PEEFACB. 

DURING  the  past  twenty-five  years  the  theory  of  morals 
has  been  discussed  by  many  writers,  each  of  whom,  doubt- 
less, has  entertained  the  hope  that  his  views  might  prove 
acceptable  to  the  majority  of  scholars.  The  outcome  has 
been  discouraging.  The  teachings  of  text-books  to-day  are 
as  divergent  as  at  any  previous  time.  Under  these  circum- 
stances another  attempt  to  grapple  with  "the  ethical  prob- 
lem" should  be  accompanied  with  justifying  reasons.  The 
mere  fact  that  no  solution  hitherto  offered  has  won  general 
approval  does  not  warrant  new  philosophizing.  One  must 
have  some  ground  of  confidence  that  his  efforts  have,  at  the 
least,  been  rightly  directed. 

The  chief  recommendation  of  the  doctrines  now  pre- 
sented is,  that  they  have  been  very  carefully  formed  ac- 
cording to  the  rules  of  inductive  logic.  Not  a  single  ab- 
stract principle  has  been  asserted,  except  so  far  as  it  follows 
fairly  from  an  analysis  of  the  moral  thought  of  men.  No 
attempt  has  been  made  to  found  theory  on  the  untested 
assertions  of  reason,  or  on  the  unexplained  dictates  of 
common  sense ;  much  less  to  deduce  it  from  the  arguments 
of  great  authorities.  In  every  case  the  actual  thought  of 
men  has  been  made  the  subject  of  analytic  scrutiny.  The 
aim  has  been  to  employ  fact — fact  only — as  the  basis  of 
theory. 

At  the  same  time,  the  tenets  of  every  school  and  the 
reasons  alleged  in  their  behalf  have  been  compared  and  in- 
vestigated. The  aid  of  every  earnest  inquirer  has  been 
sought  that  the  truth  as  seen  from  his  point  of  view  might 
be  fully  apprehended.  To  this  end  more  books  have  been 
consulted  than  have  been  quoted.  While  only  so  many 
citations  have  been  made  in  the  text  as  were  needed  to 


vi  PREFACE. 

exemplify  theories,  the  desire  has  been  to  recognize  every 
aspect  of  truth  which  has  commended  itself  to  serious 
minds. 

Another  ground  for  confidence  in  the  opinions  advocated 
is  that  they  are  the  growth  of  years.  In  his  early  manhood 
the  writer  was  contented  with  a  traditional  system,  in 
which  he  had  been  instructed,  till  he  found  that  it  failed 
to  throw  light  on  certain  theological  questions.  Then  he 
began  to  modify  his  views  till,  more  than  thirty  years  ago, 
they  commenced  to  take  on  the  form  of  a  distinct  system. 
After  this,  at  the  request  of  a  distinguished  man,  he  elabj 
orated  a  theory  in  some  articles  which  were  published  first 
in  a  quarterly  review,  and  afterwards,  in  1870,  as  a  short 
treatise  entitled  "A  New  Analysis  in  Fundamental 
Morals/'  Subsequently  the  author  advocated  the  doctrines 
of  this  analysis  in  lectures  before  young  men  in  an  Eastern 
university,  and,  yet  later,  in  a  new  course  of  lectures,  before 
the  young  men  and  women  of  a  Western  university. 
Finally,  the  greater  part  of  the  last  three  or  four  years  has 
been  devoted  to  the  chapters  of  THE  MORAL  LAW.  A  re- 
view of  these,  since  they  have  been  printed,  is  suggestive 
of  improvements  possible  upon  further  elaboration,  but,  on 
the  whole,  the  statements  of  the  book  seem  substantially 
correct. 

An  additional  circumstance  corroborative  of  the  teach- 
ings now  presented  is  that  they  have  followed  upon  a  meth- 
odical study  of  the  non-moral  activities  of  the  human 
spirit,  and  especially  of  its  intellectual  operations.  The 
more  important  part  of  ethical  science,  and  that  in  which 
its  difficulties  arise,  concerns  man's  moral  perceptions  and 
judgments;  and  these  cannot  be  adequately  understood 
without  an  analytic  knowledge  of  our  mental  faculties  in 
general.  To  comprehend  the  speculative  and  practical 
workings  of  the  moral  reason  we  must  first  comprehend  the 
speculative  and  practical  workings  of  the  natural  reason. 
Hence  a  satisfactory  system  of  ethics  has  been  an  impossi- 
bility for  some  philosophers. 

The  significance  of  these  statements  will  become  appar- 
ent when  the  discussions  of  THE  MORAL  LAW  are  read,  es- 
pecially those  in  which  reference  is  made  to  the  PERCEP- 


PREPACK  vii 

TIONALIST,  a  text-book  in  mental  science,,  or  to  the  MODAL- 
IST,  a  logic.  Some  doctrines  of  the  present  treatise  could 
not  have  been  perfected  without  the  improvements  in  psy- 
chological theory  advocated  in  these  works.  Many  years  ago, 
and  some  time  after  the  writer  had  entered  upon  his  duties 
as  a  professor,  he  was  called  upon  for  an  annual  report. 
He  took  that  opportunity  to  make  known  his  purpose  to 
write  a  series  of  books — particularly  a  mental  science,  a 
logic,  an  ethics,  and  a  history  of  philosophy.  At  that  time 
he  had  little  conception  of  the  importance  of  the  order  of 
study  contemplated  in  his  plan,  or  of  the  vital  connection 
existing  between  different  departments  of  psychological  re- 
search. He  realizes  these  things  now.  For  him  the  pres- 
ent case  specially  illustrates  the  thought  of  Cicero,  that  all 
studies  pertaining  to  humanity  have  a  bond  of  mutual  con- 
nection, and  are,  as  it  were,  united  by  blood-relationship. 
— Etenim  omnes  artes  quae  ad  humanitatem  pertinent, 
habent  commune  quoddam  vinculum  ei,  quasi  cognatione, 
inter  se  continentur  (ORATION  FOR  ARCHIAS). 

Here,  however,  it  is  to  be  confessed  that  the  following 
treatise  has  not  been  controlled  by  what  some  call  "the 
modern  point  of  view/'  and  has  not  adopted,  as  the  funda- 
mental rule  of  its  investigations,  what  some  call  "  the  mod- 
ern method." 

Not  a  few  scholars,  now-a-days,  believe  that  no  phil- 
osophy is  worthy  of  the  name  if  it  be  not,  in  some  way, 
rooted  in  Evolutionism;  by  which  doctrine  they  generally 
mean  the  hypothesis  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  that  all 
phenomena,  including  the  spiritual  and  the  moral,  are  the 
gradual  outcome  of  self-governed  atomic  or  molecular  in- 
teractions of  greater  or  less  complexity.  Now  we  hold  to 
theistic  evolution.  That  the  universe  was  once  a  homo- 
geneous nebula  of  inconceivable  extent,  and  that,  under 
the  direction  of  a  superintending  wisdom,  it  has  passed 
through  a  marvelous  development  is  a  well-supported  doc- 
trine. Moreover,  every  stage  and  every  step  of  this  prog- 
ress everywhere  seems  to  have  been  a  preparation  for  that 
next  succeeding.  We  cannot,  however,  concede  that  all  the 
existing  forms  and  organisms  of  the  Universe  have  orig- 
inated without  any  interposition  of  creative  and  providen- 


yiii  PREFA  CE. 

tial  power.  When  we  consider  the  limitations  of  observ- 
able agencies,  and  when  we  scrutinize  all  the  evidence  on 
which  theory  must  rest,  our  interpretation  of  Nature  calls 
for  a  supernatural  Deity.  At  the  risk  of  being  condemned 
as  wanting  in  scientific  insight,  we  must  reject  that  evo- 
lution which  has  no  place  or  use  for  either  providence  or 
creation. 

It  is,  however,  aside  from  our  purpose  to  contrast  dif- 
ferent theories  of  the  Universe.  What  we  would  say  is  that 
ethical  principles  cannot  properly  be  based  on  any  doctrine 
of  evolution,  whether  theistic  or  atheistic;  they  should  rest 
immediately  on  the  facts  of  rational  and  moral  life,  as 
these  present  themselves  for  our  observation,  or  are  his- 
torically known.  That  the  adoption  of  a  cosmology  may 
modify  our  appreciation  of  ethical  principles  may  be  ad- 
mitted; but  those  principles  themselves  should  be  derived 
inductively  from  the  facts  of  human  consciousness.  Any 
attempt  to  base  them  on  an  hypothesis  concerning  a  dis- 
tant and  non-ethical  past  must  result  in  failure. 

The  so-called  "modern  method"  is  denned,  by  those 
who  use  it,  as  "proceeding  along  comparative  and  critical 
lines."  It  is  followed  under  the  conviction  that  there  is  an 
evolution  of  knowledge,  as  well  as  of  existence,  whereby  the 
opinions  of  the  thoughtful  are  constantly  advancing  to- 
wards the  truth,  and  that,  therefore,  progress  may  be  ex- 
pected through  the  dialectic  study  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
wise  and  the  learned.  This  method  has  its  value.  It  is 
by  no  means  so  incompetent  as  "  the  modern  point  of  view." 
It  often  proves  effective  when  used  in  conjunction  with  the 
method  of  analysis  and  induction.  It  is  always  stimulat- 
ing to  intellectual  activity  and  conducive  to  scholarly  judg- 
ment. It  is  also  a  mode  of  procedure  open  to  any  indus- 
trious, man;  and  it  has  its  attractions  as  admitting  a  dis- 
play of  bibliography  and  erudition.  Nevertheless,  used 
alone,  it  seldom  accomplishes  positive  success.  While  it 
may  lead  to  the  rejection  of  errors,  it  gives  no  guarantee 
against  the  formulation  of  new  mistakes.  It  is  scarcely 
more  favorable  to  progress  than  the  old  dogmatism.  It  is 
especially  unsatisfactory  when  an  investigator,  ambitious 
to  rank  among  "the  advanced  thinkers,"  bases  his  work  on 


PREFACE.  Jx 

an  unproved  and  irrelevant  hypothesis,  and  thereupon, 
more  or  less  eclectically,  constructs  an  ethical  theory  of  his 
own.  In  such  a  case,  though  one  may  claim  an  indepen- 
dence, he  is  sure  to  be  controlled  by  scholastic  influence,  if, 
indeed,  he  do  not  consciously  follow  what  he  may  regard  as 
"  the  trend  of  opinion ; "  that  is,  the  intellectual  fashion  of 
the  day.  True  philosophy  conforms  to  no  fashion,  and  is 
fundamentally  affected  by  fact  only.  But,  while  we  cannot 
accept  "  the  new  method "  as  the  principal  instrument  of 
progress,  any  reader  can  see  that  the  aid  of  philosophical 
criticism  has  been  invoked  during  the  writing  of  THE 
MORAL  LAW.  Not  only  are  many  opinions  reviewed  as  the 
discussions  proceed,  but  seven  chapters  of  the  treatise  are 
expressly  given  to  the  examination  of  systems.  It  is  only 
after  this  critical  consideration  of  doctrines  that  the  in- 
ductive argument  concerning  the  universal  principle  of 
morality  begins,  in  Chapter  XXI. 

In  conclusion,  we  have  a  word  for  those  who  may  be  in- 
duced to  use  this  book.  Our  endeavor  has  been  to  prepare 
a  volume  equally  suited  for  general  circulation  and  for  col- 
lege classes.  The  private  student  is  advised  to  read  the  dis- 
cussions in  their  order:  yet  this  will  not  be  necessary  if  he 
desire  immediate  light  upon  some  topic.  The  nature  of  the 
subject  has  rendered  it  possible  to  treat  specific  questions 
in  such  a  way  that  each  may  be  considered  by  itself. 

Occasionally  a  doctrinal  passage  may  be  found  difficult. 
In  that  case  it  is  hoped  that  a  second  reading  will  make 
it  clear  and  plain.  Any  writing  which  deals  adequately 
with  disputed  philosophical  questions  cannot  be  understood 
without  close  attention.  But  if,  after  careful  study,  it  be 
found  illuminating  and  convincing,  a  peculiar  satisfaction 
is  experienced. 

The  professor  who  may  adopt  THE  MORAL  LAW  as  a 
text-book  must  judge  for  himself  whether  any  of  its  pages 
should  be  omitted,  especially  from  a  short  or  from  a  pri- 
mary course  of  instruction.  Should  the  allotted  number  of 
exercises  be  so  limited  as  not  to  allow  the  thorough  mas- 
tery and  a  review  of  the  whole  treatise,  nothing  would  be 
lost  if  some  subordinate  discussions  were  left  for  the  volun- 
tary reading  of"  the  stndent  at  some  future  time.  A  few 


X  PRKFABE. 

hints  are  given  in  the  book  regarding  omittable  portions, 
but,  in  every  case,  the  professor's  own  judgment  can  best 
determine  what  is  most  advisable. 

NEW  YORK  CITY,  DEC.,  1901. 


THE  MORAL  LAW 

CHAPTEE  I. 

ETHICS  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS. 

1.  Ethics  is  the  science  of  moral  life. — 2.  Life  in  this  connection 
signifies  the  possession  and  exercise  of  spiritual  powers. — 3. 
Moral  life  is  a  species  of  rational  life. — 4.  A  study  of  the  intel- 
lectual operations  of  moral  life  brings  every  other  part  of  that 
life  under  review. — 5.  A  more  explicit  definition  of  ethics. — 6. 
This  science  is  divided  into  the  theoretical  and  the  practical. 
Mackenzie  quoted. — 7.  Five  theories  contend  with  one  another 
for  pre-eminence.  Utilitarianism.  Perfectionism. — 8.  Motivity 
Ethics.  Authority  Ethics.  Duty  Ethics.— 9.  The  fundamental 
question  of  ethics  has  not  yet  been  clearly  answered.  The 
method  of  enquiry  followed  in  the  present  treatise. — 10.  The 
plan  of  the  treatise  ;  and  the  fundamental  doctrine  advocated 
in  it. 

1.  SOME  say  that  ethics,  or  moral  science,  is  the  science  of 
obligation,  or  duty;  others,  that  it  is  the  science  of  the 
morally  right  and  obligatory,  considering  also  with  this  the 
morally  wrong,  as  being  opposite  to  the  right  and  obligatory 
on  us  not  to  do ;  others  say  that  it  is  the  science  of  moral  law, 
meaning  by  this  law  those  rules  collectively  which  reason 
teaches  to  be  right  and  dutiful.  These  definitions  are  equiva- 
lent to  one  another.  They  are  all  justified  by  the  fact  that 
rational  beings  perceive  or  judge  certain  objects  of  pursuit 
and  certain  modes  of  conduct  to  be  right  and  obligatory,  and 
by  the  fact  that  a  certain  style  of  life,  which  we  call  moral, 
originates  from  these  judgments  and  perceptions. 

Others,  again,  make  the  subject  of  ethical  science  to  be 
vrhat  is  best  in  the  conduct,  the  character  or  disposition,  and 
the  aims  or  objects  of  pursuit,  of  rational  beings.  Accord- 
ingly we  are  told  that  ethics  is  "the  science  of  the  ideal  in 
human  life."  This  statement  and  the  thought  from  which  it 


2  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  I. 

springs  are  not  sufficiently  exact  and  specific.  We  prefer 
the  definition  that  ethics  is  the  science  of  the  morally  right 
and  obligatory.  But,  as  whatever  is  right  and  dutiful,  either 
in  any  individual  case  or  as  set  forth  in  any  precept  of  the 
moral  law,  is  of  interest  only  as  it  enters  into  and  affects  our 
lives — and  as  moral  science  considers  not  merely  the  right 
and  obligatory,  but  also  the  action  of  the  intellect  in  appre- 
hending it,  together  with  those  activities  which  accompany 
or  flow  from  that  apprehension — we  may  advantageously 
define  ethics  as  the  science  of  moral  life.  This  definition 
will  indicate  the  scope  as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  science. 

2.  The  word  "  life  "  as  here  used,  signifies  the  possession 
and   exercise   of    spiritual   powers;    such    as    sensation    and 
thought,  emotion  and  motivity,  will  and  exertion,  and  the 
capability  of  pleasure  and  pain.     According  to  this,  the  ordi- 
nary and  proper  use  of  the  term,  life  is  a  system  of  psychical 
powers  and  functions.     In  a  lower  sense  the  word  is  applied 
to  the  powers  and  functions  of  a  corporeal  or  even  of  a  vege- 
table  organism.     We   conceive    of   a    life    which   comprises 
merely  those  unconscious  and  material  potencies  which  are 
latent  in  the  seed  or  in  the  egg,  and  which  manifest  them- 
selves in  the  growing  plant  and  in  the  breathing,  pulsating 
body.     This  physical  use  of  the  term  is  secondary,  and  is 
founded  on  a  loose  analogy  rather  than  on  any  specific,  or 
even  generic,  identity  between  the  nature  of  an  animal  or 
vegetable  organism  and  that  of  a  spiritual  substance.     But 
it  is  favored  by  the  intimate  union  of  the  physical  with  the 
psychical  observable  in  human  life. 

In  ethics  our  thought  must  be  directed  chiefly  to  that  form 
of  psychical  life  which  is  known  as  rational.  For  creatures 
v/ithout  reason  cannot  make  the  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong  and  can  neither  observe  nor  disregard  the  moral  law. 

3.  Eational  life  assumes  different  modes,  or  phases,  accord- 
ing to  the  character  of  the  perceptions  in  which  it  originates 
and  of  the  objects  of  those  perceptions.     We  hear  of  com- 
mercial and  of  professional  life;  of  public,  of  political,  of 
domestic  and  of  social  life;  and  of  religious  or  scientific  or 
literary  life ;  each  of  these  being  a  phase  of  man's  intelligent 
activity.     But  of  all  modes  of  rational  life  none  is  more 
important  or  more  worthy  of  our  study  than  the  moral.    The 
thoughts  and  perceptions  of  moral  life  bring  before  us  those 
objects  which  should  be  the  supreme  aims  of  our  desire  and 
our  aversion.     Its  emotions  and  affections,  its  impulses  and 


CHAP.  I.J  ETHICS  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS.  3 

motive  principles,  are  the  chief  source  of  that  nobility  and 
excellence,  as  well  as  that  of  degradation  and  ruin,  of  which 
spiritual  beings  are  capable.  Its  good  and  its  evil  deeds,  its 
courses  of  labor  and  of  accomplishment,  form  a  fit  basis  for 
the  determination  of  our  future  destiny.  And  its  pleasures 
and  pains  are  of  so  inward  and  of  so  enduring  a  nature  that 
wise  men  in  all  ages  have  spoken  of  them  as  the  chief  ele- 
ments of  eternal  happiness  and  of  hopeless  misery. 

4.  While  every  part  of  moral  life  is  invested  with  interest 
the  attention  of  the  student  must  be  given  principally  to  its 
intellectual  operations.     It  is  only  through  an  analysis  of 
our  moral  judgments  and  perceptions  that  the  nature  of  right 
ends  and  actions  and  of  the  desire  or  will  to  realize  them  can 
be  clearly  understood.     It  is  to  be  noticed,  too,  that  a  con- 
siderable proportion  of  the  objects  of  moral  effort  are  not 
ends  to  be  externally  accomplished  but  natural  dispositions 
which  should  be  regulated  while  seeking  ends  of  their  own, 
and  which  should  be  intentionally  incorporated  with  the  life 
of  duty.     Hence  a  study  of  moral  thought  involves  a  general 
study   of   human   nature.       We    must    also   bear   in   mind 
that  the  exercise  of  moral  principle  becomes  itself  an  object  of 
its  own  perception  and  desire.     That  more  primary  develop- 
ment of  virtue  in  which  man    both    seeks  right    ends    and 
regulates-    his    natural   propensities    and    affections,    upon 
being   regarded    with    an    attentive    consciousness,    becomes 
in   its   turn   itself   an   aim   of   moral   purpose.     One  great 
duty  of  the  virtuous  man  is  to  cultivate  virtue  in  himself  and 
in   others.     Thus  not  merely  the  moral   judgment   of  the 
philosopher,   but   also   the   ordinary  thinking   of   mankind, 
covers  all  of  human  life  that  has  any  ethical  significance. 

5.  If  any  should  desire  to  define  ethics  more  explicitly  than 
by  the  statement  that  it  is  the  science  of  moral  life,  this 
statement  might  be  combined  with  that  which  mentions  the 
right  and  obligatory  together  with  the  wrong  as  the  opposite 
of  the  right.     Upon  this  basis  we  might  say  that  ethics  is 
the  science  of  the  right  and  of  the  wrong  and  of  that  life 
which  arises  from  the  perception  of  the  right  and  of  the 
wrong  and  which  is  commonly  called  moral.    This  definition, 
certainly,  is  sufficiently  explicit. 

6.  As  this  science — this  philosophy  of  moral  life— has  its 
chief  importance  not  in  satisfying  our  thirst  for  knowledge, 
but  in  qualifying  us  for  the  more  intelligent  performance  of 
duty,  it  might  be  called  a  practical  science.     It  might  even 


4;  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  I. 

be  styled  the  art  of  right  conduct  just  as  logic  has  been 
styled  the  art  of  correct  thinking,  the  word  "  art "  here  mean- 
ing not  acquired  skill,  but  only  a  system  of  knowledge  bear- 
ing on  practice.  This  was  Cicero's  thought  in  his  "  De  Fini- 
bus  "  when  he  defined  ethics  as  the  art  of  living — ars  vivendi; 
doctrina  bene  vivendi.  Nevertheless  this  science  is  com- 
monly divided  into  theoretical  and  practical  ethics;  and  with 
reason.  For  a  considerable  portion  of  it  deals  with  general 
principles  which  pertain  to  all  duty,  and  which  are  studied 
in  order  to  enlighten  and  indoctrinate  the  understanding; 
while  another  portion  relates  to  specific  laws  of  duty  and  to 
the  immediate  application  of  principles  to  the  exigencies  of 
life,  and  is,  therefore,  preeminently  practical. 

Some  ethical  works  are  devoted  to  theoretical  and  some  to 
practical  morals,  while  others  treat  of  both.  Of  late  years 
the  theory  of  morals  has  received  much  more  attention  than 
specific  questions  of  duty;  the  idea  has  even  been  advanced 
that  ethics  is  not  a  practical  science  at  all.  Prof.  Mackenzie 
says,  "  The  science  of  ethics  cannot  properly  be  described  as 
practical.  It  must  content  itself  with  understanding  the 
nature  of  the  ideal  and  must  not  hope  to  formulate  rules 
for  its  attainment.  Hence  most  writers  have  preferred  to 
treat  it  as  a  purely  speculative  rather  than  as  a  practical 
science.  This  is  probably  the  best  view  to  take."  (MANUAL 
OF  ETHICS,  p.  9.)  In  opposition  to  this  teaching  we  hold 
that  the  science  of  moral  life  cannot  be  complete  without  two 
courses  of  study,  the  theoretical  and  the  practical.  For  it 
does  not  seem  possible  that  specific  questions  can  be  settled 
in  the  best  way  by  those  who  are  ignorant  of  general  prin- 
ciples, nor  that  any  theory  of  morals  can  be  well  founded  and 
well  formed  if  it  do  not  throw  a  powerful  light  on  every 
practical  problem.  Theoretical  and  practical  questions  should 
be  studied  with  equal  care  and  thoroughness  if  we  are  to  have 
a  well  developed  science  of  morality;  though  it  is  to  be  ad- 
mitted that  thus  far  more  philosophical  thought  has  been 
bestowed  upon  the  theory  than  upon  the  practice  of  duty. 
Instructions  in  regard  to  conduct  have  shown  much  wisdom, 
but  have  left  difficult  questions,  and  new  problems  especially, 
without  adequate  solution.  This  is  partly  the  result  of  the 
concentration  of  attention  on  the  theory  of  morals,  but  it  is 
chiefly  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  this  theory  is 
as  yet  in  a  confused  and  unsettled  state.  The  student  of 
applied  or  practical  ethics  has  to  depend  on  his  own  good 


CHAP.  I.]  ETHICS  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS.  5 

sense  and  judgment  with  little  aid  from  fundamental  prin- 
ciples, and  is  at  times  impeded  rather  than  forwarded  by 
his  adherence  to  some  system. 

7.  The  unsatisfactory  condition  of  our  science  at  the  pres- 
ent time  becomes  evident  when  we  consider  that  no  one  of 
those  theories  which  have  been,  and  are  now,  advocated  by  men 
of  ability,  has  gained  any  decided  preeminence  over  the  rest. 
The  philosophy  of  moral  life  is  still  under  debate.    Throwing 
out  of  consideration  that  degraded  materialism  which  takes 
for  its  rule,  "  Let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die," 
five  different  forms  of  doctrine  contend  with  one  another  re- 
specting the  ultimate  law  of  duty.     Utilitarians  say  that  the 
promotion  of  the  welfare  of  men  is  the  radical  moral  end. 
With  them  the  highest  aim  is  not  virtue  but  happiness.    They 
have  developed  an  intelligent  and  systematic  humanitarian- 
ism,  founded  upon  the  great  duty  of  doing  good.     Yet  this 
system  is  not  generally  accepted  as  a  complete  account  of 
morality.     Perfectionists,  on  the  other  hand,  assert  that  in- 
ward spiritual  excellence  is  the  fundamental  aim  of  duty. 
They  say  that  the  essence  of  virtue  is  to  desire  and  seek  the 
realization  of  the  true  self,  or  person,  in  a  noble  character  and 
life.    But  they  very  properly  deny  that  their  doctrine  is  a  self- 
ish doctrine ;  inasmuch  as  the  true  self  is  not  selfish,  and  also 
because  the  good  man  seeks  to  develop  not  himself  only  but 
other  selves  as  well.    The  central  thought  of  this  system  sets 
forth  a  great  duty,  and  has  always  attracted  noble-minded 
men.    Just  now,  at  the  beginning  of  this  twentieth  century, 
Perfectionism  is  the  most  popular  of  ethical  theories,   at 
least  in  scholastic  quarters.     Yet  this  doctrine  is  not  likely 
to  gain  universal  favor.    It  gives  no  philosophical — that  is,  no 
thorough  and  satisfying — explanation  of  the  duties  of  benevo- 
lence and  of  justice,  or  of  the  common  duty  of  doing  good.  It 
does  not  even  render  any  very  intelligible  account  of  the  per- 
fection which  it  advocates. 

8.  Another  class  of  thinkers  teach  that  the  essence  of  all 
duty  lies  in  the  regulation  of  one's  own  motive  dispositions, 
either  through  the  supremacy  of  love  for  beings  or  under  the 
guidance  of  a  faculty  which  judges  between  "  springs  of  ac- 
tion "  as  higher  and  lower.    This  style  of  doctrine  is  preemi- 
nently subjective,  and  may  be  named   Motivity   Ethics.      It 
brings  into  prominence  the  duty  of  keeping  the  heart  with 
all  diligence.    Yet  it  does  not  explain  all  duty,  and  is  not  even 
a  satisfactory  philosophy  of  that  virtue  which  it  specially  in- 


6  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  I. 

culcates.  The  more  primary  exercises  of  moral  principle  do 
not  aim  at  one's  self-regulation  but  at  the  external  accom- 
plishment of  things  right  and  good.  Self-regulation  is  a  sec- 
ondary development  of  virtue. 

Again,  some  able  writers  maintain  that  all  duty  consists 
in  obedience  to  the  will  and  direction  of  a  superior,  and 
that  all  virtue  is  loyalty  to  the  authority  of  government. 
The  government  may  be  that  of  God  or  of  the  State  or 
of  the  sentiments  and  customs  of  the  community;  and  it 
may  have  for  its  ratio  essendi  the  common  welfare  or 
some  other  good  end.  Nevertheless,  according  to  what 
may  be  styled  Authority  Ethics,  moral  obligation  is  an 
external  legal  relation  to  a  governmental  power.  This  doc- 
trine is  plausible  from  the  fact  that  most  men  perform  duty 
out  of  respect  for  authority  and  as  a  matter  of  obedience; 
which  respect  and  obedience  are  a  part  of  moral  life,  and  not 
merely  a  supplementary  addition.  But  the  primary  exercise 
of  morality  seems  not  to  be  respect  for  authority  but  respect 
for  the  right.  Obedience  to  rulers  or  laws  is  dutiful  only  so 
far  as  it  presupposes  a  principle  of  right  and  is  founded  upon 
it.  If  government  were  not  fitted  to  serve  right  ends,  no  per- 
son would  have  the  right  to  rule  over  other  persons.  Eight 
and  wrong  do  not  originate  from  government  and  authority, 
but  just  authority  exists  for  the  sake  of  things  right  and  ob- 
ligatory, and  to  promote  the  realization  of  them. 

Finally,  it  is  asserted  by  some  that  "  oughtness"  or  <f  mor- 
al obligation"  or  ff  the  categorical  imperative/'  is  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  ethics.  These  thinkers  define  the  right 
as  the  obligatory  and  ascribe  to  the  moral  faculty  the  power 
to  perceive  intuitively  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong.  Ac- 
cording to  writers  of  this  class  there  is  no  universal  law  ex- 
cept only  that  one  should  do  what  "  oughtness,"  or  duty,  re- 
quires of  him;  therefore  their  doctrine  may  be  distinguished 
as  Duty  Ethics.  This  school  takes  the  position  that  the 
search  for  an  all-comprehensive  moral  aim  is  useless,  if  not 
chimerical.  It  claims,  and  it  receives,  a  certain  support  from 
the  "  common  sense,"  that  is,  from  the  intuitive  moral 
judgment,  of  mankind;  and  its  views  are  acceptable  to  those 
who  deny  that  the  dictates  of  the  practical  reason  can  be  prof- 
itably submitted  to  the  analysis  of  the  speculative  reason. 
Nevertheless  the  right  of  Duty  Ethics  to  philosophical  con- 
sideration rests  chiefly  on  the  incompetence  of  competitive 
systems.  No  one  has  yet  shown  that  the  moral  law  is  inca- 


CHAP.  I.]  ETHICS  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS.  7 

pable  of  analysis  and  unification ;  nor  is  it  true  that  "  ought- 
ness,"  or  moral  obligation,  is  identical  with  moral  Tightness. 
On  the  contrary,  the  moral  obligation  of  an  action  or  end  is  a 
property  consequent  upon  the  rightness  of  the  action  or  end. 
Every  duty  is  obligatory  because  it  is  right.  So  the  question 
remains,  Wherein  does  that  rightness  consist? 

9.  Such  is  the  state  of  moral  philosophy  at  the  present  day. 
While  various  aspects  of  the  life  of  duty  have  been  illumi- 
nated, the  fundamental  problem  of  ethics  has  not  yet  been 
solved. 

This  state  of  affairs  should  not  discourage  the  earnest  stu- 
dent. It  should  inspire  for  patient  persevering  work  in  the 
hope  that  a  clearer  vision  of  truth  may  be  gained  provided 
those  methods  of  inquiry  to  which  the  marvelous  scientific 
progress  of  the  past  century  is  due,  be  followed  faithfully. 

The  theory  elaborated  in  the  following  chapters  is  an  out- 
growth of  the  study  of  the  facts  of  the  moral  consciousness. 
Its  doctrines — and  especially  its  radical  doctrine — have  been 
obtained  through  a  slow  process  of  analysis  and  generaliza- 
tion. Therefore,  while  claiming  little  originality,  and  less 
ingenuity,  it  hopes  for  consideration  from  those  who  approve 
of  the  inductive  method  of  philosophizing.  Some  use  has  been 
made  of  auxiliary  plans  of  procedure.  The  critical  and  his- 
torical method,  which  traces  the  development  of  doctrines  and 
endeavors  to  extract  truth  from  conflicting  opinions,  has  been 
found  helpful.  Recourse  has  been  had,  also,  to  the  dogmatic, 
or  intuitional,  method,  which  first  asserts  principles  and  then 
tests  them;  this  method  enables  one  to  consult  the  teachings 
of  the  practical  reason.  The  derivate,  or  deductive,  method 
which,  in  constructing  any  science,  makes  proper  use  of  the 
ascertained  truths  of  other  sciences,  has  also  been  employed. 
But  the  main  effort  has  been  to  obtain  ethical  principles 
through  the  analysis  and  generalization  of  the  moral  judg- 
ments of  mankind.  If  the  system  thus  produced  has  any 
superiority  over  others,  it  is  because  the  inductive  method  has 
now,  perhaps  as  never  before,  been  faithfully  applied  to 
ethics. 

10.  On  account  of  the  existing  state  of  the  theory  of  mor- 
als the  problem  respecting  the  ultimate  rule  of  duty  has  a 
more  prominent  place  in  the  plan  of  the  treatise  than  that 
which  it  would  otherwise  have  had.     Consideration  for  this 
question  has  determined  the  order  in  which  topics  have  been 
taken  up,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  manner  of  dealing  with 


8  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  I. 

them.  The  first  twelve  chapters  of  the  book  consider  subjects 
essential  to  ethics,  yet  which  are  fairly  intelligible  without 
first  determining  the  radical  principle  of  the  moral  law. 
These  chapters  discuss  the  objects  about  which  moral  life  is 
concerned  and  the  modes  of  activity  in  which  that  life  is  de- 
veloped, these  modes  and  those  objects  being,  to  some  extent, 
identical.  The  next  eight  chapters  review  the  different  ethi- 
cal theories  which  are  contending  with  one  another  in  the 
world  of  thought;  they  consider  also  the  phases  of  moral  life 
to  which  these  theories  are  specially  related.  The  work  of 
these  eight  chapters  is  facilitated  by  that  of  the  preceding 
twelve.  The  next  part  of  the  book,  composed  of  seven  chap- 
ters (XXL— XX VII.),  contains  an  analysis  of  the  moral  law 
as  found  in  human  consciousness.  For  the  purposes  of  this 
investigation  the  duties  of  life  are  divided  into  those  of  Moral 
Goodness,  Moral  Esteem,  Regulative  Righteousness,  and  Caus- 
ative Righteousness.  The  conclusion  drawn  from  the  analy- 
sis of  the  moral  law  is  that  the  right,  the  generic  aim  of  duty, 
is  identical  with  absolute  good  considered  as  an  end  of  ra- 
tional pursuit.  The  signification  of  the  phrase  "absolute 
good  "  in  this  connection  is  fully  explained  both  at  the  be- 
ginning and  at  the  end  of  the  discussion  of  the  moral  law. 
It  is  quite  different  from  the  meaning  given  to  the  phrase  by 
Janet  and  other  authors,  and  is  to  be  distinguished  also  from 
the  ordinary  notion  of  good. 

Absjolute  good  is  the  supreme  conception  of  the  practical 
reason.  Because  of  its  abstract  character,  and  because  it  is 
seldom  used  alone  but  commonly  with  some  qualifying  addi- 
tion, the  distinct  apprehension  of  it  requires  care.  After  the 
definition  of  this  good  in  the  chapter  on  Moral  Goodness  the 
idea  of  it  is  rendered  more  and  more  determinate  as  the  con- 
stituent parts  of  the  law  are  successively  considered. 

The  remaining  portion  of  the  treatise  is  devoted  to  subjects 
which  are  best  considered  after  one's  views  respecting  the 
fundamental  moral  rule  have  been  settled.  Personality  and 
free-will  are  discussed;  they  are  factors  in  all  ethical  life. 
An  understanding  of  them  throws  light  on  the  more  subjec- 
tive side  of  morality  and  on  the  treatment  due  rational  beings 
as  responsible  agents.  Then  the  conflict  of  duties — the  next 
subject  considered — illustrates  the  relation  of  specific  laws  of 
duty  to  the  universal  law  and  the  manner  in  which  all  moral 
rules  cooperate  in  an  harmonious  unity.  So,  also,  some  dis- 
cussions concerning  the  application  of  ethical  principles  to  so- 


CHAP.  I.]  ETHICS  AND  ITS  PROBLEM.  9 

cial,  economic,  political,  and  religious  life  are  intended  to 
indicate  the  value  of  moral  theory  in  practical  inquiries. 
Finally  a  chapter  on  the  general  philosophy  of  life  shows  how 
the  theory  of  duty  and  the  theory  of  happiness  'are  connected 
with  each  other;  and  how  these  theories  exist  in  an  intimate 
correlation. 


CHAPTER  II. 

PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD. 

1.  The  generic  meaning  of  "  pleasure  "  or  "  enjoyment." — 2.  Ra- 
tional and  irrational  pleasure. — 3.  Three  significations  of  "  happi- 
ness," of  which  the  last  is  the  most  important. — 4.  The  good  and 
the  right  are  closely  related.  A  "good  man"  defined.  Also  a 
"  good  deed." — 5.  Things  are  called  good,  (1)  as  producing  pleas- 
ure, (2)  as  being  thoroughly  adapted  for  some  work  or  end. — 6. 
In  a  higher  sense  (3)  a  thing  is  good  as  being  a  means  or  a  mode 
of  happiness. — 7.  Most  good  things  are  good  conditionally  ;  and 
many  only  mediately  and  indirectly. — 8.  Welfare,  well-being 
good  actions,  and  rational  good,  defined.  9.  Sometimes  happi- 
ness itself  is  called  "  good  "  and  "  a  good."  But  it  is  misleading 
to  say  that  it  is  the  only  good.  Hopkins  criticized. — 10.  Moral 
good,  defined.  Why  is  virtue  called  good.  Janet  quoted. — 11. 
The  theory  of  pleasure.  Many  pleasures  (and  pains)  are  concomi- 
tants of  other  spiritual  activities.  The  powers  of  the  soul,  enu- 
merated. Hamilton  and  Calderwood  quoted. — 12.  Other  enjoy- 
ments (and  sufferings)  arise  upon  the  perception  of  objects  fitted 
to  affect  us. — 13.  Pleasure  and  pain  spring  also  from  the  gratifi- 
cation and  the  disappointment  of  desire.  Plato's  doctrine.  Ar- 
istotle quoted. — 14.  Aristotle's  doctrine  criticized.  The  truth 
stated.  But  for  a  full  philosophy  of  pleasure  and  pain,  happi- 
ness and  misery,  we  must  go  to  the  Stoics. 


1.  THE  words  "  pleasure  "  and  "  enjoyment "  are  often  used 
as  equivalent  to  each  other.     As  such  they  have  three  mean- 
ings, or  uses,  one  generic  or  essential,  the  others  specific  or 
specialized.    Generically,  they  indicate  an  ultimate  element  of 
spiritual  life,  which,  like  all  other  things  not  admitting  of 
analytical  definition,  must  be  defined  by  its  relations.     Let 
us  say  that  pleasure  is  that  constituent  of  experience  which 
when  felt  excites  desire  for  the  continuance  or  repetition  of 
it  and  which  is  the  opposite  of  pain  or  suffering.     In  this 
generic  sense  the  word  "  pleasure  "  is    sometimes   preferred 
when  the  experience  comes  from  the  more  passive  exercise  of 
our  powers,  and  "  enjoyment "  when  it  comes  from  the  more 
active  exercise.     But  this  distinction  is  not  of  great  impor- 
tance. 

2.  The  specific  uses  of  these  terms  arise  from  the  fact  that 

10 


CHAP.  II.]      PLEASURE,  BAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  H 

the  pursuit  and  realization  of  enjoyment  may  or  may  not  be 
regulated  and  modified  by  reason.  Having  reference  to  this 
we  distinguish  what  may  be  catted  rational  and  irrational 
pleasures.  The  difference  between  these  meanings  is  com- 
monly evident  from  the  context.  The  Bible,  speaking  of  the 
woman  who  lives  a  butterfly  life,  says,  "  She  that  liveth  in 
pleasure  is  dead  while  she  liveth";  but,  referring  to  the  en- 
joyments of  Heaven,  it  says,  "  At  thy  right  hand  there  are 
pleasures  for  evermore."  In  like  manner  philosophers  tell  us 
that  the  wise  man  does  not  seek  pleasure,  or  enjoyment,  but 
happiness,  while,  at  the  same  time,  they  assert  that  happiness 
is  the  sum  of  the  pleasures  of  a  wisely  ordered  life.  Evi- 
dently there  are  two  modes  of  enjoyment,  which,  though  pos- 
sessing radically  a  common  nature,  are  estimated  differently 
by  intelligent  persons.  Irrational  pleasures  are  enjoyed  as 
long  as  they  last,  yet,  being  pursued  aimlessly  or  recklessly, 
they  are  not  only  consistent  with  the  loss  of  happiness,  but 
may  result  in  misery.  In  their  total  operation  they  are  not 
good  but  evil.  Rational  enjoyments,  on  the  contrary,  exclude 
injurious  or  wasteful  indulgence  and  the  sacrifice  of  enduring 
and  satisfying  for  transitory  gratification.  They  not  only 
comport  with  happiness,  but  are  the  components  of  happiness ; 
and  are  not  evil  but  good. 

The  difference  between  these  two  kinds  of  pleasures  enters 
into  our  judgment  concerning  each  as  an  object  of  choice. 
The  pursuit  of  irrational  enjoyments  does  not  excite  our  re- 
spect. If  it  be  conducted  against  wisdom  and  prudence,  we 
regard  it  with  contempt.  But  to  seek  -rational  pleasures  for 
ourselves  and  for  others  is  commendable.  We  do  not  now 
refer  to  the  conscientious  approbation  of  the  duty  of  promot- 
ing happiness;  we  speak  merely  of  that  natural  appreciation 
with  which  men  contemplate  the  wise  pursuit  of  happiness. 

The  terms  "  pleasure  "  and  "  enjoyment "  have  other  mean- 
ings in  addition  to  tho.se  above  mentioned,  but  we  aim  at  pres- 
ent to  define  only  such  ideas  as  may  throw  light  on  the  con- 
ceptions of  happiness  and  of  good. 

3.  The  term  "  happiness  "  sometimes  signifies  a  state  of 
unalloyed  comfort  and  enjoyment  no  matter  how  temporary 
it  may  be.  We  speak  of  the  happiness  of  a  bride  or  of  a 
bridegroom,  or  of  the  successful  candidate  for  some  honorable 
or  lucrative  office.  The  experience  of  such  persons  for  the 
time  being  is  completely  pleasurable;  they  are  " perfectly 
happy."  This  sort  of  felicity  is  that  referred  to  in  a  polite 


12  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  II. 

exaggeration  when  one  gentleman  assures  another  that  he  is 
extremely  happy  to  make  his  acquaintance.  It  is  a  high  de- 
gree of  enjoyment,  or  conscious  pleasure,  however  efferves- 
cent. 

Again,  happiness  may  denote  a  state  of  continued  or  per- 
manent enjoyment.  The  life  promised  our  first  parents  in 
Eden  was  to  be  one  of  happiness.  They  were  assured  of 
blessedness  so  long  as  they  should  remain  obedient  to  the  di- 
vine commands.  They  may  have  been  subjected  to  the  occa- 
sional uneasiness  of  hunger  and  thirst  and  weariness  and  of 
mental  and  spiritual  longings,  but  these  experiences  were  only 
the  conditions  of  the  greatest  enjoyment  possible  for  creatures 
such  as  they  were.  Unmixed  felicity  appears  not  to  be  pos- 
sible for  finite  beings.  For  this  reason  while  the  idea  of  hap- 
piness may  be  so  held  as  to  exclude  all  pain  or  uneasiness 
whatever,  it  frequently  admits  such  concomitant  pains  and 
troubles  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  avoidance  of  misery  and 
the  realization  of  great  and  permanent  satisfaction.  Our 
ordinary  practical  conception  of  happiness  is  formed  in  this 
way. 

Finally ;  in  ethics  happiness  commonly  signifies  a  condition 
of  more  or  less  permanent  enjoyment  so  far  as  this  can  be 
attained  by  the  thought  and  effort  of  a  rational  being.  Some, 
at  least,  of  the  happiness  of  Adam  and  Eve,  if  they  had  not 
fallen,  would  not  have  come  from  what  they  themselves  might 
do  but  from  the  perfection  and  riches  of  their  surround- 
ings. The  blessedness  of  Heaven  does  not  result  wholly  from 
the  wisdom  and  virtue  of  its  inhabitants  but  also  from  the 
splendors  of  their  home.  And,  among  men,  happiness  is 
mostly  thought  of  as  largely  dependent  on  one's  circum- 
stances. Hence  prosperity  is  called  "good  fortune"  (gliick; 
bonheur)  ;  and  happiness  is  connected  with  that  which  hap- 
pens. The  happy  man  is  the  "lucky  fellow."  Some  Stoics 
taught  that  one's  happiness  depends  entirely  on  his  own  dis- 
position and  doings;  but  Aristotle  disproved  this  position. 
Enumerating  the  causes  of  a  desirable  experience,  he  showed 
that  many — though  not  the  most  important — of  them,  are  not 
under  one's  own  control.  With  reference  to  the  influence  of  a 
superior  power  he  called  the  state  of  happiness  "  iudatfuma " 
as  if  it  resulted  chiefly  from  supernatural  agencies.  A  simi- 
lar thought  is  suggested  when  we  speak  of  "  the  blessed  "  and 
their  blessedness. 

Evidently,  however,  when  we  say  that  the  wise  man  seeki 


CHAP.  II.]     PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  13 

happiness  for  himself  and  for  others  and  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  every  man  to  do  so,  we  are  thinking  of  happiness  only  so 
far  as  it  comes  within  the  scope  of  human  prosecution  and 
attainment.  We  conceive  of  a  state  of  permanent  enjoyment 
so  far  as  such  a  state  can  be  realized  through  rational  pur- 
pose and  effort.  We  also  recognize  that  some  labors,  sacrifices 
and  pains  are  necessary  elements  in  a  successful  career,  and 
that  great  and  enduring  pleasures  cannot  be  obtained  without 
them.  In  short,  happiness,  as  an  object  of  rational  pursuit,  is 
not  a  condition  of  absolutely  unalloyed  enjoyment,  but  is  the 
sum  of  those  comforts  and  gratifications  which,  however  min- 
gled with  unavoidable  or  needful  sufferings,  the  wise  man 
seeks  wisely  for  himself  and  for  others. 

The  end  thus  sought  by  reason  is  a  very  comprehensive  one. 
It  includes  the  gratification  of  every  part  of  our  nature  as 
sentient  beings.  It  neglects  no  pleasure  which  can  find  place 
in  a  wisely  chosen  course  of  enjoyable  experience.  It  rejects 
only  what  may  conflict  with  its  own  development  and  tend 
towards  misery.  The  scope  of  its  plans  varies  according  to 
the  character  and  intelligence  of  the  rational  agent,  but, 
otherwise,  it  is  unlimited  in  its  selection  of  aims,  in  its  use 
of  agencies,  and  as  to  the  length  of  the  experience  desired. 

4.  Another  idea,  closely  related  to  those  of  pleasure  and  of 
happiness,  occupies  a  more  prominent  place  than  either  of 
these  in  the  philosophy  of  morals.  The  conception  of 
"good"  (ra.Yo.dov,  bonum) ,  whether  expressed  by  the  ad- 
jective or  by  the  noun,  constantly  enters  into  moral  thought. 
We  say  that  it  is  right  and  obligatory  to  seek  the  good  of  our- 
selves and  of  others.  We  often  speak  of  some  end  or  action 
or  course  of  conduct  as  being  both  right  and  good.  We  also 
assert  that  it  is  right  because  it  is  go.od,  and  that,  in  being 
right,  it  is  the  highest  form  of  good  possible  in  the  case. 
Moreover,  we  call  virtue  moral  good  and  say  that  this  is  the 
supreme  aim  of  rational  desire.  Thus  good  of  some  kind  is 
constantly  mentioned  in  moral  philosophy. 

It  is  to  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  word  <e  good  "  has  a 
variety  of  significations,  and  that  its  use  in  ethics  cannot  be 
understood  unless  these  be  distinguished.  Let  us  note,  first, 
that  the  meaning  of  this  word  as  descriptive  of  persons  is 
quite  different  from  its  meaning  as  descriptive  of  things.  A 
good  man,  a  good  woman,  or  a  good  child  signifies  one  dis- 
posed towards  what  is  right  and  good,  a  person  of  virtuous 
character  and  conduct — especially  one  given  to  deeds  of  be- 


14  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  II. 

nevolence.  The  abstract  name  for  the  quality  thus  indicated 
by  the  adjective  is  not  good  but  goodness.  It  might  be  spoken 
of  as  "personal  good/7  but  this  would  be  an  arbitrary  and 
ambiguous  use  of  language.  Nor  is  the  word  "  good  "  used  as 
a  noun  to  designate  the  person  or  persons  possessing  the 
quality  except  occasionally  in  the  plural;  as  when  we  say, 
"  The  good  love  one  another."  The  Latin  and  Greek  lan- 
guages, in  which  adjectives  are  declined  with  three  genders, 
are  not  limited  in  this  way  like  the  English. 

While  the  excellence  ascribed  to  persons  when  we  call  them 
good  should  be  sought  by  all  and  for  all,  this  thought  is  not 
that  immediately  before  the  mind  when  we  call  them  good. 
We  mean  only  that  such  persons  are  morally  excellent  and 
worthy  of  moral  esteem.  Moreover,  though  goodness  accom- 
plishes good  and  good  men  are  instruments  of  good,  this  is 
not  our  thought  when  we  call  them  good.  We  simply  ascribe 
to  them  a  character  or  disposition  which  seeks  good,  and  is, 
therefore,  worthy  of  approbation.  The  same  idea  is  often 
expressed  by  saying  that  they  are  excellent  or  worthy  persons. 
In  like  manner  a  bad  man  is  one  disposed  towards  evil. 

This  personal,  or  subjective,  use  of  the  term  "good" 
appears  in  a  derivative  and  secondary  way  when  we  speak 
of  "good  actions"  or  "good  deeds,"  meaning,  not  actions 
which  accomplish  good  or  which  aim  at  what  is  good  and 
right,  but  those  which  spring  from  benevolence  and  good- 
ness. For  one  can  do  what  is  right  and  good  intentionally  yet 
without  any  love  for  it;  in  which  case  his  conduct  would  not 
be  good  in  the  sense  now  considered.  To  do  a  thing  right  and 
good  in  order  to  accomplish  a  wrong  end  is  not  good  but  bad, 
not  virtuous  but  vicious.  A  "  good  deed,"  that  is,  a  virtuous 
deed,  may  be  distinguished  from  a  doing  of  good. 

5.  In  ethics,  however,  the  term  "good"  more  frequently 
relates  to  certain  objects  of  pursuit  and  to  the  actions  in 
which  these  are  realized  than  to  the  dispositions  which  lead  us 
to  seek  them.  This  arises  because  the  objects  of  our  dutiful 
desire,  though  connected  with  persons,  are  properly  conceived 
of  as  things. 

There  are  four  principal  senses  in  which  things  are  styled 
good.  First  of  all,  a  thing  may  le  good  simply  as  producing 
pleasure  or  enjoyment.  In  this  wav  the  sweetmeats  of  a  child 
are  good,  and  are  called  "  goodies  " ;  an  article  of  food  may, 
in  this  sense,  have  a  good  or  a  bad  taste.  A  "  good  time  " 
often  signifies  just  an  enjoyable  time.  When  Peter,  at  the 


CHAP.  II. J     PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  15 

transfiguration,  said,  "  Lord,  it  is  good  for  us  to  be  here ;  let 
us  make  here  three  tabernacles,"  (or  booths),  he  expressed  a 
sense  of  present  happiness  and  his  desire  that  this  should  be 
continued  for  a  time.  So  when  we  say  that  many  pleasures 
result  from  the  apprehension  of  a  good  as  in  relation  to  one- 
self, the  word  "  good  "  applies  to  any  object  the  apprehension 
of  which  yields  gratification  whether  it  be  sought  rationally 
or  not.  With  this  wide  use  of  the  term  one  might  accept  the 
old  doctrine  that  no  object  is  sought  except  "sub  specie 
boni."  The  word  "  bonum  "  or  "  good  "  in  that  case  denotes 
simply  the  pleasure-producing  and  attractive,  whether  ration- 
ally desirable  or  not., 

Another  sense  of  the  word  contains  no  immediate  reference 
to  pleasure  or  pain  but  simply  sets  forth  a  high  degree  of 
adaptedness  to  some  work  or  end.  A  sharp  knife  or  sword  is 
a  good  instrument  because  it  is  thoroughly  suited  for  cutting. 
It  retains  this  designation  even  while  it  may  be  used  for  evil 
purposes.  In  like  manner  one  may  have  a  good  intellect  or 
a  good  knowledge  of  business  who  yet  employs  his  gifts  in  the 
service  of  vice.  A  good  speaker  or  a  good  debater  ntay  be  a 
bad  man  and  the  advocate  of  evil.  The  mind  conceives  of  an 
ideal  instrument  as  doing  some  work  perfectly  or  as  perfectly 
suited  for  some  purpose ;  then  an  object  is  good  if  it  approach 
this  ideal.  A  good  blow,  a  good  shout,  a  good  scolding,  a 
good  statement,  is  one  effectively  developed  and  delivered. 
This  sense  of  "  good  "  may  be  accompanied  by  the  implication 
that  a  thing  could  be  used  in  promoting  welfare,  but  it  does 
not  include  the  idea  that  a  thing  is  positively  useful  or  bene- 
ficial; it  simply  sets  forth  efficiency. 

But,  although  what  has  high  efficiency  is  called  good,  we 
do  not  call  it  "  a  good,"  nor  do  we  speak  of  such  things  collec- 
tively under  the  noun  "  good."  These  terms  are  reserved  for 
things  good  in  a  higher  sense  which  we  are  about  to  mention. 
The  idea  of  fitness  or  efficiency,  however,  is  occasionally  ex- 
pressed by  the  noun  in  the  plural,  as  when  we  speak  of  the 
"  goods  "  of  a  merchant. 

6.  We  now  come  to  the  most  important  sense  of  the  term, 
which  also  is  the  most  common  in  ethical  discussions.  Men 
often  speak  of  a  thing  as  good  when  they  mean  that  it  is  a 
mode  or  means  or  instrument  of  happiness.  Whatever  re- 
moves or  prevents  suffering  or  produces  comfort  or  any  form 
of  rational  enjoyment,  is  said  to  be  "good  "  or  "  a  good  " ;  and 
all  such  things  collectively  are  "  Good  "  in  the  general,  or 


16  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  II. 

r'  The  Good/'  these  last  two  expressions  being  equivalent  to 
each  other.  "  Good  "  presents  the  idea  simply ;  "  The  Good  " 
presents  it  as  opposed  to  other  cognate  ideas,  such  as  the  right, 
the  true,  the  beautiful,  the  bad  and  the  wrong. 

General  notions  of  things  as  good  arise  when  anything  is 
found  to  be  a  cause  or  condition  of  happiness ;  and  objects  are 
called  good  as  falling  under  these  notions.  Food,  clothing, 
furniture,  air,  light  and  heat,  farming  lands,  dwelling  houses, 
money  and  every  kind  of  wealth,  are  forms  of  good.  Knowl- 
edge, intelligence,  bodily  and  mental  vigor,  honor,  friendship, 
love,  an  upright  character,  an  unblemished  reputation,  a 
noble  and  virtuous  disposition,  are  also  good  things;  for  they 
are  productive  of  happiness. 

7.  Most  forms  of  good  are  such  not  absolutely  but  on  some 
condition  which  is  taken  for  granted.  For  example,  riches 
and  talent  are  good  things  as  employed  rationally  and  for 
their  proper  purposes.  Used  foolishly  or  viciously  they  are 
sources  of  evil. 

In  order  that  a  thing  may  be  good  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  it  be  immediately  and  directly,  or  only  mediately  and 
indirectly,  promotive  of  happiness  or  preventive  of  misery. 
That  which  produces  good  is  itself  a  good.  Moreover  that 
may  be  a  good  the  immediate  effect  of  which  is  disagreeable 
or  painful,  as  in  the  case  of  a  nauseous  medicine  or  a  severe 
surgical  operation.  An  arrangement  or  transaction  is  good 
when  the  total  effect  of  it  is  to  produce  much  more  enjoyment 
than  suffering,  even  though  it  may  involve  considerable  suf- 
fering. Generally,  however,  in  our  more  important  determi- 
nations respecting  good  no  nice  calculation  of  loss  and  gain 
is  needed.  Some  trouble  and  suffering  are  seen  to  be  the  nec- 
essary conditions  of  avoiding  vastly  greater  misery  and  of 
obtaining  vastly  greater  happiness.  Moral  life,  certainly, 
seldom  makes  any  close  comparison  of  values.  When  no  great 
evil  is  to  be  avoided  and  the  question  of  more  or  less  good  ad- 
mits of  debate,  men  commonly  decide  from  interest  or  incli- 
nation and  feel  themselves  at  liberty  to  do  so. 

8.  The  permanent  conditions  of  one's  comfort  and  happi- 
ness are  named,  collectively,  his  welfare,  and,  so  far  as  these 
conditions  may  be  included  in  the  state  of  the  person  himself, 
they  are  called  his  well-being.  Welfare  and  well-being,  there- 
fore, are  comprehensive  forms  of  good. 

The  intentional  actions  of  rational  beings,  when  performed 
as  promotive  of  welfare  and  happiness,  are  good  in  the  sense 


CHAP.  II.]      PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  17 

now  considered.  Sometimes,  as  already  said,  "  good  deeds  " 
signify  those  which  proceed  from  a  benevolent  or  virtuous  dis- 
position without  reference  to  their  actual  results.  This  use  of 
language  is  a  modification  of  that  according  to  which  persons 
are  called  good ;  it  relates  to  actions  as  proceeding  from  dis- 
positions. But  we  are  now  thinking  of  actions  simply  as 
doings  or  intentional  performances,  no  matter  whether  they 
spring  from  a  good  or  from  a  bad  animus.  Such  an  action  is 
often  conceived  of  as  including  its  result  (Chap.  VI.),  and 
when  the  result  is  good  the  action  also  is  good.  The  virtue  of 
moral  goodness  desires  the  accomplishment  of  such  actions  as 
good.  (Chap.  XXII.) 

As  the  good  of  which  we  now  speak  is  not  that  productive 
of  pleasure  -simply  but  that  promotive  of  happiness,  and  as 
happiness  is  the  sum  of  rational  enjoyments  (which  the  wise 
man  seeks  wisely),  this  good  may  be  distinguished  as  rational 
good.  But  it  is  that  commonly  intended  when  the  term 
"  good  "  is  used  by  serious  persons  without  any  qualification, 
and  especially  when  it  is  used  by  philosophers.  This  was 
probably  the  original  and  primary  sense  of  the  word  from 
which  other  significations  have  been  derived.  It  is  an  idea  of 
extremely  wide  application;  it  covers  not  only  the  immediate 
means  of  happiness  but  also  those  indirect  means  which,  did 
they  operate  alone,  would  produce  pain  only  and  not  pleasure. 

9.  Ordinarily,  in  speaking  of  good  and  forms  of  good,  our 
thought  is  confined  to  the  conditions  and  means  of  happiness, 
but  sometimes  happiness  itself — in  the  general,  and  in  its 
various  forms  and  parts — is  included  under  the  conception. 
As  every  mode  of  pain  not  necessary  for  some  important  pur- 
pose, is  an  evil,  so  every  mode  of  rational  enjoyment  is  a  good. 
This  language  is  certainly  allowable;  and  sometimes  in  phil- 
osophy it  is  desirable  to  think  of  good  as  a  comprehensive  end 
including  both  happiness  and  the  means  of  its  attainment. 
We  cannot,  however,  agree  with  some  who  would  confine  the 
word  "  good  "  to  the  satisfaction  obtainable  from  those  good 
things  which  are  the  means  of  happiness.  It  would  be  mis- 
leading to  say  that  happiness  is  the  only  real  good.  The 
statement  of  Dr.  Mark  Hopkins  that  "  a  good  is  always  sub- 
jective," and  "  is  to  be  found  only  in  some  result  in  a  sensi- 
bility," conflicts  with  ordinary  thought  and  language.  Dr. 
Hopkins  argues  that  a  good  must  be  that  which  has  "  value  in 
itself,  for  its  own  sake,"  and  in  this  he  speaks  truly.  But  he 
does  not  note  that  the  idea  of  good  is  a  formation,  not  of  the 


18  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  II. 

speculative,  but  of  the  practical,  exercise  of  reason,  and  that 
the  latter  of  these  modes  of  apprehension  is  much  more  syn- 
thetic than  the  former  (Chap.  V.).  Speculatively  we  sepa- 
rate in  thought  the  means  of  pleasure  and  that  "  result  in  a 
sensibility"  which  the  instrumentality  produces.  But  the 
intuitive  or  practical  reason  embraces  the  result  together  with 
the  cause  or  instrument  in  one  conception,  and  so  an  object  is 
thought  of  and  desired  not  simply  as  a  means  to  an  end  but 
as  including  the  result  or  results  desired  and  as  being  in  itself 
an  end.  Under  this  aspect  we  seek  food  and  drink,  health 
and  life,  knowledge  and  power,  society,  friendship,  money 
and  all  the  ordinary  means  of  gratification.  To  the  practical 
reason  these  are  ultimate  and  have  "  value  in  themselves." 

10.  We  have  now  distinguished  three  conceptions  of 
"  good."  The  first  relates  to  pleasure  as  opposed  to  happi- 
ness ;  the  second  neither  to  pleasure  nor  happiness ;  the  third 
to  happiness  as  contrasted  with  pleasure.  There  is  a  fourth 
conception  concerning  which  it  is  disputed  whether  or  not  it 
contains  any  reference  to  either  pleasure  or  happiness.  This 
is  "  moral  good."  It  is  defined  by  President  Hopkins  as  "  the 
satisfaction  that  is  inseparably  connected  with  that  form  of 
activity  which  we  call  goodness,"  in  other  words,  the  happi- 
ness concomitant  of  virtue.  So  far  as  we  know,  Dr.  Hopkins 
is  the  only  philosopher  who  uses  the  phrase  this  way.  Presi- 
dent Porter  says,  "  Moral  good  is  the  voluntary  choice  of  the 
highest  natural  good  possible  to  man."  This  agrees  with  the 
teaching  of  Professor  Janet,  who  says,  "  Moral  good  seems  to 
be  nothing  but  the  good  use  of  natural  goods."  According  to 
these  authors,  moral  good  consists  in  dutiful  choosing  and 
doing.  Others  identify  this  good  with  the  morally  obligatory, 
because  one  can  always  say  that  this  is  both  right  and  good. 
But,  ordinarily,  the  phrase  <e  moral  good  "  is  applied  to  virtue, 
or  moral  principle,  not  as  seeking  ends,  but  as  being  itself 
a  valuable  and  worthy  end.  After  this  fashion  we  speak  of 
the  moral  good  of  an  individual  or  of  the  community.  In 
like  manner  moral  evil  is  vice  considered  as  ruinous  and  de- 
testable. Without  an  unavoidable  necessity  an  important 
phrase  of  common  speech  should  not  be  employed  in  any  pe- 
culiar and  arbitrary  way. 

The  question,  also,  has  been  asked,  "  Why  is  virtue  called 
a  good  and  vrce  an  evil  ?  Is  it  simply  because  virtue  is  pro- 
motive  of  happiness  and  vice  of  misery,  or  is  it  both  for  that 
and  for  some  other  reason  ?  "  We  incline  to  say  that  men  use 


CHAP.  II.]     PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  19 

this  language  partly  because  virtue  produces  happiness  and 
partly  because  virtue  is  moral  goodness — the  estimable  qual- 
ity of  a  good  mian;  in  like  manner  that  vice  is  called  evil  both 
because  it  produces  misery  and  because  it  is  detestable  as  the 
disposition  of  a  bad  man.  In  short,  the  conception  of  "  per- 
sonal good"  (or  goodness)  affects  and  modifies  the  concep- 
tion of  impersonal  good  as  applied  to  virtue,  and  so  gives 
rise  to  the  fourth  impersonal  conception  of  good,  the  con- 
ception of  moral  good. 

II.  Since  happiness — and  good,  as  the  means  of  happiness 
— are  conditioned  on  the  capability  of  enjoyment,  additional 
ligiht  may  be  thrown  on  the  nature  of  these  aims  of  reason  if 
we  further  consider  the  philosophy  of  pleasure,  which  also 
includes,  by  an  implication,  the  philosophy  of  pain,  or  suffer- 
ing. 

One  point  of  importance  in  this  theory  is  that  many  pleas- 
ures and  pains  have  no  separate  existence  of  their  own,  but 
are  merely  concomitants  of  our  other  spiritual  activities. 
This  fact  has  been  overlooked  by  many  writers,  of  whom  Sir 
William  Hamilton  may  be  the  representative.  Having  di- 
vided all  psychical  phenomena  into  those  of  knowledge  (or  in- 
tellect), those  of  feeling  (or  sensibility),  and  those  of  cona- 
tion (or  will),  Sir  William  identifies  "the  second  great  class 
of  mental  phenomena — the  phenomena  of  feeling"  with 
"  the  phenomena  of  pleasure  and  pain  "  (MET.  LECT.  XLIL). 
This  teaching  confines  pleasure  and  pain  to  the  sensibilities 
and  ignores  the  fact  that  they  attend  every  mode  of  spiritual 
life.  It  is  especially  neglectful  of  the  bodily  senses  as  causes 
of  enjoyment  and  of  suffering. 

A  statement  less  objectionable  than  that  of  Hamilton  is 
made  by  Professor  Calderwood,  who  says:  "Pleasure  and 
pain  are  forms  of  personal  feeling  dependent  either  on  sus- 
ceptibility of  organism  as  provided  for  in  the  sensori-motor 
system  or  on  the  action  of  thought  and  attendant  mental 
susceptibility.  Pleasures  differ  in  kind,  varying  according 
to  the  mental  exercise  they  accompany.  In  this  way  we  dis- 
tinguish the  pleasures  of  the  senses,  of  the  affections,  of  the 
intellect,  of  the  imagination." 

That  pleasure  and  pain  spontaneously  accompany  every 
mode  of  psychical  life,  including  that  connected  with  the 
body,  will  be  evident  if  we  enumerate  the  powers  of  the  soul 
as  given  by  an  ultimate  analysis.  Instead  of  a  three-fold 
classification  exact  discrimination  calls  for  a  six-fold  divi- 


20  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  II. 

sion.  (See  PERCEPTIONALIST,  Chap.  III.)  There  is  first  sen- 
sation, or  the  power  of  bodily  feelings ;  secondly,  intellect,  or 
the  power  of  thinking  and  knowing;  thirdly,  emotion,  or  the 
susceptibility  of  that  feeling  which  arises  in  view  of  things 
perceived  or  imagined;  fourthly,  desire,  or  motivity,  includ- 
ing all  those  active  principles,  or  tendencies,  which  seek  ends 
and  from  which  the  action  of  the  will — the  formation  of  pur- 
poses and  resolutions — proceeds;  fifthly,  conation,  or  exer- 
tion, embracing  all  intentional  effort  and  doing;  and,  finally, 
the  capability  of  pleasure  and  pain.  One  prominent  mode 
of  this  last  manifests  itself  as  a  flavoring  concomitant  of 
every  form  of  psychical  life.  For  pleasure,  as  a  kind  of 
aroma,  emanates  from  various  natural  modes  of  activity, 
while  pain  is  given  forth  as  an  effluvium  by  experiences 
which,  in  a  certain  sense,  are  unnatural. 

12.  The  concomitant  pleasures  and  pains  just  mentioned 
are  not  conditioned  on  the  apprehension  of  objects  but  only 
on  the  exercise  of  our  faculties.  There  are,  however,  other 
enjoyments  and  sufferings  which  arise  upon  the  appreciative 
perception  of  objects  which  affect  us  as  intelligent  beings. 
These  enjoyments  and  sufferings  are  experienced  in  connec- 
tion with  various  exercises  of  the  emotional  power;  and  are, 
doubtless,  the  feelings  which  Hamilton  had  in  mind  when  he 
identified  "  the  phenomena  of  pleasure  and  pain  "  with  "  the 
phenomena  of  sensibility."  For  while  emotions,  like  sensa- 
tions, are  not  necessarily  either  pleasurable  or  painful,  it 
is  certain  that  a  large  part  of  human  enjoyment  and  suffering 
is  experienced  in  connection  with  these  cognitional  feelings. 

The  objects  which  excite  our  emotions  are  of  great  variety, 
but  all  of  them  appeal  to  spiritual  susceptibilities.  Many 
scenes  or  faces,  for  example,  may  be  contemplated  with  a  feel- 
ing of  indifference,  but  one  that  is  beautiful  excites  admira- 
tion, and  one  that  is  ugly,  disgust.  A  special  pleasure  arises 
when  truth  is  perceived  or  knowledge  is  gained ;  this  does  not 
come  from  the  exercise  of  our  powers  but  from  the  new  rela- 
tion in  which  the  mind  finds  itself  to  reality.  In  a  correspond- 
ing manner  we  are  dissatisfied  with  ignorance  and  falsehood. 
The  visible  presence  of  very  great  power  produces  the  senti- 
ment of  awe  and  sublimity,  which,  if  not  mingled  with  dread, 
is  found  delightful.  A  very  grateful  feeling  accompanies  the 
assurance  that  one  is  honored  or  esteemed  by  others,  or  that 
he  is  worthy  of  his  own  esteem;  while  disgrace  and  humilia- 
tion are  grievous  things.  Companionship  and  the  sympathy 


CHAP.  II  ]       PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  21 

of  friends  yield  comfort  and  gratification ;  to  be  lonely  and 
neglected  is  hard  to  bear.  The  conscious  possession  of  influ- 
ence or  means  gives  pleasure ;  while  no  one  likes  to  be  helpless 
or  without  resources.  There  is  enjoyment  in  one's  conscious- 
ness of  his  own  prosperity,  and  also  in  beholding  that  of 
others;  to  be  unfortunate  and  to  be  surrounded  with  unfor- 
tunates is  disheartening  and  saddening.  Finally,  there  is 
high  satisfaction  in  perceiving  that  right  is  done,  that  wrong 
is  prevented,  and  that  virtue  prevails;  while  the  sight  of 
wickedness  and  moral  evil  causes  distress. 

Such  pleasures  and  pains  as  the  foregoing  undoubtedly, 
as  Calderwood  says,  accompany  a  certain  exercise  of  the  intel- 
lect and  the  sensibility,  and  may  be  said  to  be  concomitants 
of  that  exercise,  but  they  have  the  peculiarity  of  being  deter- 
mined according  to  the  nature  of  the  objects  perceived.  They 
may,  therefore,  be  distinguished  as  objectively-related,  while 
those  first  mentioned  are,  in  a  special  sense,  subjectively-re- 
lated. 

13.  A  third  source  of  enjoyment  and  of  distress  is  supple- 
mentary to  the  two  already  described.  It  lies  in  the  gratifica- 
tion and  the  disappointment  of  desire.  Many  confound  this 
cause  of  experience  with  that  which  is  found  in  the  combined 
operation  of  cognition  and  sensibility;  and  some  have  taught 
that  all  pleasure  arises  from  this  cause.  The  fact  seems  to  be 
that  pleasure  originates  at  first  independently  of  desire  and 
either  from  the  activity  of  our  faculties  or  the  apprehension 
of  enjoyment-giving  objects.  After  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil  is  thus  obtained,  we  seek  the  one  and  avoid  the  other. 
It  is  true  that  the  very  same  things  which  originally  excite 
pleasurable  or  painful  feelings  are  also  the  objects  of  desire 
and  aversion ;  but  they  are  primarily  sought  and  avoided  for 
their  own  sake  or  for  the  sake  of  their  own  "  results  in  sensi- 
bility," and  not  in  order  to  the  satisfaction  of  desire.  After 
desire  has  been  excited,  however,  the  satisfaction  of  it  upon 
the  perceived  realization  of  its  object,  is  an  added  ground  of 
pleasure ;  and  the  disappointment  of  desire  is  a  distinct  cause 
of  grief.  Desire  intensifies  the  capacity  of  the  soul  for  en- 
joyment and  for  suffering,  so  that  great  delight  is  experienced 
when  some  earnestly  sought  end  has  been  obtained  and  keen 
anguish  is  felt  when  cherished  hopes  are  disappointed. 

JToreover,  while  the  pleasure  realized  in  the  satisfaction  of 
motive  feeling  is  largely  accounted  for  as  an  intensification  of 
that  originally  attending  the  apprehension  of  a  gratifying  ob- 


22  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  II, 

ject,  there  is  also  often  a  relief  from  the  distress  or  uneasiness 
of  desire.  We  do  not  say  that  all  desire  is  painful.  If  our 
active  dispositions  be  moderated  sufficiently  and  directed  only 
to  suitable  objects,  the  exercise  of  them  is  not  disagreeable, 
but  adds  to  our  enjoyment.  In  this  respect  motivity  obeys  the 
same  law  which  accompanies  the  exercise  of  our  other  psychi- 
cal powers.  What,  for  example,  gives  more  satisfaction  than 
rightly  regulated  benevolence  or  the  earnest  love  of  truth  and 
duty  ?  The  man  bent  on  serious  aims  has  a  vastly  happier  ex- 
perience than  the  man  controlled  by  indolence  or  irresolution. 
For  this  reason,  among  others,  it  has  been  contended  that 
most  objects  of  human  ambition  may  yield  more  pleasure  in 
their  pursuit  than  in  their  attainment.  Very  often,  however, 
human  desires  are  distressful  because  of  their  too  great  eager- 
ness; and,  of  course,  the  removal  of  this  distress  is  effected 
by  the  satisfaction  of  the  desire. 

This  circumstance,  together  with  the  general  truth  that 
deliverance  from  any  suffering  heightens  our  appreciation  of 
a  succeeding  pleasure,  has  led  many  to  adopt  a  doctrine,  an- 
ciently taught  by  Plato,  that  enjoyment,  in  every  case,  is  con- 
ditioned upon  the  removal  of  some  pain  or  discomfort.  No 
doubt  enjoyment  frequently  arises  in  this  way.  But  Aristotle 
adduces  instances  in  which  pleasure  is  not  dependent  on  pre- 
ceding pain,  and  so  disproves  the  teaching  of  Plato.  He  says, 
"  The  pleasure  we  find  in  mathematical  studies  and  even  in 
some  of  the  senses,  is  wholly  unaccompanied  with  pain.  Our 
gratification  from  the  energies  of  hearing,  smell  and  sight 
is  not  consequent  upon  any  foregoing  pain;  in  this  there  is 
no  repletion  of  a  want.  Hope  and  the  recollection  of  past 
good  are  pleasing;  but  are  the  pleasures  from  these  a  reple- 
tion? This  cannot  be  maintained;  for  in  them  there  is  no 
previous  want."  The  truth  is  that  pleasure  and  pain,  though 
opposites,  may  arise  independently  of  each  other;  each  has 
a  positive  nature  of  its  own. 

14.  The  principal  teaching  of  Aristotle  concerning  these 
forms  of  experience  is  that  pleasure  is  the  concomitant  of  the 
full  or  perfect  "  energy''  or  exercise,  of  any  psychical  power, 
while  pain  is  the  accompaniment  of  the  obstructed  or  the 
excessive  exercise  of  a  power  or  of  its  exercise  while  in  a 
diseased  condition.  "  Thus,"  says  Aristotle,  "  when  a  sense 
is  in  perfect  health,  and  is  presented  with  a  suitable  object  of 
the  most  perfect  kind,  there  is  elicited  the  most  perfect  en- 
ergy, which,  at  every  instant,  is  accompanied  with  pleasure. 


CHAP.  II.]       PLEASURE,  HAPPINESS,  AND  GOOD.  23 

The  same  holds  good  with  the  exercise  of  imagination,  reason 
and  so  on."  This  theory,  with  modifications,  has  been  held 
by  many.  It  certainly  approximates  the  truth. 

Nevertheless  it  is  open  to  criticism.  In  the  first  place,  it 
does  not  sufficiently  recognize  objectively-related  pleasures. 
These,  for  instance,  the  enjoyment  of  being  honored,  or  of 
ascertaining  the  truth,  or  of  receiving  some  valuable  pres- 
ent, do  not  arise  merely  from  the  activity  of  a  power  but 
from  the  apprehension  of  a  good,  that  is,  of  a  pleasurable 
fact  or  object.  In  such  cases  we  may  say  that  a  power,  that 
is,  the  susceptibility  of  enjoyment,  is  exercised  about  its 
proper  object,  that  is,  the  apprehended  good;  and  this  prob- 
ably was  in  Aristotle's  mind  when  he  speaks  of  a  sense  be- 
ing presented  with  a  suitable  object.  The  Greek  &iffdrjff^,  like 
the  Latin  **'  sensus  "  and  the  English  "feeling,"  is  a  word  of 
very  wide  application.  But  Aristotle  does  not  distinguish  the 
pleasure  thus  arising  from  that  accompanying  the  exercise  of 
our  faculties.  "  Pleasure,"  he  says,  "  finishes  and  completes 
the  action.  ...  It  is  an  end  which  joins  itself  with  the 
other  qualities  as  bloom  is  joined  with  youth."  (Nic.  ETHICS, 
Bk.  X.,  Ch.  IV.,  V.)  Possibly  his  language  may  be  inter- 
preted to  teach  that  certain  pleasures  result  from  the  appre- 
hension of  objective  relations.  In  that  ca<se  his  doctrine 
would  be  correct,  though  not  sufficiently  explicit. 

A  more  serious  objection  to  the  Aristotelian  statement  is 
that  it  appears  to  enounce  an  absolutely  universal  law,  where- 
as it  gives  a  law  which  has  exceptions;  and  which  needs  to  be 
explained  by  some  more  fundamental  principle.  Evidently 
in  certain  cases,  as  in  the  dissipations  of  the  drunkard  and 
the  opium  eater,  the  excitements  of  the  gamester  and  the  ac- 
cumulations of  the  miser,  pleasure  accompanies  an  excessive 
and  deranged  exercise  of  our  faculties,  instead  of  their  full 
normal  exercise;  while,  in  other  cases,  discomfort  and  suffer- 
ing accompany  the  full  natural  exercise  of  an  activity.  Are 
not  certain  tastes  and  smells  and  sounds  inherently  dis- 
agreeable? And  may  not  a  healthy  man  endure  exquisite 
bodily  pain  when  some  natural  cause  for  it  arises,  as  when 
he  is  burnt  or  tortured  in  any  way?  Fear,  disappointment, 
despair,  indignation  and  the  sense  of  being  wronged,  grief 
for  the  loss  of  friends,  sorrow  for  the  distress  of  others, 
the  accusations  of  conscience  and  the  realization  of  one's 
own  moral  turpitude,  are  all  naturally  experienced  by  spir- 
itual beings  when  the  proper  occasions  occur;  and  they  are 


24  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  1L 

all  primarily  and  in  themselves  disagreeable.  Yet  they  are 
the  exercises  of  powers  native  to  the  soul;  and  they  are  full 
and  perfect  energies,  unless  we  should  say  that  no  energy 
is  perfect  if  it  be  not  accompanied  with  pleasure.  This 
would  involve  a  "  circulus  in  definiendo  "  and  could  not  have 
been  Aristotle's  meaning.  By  a  "  suitable  object  of  the  most 
perfect  kind"  he  meant  the  object  which  has  the  highest 
fitness  to  excite  a  feeling  or  to  employ  a  power ;  and  by  "  the 
most  perfect  energy  "  (or  exercise  of  capability)  he  meant 
the  energy  as  fully  excited  and  experienced. 

Yet  there  is  truth  in  Aristotle's  theory.  Probably  he  had 
in  mind  not  pleasures  simply,  but  pleasures  as  contributing 
to  happiness.  For  the  pleasures  of  unrestrained  and  dis- 
orderly conduct  are  only  temporary  and  are  followed  by  an 
excess  of  wretchedness,  while  the  pains  which  attend  the  nor- 
mal exercise  of  certain  susceptibilities  seem  to  be  conditions 
under  which  alone  happiness  may  be  pursued  and  realized 
by  rational  beings.  Aristotle's  law  relates  to  what  may 
be  considered  the  more  primary  modes  of  spiritual  life, 
those  which  result  from  the  more  fundamental  endowments 
of  spirit.  The  enjoyment  derived  from  the  full  normal  ex- 
perience of  these  is  a  large  part  of  happiness,  while  the  glad- 
ness felt  in  the  apprehension  of  rational  good  and  in  the 
satisfaction  of  desire  makes  up  the  remaining  part. 

That  the  normal  working  of  certain  susceptibilities  is  dis- 
agreeable or  painful  is  an  exception  which  proves  the  rule. 
For  it  seems  necessary  in  the  system  of  human  nature  that 
certain  capabilities  of  suffering  should  operate  to  check,  to 
stimulate,  to  regulate,  and  to  assist,  those  other  powers  which 
are  the  immediate  producers  of  felicity;  and  this,  perhaps, 
is  the  function  of  evil  in  the  universe  of  spiritual  existence. 

These  thoughts  assume  that  the  laws  of  happiness,  and 
those  of  pleasure  and  pain,  are  rooted  in  that  constitution  of 
things  which  we  call  "  Nature,"  and  of  which  spiritual  be- 
ings with  their  powers  of  action  and  of  sensibility  form  the 
most  important  part.  We  incline  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Stoics  that  happiness  and  the  pleasures  constituent  of  it 
arise  from  a  life  in  conformity  to  Nature  and  discoverable 
by  reason,  and.  that  suffering  and  misery  belong  to  modes  of 
life  which  may  be  styled  contrary  to  Nature,  and  which  must 
be  avoided,  so  far  as  may  be,  by  rational  beings.  These 
teachings,  however,  call  for  considerable  explanation.  We 
may  attempt  to  give  this  in  some  future  chapter.  (Chap. 
XXXVI.) 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD. 

1.  The  Stoic  conception  of  "  the  wise  man  "  is  an  ideal  abstraction, 
but  may  help  to  define  the  ethical  idea  of  happiness  as  an  end. — 

2.  Reason,  in  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  chooses  objects  according 
to  their  desirability  ;  of  which  four  modes  are  recognizable. — 

3.  First,   that  of    ordinary  self-gratification    and    self-interest. 
Plato  and  Aristotle  on  the  comparison  of  values. — 4.  Secondly, 
that  of  personal  worth,  esteem  and  honor.     Leibnitz  criticized. 
Pride  and  vanity  denned.     Worth  and  worthiness  distinguished. 

5.  Thirdly,  that  of  social  enjoyment  and  of  altruistic  affection. 

6.  Fourthly,    that  of  spiritual  worthiness,  or  of  morality  and 
righteousness.     These  four  modes    of    desirability    when  com- 
pared, form  a  scale  whereby  objects  are  graded  in  value ;  and 
also  in  honor.     The  "  summum  bonum."    Eudaimonics  distin- 
guished from  Ethics. 

1.  SINCE  happiness  is  the  sum  of  those  enjoyments  which 
the  wise  man  seeks  wisely,  and  since  wisdom  here  means  the 
judgment  of  reason,  the  question  arises,  In  what  manner,  or 
according  to  what  principles,  is  this  judgment  formed? 

The  conception  of  "  the  wise  man  "  was  prominent  in  the 
philosophy  of  the  Stoics  and  corresponds  with  that  of  "  the 
superior  man"  of  Confucius.  It  means  a  person  so  intelli- 
gent that  he  sees  things  exactly  as  they  are  and  whose  inner 
and  outer  life  is  governed  by  the  knowledge  thus  obtained. 
The  reason  of  such  an  one,  being  not  merely  speculative  but 
motive  and  practical,  furnishes  ends  and  rules,  and  is  the 
controlling  element  of  his  disposition. 

This  conception  of  the  wise  man  is  an  ideal  one.  It  re- 
sembles that  of  a  machine  operating  without  friction  and 
accomplishing  its  work  without  any  waste  or  wear  or  liability 
to  accident.  We  may  question  whether  such  a  man  ever 
existed  or  can  exist.  The  Stoics  themselves  were  not  sure 
of  it.  Nevertheless  the  idea  is  useful.  It  furnishes  a  stand- 
ard with  which  the  actual  conduct  and  character  of  men  may 
be  compared,  and  it  enables  us  to  ascribe  different  degrees 
of  excellence  to  different  rules  of  conduct  in  proportion  as 
these  may  exhibit  more  or  less  conformity  to  the  standard. 

25 


26  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

Of  course  ordinary  human  wisdom  only  partially  follows 
the  methods  of  an  infallible  intelligence.  As  the  world  goes 
he  must  pass  for  a  wise  man  who  seriously  endeavors  to 
know  and  to  observe  the  best  rules  of  life.  So  far  as  one 
acts  in  that  way  we  may  say  that  he  possesses  and  uses  wis- 
dom. The  contention  of  some  Stoics  that  no  one  is  wise  who 
does  not  perfectly  obey  a  perfect  reason,  resulted  from  their 
limiting  the  definition  of  ffoyia  to  that  of  an  ideal  prac- 
tical intelligence.  Evidently  no  one  can  be  an  absolutely 
wise  man  who  is  not  an  absolutely  wise  man.  So  far,  too, 
as  one  does  not  conform  to  the  rules  of  wisdom  he  may  be 
said  to  be  affected  with  faoyia,  or  unwisdom.  But  for  all 
this  we  must  recognize  an  inferior  reason  which  falls  short — 
at  times  far  short — of  perfection,  yet  which  has  the  merit 
of  following,  to  a  commendable  extent,  the  guidance  of  truth 
and  experience. 

2.  The  doctrine  that  the  speculative  intellect  and  the  in- 
tuitive are  not  two  different  faculties  but  two  modes  of  the 
same  faculty,  is  set  forth  in  the  PERCEPTIONALIST  (Chap. 
XLVIL),  and  will  be  discussed  later  in  the  present  treatise. 
We  are  now  concerned  with  the  rules  followed  by  the  prac- 
tical intuitive  reason  in  its  conception  and  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness. These  pertain  to  the  selection  and  adjustment  of  forms 
of  good,  that  is,  of  the  modes  and  means  of  happiness.  This 
subject  has  been  much  considered  by  those  who  call  them- 
selves Utilitarians,  and  who  hold  that  the  promotion  of  hap- 
piness and  the  prevention  of  misery  constitute  the  one 
fundamental  aim  of  duty.  In  ancient  times,  too,  many  phil- 
osophers identified  that  virtue  which  pursues  the  right  with 
that  wisdom  which  pursues  the  good.  They  assumed  that  an 
explanation  of  the  latter  of  these  as  a  rule  of  life  would  be 
a  full  account  of  the  former.  These  subjects,  however,  have 
a  natural  separateness.  We  distinguish  eudaimonics,  which 
is  the  philosophy  of  happiness,  from  ethics,  which  is  the  phi- 
losophy of  duty.  The  two  systems  of  thought  are  allied; 
they  interpenetrate  each  other;  but  each  of  them  may  and 
should  be  discussed  from  its  own  point  of  view  and  developed 
from  its  own  constitutive  principle.  Our  present  inquiry 
relates  only  to  the  rational  pursuit  of  happiness;  we  shall 
speak  of  duty  hereafter. 

The  fundamental  rule  of  reason  in  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
may  be  thus  expressed:  Forms  of  good  are  chosen  according 
to  their  desirability.  The  truth  of  this  statement  becomes 


CHAP.  III.]     THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD.  27 

self-evident  if  we  consider  what  is  meant  by  desirable.  This 
word  ordinarily  does  not  signify  that  which  may  be  desired 
but  rather  that  which  should  be  desired  when  all  circum- 
stances which  are  thought  of  any  importance  have  been 
contemplated.  The  desirable  is  the  rationally  attractive. 
In  philosophy  the  term  should  be  used  with  this  meaning 
and  also  with  as  wide  an  application  as  possible.  For  any- 
thing whatever  is  desirable,  even  that  which  is  immediately 
disagreeable,  if  it  contribute  to  the  general  end  of  happiness. 

While  desirability  is  the  basis  on  which  reason  proceeds  in 
the  pursuit  of  happiness,  objects  have  this  character  in  dif- 
ferent forms  and  degrees;  and  the  choice  of  things  desirable 
also  varies  greatly  according  to  the  character  and  disposition 
of  the  agent  and  the  development  of  his  intelligence.  "  The 
wise  man/'  who  is  both  endowed  with  a  perfect  intelligence 
and  controlled  by  it,  seeks  every  attainable  mode  of  the  de- 
sirable and  would  realize  it  in  the  highest  degree.  Ordinary 
men  pursue  happiness  with  a  less  accurate  and  a  less  com- 
prehensive exercise  of  the  motive  reason.  An  observation  of 
the  conduct  of  men,  however,  leads  one  to  distinguish  four 
modes  of  the  desirable  which  constantly  enter,  separately  or 
in  combination,  into  their  plans  and  aims.  First  of  all, 
there  is  desirability  as  limited  by  the  principle  of  self-inter- 
est, or,  more  properly,  the  principle  of  private  interest — 
in  other  words,  the  attractiveness  of  any  means  of  happiness 
without  reference  to  the  happiness  of  others  or  to  honorable 
or  moral  conduct.  Secondly,  there  is  desirability  as  effected 
by  the  principle  of  personality,  that  is,  by  regard  for  one's 
own  honor  and  dignity.  Thirdly,  there  is  desirability  as 
modified  by  the  social  principle,  this  principle  being  the  tend- 
ency in  human  beings  to  seek  the  fellowship  of  others  and 
to  desire  their  happiness.  And  fourthly,  there  is  desirability 
as  dominated  by  moral  principle  or  the  rules  of  right  and 
wrong,  the  rational  agent  acting  on  the  conviction  that  true 
happiness  is  inseparably  connected  with  virtue.  Let  us  con- 
sider these  modes  of  desirability  in  turn. 

3.  The  first  is  that  of  the  Hedonist— the  thoughtful,  self- 
centered  Epicurean — who  would  obtain  for  himself  as  much 
comfort  and  pleasure  as  possible,  and  who  would  avoid  as 
far  as  possible  all  discomfort  and  suffering.  Such  a  one 
pursues  happiness  rationally  from  his  own  limited  point^  of 
view.  He  begins  by  recognizing  that  pleasures  differ  in  kind 
according  to  the  sources  from  which  they  spring,  a  fact 


28  THE  MOUAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

noticed  by  Aristotle  in  connection  with  his  theory  that  en- 
joyment is  the  concomitant  of  the  unobstructed  and  un- 
strained exercise  of  a  power  about  its  proper  object.  Aris- 
totle says:  "Actions  which  are  specifically  different  cannot 
but  be  accompanied  by  pleasures  which  differ  in  kind.  As 
the  activities  of  thought  differ  from  those  of  sense  and 
these  latter  also  from  each  other,  so  pleasure  must  also  differ. 
For  each  different  action  there  is  a  corresponding  suitable 
pleasure"  (Nic.  ETHICS,  Bk.  X.).  All  men  experience  a 
variety  of  bodily  enjoyments  and  an  equal  variety  of  those 
which  are  mental.  There  are  gratifications  in  the  pursuit 
and  attainment  of  truth,  in  the  contemplation  of  grandeur 
and  beauty,  in  the  acquisition  and  control  of  property,  in 
the  intercourse  of  society,  in  effective  action  and  employ- 
ment. 

Moreover,  different  kinds  of  pleasure  are  seen  to  differ  in 
value,  that  is,  in  happiness-producing  power.  Two  experi- 
ences may  equal  each  other  in  the  amount  of  feeling  evolved, 
while  one  is  more  enjoyable  than  the  other  and  also  more 
fitted  to  contribute  to  a  lasting  happiness.  In  estimating  the 
worth  of  a  sum  of  pleasures  we  must  add  them  together  as 
we  do  coins  of  gold  and  silver  and  copper,  not  by  weight, 
but  by  value.  And,  if  pleasures  should  be  judged  of  in  this 
way,  much  more  those  objects  which  are  the  means  of  enjoy- 
ment and  of  happiness  should  be  estimated  according  to  their 
value.  One  form  of  good  may  produce  only  one  poor  de- 
light, while  another  may  yield  many  satisfying  gratifications 
and  have  an  enduring  efficiency.  Amusements  and  gaieties 
are  good  in  their  way,  but  they  are  inferior  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  knowledge  and  the  development  of  character;  these 
forms  of  good  have  great  and  lasting  value. 

Such  being  the  case,  it  is  evident  that,  in  the  pursuit  of 
happiness,  the  less  valuable  pleasures  should  be  subordinated 
to  the  more  valuable.  The  former  should  be  abandoned  for  the 
latter  whenever  both  cannot  be  enjoyed  together.  Rest  and 
recreation  may  be  wisely  sought,  but  only  as  subsidiary  to 
higher  good.  When  a  desire  for  them  produces  indolence  and 
self-indulgence  and  prevents  self-improvement  and  a  useful 
activity,  it  is  an  evil  to  be  condemned.  Reason  also  sacrifices 
the  transitory  to  the  permanent,  and  welcomes  temporary 
sufferings  for  the  sake  of  enduring  good.  When  the  benefit 
is  great  in  proportion  to  the  suffering  and  the  expectation  of 
it  sure,  the  wise  soul  accepts  the  pain  for  the  joy  that  is  to 


CHAP.  III.]     THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD.  29 

come.  This  rule  was  in  the  mind  of  the  apostle  when  he 
said,  "  These  light  afflictions  which  are  but  for  a  moment, 
shall  work  out  for  us  a  far  more  exceeding  and  eternal 
weight  of  glory." 

When  Plato,  in  his  Protagoras,  speaks  of  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  as  a  measuring  art  (i^rp^rurj  rtyvy)  he  refers  to 
the  comparison  of  values.  Between  two  attractions  of  the 
same  kind  that  which  promises  greater  gratification  is  to  be 
preferred,  just  as  that  cake  or  fruit  which  offers  greater 
pleasure  is  chosen  by  a  child.  But  only  certain  material 
goods  can  be  quantitatively  determined,  as  gold  or  silver  or 
cloth  or  flour  may  be.  And,  indeed,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  more  important  comparisons  of  reason  do  not  concern 
goods  of  the  same  kind  but  goods  of  different  kinds,  the 
values  of  which  do  not  admit  of  arithmetical  computation  at 
all.  One  style  of  good  is  seen  to  be  manifestly — immensely 
— superior  to  another,  and  is  chosen  without  any  attempt  to 
measure  the  superiority. 

It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  after  relative  values  have  been 
determined,  there  are  further  judgments  of  reason  which 
are  not  concerned  with  the  comparison  of  values.  The 
question  to  be  settled  may  be  not  whether  one  good  should  be 
preferred  to  another,  but  whether  the  proper  occasion  has 
come  for  seeking  a  particular  gratification  or  benefit.  Ex- 
perience shows  that  every  natural  aim  has  a  place  in  life  and 
that  it  occupies  this  place  not  only  without  detriment,  but 
with  positive  advantage  to  man's  total  experience.  This 
thought  was  in  the  mind  of  the  preacher  when  he  said, 
"  To  everything  there  is  a  season,  and  a  time  to  every  pur- 
pose under  the  sun."  Wisdom  must  determine  whether  the 
season  has  come  or  not.  Reason  has  also  the  office  of  fixing 
the  limits  within  which  a  specific  kind  of  good  should  be 
desired  and  sought  for.  Without  reference  to  any  conflict 
of  pursuits  every  particular  enjoyment  has  confines  connected 
with  its  own  nature.  Aristotle  says  that  none  of  the  human 
faculties  are  capable  of  continual  action,  and  that  "  pleasure 
has  not  this  power  any  more  than  the  others:  for  it  is  only 
the  consequence  of  action."  The  overstrained  activity  of 
enjoyment  injures  our  ability  of  appreciation  and  may  even 
result  in  wretchedness.  In  like  manner  an  evil  excess  may 
be  developed  from  almost  any  kind  of  good.  Physical  ex- 
ercise is  a  good  thing  and  should  not  be  neglected,  but  exces- 
sive athletic  training  produces  heart  disease  and  other 


30  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

troubles.  So  also  mental  weakness  and  derangement  result 
from  too  much  study  and  care.  An  over-indulgence  in  food 
is  no  less  injurious  than  insufficient  nutriment.  Vast  wealth 
ordinarily  yields  less  satisfaction  than  an  affluent  independ- 
ence. The  prayer  of  the  wise  is  "  Give  me  neither  poverty 
nor  riches/'  Moderation,  also,  should  be  shown  in  the  exer- 
cise of  all  natural  dispositions,  however  excellent,  including 
that  of  love  or  benevolence.  The  maxim  prfiiv  ayav  (nothing 
to  excess)  is  especially  applicable  here.  Kind  affection  is  not 
so  subject  to  limitations  as  our  other  motive  tendencies; 
within  the  sphere  of  duty  it  is  incapable  of  excess.  Yet  it 
may  be  exercised  contrary  to  duty,  and  may  take  the  form 
of  a  foolish  love  or  a  ruinous  passion. 

4.  The  second  mode  of  desirability  has  been  described  as 
that  affected  by  the  principle  of  personality.  Here  this 
phrase — "  principle  of  personality  " — does  not  indicate,  as 
might  be  supposed,  the  consciousness  of  being  a  person,  but 
a  motive  tendency  common  to  all  rational  spirits  and  which 
manifests  itself  under  a  variety  of  forms.  Every  human 
being  naturally  desires  to  be  held  in  esteem  or  respect  by 
himself  and  by  others.  This  sentiment  is  not  necessarily  or 
exclusively  related  to  moral  goodness,  but  is  founded  on  the 
recognition  or  assumption  of  any  form  of  personal  excellence 
or  superiority.  To  understand  the  nature  of  it  we  must  dis- 
tinguish moral  excellence  from  such  excellence  as  may  be 
taken  to  justify  any  exercise  of  self-esteem.  With  a  some- 
what arbitrary  use  of  terms  the  former  might  be  designated 
worthiness  and  the  latter  worth,  worthiness  being  one  species 
of  worth.  The  difference  between  these  natures  is  obvious, 
but  they  are  sometimes  confounded  because  they  are  analo- 
gous to  one  another  and  because  the  same  forms  of  language 
are  applied  to  both. 

This  worth — this  ground  of  personal  esteem — is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished not  only  from  moral  excellence,  but  also  from  any 
value  pertaining  to  a  person  as  an  instrument  or  agency  of 
happiness.  It  resembles  that  quality  on  account  of  which 
things  are  called  "good"  simply  as  being  well  suited  to 
serve  some  purpose.  It  always  relates  to  some  source  of 
power  over  persons  or  things,  but  does  not  imply  any  specific 
purpose  for  which  the  efficiency  is  used,  or  to  be  used.  It 
lies  simply  in  the  possession  of  the  ability  or  power,  and  is 
realized,  as  an  end,  in  the  conscious  possession  of  the  power. 
This  is  that  excellence  which  Leibnitz  defines  as  efficacious 


CHAP.  III.]     THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD.  31 

power — "  die  Kraft  zu  wirken  " — and  which,  in  its  highest 
spiritual  development  and  under  the  name  "  perfection/' 
he  wrongly  identifies  with  the  essential  aim  of  morality. 

In  the  above  definition  of  "  worth,"  the  word  "  power " 
is  to  be  understood  very  widely  so  as  to  cover  every  desirable 
personal  quality  or  belonging  whatever,  bodily  or  mental, 
material  or  spiritual.  Accordingly  the  love  of  personal 
esteem  may  be  gratified  in  many  ways  and  assumes  a  multi- 
tude of  forms.  The  beautiful  and  accomplished  woman  de- 
lights in  her  charms  and  takes  pains  to  preserve  and  perpetu- 
ate them.  The  man  of  genius,  be  he  orator,  poet,  artist, 
scholar,  investigator,  or  inventor,  prizes  not  only  his  talent, 
but,  along  with  that  and  often  more  than  that,  the  considera- 
tion which  it  procures.  Even  the  skill  displayed  in  amuse- 
ments is  a  ground  of  esteem.  Hence  the  rivalry  in  ball 
games  and  athletic  contests,  in  billiard  playing  and  in  chess 
tournaments.  Ordinarily  such  diversions  are  not  pursued  for 
profit,  but  because  they  develop  and  exhibit  a  certain  ability. 
Physical  strength  and  prowess  are  valued  by  those  who  have 
them  because  they  give  a  consciousness  of  power.  Wealth, 
also,  is  a  basis  of  personal  estimation.  A  rich  man,  when 
reduced  to  poverty,  often  feels  the  loss  of  consideration  and 
importance  more  than  his  impoverishment.  So  also  a  great 
man  who  falls  from  some  lofty  station  is  afflicted  more  by 
his  humiliation  than  by  the  loss  of  favor  and  prestige. 
What  Cardinal  Wolsey  felt  most  deeply  when  he  bade  a  long 
farewell  to  all  his  greatness  was  the  insignificance  conse- 
quent upon  his  downfall. 

Go,  get  thee  from  me,  Cromwell ; 
I  am  a  poor  fallen  man,  unworthy  now 
To  be  thy  lord  and  master. 

HENRY  VIII.,  in.  2. 

In  many  men  the  passion  for  preeminence  and  honor  has 
far  exceeded  the  desire  for  riches  or  power  or  pleasure,  and 
has  led  to  a  total  disregard  of  safety,  comfort  and  ease. 
Horatio  Nelson,  the  English  admiral,  was  marked  with  a 
wonderful  magnanimity  and  with  a  love  of  glory  which 
made  him  face  dangers  and  difficulties  with  the  utmost  tran- 
quillity and  resolution.  Then  also  this  lofty  ambition  was 
combined  with  earnest  patriotism  and  a  generous  concern 
for  others.  There  have  been  many  heroes  like  Nelson.  On  the 
other  hand  some  men  of  talent  have  desired  honor  unwisely 
and  with  a  reckless  sacrifice  even  of  honor  itself.  Blinded  by 


£2  THE  MO&AL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

selfishness,  they  have  sought  promotion  through  mean  trick- 
ery and  the  disparagement  of  rivals,  through  the  sacrifice  of 
great  interests  and  the  commission  of  atrocious  crimes. 
These  are  the  Catalines  and  the  Benedict  Arnolds  of  history. 

Pride  and  vanity  are  degenerate  forms  of  the  principle  of 
personality.  The  former  seeks  to  gratify  the  sense  of  worth 
through  an  unreasonable  assumption  of  one's  own  excellence, 
and  refuses  under  every  possible  pretext  to  acknowledge  any 
dependence,  inferiority  or  weakness.  It  demands  honor  as  a 
right.  It  resents  any  apparent  want  of  deference  or  respect; 
and  it  is  unwilling  to  accept  any  position  except  one  of 
dignity.  Pride  sometimes  cooperates  with  principle,  but 
more  frequently  it  conflicts  both  with  one's  duties  and  one's 
interests.  Vanity  is  the  fault  of  one  whose  opinion  of  his 
own  value  is  not  stable  and  who  seeks  support  for  self-esteem 
from  the  praise,  and  even  from  the  flattery  of  others.  This 
passion  gives  evidence  of  its  weakness  in  boasting,  osten- 
tation and  the  seeking  of  compliments.  It  is  one  of  the 
inconsistencies  of  human  nature  that  both  pride  and  vanity 
may  be  exhibited  by  the  same  person,  though  they  cannot  be 
exercised  together  in  the  same  direction. 

The  desire  for  esteem  is  no  more  a  selfish  principle  than 
the  desire  for  knowledge  or  for  society.  No  one  of  these  three 
motivities  aims  at  self-interest,  but  at  an  end  and  a  gratifi- 
cation of  its  own.  Each  of  them,  too,  may  harmonize  and 
cooperate  with  moral  goodness.  But  the  inordinate  desire 
for  knowledge,  society  or  esteem  may  be  selfish  in  the  sense 
of  seeking  a  particular  private  satisfaction  to  the  neglect  of 
the  welfare  of  others.  Pride  is  always  selfish  after  this 
fashion;  vanity,  not  always. 

The  desire  for  the  consciousness  of  personal  superiority — 
for  self-realization,  as  it  has  been  called — is  a  radical  en- 
dowment of  intelligent  beings.  It  belongs  to  all,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest.  Even  the  Almighty  may  be  supposed 
to  have  it.  Theologians  tell  us  that  God  made  all  things  for 
his  own  glory,  and  that  the  manifestation  of  the  Divine 
excellence  is  the  immediate  end  of  the  creation.  Assuming 
the  truth  of  this  statement,  two  aims  appear  to  have  influ- 
enced the  Supreme  Being.  First,  God  sought  to  gratify 
himself  in  the  conscious  activity  of  his  own  perfections; 
and  secondly,  he  planned  that  rational  creatures  should  be 
brought  into  blessed  fellowship  with  himself  through  an 
understanding  of  his  works  and  ways.  The  second  of  these 


CHAP.  III.]     THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD.  33 

aims  appealed  to  the  goodness  of  God;  the  first  involved 
the  principle  of  personality — the  desire  for  a  full  realization 
of  his  own  excellence — as  an  attribute  of  the  Creator. 

The  Leibnitzian  doctrine  that  the  essential  aim  of  moral- 
ity is  the  development  of  spiritual  worth  or  efficiency — or, 
as  it  is  otherwise  stated,  the  realization  of  the  true  self  or  of 
personal  perfection — is  widely  favored  at  the  present  day. 
Undoubtedly  inward  excellence  is  an  end  of  duty.  Mere 
vigor  and  capability  of  spirit — virtue  (virtus)  in  the  original 
sense  of  the  term — should  be  sought  by  every  one.  Much 
more  that  virtue  which  loves  the  right  and  hates  the 
wrong  should  be  earnestly  desired.  But  each  of  these  objects 
is  only  a  specific  aim  of  duty.  Neither  is  the  primary  and 
generic  aim.  Moreover,  while  spiritual  worthiness,  or  that 
virtue  which  is  identical  with  righteousness,  is  invariably  an 
end  of  duty,  spiritual  worth,  or  general  inward  efficiency, 
whether  mental  or  practical,  should  be  sought  only  as  any 
other  natural  good  is  sought.  That  is,  we  should  labor  for 
it  when  no  other  more  imperative  duty  intervenes.  And  this 
is  true  also  respecting  the  esteem  founded  on  the  apprehen- 
sion of  this  excellence,  as  well  as  respecting  every  other 
kind  of  dignity  and  honor.  Hence  we  find  that  while  the 
principle  of  personality  seeks  a  naturally  noble  end,  it  can 
have  an  immoral  as  well  as  a  moral  action.  The  good  man 
subjecting  himself  to  the  rule  of  right,  strives  for  "  glory  and 
honor  and  immortality;"  the  reckless  aspirant  after  great- 
ness sacrifices  justice  and  humanity  on  the  altar  of  his  am- 
bition. The  "honor"  of  a  duelist  is  murderous;  and  pride 
was  the  sin  of  Satan.  This  was  the  thought  of  the  discarded 
cardinal : 

Cromwell,  I  charge  thee,  fling  away  ambition  ; 
By  that  sin  fell  the  angels. 

HENRY  VIII.,  ibidem. 

While  personal  excellence  and  honor  are  not  necessarily 
moral  ends,  the  pursuit  of  them  sometimes  supplies  the  place 
of  principle.  The  man  who  seeks  the  esteem  of  himself  and 
of  others  has  much  inducement  to  act  virtuously.  He  is 
influenced  against  vice  because  of  its  despicable  meanness, 
and  is  attracted  by  the  right  because  it  is  the  supremely  hon- 
orable. Combined  with  moral  principle — resting  on  that  as 
the  highest  quality  of  immortal  beings — the  love  of  dignity 
3 


34  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

and  worth  produces  the  hero,  the  noblest  and  strongest  type  of 
man. 

At  present,  however,  we  contemplate  this  principle  simply 
as  a  factor  in  the  calculus  of  happiness  and  misery.  The 
sense  of  satisfaction  is  so  keen  when  the  desire  for  esteem  is 
gratified,  and  the  hurt  from  humiliation  or  disgrace  is  so 
sore,  that  no  scheme  of  life  is  complete  which  leaves  out  of 
account  the  principle  of  personality,  A  normally  constituted 
man  cannot  be  happy  without  honor  and  respect,  and  must 
be  wretched  if  subjected  to  the  contempt  of  himself  and 
others.  This  is  a  law  from  the  operation  of  which  no  man 
can  permanently  escape. 

5.  The  third  mode  of  desirability  is  that  which  takes  into 
one's  plans  the  welfare  of  others,  as  well  as  one's  own.  That 
motive  principle  which  seeks  satisfaction  in  the  activities  of 
society  comprises  two  general  springs  of  action.  There  is 
first  the  desire  for  the  fellowship,  love,  and  help  of  others; 
and,  secondly,  the  desire  for  the  happiness  of  others  and 
a  readiness  to  contribute  to  their  good.  These  two  disposi- 
tions may  exist  in  the  same  person  in  very  different  degrees: 
it  is  even  conceivable  that  the  one  or  the  other  may  become 
practically  extinct.  But  since  all  mankind  have  a  common 
nature,  we  must  regard  every  member  of  our  race  as  at  least 
capable  of  both  these  modes  of  motivity.  It  would  certainly 
be  a  ridiculous  inconsistency  if  any  member  of  a  community 
should  ask  the  sympathy  and  assistance  of  his  associates  while 
he  himself  was  indisposed  to  show  good  will  towards  them. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  every  society  of  men  is  bound  together  by 
mutual  ties.  We  are  all  members  one  of  another;  every  nor- 
mal human  being  takes  an  interest  in  his  fellow-men  and  de- 
sires his  fellow-men  to  take  an  interest  in  him. 

Of  the  two  social  desires,  that  which  seeks  the  welfare  of 
others  is  more  radical  than  that  which  looks  for  the  favor 
of  others.  The  latter  of  these  dispositions  assumes  the 
former  and  would  have  the  benefit  of  the  exercise  of  it 
towards  oneself.  Both  affections  appear  to  be  original  en- 
dowments of  our  nature.  Some  have  disputed  this  with 
respect  to  that  principle  which  seeks  the  welfare  and  happi- 
ness of  others — the  altruistic  principle,  as  it  has  been  named 
by  Herbert  Spencer.  But  all  attempts  to  explain  love  for 
others  as  a  form  of  love  for  oneself  have  proved  abortive. 
It  is  possible  for  one  to  have  selfish  desires  through  a  sym- 
pathy with  others,  as  when  fear  of  peril  to  oneself  is  excited 


CHAP.  III.]     THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD.  35 

by  seeing  the  sufferings  of  others,  or  when  one  is  determined 
to  some  course  of  conduct  through  the  influence  of  example. 
But  it  is  not  possible  to  trace  sympathy  for  others  to  any 
regard  for  oneself,  nor  to  account  for  it  except  as  an  original 
capability  of  spirit.  The  lowest  form  of  this  motivity  is  the 
impulse  of  irrational  creatures  to  provide  for  the  comfort, 
sustenance  and  defense  of  their  offspring  and  their  immediate 
companions.  In  mankind  altruism  manifests  itself  in  kindly 
feelings  and  conduct,  in  benevolence,  beneficence,  friendship, 
domestic  affection,  public  spirit,  patriotism,  philanthropy. 

Both  the  self-centered  and  the  altruistic  mode  of  the  social 
principle  find  a  place  in  the  philosophy  of  happiness.  Much 
of  the  enjoyment  of  life  arises  from  the  consciousness  of  be- 
ing the  object  of  kind  regards  and  from  the  aid  given  us  by 
others;  much  happiness,  also,  is  found  in  loving  others  and 
in  the  promotion  of  their  good.  The  benevolent  activity, 
however,  not  only  lies  more  within  our  control,  but  is  also 
a  nobler  source  of  pleasure  than  the  other.  Besides,  it  at- 
tracts the  love  of  others  even  more  than  direct  effort  after 
their  favor  does.  It  is  the  more  important  to  be  considered 
by  those  who  would  live  wisely  and  well. 

That  happiness  is  largely  dependent  on  the  social  prin- 
ciple is  very  evident.  What  experiences  are  more  delightful 
than  those  of  loving  and  of  being  loved?  The  sweetness  of 
life  springs  from  the  interchange  of  kindness  and  affection. 
The  Epicureans  are  justly  blamed  for  making  pleasure  the 
end  of  all  morality.  Yet  they  must  be  honored  for  finding 
their  chief  enjoyment  in  the  intercourse  of  friendship.  Be- 
yond question  he  who  takes  delight  in  the  happiness  of  others 
adds  greatly  to  his  own  happiness.  Even  the  compassionate 
man,  who  is  grieved  for  the  sorrows  of  the  unfortunate,  real- 
izes the  satisfaction  of  a  noble  sentiment.  The  heart,  indeed, 
must  be  controlled  by  reason,  and  certain  extremes  of  feeling 
must  be  avoided.  But,  this  being  granted,  a  friendly,  loving 
disposition  is  second  only  to  virtue  itself  as  a  source  of  hap- 
piness. It  gives  enjoyment  even  in  this  world,  where  kind- 
ness often  meets  with  unworthy  objects,  and  where  the  spirit 
is  frequently  oppressed  with  the  sight  of  suffering.  And  we 
are  told  of  another  world  whose  inhabitants,  governed  by 
reason  and  truth,  love  and  goodness,  are  removed  from  all 
evil  and  enriched  with  every  means  of  enjoyment;  in  that 
world  the  blessedness  of  the  good  must  be  indescribably 
great. 


36  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  there  be  a  place  from  which  kind- 
ness and  love  are  excluded,  and  where  suspicion,  envy,  hatred 
and  violence  reign,  that  must  be  the  abode  of  misery.  Even 
now  the  man  who  cares  for  himself  only  is  burdened  with  his 
own  meanness,  and  forfeits  the  fellowship  of  the  virtuous 
and  the  favor  of  all.  Nature  limits  the  friendship  that  can 
be  shown  to  the  depraved  and  ill-disposed  and  points  to  a 
future  in  which  all  kindness  towards  them  may  be  impossible. 
The  full  effect  of  selfishness  in  the  destruction  of  the  social 
principle  may  not  occur  during  this  brief  earthly  life,  and 
the  enormity  of  threatening  evil  may  be  concealed  from  those 
most  in  danger  of  being  affected  by  it.  But  were  the  lives 
of  human  beings  prolonged  with  an  unchecked  development 
of  selfish  wickedness,  a  society  would  be  produced  the  mem- 
bers of  which  would  be  loveless,  hopeless  and  unhappy,  hate- 
ful and  hating  one  another. 

6.  The  fourth  style  of  desirability  is  that  modified  not  only 
by  the  principles  of  honor  and  kindness,  but  also  by  the 
principle  of  morality  or  righteousness.  It  arises  from  the 
fact  that  true  happiness  can  be  attained  only  through  the  ex- 
ercise of  virtue.  The  term  "  self-interest,"  in  its  broadest 
sense,  applies  to  every  form  of  the  desirable,  and  therefore 
includes  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  honor,  love,  and  vir- 
tue. One's  best  welfare  requires  that  he  should  seek  not 
merely  private  good  and  gratification,  but  also  the  satisfac- 
tions of  personal  esteem,  of  the  interchanges  of  benevolence, 
and  of  a  just  and  righteous  life.  Frequently,  however,  self- 
interest  indicates  a  more  limited  view  of  the  desirable,  and 
one  which  excludes  these  eminently  rational  ends.  Thus  it 
happens  that  a  higher  self-interest  subordinates  a  lower  self- 
interest  to  principles  which  are  really  more  essential  to  one's 
happiness.  Those  sources  of  comfort  and  enjoyment  which 
are  independent  of  man's  social  and  moral  nature  are  not 
to  be  neglected,  but  they  should  be  held  secondary  to  the 
aims  of  honor,  love,  and  virtue.  In  thus  speaking  we  do  not 
identify  these  principles  with  the  principle  even  of  the  wisest 
self-interest.  Each  of  them  has  an  end  of  its  own  wholly 
different  from  one's  own  happiness.  But  we  say  that  one's 
happiness,  which  is  the  aim  of  self-interest,  will  be  best 
realized  if  the  aims  of  honor,  goodness,  and  duty,  be  preferred 
to  any  private  means  of  gratification.  We  add,  that,  simply 
on  the  score  of  value,  the  claims  of  friendship  and  charity  are 
superior  to  those  of  honor,  while  those  of  duty  are  supreme 
over  all. 


CHAP.  III.]     THE  RATIONAL  PURSUIT  OF  GOOD.  37 

This  gradation  of  modes  of  desirability  makes  it  possible 
for  one  to  exercise  different  degrees  of  wisdom  in  his  choice 
of  the  means  of  happiness.  The  selfish  pursuit  of  good  is 
rational,  but  only  in  a  limited  way.  A  decision  which  takes 
honor  into  account  is  better  than  one  confined  to  self -gratifica- 
tion. That  which  embraces  the  welfare  and  the  fellowship 
of  others  is  superior  to  one  dominated  by  the  desire  for  honor. 
That  which  recognizes  virtue  as  the  summum  bonum  is  the 
wisest  conclusion  of  all.  Each  of  these  styles  of  judgment 
may  be  made  with  more  or  less  intelligence,  and  so  may  dif- 
ferent combinations  of  them.  But  in  the  perfect  exercise  of 
the  practical  reason  all  modes  of  desirability  are  given  their 
full  proper  consideration. 

It  is  also  observable  that  the  gradation  of  values,  in  which 
private  interest,  honor,  goodness,  and  duty  succeed  one  an- 
other, forms  a  basis  for  a  scale  of  esteem  whereby  we  rank 
actions  and  aims  as  higher  and  lower.  We  find  ourselves,  in 
the  changing  circumstances  of  life,  attaching  different  de- 
grees of  honor — or,  it  may  be,  of  dishonor — to  modes  of  con- 
duct and  ends  of  pursuit.  Some  are  regarded  as  noble  and 
praiseworthy;  others,  as  ignoble  and  contemptible.  The 
ground  of  such  judgment  seems  to  be  the  relation  of  the 
objects  judged  to  the  course  which  honor,  love,  and  duty 
would  demand  under  the  circumstances.  The  more  our  con- 
duct and  aims  harmonize  with  that,  the  more  they  appear  not 
only  valuable  and  desirable,  but  also  entitled  to  regard  and 
estimation.  The  more  they  conflict  with  that,  the  more  they 
are  to  be  contemned.  Though  some  identify  these  judgments 
respecting  the  worth  or  dignity  of  things  with  our  perceptions 
of  right  and  wrong,  the  two  classes  of  judgments  are  quite 
distinguishable. 

At  present,  however,  we  are  directly  concerned  to  note  that 
reason,  on  the  ground,  merely  of  self-interest,  gives  the  moral 
principle  a  preference  over  all  others.  Apart  from  its  own 
authoritative  claims  virtue  is  the  most  important  agency  of 
personal  happiness.  It  is  a  kind  of  good  which  can  never 
under  any  circumstances  be  anything  else  than  good.  Per- 
sonal dignity  may  be  unduly  prized  and  may  be  sought  to 
the  detriment  of  higher  interests.  The  social  propensities 
may  be  indulged  excessively  or  in  an  injurious  way.  But 
virtue  is  so  absolute  a  good  that  it  should  never  be  subordi- 
nated to  any  other  end.  One  mode  of  duty  may,  under  certain 
circumstances,  supersede  another ;  and  a  weak,  imperfect  form 


38  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  III. 

of  principle  should  always  give  way  to  that  which  is  stronger 
and  better.  But  moral  goodness  in  general  can  never  be 
supplanted  by  any  superior  good. 

Virtue  is  also  the  most  prolific  source  of  happiness.  Deep 
and  pure  satisfaction  attends  the  exercise  of  it,  and  under  its 
guidance  every  specific  means  of  enjoyment  finds  its  proper 
office  and  reaches  its  most  complete  efficiency.  The  upright 
man,  too,  being  in  accord  with  the  moral  order  of  the  universe, 
has  the  assurance  that  all  things  are  working  together  for  his 
good.  Upon  such  considerations  as  these  the  Stoics  founded 
their  belief  that  virtue  is  the  summum  bonum — the  supreme 
interest — of  rational  beings. 

Moreover,  while  the  right-minded  man  is  conscious  of 
present,  and  looks  forward  to  future  satisfactions,  the  evil- 
minded  man,  as  far  and  as  soon  as  he  becomes  aware  of  his 
condition,  is  filled  with  dissatisfaction  and  gloomy  fore- 
bodings. He  is  at  war  with  the  government  of  Heaven  and 
with  his  own  conscience.  He  is  self -condemned  at  the  bar 
of  universal  justice.  If  he  find  no  means  of  salvation  he  will 
be  overwhelmed  by  the  force  of  his  own  sinfulness  and  of  a 
despairing  remorse.  No  miseries  are  so  profound  as  those 
of  the  abandoned  soul  conscious  of  his  own  determined 
wickedness. 

The  foregoing  account  of  the  methods  of  reason  in  the 
pursuit  of  happiness  is  not  offered  as  a  complete  and  exact 
treatment  of  the  subject.  It  is  merely  an  illustrative  sketch. 
It  may,  however,  serve  to  show  that  eu^aimonics,  or  the 
science  of  welfare  and  prosperity,  is  different  from  ethics,  or 
the  science  of  duty.  To  make  that  clear  has  been  the  chief 
object  of  the  discussion  now  brought  to  a  close.  Some  phil- 
osophers scarcely  recognize  this  distinction.  Indeed,  if  we 
would  think  clearly,  we  must  carefully  distinguish  from  each 
other  four  closely  cognate  theories — the  theory  of  happiness 
and  good,  the  theory  of  honor  and  esteem,  the  theory  of  love 
and  benevolence,  and  the  theory  of  duty  and  virtue.  This 
last  is  the  proper  subject  of  ethics. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  RIGHT  AND  OBLIGATORY. 

1.  Rightness  etymologically  considered. — 2.  Conformity  to  a  rule 
really  signifies  participation  in  the  character  or  nature  which 
the  rule  sets  forth. — 3.  Positive  and  negative  moral  Tightness. 
Only  the  former  is  the  ground  of  obligation.— 4.  Rightness,  that 
is,  positive  Tightness,  is  the  essential  characteristic  of  the  moral 
law> — 5.  «  The  Right  '*  is  a  collective  or  a  general  term  for  all 
things  right  and  obligatory. — 6.  The  right  includes  ends  as  well 
as  actions. — 7.  Moral  Tightness  is  a  conception  sui  generis  and 
not  to  be  confounded  with  any  other. — 8.  The  right  may  actually 
exist,  but  it  is  mostly  a  thing  conceived  of,  or  ideal.— 9.  The  right 
is  superior  to  every  possible  competitive  end  or  action. — 10.  The 
right  is  the  obligatory,  though  Tightness  and  obligatorinessare  not 
the  same  tiling. — 11.  An  action  in  one  aspect  or  relation  may  be  ob- 
ligatory and  in  another  obligated. — 12.  The  term  "  oughtness." — 
13.  Moral  obligation,  as  the  relation  of  an  agent  to  an  ideal  end  or 
action,  is  itself  ideal :  but  its  influence  and  operation  are  actual 
through  the  conceptions  of  the  moral  law. — 14.*  What  is  meant  by 
a  "  legal "  relation  ;  and  by  the  expressions  "  de  jure  "  and  "  de 
facto." — 15.  Like  every  relation  moral  obligation  embTaces  two 
relationships.  But  the  term  may  denote  one  of  these  relation- 
ships or  the  other,  as  well  as  the  whole  relation. — 16.  This  rela- 
tion exists  between  the  right  and  the  rational  agent,  is  simple 
and  sui  generis,  and  should  not  be  confounded  with  any 
other  relation. — 17.  Perfectly  holy  beings  recognize  the  legal 
supremacy  of  the  right,  but  without  any  feeling  of  constraint. — 
18.  The  question  whether  moral  Tightness  admits  of  analytical 
definition  should  be  deferred  till  after  a  critical  examination  of 
the  moral  law. — 19.  Meanwhile  the  wrong  may  be  defined  as 
including  all  objects  of  intelligent  pursuit  which  conflict  with 
the  right. — 20.  The  nature  of  the  wrong  lies  in  opposition  to  the 
right,  but  the  nature  of  the  right  is  self-determined. 

1.  RIGHTNESS  originally  signified  conformity  to  a  rule,  the 
word  "  right "  being  the  same  as  the  Latin  "  rectus."  In 
ethics,  doubtless,  the  term  primarily  indicated  conformity  to 
moral  rule  or  to  the  law  of  duty.  This  primitive  meaning 
of  "  right "  was  similar  to  that  which  now  belongs  to  the 
word  "  correct."  In  order  to  accomplish  some  end  or  to  per- 
form some  operation  successfully  a  certain  mode  of  proced- 
ure has  been  found  necessary  or  desirable;  and  so  a  rule  is 

39 


4:0  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  IV. 

formed.  Action  conformable  to  this  rule  is  right,  or  cor- 
rect ;  action  conflictive  with  it  is  incorrect,  or  wrong.  Within 
the  sphere  of  ethical  thought  right  conduct  is  that  which 
is  in  accord  with  moral  law,  and  wrong  conduct  is  that  which 
is  contrary  to  such  law. 

2.  But  we  must  notice  that  even  this  original  meaning  of 
the  adjective  "  right "  includes  more  than  mere  conformity 
to   a  rule.     It   involves  participation   in   that   character  or 
nature  which  the  rule  sets  forth,  and  the  realization  of  which 
is  the  sole  end  and  use  of  the  rule.     A  right  line  is  one 
which  not  merely  conforms  to  a  straight  edge  but  which  also 
is  straight  itself — which  does  not  at  any  point  change  its 
direction.     A  man  is  right  in  his  belief  or  judgment  not 
merely  because  this  is  formed  in  a  correct  way  but  yet  more 
because  it  is  assertive  of  truth  or  fact.     This  implication  of 
the  word  "  right,"  by  reason  of  which  it  ascribes  to  an  object 
or  action  a   certain  excellence   or  perfection,   is   always   a 
prominent  part  of  its  meaning;  often  it  occupies  the  mind 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  thought  of  conformity  to  a  rule.     In 
morals  certainly  an  action  is  right  not  simply  because  it  may 
agree  with  some  obligatory  law,  but  yet  more  because  it  has 
an  inherent  excellence  of  its  own,  and  we  frequently  call  it 
right  while  thinking  chiefly,  or  only,  of  such  excellence. 

3.  Now  this  Tightness,  the  possession  of  which  renders  an 
action  or  aim  conformable  to  moral  law  and  in  the  service 
of  which  the  law  has  its  origin  and  use,  may  be  either  of  a 
negative  or  of  a  positive  character.     Accordingly  there  are 
two  senses,  a  weaker  and  a  stronger,  in  which  a  thing  may 
be  morally  right. 

In  the  first  place,  a  piece  of  conduct  may  be  right  provided 
only  it  does  not  violate  the  law.  Some  things  we  judge  it 
to  be  our  duty  to  do;  others  we  judge  it  to  be  our  duty  not 
to  do ;  and  there  are  others  still  about  which  we  make  neither 
judgment  and  which  we  deem  ourselves  at  liberty  to  do  or 
not  to  do  as  we  may  find  convenient  or  desirable.  Conduct 
or  purpose  of  this  last  description  is  often  called  "right" 
simply  as  having  in  it  nothing  wrong,  or  as  being  consistent 
with  the  requirements  of  duty.  This  is  especially  the  case 
if  it  be  judicious  and  sensible,  and  so,  in  an  inferior  way, 
be  worthy  of  commendation.  We  remember  a  cheery  old 
Irish  gentleman  who,  when  he  saw  young  people  enjoying 
themselves,  used  to  say,  "  That's  right ;  that's  right ;  that's 
right ;  that's  right."  By  this  he  did  not  mean  that  their  con- 


CHAP.  IV.]         THE  EIGHT  AND  OBLIGATORY.  £1 

duct  was  meritorious  as  being  the  fulfilment  of  duty  and  obli- 
gation, but  only  that  it  was  wise  and  innocent.  The  same  con- 
ception of  "  right "  is  used  in  the  discussion  concerning  the 
lawfulness  of  certain  amusements,  such  as  theater-going,  pro- 
miscuous dancing,  and  card-playing.  When  one  asks  whether 
these  diversions  are  right,  or  asserts  that  they  are,  he  refers 
to  a  Tightness  which  involves  freedom  from  guilt,  but  which 
is  not  the  basis  of  moral  obligation.  Such,  too,  is  the  idea 
expressed  when  one  assigns,  as  his  reason  for  refusing  to  do 
some  deed,  that  it  would  not  be  "  right "  for  him  to  do  it. 

4.  The  second  meaning  of  the  word  "  right "  is  seen  when 
we  say  that  the  virtuous  man  seeks  what  is  right  because  it 
is  right  or  that  a  certain  action  should  be  done  because  it  is 
right.     This  Tightness  is  the  character  of  that  which  the 
law  prescribes  and  commands,  and  is  the  reason  on  account 
of  which  it  is  prescribed  and  commanded.     This  sense  ap- 
pears in  the  phrase  used  by  President  Lincoln,  "  Firmness 
in  the  right  as  God  gives  us  to  see  the  right,"  and  in  those 
verses  of  Scripture  "  Shall  not  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth 
do  right  ?  " — "  Children,  obey  your  parents  in  the  Lord ;  for 
this  is  right." 

This  positive  signification  of  the  word  is  both  more  prom- 
inent and  more  important  in  ethics  than  the  negative  one. 
It  is  that  commonly  employed  by  writers  when  they  mention 
"  right  actions  "  or  "  moral  Tightness ; "  and  it  is  the  only 
meaning  attached  to  the  expression  "  The  Right " — this 
phrase  always  denoting  that  which  is  both  right  and 
obligatory.  The  importance  of  this  second  conception  is  that 
it  brings  before  us  the  moral  law  as  aiming  both  at  the 
prevention  of  evil  and  at  the  effectuation  of  good,  as  being 
both  prohibitory  and  mandatory,  and  then  calls  upon  us  to 
determine  what  the  radical  nature  of  the  moral  law  and  of 
moral  conduct  may  be.  For  this  law  is  a  rule,  or  set  of  rules, 
setting  forth  things  which  are  right  and  obligatory.  An 
understanding  of  this  obligatory  Tightness  will  reveal  what 
logicians  call  the  "  specific  difference/'  that  is,  the  essential 
characteristic,  of  the  law  and  of  all  its  requirements.  The 
remainder  of  the  present  discussion  will  be  devoted  exclu- 
sively to  that  positive  conception  which  is  expressed  when  we 
speak  of  "  The  Eight  and  Obligatory." 

5.  "The  Right"  is  a  general  term  for  all  those  things 
taken  collectively  which  are  right  and  obligatory.     In  its 
abstract  comprehensiveness  it  resmbles  "The  Good"  when 


42  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  IV. 

this  phrase  is  used,  not  for  all  good  and  virtuous  beings,  but 
for  all  good  things,  objects  or  ends  taken  collectively.  More- 
over as  "  Good  "  sometimes  signifies  the  same  as  "  The  Good/' 
so  "  Right "  sometimes  signifies  the  same  as  "  The  Eight." 
Hence  the  poetic  prophecy, 

"  For  Right  is  Right  since  God  is  God  ; 
And  Right  the  day  shall  win." 

Much  light  will  be  thrown  on  the  nature  of  the  right  if  we 
consider  some  statements  concerning  it  which  embody  the 
consensus  of  mankind. 

6.  First  of  all,  let  us  note  that  the  right  includes  ends  as 
well  as  actions,  and  indeed  includes  actions  only  so  far  as 
these  may  be  promotive  of  ends  or  may  be  ends  themselves. 
For  example,  the  relief  of  the  distressed,  the  enlightenment  of 
the  ignorant,  the  peace  and  good  order  of  the  community, 
the  freedom  and  civilization  of  mankind,  are  right  ends ;  and 
a  derivative  Tightness  attaches  to  any  conduct  or  effort  which 
may  be  conducive  to  these  objects.     On  the  other  hand  such 
actions  as  truthful  witness-bearing,  the  observance  of  freely 
made  contracts,  the  payment  of  honest  debts,  obedience  to 
parents  and  lawful  rulers,  and  such  inward  actions  as  the 
cherishing  of  good  will  for  one's  neighbor,  or  patriotism  for 
one's  country,  or  reverence  for  God,  or  hatred  for  wrong- 
doing, are  things  right  in  themselves  and  to  be  practised  on 
their  own  account. 

Two  questions  concerning  the  right  naturally  arise  in 
ethics;  first,  What  ends  are  right  and  therefore  obligatory 
upon  us  to  pursue?  and  second,  What  actions  are  right  and 
obligatory  upon  us  to  do?  These  inquiries  are  equally  im- 
portant; the  former  of  them  is  the  more  fundamental;  it 
must  be  answered  clearly  if  we  would  have  a  satisfactory  un- 
derstanding of  the  nature  of  right  actions. 

7.  Next  we  remark  that  "  the  right "  and  moral  "  right- 
ness  "  are  conceptions  "  sui  generis  "  and  not  to  be  identified 
with  any  other  of  our  ordinary  ideas.     There  seems  to  be 
some  confusion  of  thought  when  the  right  is  defined  to  be 
the  true,  or  that  which  conforms  to  fact;  or  when  it  is  de- 
fined to  be  the  beautiful,  or  that  which  is  fitted  to  excite 
admiration ;  also  even  when  it  is  defined  to  be  the  good,  that 
is,  the  source  or  the  means  of  happiness.     This  last  opinion 
is  held  by  many;  they  make  no  distinction  between  the  right 
and  the  good;  with  them  the  promotion  of  good  and  hap- 


CHAP.  IV.]        THE  EIGHT  AND  OBLIGATORY.  43 

piness  is  the  whole  duty  of  man.  If  we  respect  the  common 
thought  and  language  of  the  people  no  definition  of  the  right 
can  be  accepted  which  does  not  make  it  different  from  any 
ordinary  conception  of  the  good.  Especially  we  may  say 
that  the  right  is  not  the  useful,  nor  even  is  it  that  which 
secures  the  greatest  happiness  to  the  greatest  number.  Such 
is  the  case  even  though  a  considerable  part  of  our  duty  is 
to  do  what  we  can  for  the  good  of  all. 

We  may  say,  in  general,  that  no  teaching  can  be  correct 
which  treats  of  one  leading  duty  as  if  it  comprehended  all 
the  other  requirements  of  the  moral  law.  While  love  does 
lead  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  law  we  cannot  say  that  to 
love  is  the  only  requirement  of  morality,  nor  even  that  it 
is  the  radical  and  formative  principle  of  what  is  right  and 
obligatory.  Again,  neither  the  rational  regulation  of  one's 
own  life  nor  the  realization  of  a  high  ideal  of  character,  is 
the  fundamental  and  all-comprehensive  aim  of  duty.  Such 
views  have  been  held  by  many;  that  which  speaks  of  the 
"  ideal  self  "  or  the  "  ideal  character  "  is  in  special  favor  at 
the  present  time.  We  cannot  accept  either  of  it  or  of  the 
principle  of  self-regulation  as  a  statement  of  the  ultimate 
right  end.  Neither  would  be  satisfactory  even  though  one 
were  able  to  define  exactly  the  ideal  to  be  realized  or  to  say 
by  what  rules  or  conceptions  the  self  should  be  governed. 
The  realization  of  a  noble  self  and  of  a  noble  life  is  an  end 
which  appeals  to  thoughtful  and  intelligent  persons,  but  it 
is  a  duty  of  secondary  development.  It  presupposes  the 
apprehension  of  simpler  and  more  primary  ends.  It  is  not 
the  ultimate  principle  of  right  conduct.  Nor  can  any  defini- 
tion of  right  be  approved  by  the  common  sense  of  men  which 
may  not  be  applied,  without  distortion  or  curtailment,  to 
every  right  action  and  to  every  right  end. 

8.  Another  point  of  interest  regarding  "the  right"  is 
that,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  it  is  contemplated,  not  as  an 
actual,  but  as  an  ideal,  or  conceived  of,  object — as  a  thing 
not  yet  realized  but  to  be  realized.  It  sometimes  even  as- 
sumes the  form  of  an  idealized  object  or  what  we  commonly 
call  an  "ideal."  In  these  respects  it  resembles  all  other 
objects  which  are  or  may  be  the  ends  of  intelligent  pursuit. 
Often  the  right  has  an  actual  existence  in  which  case  we 
should  rejoice  in  that  and  desire  its  continuance:  generally 
moral  effort  is  directed  to  that  which  is  not  yet  realized. 
Even  when  engaged  with  an  existing  state  of  facts  it  aims 


44  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  IV. 

at  the  maintenance  or  increase  of  this  in  the  future.  It  is 
right  that  brethren  should  dwell  together  in  unity;  if  this 
happy  condition  of  affairs  does  not  exist  already,  it  is  our 
duty  to  seek  for  it;  if  it  does  exist,  it  should  be  cherished 
and  strengthened  and  made  enduring. 

But  while  the  objects  of  moral  choice  and  pursuit  are  com- 
monly things  not  yet  realized,  they  always  are  related  in 
nature  to  things  already  perceived  and  known  to  be.  This 
is  true  even  of  those  ideal  ends  of  action  or  modes  of  con- 
duct which  may  be  more  excellent  than  any  actually  observed. 
The  mind  has  a  power  of  fashioning  for  itself,  from  the 
materials  presented  by  fact,  things  of  a  quality  surpassing 
past  attainments,  and  can  use  these  ideals  as  the  aims  of  its 
activity. 

9.  In  the  next  place,  men  recognize  that  the  right  has  a 
superiority  over  any  other  end  or  action  which  can  be  brought 
into  competition  with  it.     In  this  sense  even  the  humblest 
form  of  duty  has  a  supreme  excellence.     A  course  of  right 
conduct  or  of  virtuous  living  is  the  best  course  a  man  can 
pursue.     Some  of  the  duties  of  life  are  not  of  a  very  exalted 
or  ennobling  character,  such,  for  example,  as  the  payment 
of  a  debt  by  one  who  has  an  abundance  of  means  and  who 
has  no  good  reason  to  defer  payment,  but,  in  every  case,  duty 
is  the  best  thing  that  can  be  done  in  the  circumstances.     In 
the  instance  mentioned  to  keep  back  one's  money,  or  to  spend 
it  for  one's  own  benefit,  would  be  an  inferior  way  of  doing. 
So,  to  correct  and  restrain  an  obstinately  naughty   child, 
though  this  may  not  be  easy  or  pleasant  for  the  parent,  is 
better  than  to  allow  free  play  to  its  whims  and  passions  or 
to  pass  over  its  disobedience  with  neglect.     To   share  our 
spare  means  with  destitute  ones  who  would  otherwise  perish 
at  our  doors,  is  better  than  to  store  up  that  surplus  for  our- 
selves, or  to  spend  it  in  beautifying  our  home,  or  in  enter- 
taining our  friends,  and  even  than  to  employ  it  in  some  profit- 
able venture,  or  in  some  distant  charity. 

Moreover,  when  the  right  becomes  difficult  of  accomplish- 
ment or  involves  much  suffering  or  sacrifice,  we  admire  and 
commend  that  heroic  spirit  who  loves  the  right  because  of  its 
excellence,  and  who  subordinates  all  other  ends  to  that  su- 
preme end.  We  honor  him  who  said,  "  I  would  rather  be 
right  than  President ; "  we  applaud  the  sentiment  which  calls 
for  "  justice  though  the  heavens  fall." 

10.  Perhaps,    however,    the    most    prominent    conviction 


CHAP.  IV.]        THE  EIGHT  AND  OBLIGATORY.  45 

which  men  have  about  the  right  is  that  it  is  the  obligatory. 
The  relation  in  which  the  conscious  rational  agent  finds  him- 
self when  confronted  with  the  right  is  expressed  when  he 
says,  "I  ought"  to  do  this  action  or  seek  that  end.  This 
is  called  his  "  moral  obligation."  It  might  be  more  exactly 
styled  his  moral  obligatedness ;  for  the  right,  in  reference  to 
a  person,  is  obligatory,  and  the  person,  in  his  relation  to  the 
right,  is  obligated. 

11.  But  while  this  is  so,  it  is  noteworthy  that  an  action 
which  in  one  aspect  is  obligatory,  may,  at  the  same  time  and 
in  another  aspect,  be  obligated.     Moreover  this  latter  thought 
seems  to  be  that  primarily  expressed  by  our  language  when 
we  say  of  some  deed  that  "  it  ought  to  be  done."     The  action 
of  a  rational  being  may  be  regarded  in  two  lights  or  connec- 
tions.    According  to  one  of  these  it  includes  a  result  or  pro- 
motes an  end ;  when  contemplated  in  this  aspect  by  the  agent 
it  may  become  obligatory  upon  him ;  if  he  sees  it  ito  be  right, 
he  recognizes  it  as  binding  upon  him  because  of  its  Tightness. 
On  the  other  hand  the  action  may  be  viewed  as  part  of  the 
life  and  activity  of  the  agent  himself  and  therefore  as  some- 
thing obligated  or  due  to  the  result  or  end  to  be  obtained. 
In  this  aspect  the  action  is  not  obligatory,  but  obligated;  it 
is  included  in  the  same  obligation  with  the  agent ;  we  say  that 
it  is  something  which  ought  to  be  done.     Thus  the  payment 
of  a  debt  as  the  accomplishment  of  an  end  and  so  as  being 
itself  an  end,  is  obligatory;  while  the  paying  of  the  debt  as 
the  accomplishing  of  the  end  is  obligated.     When  the  em- 
phasis of  thought  is  on  the  connection  of  the  action  with  its 
result,  the  action  is  viewed  as  obligatory;  when  we  emphasize 
the  connection  of  the  deed  with  the  doer,  the  action  is  viewed 
as  obligated. 

12.  The  choice  which  the  mind  has  of  regarding  a  moral 
action  either  as  obligatory  or  as  obligated,  and  the  fact  that 
the  former  of  these  aspects  is  more  frequently  chosen,  account 
for  the  employment  by  some  authors  of  the  term  "ought- 
ness"  to  signify  the  obligatoriness  of  an    action    or    end. 
That  word  would  more  naturally  denote  the  character  of  being 
owed  or  due.     Its  etymology  would  suggest  the  thought  that 
a  thing  was  bound  to  be  done  rather  than  that  it  was  binding 
on  us  to  do.     However  we  shall  not  object  to  the  use  of  the 
word  "  oughtness,"  provided  only  those  employing  it  do  not 
permit  it  to  be  the  cause  of  obscure  or  confused  statements. 

It  is  important  to  remark  that  rightness  and  obligatoriness 


46  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  IV. 

are  not  the  same  thing,  though  the  same  thing  is  always  both 
right  and  obligatory.  Those  make  a  mistake  who  say  that 
"  oughtness,"  meaning  by  this  obligatoriness,  is  the  essential 
or  constitutive  characteristic  of  right  action.  To  be  right, 
in  itself,  is  neither  to  obligate  nor  to  be  obligated.  Rightness 
is  a  kind  of  excellence  which  may  belong  to  an  action  or  end ; 
obligatoriness  is  the  claim  which  an  action  or  end  by  reason 
of  its  Tightness  has  on  one's  personal  life  and  service.  It 
might,  indeed,  be  said  that  moral  obligation  is  a  part  of  what 
is  right — an  adjunct  and  ministerial  part  which  supports 
all  other  things  that  are  right.  But,  for  ordinary  purposes, 
it  is  better  to  say  that  it  is  something  additional  to  the  right 
— something  which  presupposes  the  right  and  is  founded 
upon  it.  Moral  obligation  is  not  included  in  our  ordinary 
conception  of  the  right. 

13.  We  Lave  seen  that  the  right,  like  all  other  ends  of 
rational  pursuit,  is  for  the  most  part  thought  of  as  an  ideal 
object,  as  a  thing  not  yet  realized  but  to  be  realized.     This 
peculiarity  of  the  right  affects  the  relation  of  obligation  also. 
In  strict  literality,  a  relation  could  not  exist  between  a  per- 
son who  actually  exists  and  an  end  or  action  which  does  not 
as  yet  actually  exist.     At  the  same  time  we  constantly  speak 
of  one  being  obligated  to  this  action  or  to  that  end.     What 
does  literally  exist  in  the  premises  is  a  relation  between  the 
person    and    his    conception    or    knowledge    of    the    right, 
especially  as  this  may  be  set  forth  to  him  in  some  moral 
law.     Yet  we  commonly  speak  of  a  person  being  obligated, 
not  to  the  law  or  to  his  conception  of  duty,  but  to  that  action 
or  end  which  his  knowledge  sets  forth.     The  significance  of 
this  mode  of  speech  is  that  moral  law  is  binding  upon  us  not 
simply  as  a  form  of  thought,  but  by  reason  of  the  nature 
of  the  ideal  which  it  exhibits.     In  this  case,  as  in  others, 
the  ordinary  and  practical  use  of  language  is  so  intelligible 
that  it  may  very  well  be  adopted  by  philosophers.     The  truth 
could  not  be  expressed  better. 

14.  In  order  to  indicate  that  the  subjection  of  one's  spirit 
and  life  required  in  moral  obligation,  is  not  asserted  as  an 
existing  fact,  but  is  for  the  most  part  only  a  thing  conceived 
of  and  not  yet  realized,  but  to  be  realized  or  which  should  be 
realized,  this  subjection  is  sometimes  called  a  legal  relation. 
By  this  we  do  not  understand  that  moral  obligation  has  its 
origin  in  any  human  law  or  custom,  or  even  in  legislation 
by  the  Supreme  Being.     Right  and  duty  precede  all  institu- 


CHAP.  IV.]        THE  RIGHT  AND  OBLIGATORY.  47 

tions  whether  human  or  divine,  and  are  the  sources  of  their 
morality  and  their  authority.  Such  language  teaches  that, 
as  law  often  sets  forth  modes  of  conduct  which  are  not  rea- 
lized in  obedience,  so  that  subjection  to  the  right  which  moral 
obligation  calls  for  is  primarily  and  commonly  an  ideal  object 
— an  object,  too,  which  may  remain  an  unfulfilled  ideal. 
There  is,  of  course,  a  relation  actually  existing  between  the 
law  and  the  rational  being  who  understands  it ;  and  this  may 
be  styled  his  obligation,  or  obligatedneas,  to  the  law.  But  the 
subjection  now  mentioned  is  conceived  of  as  a  conformity 
between  the  agent  and  the  law,  or  between  the  agent  and  that 
which  the  law  sets  forth  as  right;  this  conformity  may  be 
entirely  ideal  and  unrealized.  If  a  rightful  king  were  de- 
throned and  in  exile,  we  could  say  that  he  was  a  king  de  jure 
though  not  de  facto;  we  could  conceive  of  him  as  exercising 
power  and  authority  and  of  those  in  rebellion  against  him 
as  being  his  obedient  subjects ;  and  we  might  say  that,  in  law 
or  de  jure,  they  were  his  subjects.  So,  in  general,  that  sub- 
jection to  the  right  which  the  law  requires  is  primarily  a  re- 
lation de  jure,  a  legal  subjection,  whether  it  become  a  rela- 
tion de  facto  or  not. 

15.  Moral  obligatedness — that  is,  oughtness  in  the  proper 
sense  of  that  word — is  the  legal  relationship  correlative  to 
obligatoriness  and  is  the  thought  commonly  expressed  by  the 
words  " ought "  and  "obligation."  Conceiving  of  man  and 
his  life  as  in  subjection  or  service  to  the  right,  it  says  that 
this  state  of  things  "  ought "  to  be,  or  is  a  matter  of  "  obli- 
gation " — that  the  man  "  ought "  to  tell  the  truth  -and  to 
pay  his  debts,  or  that  he  is  under  "obligation"  to  do  so. 
But,  while  such  is  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word  "  obli- 
gation/' this  term  may  sometimes  signify  the  binding  force 
of  the  right  rather  than  the  condition  of  being  bound  by  it. 
We  may  speak  of  the  obligation  of  the  right  upon  us  rather 
than  of  our  obligation  to  the  right.  As  "regulation"  may 
mean  either  the  act  of  regulating  or  the  state  of  being  regu- 
lated, so  "  obligation "  may  indicate  sometimes  the  act  of 
obligating  as  well  as  the  state  of  being  obligated.  This 
word,  too,  occasionally,  appears  to  express  a  comprehensive 
conception  including  both  of  these  ideas.  Just  as  "mar- 
riage" involves  both  the  relatedness  of  husband  and  that 
of  wife,  and  as  "possession"  includes  both  the  relatedness 
of  owner  and  that  of  property,  so  "  obligation  "  may  com- 
prise both  obligatoriness  and  obligatedness.  Every  relation 


48  THE  MORAL  LAW.  CHAP.  IV.] 

whatever  consists  of  two  elements,  or  aspects,  or  relationships, 
one  of  which  belongs  to  one  of  the  relata  and  the  other  to 
the  other.  Take  things  that  are  similar,  or  that  are  equal, 
or  that  are  cause  and  effect,  or  that  are  greater  and  less, 
or  that  go  before  and  come  after — in  all  these  cases  both  the 
relationships,  or  parts  of  the  relation,  may  be  thought  of  as 
a  unity  and  as  constituting  the  relation.  This  seems 
to  be  the  case  at  times  when  we  speak  of  moral  obligation  in 
the  general. 

16.  In  saying  that  obligation  is  the  legal  relation  of  a  ra- 
tional being  and  his  life  conceived  of  as  subject  to  the  right 
or  to  the  moral  law,  no  attempt  is  made  at  analytical  defini- 
tion.      We  only  state  the  circumstances  under  which  this 
relation    arises.     Many    have    endeavored    to    explain    this 
thought  of  moral  obligation  as  a  special  mode  or  develop- 
ment of  some  other,  but  it  seems  to  be  as  simple  and  sui  gen- 
eris as  any  relation  can  be.     It  can  only  be  defined  from  its 
peculiar  properties,  the  chief  of  which  is  that  it  springs  di- 
rectly from  the  nature  of  the  right  and  is  not  imposed  on  the 
soul  by  any  external  or  personal  authority. 

Such  being  the  case  we  reject  those  systems  which  place 
the  first  foundations  of  morality  in  the  commanding  influence 
of  rulers,  or  of  society,  or  of  God,  and  also  those  which  ident- 
ify the  sense  of  moral  obligation  with  the  realization  of  a  neces- 
sity, or  with  the  fear  of  a  penalty,  or  with  a  regard  for  one's 
own  future,  or  with  a  respect  for  the  general  good,  or  with 
any  other  natural  motivity.  It  is  something  sui  generis; 
it  is  a  sense  of  our  relation  to  the  right  as  legally  supreme 
over  human  life  and  conduct. 

17.  The  question  has  been  asked  whether  God,  or  any  per- 
fectly good  and  holy  being,  ever  feels  the  sense  of  obligation. 
This  inquiry  may  be  best  answered  with  the  help  of  a  distinc- 
tion.    A  sense  of  duty  may  be  so  opposed  by  powerful  natural 
inclinations  that  a  struggle  results  and  a  feeling  of  constraint 
and  difficulty.     In  such  a  case  moral  principle  may  labor- 
iously triumph ;  or  it  may  be  overcome  by  one's  lower  propen- 
sities and  desires,  and  result  only  in  an  uncomfortable  con- 
science.    Plainly  no  perfectly  moral  being  can  experience 
such   half-willing   or  unwilling   constraint.     He    loves   the 
right,  accepts  it  promptly,  and  pursues  it  cheerfully.     At  the 
same  time  all  holy  beings  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  the 
right  over  their  life  and  conduct.     They  conform  to  its  re- 
quirements as  a  servant  would  to  the  commands  of  a  beloved 


CHAP.  IV. J        THE  RIGHT  AND  OBLIGATORY.  49 

master,  and  in  this  absolute  submission  of  their  spirits  to 
the  rule  of  goodness  and  wisdom  they  find  the  most  perfect 
freedom.  All  holy  intelligences,  including  God  Himself, 
conform  to  the  right  as  the  law  of  their  activity  and  the 
supreme  end  of  their  existence. 

18.  When  we  say  that  the  right  is  the  ground  of  moral  obli- 
gation and  that  it  is  superior  to  any  other  object  or  end  which 
can   come   into   competition   with    it,    we    distinguish    the 
right  from  all  other  aims.     Yet  this  is  not  a  full  and  satis- 
factory definition.     It  does  not  tell  us  what  the  right  is;  it 
only  sets  forth  the  more  prominent  properties  of  the  right. 
If  we  should  accept  the  opinion  of  some  that  the  quality  of 
moral   Tightness  is  a  thing  absolutely   simple  and  uncom- 
pounded,  we  could  not  hope  for  any  better  definition  than 
that  above  given,  even  though  it  is  relational  or  "  accidental " 
and  not  analytical  or  "essential."     But  are  we  prepared  to 
say  that  the  right  is  incapable  of  analysis?     To  determine 
truly  the  nature  of  the  right  one  should  classify  and  compare 
all  forms  of  moral  actions  and  moral  ends,  and,  in  this  way, 
bring  before  his  mind  clearly  that  character  which  belongs 
alike  to  all.     Let  us,  therefore,  put  off  any  further  attempt 
to  define  the  right  till  we  have  scrutinized  all  the  different 
parts  of  the  moral  law.     Then,  by  a  kind  of  induction,  or 
principiation,  we  may  discover  the  essential  elements  which 
are  common  to  all  things  that  are  right. 

19.  Perhaps,  however,  should  we  assume  the  right  to  be 
a  thing  known  or  knowable,  we  need  not  delay  to  attempt  a 
definition  of  the  morally  wrong.       This  seems  to  be  that 
which,  as  an  actual  or  possible  object  of  one's  choice,  is  con- 
flictive  with  the  right.     It  may  be  that  which  prevents  or 
obstructs  the  realization  of  the  right,  or  it  may  be  that  which 
destroys  the  right  or  produces  the  opposite  of  it.     To  with- 
hold any  or  all  of  the  price  which  one  has  agreed  to  pay  for 
some  property  would  be  opposed  to  one's  duty  in  a  negative 
way;  while  to  purloin  an  article  from  its  rightful  owner  or 
to  do  some  injury  to  his  estate  would  be  a  more  positive  form 
of  wrong. 

While  the  wrong  does  not  consist  in  the  mere  absence  of  the 
right,  and  is  something  which  is  opposed  to  the  right,  it  may 
yet  be  said  to  have  a  less  positive  and  independent  nature 
than  the  right.  The  evil  of  the  wrong  consists  in  its  opposi- 
tion to  the  right;  the  excellence  of  the  right  consists,  not 
simply  in  its  antagonism  to  the  wrong,  but  primarily  and 
4 


50  THE  MORAL  LAW.  CHAP.  IV. 

principally  in  being  what  it  is.  In  one  sense  right  and  wrong 
are  opposed  to  each  other  as  much  as  pleasure  and  pain  or  as 
sweet  and  bitter  are;  in  another  sense,  this  is  not  so.  For 
the  evil  of  pain  lies  not  simply  in  its  opposition  to  pleasure, 
but  in  its  own  nature  yet  more ;  and  bitter  is  disagreeable  in 
itself,  and  not  simply  because  it  conflicts  with  the  sweet. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  MORAL   REASON". 

1.  Reason  is  not  a  specific  faculty  but  a  general  endowment  of 
ability  affecting  all  the  powers  of  the  mind.— 2.  In  a  last  analysis 
the  primary  powers  of  intellect  are  Thought  (mere  conception) 
and  Belief  (that  conviction,  or  mental  confidence,  which  may  or 
may  not  accompany  our  conceptions). — 3.  Attention,  Acquisi- 
tion, Reproduction  and  Association,  Analysis,  Syntheses,  and  so 
forth,  are  secondary  powers  because  their  operation  modifies  that 
of  conception  and  conviction. — 4.  The  conceptions  (or  ideas)  of 
rational  beings  are  vastly  more  comprehensive,  and  their  per- 
ceptions vastly  more  penetrative,  than  those  of  brute  beings. — 
5.  Reason  is  exercised  in  two  modes,  the  speculative,  or  discus- 
sive,  and  the  intuitive,  or  practical. — 6.  Besides  the  ordinary 
"  intuitions  of  reason  "  which  are  not  absolutely  simple  and  im- 
mediate, there  are  intuitions  of  reason  in  the  strict  literal  sense. 
— 7.  The  rational  faculty,  as  dealing  with  the  right  and  the 
wrong,  is  called  the  Moral  Reason,  and,  as  such,  becomes  motive 
as  well  as  intellectual.  — 8.  As  intuitively  exercised  it  is  often 
known  as  "  the  moral  sense." — 9.  As  judging  and  feeling  respect- 
ing conduct,  especially  one's  own  conduct,  it  is  styled  "  con- 
science."— 10.  The  general  agreement  of  men  respecting  a  point 
of  conscience  has  some  authority  but  is  not  infallible. — 11. 
Though  the  doctrine  that  man  should  live  according  to  Right,  or 
Moral,  Reason,  does  not  answer  philosophical  enquiry,  it  makes  a 
start  in  the  right  direction. 

1  REASON",  or  the  Rational  Faculty,  as  distinguished  from 
Reasoning,  or  Ratiocination,  is  not  a  faculty  wholly  separate 
in  nature  and  operation  from  the  lower  developments  of  in- 
tellect such  as  are  common  to  mankind  and  the  more  capable 
of  the  brutes.  It  is  rather  a  special  endowment  of  ability 
which  greatly  enlarges  the  scope  of  the  essential  functions 
of  mind,  and  so  fits  man  for  language,  society,  invention, 
industry,  morality,  and  religion. 

2.  Two  radical  modes  of  action  are  manifested  by  all 
intelligence  of  whatever  kind  or  degree.  These  for  the  most 
part  are  intimately  united  or  combined;  for  which  reason 
they  have  not  been  distinguished  as  they  should  have  been. 

51 


52  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  V. 

The  difference  between  them  may  be  easily  apprehended 
if  it  can  only  be  clearly  stated.  It  is  that  between  concep- 
tion and  conviction,  or  between  our  mere  thought  or  idea 
of  a  thing  and  our  confidence  or  belief  in  its  existence  or 
non-existence.  The  word  "  conception "  is  here  used  in  a 
very  broad  sense  for  the  forming  and  having  of  ideas,  leaving 
out  of  consideration  any  mental  confidence,  as  to  fact  or 
truth,  with  which  the  ideas  may,  or  may  not,  be  accompanied. 
On  the  other  hand,  with  a  similar  width  of  signification,  con- 
viction, or  belief,  as  opposed  to  thought  or  conception,  is  that 
mental  confidence  which  we  exercise  as  to  fact  or  truth,  and 
which  varies  wonderfully  from  the  feeble  expectation  of  a 
guess  or  conjecture  up  to  the  assurance  of  highly  probable 
opinion  and  the  certainty  of  absolute  knowledge.  These  two 
powers,  that  of  thought  or  conception  and  that  of  belief  or 
conviction,  are  the  fundamental  attributes  of  intelligence; 
and  it  is  evident  that  both  of  them  are  employed  alike  by  our 
lower  faculties,  such  as  sense-perception  and  memory  and  that 
simple  judgment  which  is  immediately  connected  with  these 
powers,  and  by  the  rational  faculty. 

3.  In  addition  to  the  two  powers  above  mentioned,  which 
might  be  called  primary,  because  their  operation  is  the  ulti- 
mate work  and  function  of  mind,  there  are  others,  such  as 
attention,  acquisition,  reproduction,  analysis,   synthesis,  ab- 
straction, and  generalization,  which  may  be  called  secondary, 
because  their  operation  is  to  modify  the  working  of  the  pri- 
mary powers  and  to  render  it  effective.     The  •  investigations 
of  mental  science  show  that  reason  has  no  more  a  monopoly  of 
these  secondary  powers  than  it  has  of  the  primary;  they,  too, 
are  exercised  in  the  perceptions,  recollections,  judgments  and 
inferences  of  the  higher  animals  as  well  as  in  those  of  human 
beings. 

4.  We  repeat,  therefore,  that  Reason  is  not  a  faculty  wholly 
separate  in  nature  from  our  other  faculties,  but  rather  a  spe- 
cial endowment  of  ability  whereby  the  scope  and  capacity  of 
the  functions  of  mind  are  vastly  enlarged.     Externally,  the 
excellence  of  this  gift  is  seen  in  the  incomparable  superiority 
of  man  over  all  other  earthly  creatures.      As    Locke    says, 
"Keason  is  that  faculty  whereby  man  is  supposed  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  beasts  and  wherein  it  is  evident  that  he  much 
surpasses  them."     Language,  domestic  life,  social  life,  busi- 
ness occupation  and  useful  pursuits  generally,    art,    science, 
philosophy,  civil  government,  religion,  moral  law  and  moral 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  MORAL  REASON.  53 

conduct,  are  the  outgrowths  of  this  rich  endowment.  Inter- 
nally, Reason  is  to  be  known  by  the  wide  sweep  of  its  thought 
and  its  far-seeing  discernment.  The  conceptions  of  a  rational 
being  are  more  comprehensive  and  his  perceptions  are  more 
penetrative  than  those  of  a  being  not  rationally  endowed. 
How  weak  compared  with  the  human  mind  is  that  of  an  intel- 
ligent animal  with  respect  to  any  object  of  which  each  alike 
has  a  distinct  sense-perception — as,  for  example,  a  locomotive 
or  a  printing-press !  While,  as  for  abstract  thinking  and  the 
solutions  of  scientific  thought,  in  which  reason  glories,  the 
brute  is  incapable  of  any  advancement  whatever.  Let  then, 
those  who  would  comprehend  the  workings  of  the  Rational 
Faculty,  remember  that  it  has  a  common  radical  nature  with 
the  lower  developments  of  mind  while  yet  in  ability  it  has  an 
inexpressible  superiority  over  them. 

5.  Metaphysicians  mention  two  modes  in  which  Reason  is 
ordinarily  exercised,  the  Speculative  or  Discursive,  and  the 
Intuitive  or  Practical.  In  the  former  of  these  the  mind 
is  conscious  of  every  step  of  the  process,  as,  for  example,  when 
one  enters  on  the  methodical  investigation  of  some  new  or  un- 
familiar subject  of  study.  In  the  latter  the  operation  of  the 
mind,  by  reason  either  of  special  ability  or  of  acquired  abbre- 
viations and  the  ease  produced  by  practice,  is  so  rapid  that 
the  result  has  the  appearance  of  being  reached  without  a  pro- 
cess. For  this  reason  it  is  called  intuitive.  It  is  named  prac- 
tical because  it  is  often  noticeable  in  the  judgments  of  busi- 
ness and  of  daily  life.  At  the  same  time  it  is  not  confined  to 
these,  but  is  sometimes  manifested  in  the  instantaneous  solu- 
tion of  complicated  problems  by  persons  of  remarkable  gifts. 

Though  each  of  the  above  described  exercises  of  the  rational 
faculty  is  marked  by  its  own  mode  of  procedure,  both  alike 
involve  processes,  and  both  follow  the  same  essential  laws. 
The  movements  of  the  intuitive  reason  are  so  spontaneous  and 
rapid  that  their  articulation  is  not  easily  discerned,  yet  in- 
vestigation shows  that  they  are  to  be  explained  and  justified 
by  those  laws  of  the  discursive  reason  which  are  treated  of  in 
Logic.  Hence  the  general  power  of  rational  intelligence, 
without  distinguishing  its  modes,  is  often  spoken  of  as  the 
"  discursive  faculty." 

Such  being  the  case  it  is  evident  that  both  the  foregoing 
modes  of  reason  are  opposed  to  "  intuition  "  when,  by  this 
last,  absolutely  immediate  perception  is  meant,  or,  as  Presi- 
dent McCosh  says,  "  the  pereception  of  -a  fact  or  truth  without 


54:  THE  MORAL  LAW.  |CHAP.  V. 

a  process."    In  short,  the  ordinary  "  intuition  of  reason  "  is 
not  intuition  in  the  strict  sense  at  all. 

6.  Some  rational  judgments  or  perceptions,  however,  are 
intuitional  in  the  sense  of  being  absolutely  simple  and  imme- 
diate.    Therefore,  also,  if  we  would  avoid  an  ambiguous  use 
of  terms,  we  must  distinguish  between  two  sorts  of  rational 
intuition,  one  of  which  may  be  styled  the  ordinary,  and  the 
other  the  absolute,  intuition  of  reason.     The  former  is  what 
we  commonly  mean  when  we  speak  of  a  rational  intuition, 
though  it  is  not  strictly  and  properly  intuitive;  it  is  some- 
times, also,  called  the  "  instinctive  "  exercise  of  reason.    The 
other  exercise  of  reason  is  a  true  intuition,  being  absolutely 
simple  and  without  a  process.     Indeed,  it  is  a  doctrine  of 
philosophical  importance  that  some  of  our  immediate  percep- 
tions are  such  as  only  reason  can  make.     The  judgment  that 
these  two  straight  lines  parallel  to  each  other  in  the  same 
plane  can  never  meet  however  they  may  be  prolonged,  can  be 
made  and  understood  only  by  a  rational  intelligence.     In 
like  manner,  that  it  is  right  and  obligatory,  for  those  who  have 
the  means,  to  give  aid  to  a  needy,  struggling  and  suffering 
brother,  seems  to  be  self-evidently  true — a  moral  axiom.     On 
the  other  hand  the  ordinary  intuition  of  Reason  takes  place 
whenever  any  process  of  ratiocination,  whether  demonstrative 
or  probable,  is  so  easy  or  so  habitual  as  to  require  only,  as  it 
were,  a  glance  of  the  mind.    Thus  a  person  of  a  good  mathe- 
matical turn  might  see  instantly  that,  if  any  side  of  a  plane 
triangle  be  produced,  the  exterior  angle  thus  formed  is  equal 
to  the  sum  of  the  two  interior  and  opposite  angles.     In  the 
same  way  a  person  of  moral  insight  might  see  at  once  that, 
under  ordinary  circumstances,  it  is  wrong  to  disobey  a  magis- 
trate, but  that,  in  case  a  civil  ruler  command  things  contrary 
to  the  law  of  God,  it  would  be  right  to  disobey  him. 

7.  Such  being  the  nature  of  Reason  in  the  general,  let  us 
now  turn  to  that  special  mode  or  exercise  of  it  which  is  called 
the  Moral  Reason.    This  does  not  appear  to  be  a  mental  power 
radically  different  from  the  general   faculty;   it   is   simply 
Reason  considered  so  far  forth  as  it  is  conversant  with  those 
ends  and  actions  and  with  that  life  and  conduct  which  are 
morally  right  or  morally  wrong. 

This  mode  of  intelligence,  however,  takes  on  peculiarities, 
the  addition  of  which  renders  it  more  than  a  purely  intellec- 
tual faculty.  Because  of  the  most  important  of  these  pecu- 
liarities Moral  Reason  is  frequently  regarded  not  merely  as  a 


CHAP.  V.J  THE  MORAL  REASON.  55 

mental  but  also  as  a  motive  power.  For  any  exercise  of  the 
intellect  may  become  motive  when  it  brings  before  the  soul 
aims  of  pursuit  and  methods  of  action.  This  is  especially 
true  of  the  Moral  Reason. 

8.  A  correct  use  of  the  rational  faculty  about  questions  of 
interest  and  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  conduct  of  life  is 
frequently  styled  "  good  sense  " ;  moreover,  because  this  ex- 
ercise of  judgment  is  greatly  concerned  with  ordinary  and 
recurrent  cases,  it  is  often  called  "  common  sense."    This  ex- 
pression, "  common  sense/'  however,  is  also  used  by  philoso- 
phers to  indicate  that  exercise  of  Reason  wherein  the  convic- 
tions of  mankind  are  found  to  harmonize  in  regard  to  things 
fully  subjected  to  their  perception  and  examination.     It  is, 
therefore,  a  phrase  affected  with  ambiguity. 

The  word  "  sense  "  sometimes  signifies  the  power  of  feeling 
as  distinguished  from  that  of  cognition  and  considered  sep- 
arately. It  may  even  be  restricted  to  the  power  of  bodily 
feeling,  as,  when  we  say  that  sensation  is  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  sense — in  this  statement  sensation  does  not  mean 
sense-perception  but  only  that  feeling  which  is  excited  in 
the  soul  by  some  action  of  the  nerves,  and  which  is  the  con- 
dition of  sense-perception.  But  when  the  word  "  sense  "  is 
used  variously,  as  above,  to  denote  a  faculty  of  cognition  and 
judgment,  this  does  not  imply  any  identification  of  perception 
with  feeling;  it  indicates  merely  that  the  mode  of  cogni- 
tion or  judgment  named  is  accompanied  by  feeling  and  stimu- 
lated by  it.  The  interest  which  a  merchant  takes  in  his  busi- 
ness and  his  keen  appreciation  of  the  failure  or  of  the  success 
of  every  projected  enterprise,  develop  his  faculties,  if  he  have 
any  natural  gifts,  and  make  him  a  man  of  "good  common 
sense." 

The  foregoing  explanations  dispel  all  obscurity  from  the 
phrase,  "  Moral  Sense,"  which  is  one  frequently  employed  by 
philosophical  as  well  as  by  popular  writers.  This  means  the 
Intuitive  Moral  Reason,  especially  when  considered  as  practi- 
cal and  motive.  Hence  we  hear  of  this  measure  or  of  that 
being  approved  of  or  condemned  by  the  moral  sense  of  an 
individual  or  of  a  community,  and  of  persons  being  re- 
strained, guided  or  governed  by  their  Moral  Sense  or  their 
Moral  Reason.  The  word  "  sense  "  here  indicates  a  form  of 
rational  judgment  accompanied  with  its  appropriate  feeling 
and  motivity. 

9,  Another  name  applied  to  the  Moral  Reason  in  its  prac- 


56  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  V. 

tical  relations  and  almost  synonymous  with  "  moral  sense  " 
is  Conscience.  This  word,  as  its  etymology  suggests,  origin- 
ally designated  any  accompanying  knowledge,  especially  any 
knowledge  concomitant  of  one's  own  direct  experiences. 
Thus,  among  the  Eomans,  one  conspirator  could  be  said  to 
have  a  conscience  of  the  purposes  of  another,  together  with  a 
knowledge  of  his  own  purposes;  or  two  friends  might  have 
conscience  of  each  other's  ..secrets.  Then  the  word  came  to  be 
applied  to  that  perception  which  all  intelligent  creatures  have 
of  their  own  existence,  and  of  their  own  actions,  thoughts  and 
lives.  This  meaning  is  now  expressed  by  the  term  "  con- 
sciousness "  and  by  the  yet  more  explicit  designation  "  self- 
consciousness."  By  another  specific  application  "  conscience  " 
came  to  denote  that  perception  of  one's  moral  relations  and 
obligations  which  accompanies  the  intelligent  life  of  a  ra- 
tional being  and  his  simple  consciousness  of  it.  Finally,  be- 
cause the  perception  of  personal  duty  and  of  the  character  of 
one's  conduct  as  right  or  wrong  specially  excites  the  moral 
feeling  and  tendencies,  "  conscience  "  has  come  to  connote  the 
sensitive  and  motive  action  of  the  Moral  Reason  even  more 
than  the  intellectual.  Moreover,  though  Conscience  mostly 
indicates  one's  ethical  faculty  as  concerned  with  his  own 
actions  and  their  relations,  it  is  sometimes  used  in  a  wide 
sense  for  the  Moral  Reason  in  general.  Thus  we  might  say 
that  the  conscience  of  mankind  condemned  the  tyranny  and 
cruelty  of  the  colonial  government  of  Spain.  In  such  a  case 
Conscience  and  Moral  Reason  are  simply  synonymous. 

10.  The  value  of  the  intuitive  moral  reason  of  mankind 
as  a  ground  of  judgment  in  ethical  science  is  similar  to  that 
of  the  "  common  sense "  of  mankind  in  metaphysical  phi- 
losophy. The  universal  agreement  of  fair-minded  men  in 
support  of  some  principle  or  law  of  conduct  creates  a  strong 
presumption  in  its  favor.  Moreover  the  more  enlightened  a 
community  may  be  the  greater  weight  attaches  to  its  judg- 
ments. It  is  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  opinions  of 
men  respecting  right  and  wrong  and  their  estimates  of  dif- 
ferent codes  of  duty  are  more  likely  to  be  affected  by  causes  of 
error  than  their  beliefs  concerning  the  facts  and  operations  of 
the  natural  universe  are.  Selfishness,  pride,  vanity,  the 
undue  love  of  pleasure,  power  and  earthly  possessions,  the 
overbearing  influence  of  society  and  the  authority  of  false 
traditional  teachings,  interfere  with  the  correct  exercise  of 
the  moral  faculty.  We  should  make  allowance  for  these 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  MORAL  REASON.  57 

causes  of  error,  and  should  accept  only  such  views  as  may 
seem  to  be  unaffected  by  them. 

11.  A  clear  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  Moral  Reason 
as  both  intellectual  and  motive,  throws  light  on  many  points 
of  ethical  inquiry.  Yet  an  understanding  of  the  operation  of 
this  faculty  does  not  of  itself  give  the  essential  characteristics 
of  the  right  and  obligatory.  Some  have  contented  themselves 
with  saying  that  morality  requires  of  us  a  life  according  to 
right  reason,  as  if  this  were  the  most  fundamental  truth  in 
ethics.  This  doctrine  is  only  the  starting  point  of  investiga- 
tion. It  would  not  explain  duty  to  say  simply  that  it  is  the 
conduct  required  of  us  by  the  moral  law.  We  would  have  to 
ascertain  what  the  requirements  of  the  moral  law  are,  and 
for  what  reason  they  are  right  and  obligatory  upon  us.  In 
the  same  manner  when  we  have  learned  that  virtue  is  a  life  in 
accordance  with  Moral  Reason,  we  have  still  to  determine 
what  the  teachings  and  guidings  of  that  reason  are,  and 
wherein  lies  their  excellence  and  the  source  of  their  authority. 

NOTE. — For  a  more  complete  analysis  of  intellectual  action 
whether  rational  or  subrational,  the  reader  is  referred  to  "THE 
PERCEPTION ALIST,"  a  text-book  in  Mental  Science. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MORAL  ACTIONS. 

1.  A  word  may  have  various  meanings  through  additions  to  a  fun- 
damental signification. — 2.  Primarily  an  action  is  simply  the 
operation  of  some  power. — 3.  Then  it  may  be  an  operation  con- 
sidered as  effecting  some  result.— 4.  Thirdly,  it  may  be  the  in- 
tentional (or  intelligent)  exertion  of  power. — 5.  Fourthly,  it  may 
be  conceived  of  as  springing  from  a  given  animus,  or  motivity. 
— 6.  Intentional  and  desiderative  actions  may  be  based  on  either 
the  intransitive  or  the  transitive. — 7.  The  desiderative  action  is 
based  on  the  intentional ;  and  is  sometimes  confounded  with  it. 
— 8.  An  action  has  no  moral  character  unless  it  be  either  inten- 
tional or  desiderative  ;  a  complete  moral  action  is  both. — 9. 
Actions  are  right  or  wrong  as  intelligent  and  intentional  ;  they 
are  virtuous  or  vicious  as  being  also  desiderative,  or  dispositional. 
— 10.  One  may  intelligently  perform  a  right  action  with  a  vicious 
motive  or  animus,  but  not  a  wrong  action  with  a  virtuous 
motive. — 11.  In  a  weak  sense  an  action  may  be  right  or  wrong 
simply  as  intentionable  ;  in  which  case  one  may  do  wrong  with- 
out any  vicious  motive. — 12.  Since  only  intentional  action  is 
right  or  wrong  the  judgments  of  reason  are  to  be  obeyed,  even 
though  they  may  vary  from  those  of  a  perfect  wisdom.  They 
give  the  right  and  the  wrong  for  us. — 13.  Right  and  wrong 
actions  may  be  either  practical  or  affectional.  In  the  former 
one  accomplishes  an  external  aim.  In  the  latter  he  exercises  a 
desire,  or  motivity,  intentionally  ;  he  cherishes  the  desire. 

1.  AMONG  those  uses  of  language  which  tend  to  confusion 
of  thought  one  of  the  most  subtle  is  that  the  same  word  may 
sometimes  express  an  idea  taken  simply  and  at  other  times 
that  same  idea  with  some  modifying  addition.  "  Man/'  for 
example,  may  mean  merely  a  human  being,  one  of  the  species 
liomo;  as  when  we  say,  "  Man  is  mortal"  ;  in  which  case  it  is 
used  simply;  or  it  may  stand  for  the  adult  male  of  our  species, 
as  when  we  say,  "  Marriage  is  the  union  of  one  man  and  of 
one  woman  for  life;"  or  it  may  signify  one  who  exhibits  the 
qualities  which  should  belong  to  the  adult  male  human  being, 
and  who  in  the  Latin  language  is  called  "  vir ; "  as  in  the  ex- 
hortation, "  Be  a  man ;  show  thyself  a  man."  In  like  manner 
the  term  "  vessel  "  sometimes  signifies  a  receptacle  suitable  for 
containing  liquids  or  solids,  as  when  we  speak  of  an  earthen 
58 


CHAP.  VI.]  MORAL  ACTIONS.  59 

or  metal  or  wooden  vessel,  while  at  other  times  it  means  a 
structure,  such  as  a  ship  or  a  boat,  capable  of  carrying  goods 
and  passengers  on  the  water.  In  ethics  it  is  quite  necessary  to 
consider  both  the  radical  idea  belonging  to  the  word  "  action  " 
and  certain  modifications  of  this  idea  which  are  expressed  by 
the  same  word. 

2.  In  the  simplest  use  of  the  term,  an  action  is  merely  the 
operation  of  some  power,  any  effect  which  may  be  produced  by 
the  operation  being  excluded  from  the  conception.    An  exer- 
cise of  power  thus  conceived  of  is  what  grammarians  call  an 
intransitive  action.    Thus  we  say,  "  The  wind  blows ;  the  sun 
shines;  the  dog  barks;  the  child  screams;  the  man  thinks;  the 
woman  talks."    In  the  discussions  of  ethics  this  radical  idea  of 
action  must  be  taken  in  a  very  broad  application  and  so  as  to 
include  mere  efforts  as  well  as  completed  activities.     For  an 
effort  is  an  inchoate  or  rudimentary  action ;  it  becomes  an  ac- 
tion in  the  full  sense  when  it  is  rightly  directed  and  is  of  suf- 
ficient vigor  to  overcome  obstructions  or  counteractives.    The 
endeavor  of  a  paralytic  to  rise  or  of  a  dumb  man  to   speak 
would  be  actions  of  this  sort.    Such  efforts  of  themselves  are 
not  moral,  though  they  may  become  so,  by  reason  of  certain 
additions,  in  the  same  way  that  successful  efforts  become 
moral;  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  their  morality  that  they 
should  be  successful. 

3.  In  the  next  place,  an  action  may  be  conceived  and  spoken 
of,  not  simply  as  an  exercise  of  power,  but  as  an  exercise  of 
power  accomplishing  some  result.    It  is  then  what  gramma- 
rians call  a  transitive  action.    The  distinction,  however,  which 
we  now  make  is  more  searching  than  that  required  by  gram- 
matical rules,  because  the  science  of  Ethics  calls  for  a  more 
thorough  analysis  of  thought  than  is  suggested  by  the  ordi- 
nary forms  of  language.     Let  us  now  style  an  action  tran- 
sitive whenever  the  thought  of  a  result  is  included  in  it,  even 
though  the  expression  of  this  thought  may  not  need  a  noun 
in  the  objective  case.     When  we  say,  "  The  tree  falls ;  the 
water  freezes ;  the  man  dies,"  we  speak  of  actions  not  merely 
as  exercises  of  power,  but  also  as  resulting  in  certain  condi- 
tions.    For  as  the  tree  falls,  so  it  lies;  the  frozen  water  has 
become  hard ;  and  the  man  who  has  died  is  dead.    As  involv- 
ing a  result  these  are  as  transitive  actions  as  when  we  say, 
"  The  workman  fells  the  tree ;  the  sun  melts  the  ice ;  the  rob- 
ber has  killed  the  man."    They  would  be  strictly  intransitive 
only  if  we  could  exclude  from  them  any  thought  of  the  con- 


60  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  VI. 

sequence.  In  metaphysical  and  ethical  discussions  any  action 
may  be  called  transitive  if  regarded  as  productive  of  some- 
thing different  from  itself  either  in  the  agent  or  in  the  object 
acted  upon,  the  idea  of  this  result  being  combined  and  incor- 
porated with  that  of  the  exercise  of  power. 

4.  A  third  style  of  action  may  be  designated  the  inten- 
tional.   This  arises  whenever  an  agent  performs  any  action, 
whether  intransitive  or  transitive,  knowingly  and  freely.    For 
example,  we  say,  "  The  dog  defended  his  master ;  the  wood- 
man felled  a  tree ;  the  student  read  his  book ;  the  lion  roared 
savagely;  the  minstrel  sang  of  battles;  the  warrior  fought 
well;"  for  all  these  actions  include  the  intention  of  doing 
them.    This  is  a  part  of  their  very  essence.    Under  this  head, 
too,  we  place  a  class  of  actions  which  may  fail  of  their  end 
but  yet  must  be  ranked  as  intentional,  because  they  include  a 
design  or  purpose.     They  may  be  called  attemptive  actions. 
One  shoots  at  but  misses  his  bird ;  it  flies  away  soaring  and  re- 
joicing.   In  ethics  such  a  futile  attempt  differs  little  from -the 
successful  one.     For  certain  sufficient  reasons  human  justice 
does  not  reward  the  ineffectual  effort  to  do  right  or  to  do 
wrong  so  decidedly  as   the   effectual;   Divine   righteousness, 
however,  makes  no  discrimination.     Human  laws  take  only 
a  limited  cognizance  of  the  unsuccessful  attempt,  but  we  have 
reason  to  believe  that  no  endeavor  to  do  good  fails  of  appro- 
bation and  blessing  from  above  and  that  no  attempted  crime 
fails  to  be  recorded  in  a  supreme  judgment-book. 

5.  Finally,  an  action,  whether  transitive  or  intransitive, 
may  be,  not  merely  the  intentional  doing  or  attempting  of 
something,  but  it  may  be  such  a  doing  from  a  given  animus, 
or  motivity,  of  the  spirit.    In  other  words,  an  action  may  be 
not  simply  the  doing  of  a  thing  knowingly  and  with  an  intel- 
ligent purpose,  but  also  the  doing  of  it  from  a  desire  for  some 
end  to  be  realized  either  in  the  action  or  by   means    of   it. 
Hence  the  deeds  of  a  conqueror  or  usurper  are  said  to  be  am- 
bitious actions,  as  when  Napoleon  in  Notre  Dame  placed  the 
crown  upon  his  own  head.    The  doings  of  a  philanthropist  are 
called  benevolent ;  such  were  those  of  Florence  Nightingale  in 
the  Crimean  hospitals;  of  Howard  when  he  visited  the  jails  of 
Europe  in  order  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  prisoners ; 
such  to-day  are  those  of  Miss  Barton  and  her  associates  of  the 
red  cross  among  the  Cuban  reconcentrados.    The  occupations 
of  an  earnest  business  man  are  said  to  be  interested  actions; 
they  may  even  be  avaricious.    We  characterize  deeds  as  selfish 


CHAP.  VI.J  MORAL  ACTIONS.  61 

or  generous,  noble  or  base,  according  to  the  character  of  the 
motive  feeling  which  controls  and  governs  them.  As  the  kind 
of  actions  of  which  we  now  speak  are  distinguished  by  the  ani- 
mus or  desire  from  which  they  proceed  they  may  be  desig- 
nated desiderative  actions.  They  might  also  be  named  "  dis- 
positional,"  not  simply  as  arising  from  a  disposition,  or  spring 
of  action,  but  because  they  are  conceived  of  as  including  the 
exercise  of  a  particular  disposition  or  motive  tendency  as  a 
part  of  themselves.  Intentional  and  desiderative  actions  may 
be  based  on  either  the  intransitive  or  the  transitive. 

6.  Thus,  beginning  with  the  radical  conception  of  the  activ- 
ity of  some  power,  we  find  that  the  term  "  action  "  may  have 
four  different  meanings.    It  may  indicate  an  intransitive,  or  a 
transitive,  or  an  intentional,  or  a  desiderative,  action. 

The  transitive  is  distinguished  from  the  intransitive  be- 
cause of  our  ways  of  viewing  things  quite  as  much  as  because 
of  difference  in  the  things  themselves.  For  every  exercise  of 
power  seems  to  be  attended  by  some  result,  though  in  many 
cases  this  may  not  be  prominent  or  noticeable ;  in  other  cases, 
too,  actions  ordinarily  conceived  of  as  transitive,  if  the  result 
be  neglected,  may  be  conceived  of  as  intransitive.  Thus  the 
transitive  actions  of  buying  and  selling  may  be  considered  in- 
transitively as  the  occupation  of  trading. 

The  intentional  action  is  built  upon  either  one  of  the  more 
simple  kinds,  though  more  frequently  on  the  transitive.  It 
always  includes  an  intelligence  on  the  part  of  the  agent,  or,  as 
we  say,  a  knowledge  of  what  one  is  doing.  It  includes  also  the 
aiming  at  an  end,  though  this  may  not  be  an  end  of  desire  but 
only  of  intention.  When  William  Tell  sent  his  arrow  through 
the  apple  on  his  boy's  head,  the  cleft  apple  was  the  immediate 
end  or  aim  of  his  action,  but  the  cleaving  of  that  apple  was 
not  the  end  of  the  desire  in  his  heart.  He  shot  at  the  apple 
most  unwillingly.  His  motive  thought  was  to  obtain  freedom 
for  himself  and  for  his  son  and  for  all  Switzerland.  Some- 
times, indeed,  an  agent  may  be  spoken  of  as  intentionally  ac- 
tive without  any  end  or  purpose,  as  when  monkeys  gambol 
among  the  trees  or  dogs  frisk  over  the  ground.  In  such  cases, 
however,  the  activity  itself  is  aimed  at  both  as  an  intentional 
and  as  a  desiderative  end.  For  one  may  take  a  walk  or  a  ride, 
or  may  dance  or  sing  or  swing  clubs  or  turn  summersaults, 
simply  because  he  finds  these  exercises  pleasurable  in  them- 
selves. 

7.  The  desiderative  or  dispositional  action  is  founded  on 


62  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VI. 

the  intentional ;  it  is  the  intentional  with  an  important  addi- 
tion. Often  when  we  see  a  man  doing  a  thing  intentionally, 
we  understand  his  immediate  aim  or  end,  but  we  do  not  see 
why  he  does  it,  or,  rather,  with  what  motive  he  does  it.  In 
this  case  we  can  call  his  action  intentional,  but  not  desidera- 
tive.  But  when  we  perceive  the  ultimate  end — the  end  which 
the  man  desires — and  allow  this  to  qualify  our  conception, 
then  we  have  the  dispositional  action.  This  is  built  on  the 
intentional  somewhat  in  the  same  way  that  the  transitive  is 
built  on  the  intransitive.  When  we  speak  of  a  deed  as  kind 
or  selfish,  or  revengeful,  or  generous,  or  public-spirited,  or 
disinterested,  or  wicked,  or  virtuous,  then  we  are  thinking  of 
it  as  a  desiderative  action.  Such  an  action  might  also  be 
called  movent,  because  it  includes  the  exercise  of  motivity  as 
a  part  of  its  very  essence. 

8.  We  are  now  prepared  to  consider  rational  actions  in 
their  relations  to  morality.     Evidently  no  action  is  moral 
simply  as  an  exertion  of  power  or  even  as  effectuating  a  result. 
The  blowing  of  the  wind,  the  falling  of  a  tree,  the  sinking  of 
a  ship,  the  wreck  of  a  railroad  train,  are  of  themselves  with- 
out ethical  character.     This  is  the  case  with  all  of  man's 
actions  apart  from  his  conscious  intelligence.    Should  one  on 
a  dark  night  walk  over  a  precipice  and  be  dashed  to  pieces  he 
would  not  have  committed  suicide :  or  should  he  through  mis- 
take give  deadly  poison  to  a  sick  friend,  as  Mrs.  Tyndall  did 
to  her  beloved  husband,  he  would  not  be  guilty  of  murder.    In 
either  case  there  would  be  a  sad  accident,  but  nothing  blame- 
worthy or  morally  wrong. 

Every  complete  moral  action  is  both  intentional  and  de- 
siderative, and,  as  such,  it  is  not  only  right  or  wrong,  but  also 
virtuous  or  vicious.  In  order  to  this  completeness,  however, 
as  has  been  already  suggested,  it  need  not  be  an  effectual  suc- 
cess. There  is  need  only  that  it  be  an  intelligent  and  earnest 
attempt.  The  man  who  deliberately  aims  the  gun  and  pulls 
the  trigger  with  the  intent  to  take  the  life  of  an  innocent  per- 
son is  a  murderer,  even  though  the  weapon  may  fail  to  explode 
or  the  bullet  go  wide  of  its  mark.  Evidently  the  ethical 
character  of  an  action  depends  upon  the  intelligence,  or  the 
intention,  and  upon  the  desire,  or  animus,  with  which  it  is 
done.  All  the  morality  of  actions  lies  essentially  in  these  two 
things. 

9.  Considerable  light  may  now  be  thrown  upon  some  im- 
portant terms  in  moral  science  and  upon  the  ideas  they  are 


CHAP.  VI.]  MORAL  ACTIONS.  63 

used  to  express.  We  can,  at  least  partially,  explain  these 
terms.  Sometimes  we  speak  of  actions  as  right  or  wrong;  at 
other  times,  we  speak  of  them  as  virtuous  or  vicious.  It  is 
natural  to  ask,  "  Is  there  any  difference  in  these  two  modes  of 
characterization,  and,  if  so,  what  is  it  ? "  These  questions 
may  be  answered  in  view  of  the  distinction  which  we  have 
made  between  the  intentional  and  the  desiderative  action. 

First  we  say  that  no  action  is  morally  right  unless  it  be  the 
intentional  effectuation  of  a  certain  kind  of  end,  or  the  inten- 
tional exercise  of  a  certain  mode  of  activity — this  latter,  as  in 
the  case  of  loving  one's  children  or  honoring  one's  parents, 
being  in  itself  an  end.  So  also  no  action,  strictly  speaking, 
can  be  morally  wrong  unless  it  be  the  intentional  doing  of 
that  which  conflicts  with  what  it  is  right  and  obligatory  to 
seek  or  do.  All  this  is  involved  in  the  fact  that  only  rational 
actions  can  be  right  or  wrong. 

Here,  however,  it  is  needful  to  note  that  although  a  right 
action  is  always  the  seeking  or  accomplishment  of  some  right 
end,  it  does  not  necessarily  involve  the  seeking  of  that  end  for 
its  own  sake.  When  one  obeys  some  moral  law  or  does  some 
right  action  his  immediate  intention  and  aim  is  to  do  that 
which  is  right ;  and  so  this  may  be  called  his  immediate  pur- 
pose or  end.  But  it  may  be  an  intentional  and  instrumental, 
and  not  a  desiderative,  or  ultimate,  end.  Thus  it  happens 
that  one  may  do  a  right  action,  and  that  intentionally,  with- 
out any  virtuous  animus  or  desire.  He  who  is  honest  only 
because  honesty  is  the  best  policy  may  be  morally  correct  and 
right  in  his  business  dealings,  but  his  conduct  is  entirely  de- 
void of  virtue.  Knaves  often  do  right  things  and  intend  to  do 
them  as  such,  though  not  for  their  own  sake.  Selfish  and  un- 
principled men  have  been  known  to  observe  for  a  time  the 
strictest  rules  of  conduct  that  they  might  obtain  the  confi- 
dence of  those  whom  they  intend  to  swindle.  The  intentional 
doing  of  right  is  often  a  part  of  that  course  of  conduct  by 
which  hypocritical  scoundrels  bring  on  themselves  a  just  con- 
demnation. 

10.  But,  while  a  right  action  may  be  done  with  a  vicious 
motive  by  one  who  has  a  full  understanding  of  its  nature,  we 
cannot  say  that  a  wrong  action  can  be  done  with  a  virtuous 
motive  by  one  who  has  a  full  understanding  of  its  nature. 
The  mere  fact  that  one  does  a  right  action  intelligently  does 
not  enable  us  to  determine  from  what  spirit  or  desire  it  pro- 
ceeds, but  the  doing  of  a  wrong  deed  intelligently  must  pro- 


64  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VI. 

ceed  from  an  improper  or  immoral  animus.  For  while  every 
rational  action  must  proceed  from  some  motivity  or  other,  any 
disposition,  which,  in  full  view  of  the  right,  rejects  the  right 
and  pursues  an  opposite  end,  is  necessarily  vicious ;  therefore, 
also,  the  action  which  it  animates  is  vicious.  The  intelligent 
intentional  violation  of  the  law  of  Tightness  cannot  be  done 
innocently.  In  accordance  with  this  we  find  that  the  intelli- 
gent doing  of  an  unlawful  act  is  always  considered  a  crime,  as 
in  the  case  of  blasphemy,  theft,  perjury  and  murder.  In  such 
cases  the  evil  animus  cannot  be  separated  from  the  intelligent 
intention. 

11.  Nevertheless  at  this  point  we  must  note  an  exception 
to  the  rule  that  actions,  as  morally  right  or  wrong,  are  always 
intentional;  though  it  is  an  exception  which  proves  the  rule. 
We  must  admit  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  one  may  do 
what  is  right  or  wrong  without  knowing  that  it  is  right  or 
wrong,  and  therefore  without  intending  to  do  it.  Such  an  ac- 
tion cannot  properly  be  called  intentional.  A  farmer  who  did 
not  know  the  exact  boundaries  of  his  land  might,  through 
mistake,  cut  down  trees  belonging  to  his  neighbor;  a  woman, 
who  had  been  erroneously  informed  of  the  death  of  her  hus- 
band, might  marry  another  man  while  her  husband  was  yet 
living.  These  persons  might  be  said  to  do  wrong  unintention- 
ally. In  like  manner  if  one  of  two  assassins,  on  a  dark  night, 
wounded  and  disabled  the  other  instead  of  stabbing  the  man 
they  intended  to  attack,  or  if  a  perjured  witness  by  mistake 
told  the  truth  when  he  was  intending  to  swear  falsely,  in 
either  case  we  could  say  that  one  acted  rightly  without  having 
any  intention  of  doing  so. 

Even  in  such  exceptional  instances,  however,  an  action  as 
right  or  as  wrong  is  always  thought  of  as  having  a  relation  to 
rational  intelligence.  It  has  ethical  character  and  signifi- 
cance as  being  a  possible  and  natural  object  of  conception  and 
purpose.  Although  not  intentional  it  is  intentionable.  Only 
in  this  light  it  can  be  spoken  of  as  right  or  wrong.  But  this 
is  a  weak  and  secondary  use  of  language.  In  most  cases  when 
we  say  that  a  man  does  what  is  right  or  what  is  wrong,  we 
mean  that  he  acts  knowingly  and  intentionally.  Moreover, 
in  order  that  a  deed  may  be  virtuous  or  vicious  it  must  be  an 
intentional,  and  not  merely  an  intentionable,  action.  An  ac- 
tion merely  intentionable,  and  not  intended,  cannot  be  con- 
nected with  that  spirit,  or  animus,  in  the  exercise  of  which 
virtue  and  vice  essentially  consist. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MORAL  ACTIONS.  (55 

12.  The  distinctions  above  considered  throw  light  not  only 
on  right  and  wrong,  virtue  and  vice,  but  also  on  some  ques- 
tions respecting  moral  law  and  its  binding  effect.     As  right 
and  wrong,  virtue  and  vice,  pertain  to  actions  only  as  inten- 
tional, it  is  plain  that  a  rule  of  conduct  is  obligatory  only  on 
those  who  can  understand  and  apply  it,  and  only  so  far  as 
they  do  so,  according  to  their  ability.    Therefore  should  one 
be  limited  to  a  partial  and  imperfect  apprehension  of  duty, 
he  might  be  obligated  to  do  that  which  falls  short  of  an  abso- 
lute and  unobjectionable  standard.    This  principle  should  be 
especially  borne  in  mind  if  we  would  not  judge  too  harshly 
the  morality  of  any  nation  or  any  age.     Any  person,  who,  at 
any  time,  has  earnestly  and  honestly  desired  and  striven  to 
know  his  duty,  and  who  has  lived  according  to  the  light  ob- 
tainable by  him,  should  be  considered  to  have  done  right,  and 
should  have  the  praise  and  reward  of  virtue,  even  though  he 
may  not  have  lived  according  to  an  omniscient,  or  even  an 
enlightened,  wisdom.     Were  a  worker  in  wood  ordered  to 
make  a  globe  exactly  one  foot  in  diameter  or  a  cube  each  of 
whose  edges  should  be  exactly  a  foot  in  length,  his  task  would 
be  so  definite  that  he  himself  as  well  as  others  would  be  cog- 
nizant of  any  imperfection  in  the  execution  of  it.     Models 
for  moral  conduct  have  not  been  given  after  this  fashion. 
Fallible  human  reason  must  determine  for  itself  the  princi- 
ples of  duty  and  apply  them  according  to  the  varying  cir- 
cumstances of  life.     Therefore,  while  right  and  wrong  may 
not  in  themselves  be  things  of  an  unsettled  and  changeable 
nature,  man's  perception  of  them  may  be  partial,  imperfect 
and  even  erroneous,  and  may  vary  somewhat  from  time  to 
time  and  from  age  to  age. 

13.  Before  closing  this  discussion  we  must  notice  a  dis- 
tinction of  considerable  importance  in  ethics.    It  is  that  be- 
tween practical  and  affectional  actions.     Here,  for  the  want 
of  a  better  designation,  we  give  the  name  "  practical  "  to  those 
actions  in  which  we  exert  either  bodily  or  mental  power,  be- 
cause these,  for  the  most  part,  when  they  are  intentional,  aim 
at  some  practical  result;  as,  for  example,  when  one  performs 
a  calculation,  or  delivers  a  speech,  or  runs  a  race,  or  does  a 
day's  work.    On  the  other  hand,  by  an  affectional  action,  we 
mean  the  exercise  of  any  of  the  motivities  of  the  soul,  whether 
it  be  love  or  hatred,  ambition  or  avarice,  generosity,  domestic 
affection,  self-interest,  public  spirit  or  any  other  motive  tend- 
ency.    Sometimes  the  exercise  of  such  motive  feeling  is  not 

5 


66  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  VI. 

called  an  action,  but  is  spoken  of  as  a  source  or  spring  of 
action ;  then,  in  correspondence  with  this  use  of  language,  the 
word  action  is  limited  to  those  exercises  of  power  which  have 
been  designated  above  as  practical.  But  evidently  the  exercise 
of  motivity,  while  being  the  source  and  cause  of  practical 
actions,  can  also  itself  be  styled  an  action ;  because  any  activ- 
ity of  any  power  is  an  action,  and  this  is  the  activity  of  a 
mode  of  psychical  power.  It  is  also  clear  that  any  motivity 
can  be  exercised  either  simply — that  is,  as  excited  by  it's 
proper  object  or  end  and  without  self-direction  or  self-stimu- 
lation on  the  part  of  the  agent,  or  it  can  be  consciously  en- 
couraged or  consciously  repressed  by  the  effort  of  the  agent 
himself.  In  other  words,  an  affectional,  no  less  than  a  prac- 
tical, action  either  may  or  may  not  be  intentional. 

In  accordance  with  what  has  been  said  it  is  only  as  inten- 
tional thai  any  action,  whether  practical  or  affectional,  can  be 
right  or  wrong  or  have  any  moral  character.  One  may  exer- 
cise a  natural  affection  or  motivity  not  only  intentionally  but 
also  because  he  desires  to  do  right  and  regards  that  as  the 
right  and  obligatory  thing  to  do.  In  this  case  we  say  that  his 
action,  that  is,  his  exercise  of  motivity,  is  virtuous;  we  even 
call  the  motivity,  thus  rightly  and  intentionally  exercised,  a 
virtue.  We  say,  for  example,  that  patriotism,  parental  affec- 
tion, patience,  and  benevolence,  as  rightly  exercised,  are  vir- 
tues. On  the  other  hand  the  conscious  cherishing  of  motivi- 
ties  which  oppose  themselves  to  right  conduct,  such  as  selfish- 
ness, or  envy,  or  avarice,  is  considered  an  evil  action ;  and  the 
affection  as  thus  cherished  is  called  a  vice. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

ENDS   OR  FINAL   CAUSES. 

1.  The  word  "  end  "  has  various  meanings.  In  ethics  it  signifies  a 
result,  not  as  accomplished,  but  only  as  intended  or  desired. — 
2.  We  distinguish  the  intentional,  or  proximate,  from  the  ulti- 
mate, or  desiderative,  end. — 3.  The  latter  is  the  end  par  excellence. 
It  is  an  ideal,  not  a  real,  object. — 4.  An  object  as  an  end  is 
characterized  ab  extra. — 5.  Though  ends  are  called  "  final 
causes,"  it  is  not  they  but  the  conception  of  them  that  is  caus- 
ative. Even  this  is  not  an  "  efficient  "  but  only  an  "  occasional " 
cause.  Aristotle  quoted. — 6.  The  proximate  end  does  not  deserve 
the  name  "  final  cause  "  so  fully  as  the  ultimate  end. — 7.  The 
limited  meanings  of  the  word  "  cause  "  may  be  explained  in 
connection  with  the  complete  philosophical  conception  of  cause. 
— 8.  Some  make  moral  actions,  others  moral  ends,  the  chief 
subject  of  their  study.  Both  claim  our  attention. — 9.  Some 
actions  are  right  or  wrong  "  per  se,"  others  "per  accidens." — 
10.  The  doctrine  of  ends  is  more  fundamental,  though  it  is  not 
more  important,  in  ethics  than  that  of  actions. 

1.  THAT  part  of  an  object  which  is  last  reached  in  some 
order  of  movement  or  procedure  is  commonly  called  the  end; 
this  is  the  primary  use  of  that  term.  We  speak  of  the  end  of 
a  string  or  of  a  rod;  we  say  that  the  ferule  is  on  the  end  of 
the  cane,  or  that  in  walking  we  have  come  to  the  end  of  the 
pathway.  With  a  somewhat  similar  meaning  the  last  part  of 
some  process  or  work  is  called  the  end  of  it.  Rest  is  enjoyed 
after  one's  labors  have  come  to  an  end;  the  speaker  reserves 
some  weighty  thought  for  the  end  of  his  oration ;  the  driving 
of  the  last  spike — a  gilded  one — was  the  end  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  first  transcontinental  railroad.  Again,  the  term\ 
"  end  "  is  sometimes  used  to  signify  the  final  result  of  some/ 
protracted  undertaking  or  series  of  operations.  A  house,  i 
statue,  a  picture  is  the  end  accomplished  by  skilfully  directed 
labors.  One  of  the  Hebrew  prophets  in  view  of  wonderful 
events  which  he  foresaw,  asked  "  0  my  Lord,  what  shall  be 
the  end  of  these  things  ?  "  that  is,  "  what  shall  be  the  outcome 
of  them?"  and  one  of  the  apostolic  writers,  having  referred 
to  certain  shameful  sins,  said,  "  The  end  of  those  things  is 
death," 

67 


68  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VII. 

In  ethics  an  end  is  not  an  accomplished  result,  nor  is  it,  in* 
any  literal  sense,  the  last  of  a  series  of  things.     It  is  con-\ 
ceived  of  as  existing  and  operating  at  the  beginning  of  a  series  1 
and  is  considered  to  be  in  some  sense  a  cause.    Philosophers 
have  designated  it  the  final  cause.    It  is  a  result  considered  as 
not  yet  existing  but  as  conceived  of  and  aimed  at.     It  is  the 
object  which  one  who  has  a  purpose  seeks  to  realize,  or  which, 
with  or  without  a  purpose,  one  desires  to  be  realized.    For,  in 
either  of  these  cases,  there  is  what  may  be  called  a  cause. 

2.  At  this  point  we  must  recall  the  distinction  made  in  a 
previous  discussion  between  what  we  style  the  intentional  and 
the  desiderative  end,  or,  as  they  are  sometimes  called,  the 
proximate  and  the  ultimate.  The  latter  of  these  is  preemi- 
nently an  end,  and  is  what  this  word  more  commonly  signi- 
fies.   For  when  any  object  is  an  end  of  desire,  it  is  sought  for 
its  own  sake  and  not  for  any  other  object  for  which  it  may  be 
instrumental.     But  a  proximate  or  intentional  end,  though 
aimed  at  and  labored  for,  being  the  end  simply  of  an  inten- 
tion and  not  of  a  motivity,  may  be  only  the  means  to  an  end 
beyond  itself.    Though  such  ends  are  often  called  final  causes, 
they  deserve  that  name  only  in  a  secondary  way. 

Of  course  the  same  object  may  be  at  the  same  time  an  end 
of  purpose  and  an  end  of  desire — in  other  words,  both  an  in- 
tentional and  a  desiderative  end.  Indeed  an  end  of  motivity 
cannot  be  definitely  sought  without  its  being  also  an  end  of 
purpose  or  intention.  Nevertheless  an  object  as  in  one  of 
these  relations  can  easily  be  distinguished  even  from  itself  as 
in  the  other  of  these  relations ;  and  so,  with  a  little  care,  one 
can  avoid  confounding  the  intentional  with  the  desiderative 
end. 

3.  In  further  discussion  we  shall  refer  chiefly  to  those  ends 
which  are  desiderative,  and  therefore  truly  ultimate.     Evi- 
dently such  ends  do  not  literally  exist.     In  fact  both  inten- 
tional and  desiderative  ends  are  only  ideal  objects — objects 
not  real  but  to  be  realized.    When  Napoleon  at  the  beginning 
of  his  career  determined  to  win  fame  and  power  these  things 
were  as  yet  non-existent;  and  so  every  object  of  desire  exists 
only  in  the  ideas  of  the  mind — that  is,  it  does  not  exist  at  all, 
but  is  only  conceived  of  as  having  a  future  or  possible  exist- 
ence.    It  may  be  said,  "  Do  not  men  desire  money  ?     And 
does  not  money  really  exist  ?  "    Certainly  we  often  speak  in 
that  way.    But,  in  strict  truth,  the  object  desired  is  not  the 
money  simply  but  the  money  in  possession ;  and  so  our  wishes, 


CHAP.  VII.]  ENDS  OR  FINAL  CAUSES.  69 

even  when  occupied  about  existing  things,  always  are  directed 
to  some  future  having  or  enjoying  which  is  not  yet  a  reality. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  ideals  of 
our  desire  and  pursuit  are  fashioned  by  the  mind  from 
knowledge  gained  in  experience.  Therefore,  though  not  reali- 
ties, they  refer  to  realities  and  are  based  upon  them.  This  is 
the  case  with  the  ideals  of  the  moral  faculty  and  of  the  moral 
law  as  well  as  with  all  others.  Although,  by  a  refining  pro- 
cess in  the  mind,  they  may  be  made  more  excellent  than  any 
results  yet  realized,  they  are  formed  from  a  consideration  of 
man's  circumstances  in  the  past,  and  of  the  conduct  which  in 
those  circumstances  has  been  found  necessary  or  desirable. 

4.  Another  point  worthy  of  attention  is  that  any  object, 
considered  as  an  end,  may  be  said  to  be  characterized  ab  extra. 
In  other  words,  it  is  viewed,  not  simply  in  itself,  but  in  its 
relation  to  some  motivity  of  spirit  by  which  we  naturally  tend 
to  seek  that  object.    We  must,  indeed,  conceive  of  the  object 
with  its  own  proper  nature,  but,  in  addition  to  this,  we  must 
perceive  that,  by  reason  of  its  nature,  it  is  fitted  to  excite  and 
to  satisfy  some  motivity.    For  things  are  attractive,  indiffer- 
ent or  repulsive  to  us  according  to  what  we  believe  each  of 
them  is,  or  rather  would  be  if  realized.     There  is  always  a 
relation  of  correspondence  between  the  character  of  an  end 
and  the  kind  of  motive  feeling  to  which  it  appeals. 

5.  An  objection  to  the  doctrine  that  ends  are  ideal  objects 
and  have  no  literal  existence,  may  now  be  considered.     One 
may  ask,  "  Can  any  relation  exist  if  one  of  the  two  relata  does 
not  exist  ?    If,  then,  there  is  a  relation  between  an  end  and  a 
motivity,  must  not  the  end,  as  well  as  the  motivity,  have 
actual  existence?"    It  must  be  allowed  that  no  relation  can 
exist  with  a  non-entity;  and  certainly  a  non-entity  cannot 
have  any  causal  relation  or  .exert  any  influence  of  any  kind. 

The  truth  is  that,  in  speaking  of  ends  and  their  attractive- 
ness, we  are  using  language  in  a  secondary  way.  We  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  ends  themselves  affect  motivities,  but  only 
that  the  ideas  of  the  ends  do  so.  Our  language  also  intimates 
that  the  ideas  exert  this  influence  because,  by  means  of  them, 
we  know  what  the  ends  would  be  if  they  were  realized.  Such 
language,  though  not  literal  but  secondary,  conveys  this  truth 
more  conveniently  than  could  be  done  by  any  other  use  of 
words. 

This  being  so,  we  have  to  say  that  the  expression  "final 
cause"  (which  would  mislead  if  interpreted  to  mean  that 


TO  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  VII. 

ends  exist  and  are  causative)  calls  attention  to  the  truth  that 
every  desire  or  motivity  has,  in  some  appropriate  idea,  what 
may  be  styled  a  specific  cause  or  excitant.  For  the  cause 
whereby  any  motivity  is  excited  to  seek  its  end,  is  the  con- 
ception of  the  end  as  apprehended  by  the  mind.  This  fact 
influenced  the  thought  of  Aristotle  when  he  divided  causes 
into  the  material,  the  formal,  the  final  and  the  efficient;  and 
when  he  sometimes  identified  the  final  with  the  formal,  and  at 
other  times  with  the  efficient.  According  to  Aristotle  final 
causes  operate  not  only  in  human  life  but  also  in  the  arrange- 
ments of  the  universe.  This  has  been  the  opinion  of  most 
philosophers,  though  some,  both  in  ancient  and  in  modern 
times,  have  denied  that  the  working  of  any  supreme  wisdom 
can  be  discovered  in  Nature  and  in  the  world.  To  us  the  evi- 
dence of  such  wisdom  is  overwhelming.  The  great  events  of 
history  as  well  as  the  great  operations  of  Nature  do  not  ap- 
pear to  have  been  accidents  nor  the  outcome  merely  of  human 
plans  and  efforts;  they  are  yet  more  the  doings  of 

"  a  Providence  which  shapes  our  ends 

Rough-hew  them  as  we  may." 

Final  causes  are  indispensable  to  any  adequate  explana- 
tion of  the  wonderful  organisms  and  orderings  of  the  physi- 
cal universe. 

6.  While  desiderative  ends,  preeminently,  are  called  causes, 
intentional  ends,  also,  may  claim  this  title.  They  are  condi- 
tions of  the  production  of  that  which  one  intends  to  accom- 
plish; without  intention,  there  could  be  no  doing,  and,  with- 
out doing,  nothing  done.  Moreover,  as  the  thing  immediately 
to  be  accomplished  is  an  intentional  "  end,"  it  may  be  called  a 
"  final "  cause.  At  the  same  time  it  is  less  worthy  than  the 
desiderative  end  of  the  designation  "final,"  and  it  is  less 
worthy  of  the  designation  "  cause."  It  resembles  what  Aris- 
totle terms  the  "  formal "  cause  in  being  a  causational  con- 
dition rather  than  what  we  ordinarily  call  a  cause,  and  in 
being  often  instrumental  to  an  end  beyond  itself.  It  is  "  for- 
mal "  because  it  includes  a  conception  of  the  result  to  be 
reached.  For  example,  the  plan  of  the  construction  of  a  chair 
or  of  a  table  is  an  essential  part  of  the  intention  to  make 
either  of  these  articles.  We  explain,  though  we  do  not  fully 
justify,  Aristotle's  occasional  identification  of  the  formal 
with  the  final  cause  by  reason  of  the  close  relationship  which 
exists  between  the  intentional  and  the  desiderative  end, 


CHAP.  VII.J  ENDS  OR  FINAL  CAUSES.  71 

7.  In  order  to  a  clear  and  exact  understanding  of  this  sub- 
ject, we  must  turn  from  the  obscure  and  perplexing  state- 
ments of  the  ancient  metaphysician  to  that  simple  and  com- 
prehensive definition  of  a  cause  which  is  given  us  by  modern 
philosophy.  The  fundamental  sense  of  this  word,  and  that 
presupposed  in  all  its  other  meanings,  is  that  a  cause  is  some 
efficient  agency  or  adequate  power  together  wi'th  all  the  condi- 
tions necessary  to  its  operation.  For  a  power  or  agent  can 
accomplish  nothing  unless  it  be  surrounded  by  circumstances 
suitable  to  excite,  to  guide,  and  to  receive,  its  activity.  Gun- 
powder can  send  a  ball  into  a  distant  fort  only  when  confined 
in  the  cannon  with  the  ball  in  front  of  it  and  with  the  muz- 
zle pointing  in  the  right  direction  and  when  the  cap  or  match 
has  been  used  to  start  the  explosion.  All  these  conditions, 
together  with  the  gunpowder  itself,  are  included  in  the  com- 
plete philosophical  cause. 

But  while  such  is  the  broad  meaning  of  the  word  "  cause," 
this  name  is  often  given  to  that  which  is  only  part  of  the 
entire  causal  antecedent.  For  example,  it  often  signifies  the 
power  and  efficiency  of  the  agent,  or  of  the  principal  agent, 
in  the  causation ;  or  it  may  denote  the  agent  as  possessing  and 
exercising  that  power.  In  the  illustration  given  either  the 
gunpowder  or  its  inherent  explosive  force  might  be  called 
the  cause.  Almost  as  frequently  this  term  is  applied  to  some 
condition  which  is  necessary  to  the  causation  but  which  yet 
contributes  no  efficiency  at  all.  Such  is  the  case  especially 
when  any  condition  may  be  regarded  as  the  only  circumstance 
wanting  to  render  the  antecedent  complete,  all  other  requi- 
sites being  already  supplied  or  at  hand.  Thus  one  might  say 
that  the  cause  of  a  railroad  train  being  precipitated  into  a 
river  was  that  the  drawbridge  had  been  carelessly  left  open, 
although  this  circumstance  could  not  exert  any  efficiency. 
We  are  sometimes  told — and  told  truly — that  cold  can  pro- 
duce great  effects.  But  if  cold,  as  scientists  say,  is  merely 
the  absence  of  heat,  it  can  exert  no  power  of  its  own  and  is 
only  the  opportunity  needed  for  the  operation  of  certain 
molecular  agencies.  In  some  such  secondary  way  as  this  the 
conception  of  an  end  is  called  a  cause;  and  is  a  cause.  The 
idea  of  a  desirable  object  and  even  our  belief  in'  the  attain- 
ability of  the  object  do  not  of  themselves  exert  any  attracting 
or  impelling  efficiency.  This  lies  wholly  in  the  motive  nature 
of  the  spirit.  Even  when  we  say  that  an  idea  excites  a  motiv- 
ity,  the  language  is  stronger  than  strict  literality.  The  con- 


72  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VII. 

ception  of  the  object  cannot  be  said  to  start  the  souPs  activity 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  a  spark  causes  powder  to  explode ; 
for  in  this  latter  action  there  is  an  initial  efficiency.  The  con- 
ception simply  presents  the  proper  natural  occasion  for  the 
exercise  of  a  motive  feeling;  for  this  reason,  it  belongs  to  a 
class  of  causes  which  are  sometimes  denominated  "  occa- 
sional "  causes, '  and  in  that  way  distinguished  from  "  effi- 
cient "  causes.  In  short,  while  the  conception  of  an  end  may 
be  properly  styled  causative,  the  efficiency  producing  desire 
and  volition  lies,  not  in  that  conception,  but  in  the  motive 
nature  which  the  conception  is  said  to  excite. 

8.  Some  ethical  writers — and  especially  the  Intuitionalist 
or  Dogmatic  school — give  no  fundamental  place  in  their  dis- 
cussions to  the  doctrine  of  ends.  They  direct  their  attention 
chiefly  to  rational  actions ;  they  define  ethics  as  the  science  of 
moral  conduct  or  of  the  moral  law.  Other  authors  base  their 
teachings  on  the  consideration  of  ends  and  treat  of  actions 
only  as  instrumental  and  subordinate  to  ends.  To  this  class 
belong  those  Hedonists,  whose  sole  rule  of  life  is  to  take  one's 
ease,  and  to  eat,  drink,  and  be  merry;  and  also  the  Utilita- 
rians, who  would  live  for  the  good  of  themselves  and  of 
others.  A  careful  student  of  ethics  must  hold  actions  and 
ends  in  equal  regard.  The  knowledge  of  ends  is  necessary  if 
we  would  understand  the  true  character  of  moral  actions, 
which  are  always  either  intentional  or  desiderative ;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  pursuit  of  ends,  except  in  and  through  right 
and  regulated  action  may  develope  an  erratic  and  dangerous 
freedom. 

The  whole  doctrine  concerning  the  relation  of  moral  actions 
to  ends  may  be  summed  up  in  two  propositions;  in  the  first 
place,  moral  ends  are  often  conceived  of  independently  of  ac- 
tions, and  are  then  regarded  as  the  objects  of  dutiful  desire 
and  as  results  to  which  actions  may  and  should  be  instru- 
mental; in  the  second  place,  actions  not  only  may  become 
moral  as  being  instrumental,  or  conducive,  to  moral  ends,  but 
are  often  themselves  regarded  as  including  and  being  moral 
ends. 

Nothing  could  be  more  evident  than  that  men  constantly 
conceive  of  moral  ends,  and  recognize  these  as  right  and  ob- 
ligatory and  as  the  basis  of  virtuous  and  praiseworthy  con- 
duct. That  was  a  right  end  which  Henry  the  Fourth^  the 
good  king  of  France,  kept  in  view  when  he  was  determined 
that  every  peasant  in  the  kingdom  should  have  a  chicken  in 


CHAP.  VII.]  ENDS  OR  FINAL  CAUSES.  73 

his  pot  on  Sunday.  George  Peabody,  the  American  banker 
who  had  accumulated  an  immense  fortune  in  London,  Eng- 
land, aimed  at  a  high  duty  when  he  devoted  his  means  to  the 
enlightenment  of  four  millions  of  African  freedmen  and  their 
descendants.  The  public  school  system  of  the  United  States 
has  for  its  object  an  intelligent  self-respecting  and  law-abid- 
ing citizenship;  and  this  is  its  claim  on  our  support.  Civil 
government  itself  is  founded  on  natural  and  divine  justice 
because  it  is  an  agency  necessary  for  order,  peace  and  equity 
between  man  and  man,  and  for  national  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence. Moreover,  when  we  examine  the  different  kinds  of 
virtue,  each  is  found  to  have  its  own  end.  The  aim  of  honesty 
is  that  every  man  should  have  what  is  rightfully  his  own. 
Chastity  seeks  for  purity  in  thought,  speech  and  behavior. 
Beneficence  and  benevolence  strive  for  the  good  of  one's  fel- 
low-creatures— for  their  comfort  and  prosperity  here  and  for 
their  welfare  in  a  future  world.  Righteousness,  or  justice  in 
general,  labors  for  the  maintenance  of  all  human  rights; 
while  punitive  justice  endeavors  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of 
law  and  duty  by  the  infliction  of  penalty  on  the  transgressor. 
Every  virtue  aims  at  some  end  which  claims  our  service. 
Evidently,  also,  any  action  or  doing  which  in  itself  is  without 
moral  character,  may  become  right  and  obligatory  if  it  be 
found  instrumentally  necessary  for  the  effectuation  of  a  right 
end. 

9.  We  agree,  therefore,  with  Utilitarians  and  others  who 
teach  that  actions  become  moral  and  dutiful  in  this  deriva- 
tive way,  but  we  do  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  Tightness  can 
attach  to  actions  only  so  far  as  they  may  be  instrumental  to 
ends  beyond  themselves.  For  certain  intransitive  actions,  as 
loving,  reverencing,  trusting,  honoring,  fearing,  and  other 
exercises  of  the  affections,  have  an  excellence  and  rightful- 
ness  of  their  own,  while  transitive  actions  are  often  regarded 
as  moral  because  they  include  the  result  aimed  at  as  a  very 
part  of  themselves.  In  either  of  these  cases  an  action  is  right 
per  se — it  has  the  ground  of  its  Tightness  in  its  own  nature, 
and  not  in  something  beyond  itself.  It  is  true  that  love  and 
other  virtues  are  right  because  they  lead  to  right  doing,  but 
they  also  have  an  inherent  excellence  and  Tightness  of  their 
own.  Then  such  crimes  as  theft  and  murder  are  wrong  in 
themselves,  not  because  of  results  that  follow  them,  but  be- 
cause of  the  results  included  in  them.  In  like  manner,  the 
telling  of  truth,  the  payment  of  debt,  the  relief  of  the  poor, 
the  instruction  of  the  young,  obedience  to  parents  and  magis- 


Y4  THE  MORAL  LAW.  CHAP.  VII. 

trates,  are  right,  because  these  things  include  within  them- 
selves the  realization  of  right  ends. 

The  scholastic  distinction  between  actions  right  or  wrong 
per  se  and  actions  right  or  wrong  per  accidens  is  well  founded. 
Few  actions,  except  loving,  doing  good,  hating,  and  doing  evil, 
are  so  inherently  right  or  wrong  that  they  are  never  con- 
ceived of  except  as  unavoidably  and  invariably  moral;  but 
many  actions  can  be,  and  are,  regarded  as  essentially  right  or 
wrong  when  they  are  the  definite  effectuation  of  some  moral 
or  immoral  end,  and  are  conceived  of  as  including  the  reali- 
zation of  that  end.  The  intentional  killing  of  a  man  is  not 
of  itself  a  crime,  but  when  done  without  just  and  sufficient 
cause  it  is  murder.  The  taking  of  one's  property  by  force  is 
not  always  robbery ;  it  is  such  only  in  ordinary  cases  and  when 
no  higher  consideration  of  duty  displaces  the  owner's  claim. 
To  lend  assistance  to  the  poor  is  a  thing  right  and  obligatory 
per  sef  but  only  when  performed  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  weak- 
en manhood  or  encourage  idleness.  In  like  manner,  the 
duties  of  friendship,  generosity,  loyalty  and  obedience  to 
authority,  self-denial  and  industry,  are  inherently  right,  but 
only  within  proper  limits  and  as  being  the  effectuation  of 
moral  ends.  These  statements  express  the  common  judgment 
of  mankind;  evidently  they  do  not  support  the  doctrine  that 
actions  are  never  right  or  wrong  per  se;  they  only  go  to  show 
in  what  manner  they  may  become  so.  For  any  form  of  action 
so  circumstanced  as  necessarily  to  effect  a  moral  end,  especi- 
ally if  it  be  of  frequent  recurrence,  naturally  comes  to  be  con- 
ceived of  as  inherently  right  or  wrong. 

10.  The  foregoing  discussion  evinces  that  the  consideration 
of  moral  ends,  though  no  more  important  than  that  of  moral 
actions,  is  more  fundamental.  Ends  have  a  moral  character 
apart  from  actions,  but  actions  are  right  or  wrong  only  as 
directed  towards  ends  or  as  including  their  accomplishment. 

Since  every  exercise  of  virtue  and  every  dutiful  action  aims 
at  some  end,  the  question  presents  itself,  "  Do  not  all  right 
ends  have  some  common  generic  nature  which  can  be  ascer- 
tained and  of  which  we  may  speak  as  the  supreme,  universal 
law  of  virtuous  conduct  ?  "  This  question  has  been  much  de- 
bated. Plainly,  if  any  satisfactory  answer  be  possible,  we 
can  hope  to  reach  it  only  through  a  process  of  patient  analysis 
and  induction.  For,  even  if  the  right  answer  were  hit  upon 
by  some  wise  conjecture,  we  could  not  be  sure  that  it  was 
right,  nor  could  we  convince  others  of  its  correctness,  without 
the  methodical  use  of  analysis  and  generalization. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  LOWER  MOTIVITIES. 

1.  The  word  "  motivity  "  designates  every  form  of  motive  feeling 
or  principle  in  an  unambiguous  and  unrestricted  way.— 2.  Our 
principal  motivities  are  (1)  instinct,  appetite,  propensity ;  (2) 
self-love,  affection  (benevolent  and  malevolent),  public  spirit; 
(3)  self-interest,  rational  beneficence,  moral  principle.  Roughly 
speaking  the  first  three  are  our  lower,  the  rest,  our  higher, 
motivities. — 3.  Instinct  pursues  an  end  of  its  own,  but  is  not 
cognizant  of  the  rational  end  which  it  serves. — 4.  It  is  not  mere 
physical  automatism.  Neither  is  it  the  only  form  of  psychical 
life  in  the  lower  animals. — 5.  Appetite  is  a  craving  of  which  we 
are  immediately  conscious  for  some  bodily  relief  or  gratification. 
Like  instinct  it  serves  a  rational  end  without  knowing  that  it 
does  so. — 6.  The  appetites  of  beings  endowed  with  reason  call 
for  a  regulation  not  needed  in  irrational  creatures. — 7.  Propen- 
sities have  their  roots  in  the  nature  of  spirit,  though  they  find 
stimulus  and  direction  in  bodily  life  and  its  surroundings.  •  They 
seek  (1)  knowledge  and  mental  occupation  ;  (2)  power  and  in- 
fluence ;  (3)  freedom  from  annoyance  along  with  ease  and  com- 
fort ;  (4)  activity  in  doing  ;  (5)  novelty  and  excitement  ;  (6)  con- 
genial society  ;  (7)  the  relief  and  comfort  of  companions  (sym- 
pathy) ;  (8)  the  esteem  of  others  and  of  oneself ;  (9)  property  ; 
(10)  the  reward  of  kindness  (gratitude)  ;  (11)  the  punishment 
of  injury  (resentment). — 8.  Sympathy,  the  altruistic  propensity, 
which  seeks  the  relief  and  satisfaction  of  one's  neighbor,  has  a 
peculiar  office  in  the  economy  of  spiritual  life. — 9.  The  love  of 
esteem  by  exciting  emulation  stimulates  other  propensities. 
Vanity  and  pride  are  its  illegitimate  offspring. — 10.  The  desire 
for  property  is  a  complex  sentiment  of  secondary  development. 
— 11.  Gratitude  and  resentment  are  propensities  only  in  their 
rudimentary  forms.  In  one  sense  the  former  is  more  "  natural ', 
than  the  latter. — 12.  Our  higher  motivities  technically  defined 
as  "  the  rational." 

THE  term  "  motivity "  designates  every  form  of  motive 
feeling  or  principle  in  an  unambiguous  and  unrestricted 
way. 

1.  The  word  "  motivity  "  is  used  to  avoid  an  ambiguity  in 
the  word  "  motive."  This  latter  term  sometimes  signifies  the 
end  which  one  desires  and  which  is  said  to  excite  one's  de- 
sires and  to  move  one  to  a  course  of  action ;  and  sometimes  it 
signifies  the  animus  or  desire  by  which  one  is  influenced  in 

75 


76  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP. Till. 

view  of  some  object  or  end.     "  Motivity  "  designates  the  de- 
sire, or  motive  feeling,  or  inward  principle  of  action,  alone. 

This  word,  also,  has  the  advantage  of  being  more  unre- 
stricted in  its  application  than  the  word  "  desire,"  and  even 
than  the  expression  "motive  feeling,"  as  these  terms  are 
ordinarily  employed.  Commonly,  when  we  speak  of  one  as 
having  a  desire  to  obtain  some  object  or  to  perform  some  ac- 
tion, we  understand  that  some  specific  form  of  pleasure  or 
gratification  is  sought,  and  is  to  be  realized  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  end  desired.  Moreover,  the  terms  "  desire  "  and 
"  feeling "  ordinarily  indicate  more  exciting  and  engrossing 
experiences  than  prudence,  or  interest,  or  principle,  or  right 
reason:  yet  all  these  are  true  motives.  Unless,  therefore,  we 
should  use  the  designations  "  desire  "  and  "  motive  feeling  " 
in  an  unusual  and  comprehensive  sense,  as,  indeed,  we  do 
sometimes,  we  must  avail  ourselves  of  some  such  term  as 
"  motivity." 

2.  Psychologists  classify  motivities  differently;  the  follow- 
ing plan  of  discussion  may  bring  them  before  us  in  an  orderly 
way.     Let  us  consider,  first,  the  instincts,  the  appetites,  and 
the  propensities;  secondly,  self-love,  benevolent  and  malevo- 
lent affection,  and  public  or  social  spirit;  thirdly,  self-inter- 
est, rational  beneficence,  and  moral  principle.    After  a  study 
of  these  groupings  let  us  also  consider  three  factors,  namely, 
reason,  sympathy,  and  habit,  which  largely  affect  the  motivi- 
ties, and  which  in  some  cases  may  be  said  to  originate  mo- 
tivities. 

3.  Instinct  is  more  removed  than  any  other  psychical  tend- 
ency from  moral  life.     It  is  an  inborn  disposition  to  act  in 
some  given  way,  or  to  work  in  some  useful  manner,  without 
rational  knowledge  of  the  end  to  be  subserved — there  being 
always  some  important  reason  for  the  instinctive  action.    In- 
stinct cannot  be  accounted  for  except  on  the  supposition  that 
the  same  wisdom  which,  at  the  first,  constructed  the  bodily 
organs  of  animals  without  any  assistance  from  them,  endowed 
their  spirits  also  with  tendencies  to  activities  without  any 
understanding,  on  the  part  of  the  animals,  of  the  main  pur- 
poses of  these  activities.     Instinct  is  a  device  whereby  the 
work  of  reason  and  experience  is  accomplished  in  the  absence 
of  reason  and  experience. 

•At  the  same  time  this  principle,  in  common  with  other 
motivities,  appears,  in  every  case,  to  pursue  an  end  or  pur- 
pose of  its  own.  The  animal,  acting  from  instinct,  is  not  a 


CHAP.  VIII.]  THE  LOWER  MOTIVITIES.  77 

mechanical  or  physical  automaton;  it  seeks  an  end,  though 
not  the  end  which  reason  discovers  to  be  the  origin  of  the 
instinct.  A  bird  hatched  one  Spring  will  sit  on  eggs  the 
next  Spring  without  having  any  idea  that  she  is  bringing 
other  birds  into  being.  She  knows  what  she  is  doing,  but  she 
does  not  know  the  rational  purpose  of  her  sitting.  She  is 
conscious  only  of  the  immediate  comfort  and  satisfaction 
which  she  has  in  sitting  on  those  eggs.  A  new  swarm  of  bees, 
without  previous  practice  or  instruction,  builds  the  comb  and 
collects  the  honey  with  as  much  skill  and  industry  as  if  it 
had  been  trained  through  a  long  apprenticeship.  The  Rocky 
Mountain  locust,  in  immense  clouds,  flies,  day  after  day,  in 
a  straight  southeast  direction,  alighting  towards  sundown 
upon  some  feeding-ground  which  it  leaves  only  after  the  sun 
has  ascended  to  a  considerable  height  and  when  the  wind  is 
favorable.  After  the  locusts  rise,  if  the  wind  be  in  the  wrong 
direction,  they  settle  down  upon  the  fields  again.  Birds  of 
passage  show  a  wonderful  instinct  by  reason  of  which  they 
change  their  dwelling-place  semi-annually,  living  in  one 
zone  of  the  earth  during  the  winter  and  in  another  during 
the  summer.  The  dates  of  their  migrations  are  very  regular, 
but  observers  say  that  these  vary  somewhat  as  the  spots  on 
the  sun  increase  or  diminish  so  as  to  affect  the  seasons.  In 
these,  and  in  other  yet  more  remarkable  cases,  the  animal 
seems  stimulated  by  its  bodily  feelings  and  by  its  outward 
circumstances  to  a  certain  mode  of  activity  and  accomplish- 
ment, of  which  it  has  a  definite  conception,  and  in  which  it 
finds  an  immediate  satisfaction. 

4.  Instinct  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  a  mere  physical 
tendency  controlled  by  an  automatic  action  of  the  nerves. 
Sneezing  and  coughing  and  the  ceaseless  motions  of  the  heart 
and  of  the  digestive  organs,  are  produced  in  this  way.  The 
cooperation  of  one  limb  with  another  in  walking  or  in  work- 
ing is  largely  effected  by  nervous  action  without  mental  in- 
tention. The  cerebellum  and  certain  central  lobes  of  the 
brain  have  been  found  to  have  much  to  do  with  the  automatic 
actions  of  the  body  and  the  coordinate  motion  of  its  differ- 
ent parts.  This  tendency  of  the  nerves  may  unite  with  in- 
stinct or  with  habit,  but  is  different  from  both  these  prin- 
ciples. They  are  psychical,  and  have  even  an  intellectual 
element;  they  belong  to  the  spiritual  part  of  animal  existence; 
the  automatism  of  nerves  and  muscles  is  purely  material  and 
corporeal.  This  automatism  may  be  regarded  as  the  highest 


78  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

form  of  physical,  while  instinct  is  the  lowest  form  of  psychi- 
cal and  mental,  activity. 

In  the  foregoing  statements  the  term  "  instinct "  has  been 
used  in  a  limited  and  exact  sense.  Sometimes  all  the  con- 
scious doings  of  the  inferior  animals  are  said  to  proceed 
either  from  appetite  or  from  instinct.  According  to  this 
language  instinct  would  include,  not  only  that  unreasoning 
and  untaught  tendency  of  which  we  have  spoken,  but  also 
those  powers  of  observation  and  judgment,  experience  and 
habit,  which  many  brutes  exhibit.  We  refer  now  only  to  the 
inborn  ability  and  disposition  of  animals  for  certain  useful 
activities  the  rational  purpose  of  which  is  beyond  their  intel- 
ligence. 

5.  Appetite  is  less  removed  than  instinct  from  moral  prin- 
ciple and  conduct.  Though  not  moral  in  itself,  it  is  a  promi- 
nent and  permanent  part  of  human  experience,  and  is  prop- 
erly subject  to  rational  control.  This  is  not  true  of  instinct 
to  any  appreciable  extent.  Though  man  in  his  earliest  in- 
fancy may  act  from  instinct,  he  soon  develops  more  intelli- 
gent tendencies  and  follows  these  instead  of  instinct  during 
the  remainder  of  his  life.  But  he  never  ceases  to  be  affected 
with  appetite.  While  there  is  an  affinity  of  nature  between 
these  two  forms  of  motivity — a  closer  affinity,  perhaps,  than 
might  at  first  be  supposed — they  are  so  related  to  each  other 
and  to  us  that  appetite  throws  more  light  on  instinct  than 
instinct  does  on  appetite.  Both  have  an  immediate  aim  and 
satisfaction  of  their  own ;  and  both  -are  evidently  designed 
by  a  formative  wisdom  to  further  useful  ends  in  the  economy 
of  Nature.  Appetite  provides  for  the  nourishment  and  health 
of  the  body  and  for  the  -continued  existence  of  the  individual 
and  of  the  species;  it  supplements  and  stimulates  reason  in 
her  care  for  our  bodily  life.  Instinct  takes  the  place  of 
reason  in  cases  where  no  such  intelligence  exists,  and  its  uses 
are  more  varied  and  generally  more  distant  than  those  of 
appetite.  While  both  are  excited  by  some  corporeal  stimu- 
lus, this  is  less  evident  in  the  case  of  instinct.  An  appetite 
is  immediately  known  to  us  as  a  desire  for  some  bodily  relief 
or  gratification,  while  instinct  is  sometimes  credited  by  us 
with  an  intelligence  which  it  cannot  possess. 

Hunger  is  a  typical  appetite.  Neither  man  nor  beast  in 
the  exercise  of  this  desire  thinks  of  food  as  the  means  of 
sustaining  life  and  strength ;  food  is  sought  for  its  own  sake, 
as  we  say,  that  is,  for  the  removal  of  the  distress  of  an  empty 


CHAP.  VIII.]  THE  LOWER  MOTIVITIES.  79 

stomach,  together  with  the  pleasure  of  partaking  of  things 
agreeable  to  the  taste.  There  is  a  tendency  to  do  something 
knowingly,  yet  without  consideration  of  the  ulterior  and 
more  important  ends  to  be  served.  The  demands  of  hunger 
and  of  other  appetites  vary  from  time  to  time;  this  occurs 
through  the  operation  of  laws  and  natural  causes  which  have 
been  wisely  instituted.  When  the  system  has  received  suf- 
ficient food  of  one  kind,  the  desire  for  that  disappears^  and 
when  the  conditions  of  life  call  for  a  large  supply  of  some 
peculiar  nourishment,  the  appetite  for  that  arises.  In  arctic 
countries  men  relish  fats,  greases  and  oils  which  would  be 
repellent  to  them  in  a  warm  climate;  in  tropical  countries 
they  crave  fruits  and  vegetables.  The  accommodation  of 
appetite  to  bodily  needs  is  seen  also  in  the  desire  for  sleep 
or  rest  when  one  is  fatigued,  and  in  the  eagerness  of  move- 
ment and  action  of  those  who  are  vigorous  and  fresh. 

The  appetite  of  thirst,  which  is  even  a  stronger  motivity 
than  hunger,  has  for  a  final  end — or  ulterior  purpose — to 
supply  fluidity  to  food  in  the  process  of  digestion.  Neither 
animal  nor  vegetable  tissues  are  repaired  except  by  matter  in 
a  state  of  solution. 

For  ethical  purposes  we  may  group  with  the  appetites  all 
motive  feelings  of  any  kind  which  are  excited  by  a  condition 
of  the  body,  even  though  some  of  these  may  not  ordinarily 
be  called  appetites.  Not  only  weariness,  sleepiness,  the  de- 
sires for  breath  and  air  and  light  and  warmth,  and  that  for 
bodily  exercise  and  excitement,  but  also  every  longing  to  es- 
cape any  disagreeable  or  to  enjoy  any  pleasurable  corporeal 
experience,  are  motivities  of  the  kind  which  we  now  consider. 
All  these  belong  to  spirit  only  as  embodied,  and  are  not  nec- 
essarily connected  with  the  nature  of  spirit,  as  the  propensi- 
ties seem  to  be. 

6.  Now,  this  class  of  feelings,  which  we  call  appetites,  has 
a  different  standing  in  the  constitution  of  rational  beings 
from  that  which  it  has  in  creatures  not  endowed  with  reason. 
In  the  latter  it  needs  little  or  no  regulation ;  animals,  follow- 
ing their  appetites  without  restraint,  live  happily  and  well. 
But  as  man,  through  the  faculty  of  reason,  can  provide  the 
means  of  injurious  indulgence  and  can  even  produce  in  him- 
self an  excessive  or  depraved  appetite,  so  he  must  employ  his 
reason  in  the  restraint  and  regulation  of  his  bodily  desires. 
Otherwise  his  abnormal  pursuit  of  sensual  gratifications  may 
have  ruinous  results. 


80  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

7.  By  the  propensities,  as  a  comprehensive  class  of  motivi- 
ties,  we  mean  those  desires  for  specific  ends  which  spring 
spontaneously  from  the  nature  of  spiritual  beings.  The  rudi- 
mentary exercise  of  such  dispositions  is  observable  among  the 
more  intelligent  brutes;  the  full  development  of  them  is  to 
be  found  only  in  human  beings.  For  example,  all  men  have 
the  power  of  perceiving,  investigating  and  understanding 
things,  and,  in  correspondence  with  this,  they  have  the  de- 
sire for  knowledge  and  for  mental  occupation.  In  some  this 
may  be  a  mere  curiosity;  in  some  it  may  be  an  earnest 
thoughtf ulness ;  in  others  it  may  be  a  love  for  phil- 
osophic inquiry  and  for  scientific  attainment;  but  it  is  com- 
mon to  mankind.  In  early  life  it  appears  in  the  eagerness 
with  which  children  listen  to  stories  and  explanations. 

Again,  the  human  soul,  or  spirit,  is  capable  of  exerting 
power  and  influence;  accordingly,  it  is  natural  for  us  to  de- 
sire the  possession  of  control  and  sway.  These  things  are 
sought  not  simply  for  their  own  sake,  though  they  are  an 
immediate  source  of  pleasure,  but  also  for  the  respect  and 
estimation  which  they  attract  and  for  the  means  of  grati- 
fication which  they  command.  The  love  of  power  is  one  of 
the  chief  elements  of  what  is  known  as  "  ambition."  Another 
propensity  is  seen  when  one  seeks  for  himself  freedom  from 
injury  or  annoyance,  together  with  surroundings  of  ease  and 
comfort.  If  one  be  in  prosperous  circumstances  this  desire 
for  things  agreeable  to  one's  tastes  may  aspire  to  every  con- 
venience and  elegance. 

A  fourth  fundamental  inclination  of  mankind  is  that  for 
the  activity  of  our  faculties  of  exertion  and  doing.  Exhaust- 
ing labor  is  irksome,  but  enforced  idleness  also  is  unendurable. 
Some  suitable  employment  is  sought  by  all.  Then,  also,  a 
love  of  excitement  is  natural  to  man.  This  frequently  com- 
bines with  the  desire  for  action  so  as  to  produce  the  spirit  of 
adventure,  and  sometimes  with  the  desire  for  knowledge  so 
as  to  become  a  craving  for  novelty.  Developed  to  an  excess 
these  dispositions  render  one  dissatisfied  with  ordinary  occur- 
rences and  occupations;  then  restlessness  arises,  and  sat- 
isfaction is  sought  in  excessive  novel-reading  and  play-going, 
in  gambling  and  wild  revelry,  or  in  a  life  of  lawless  daring. 

A  sixth  sort  of  propensity  leads  man  to  society  and  to  social 
intercourse.  Without  reference  to  the  aid  which  one  com- 
panion may  receive  from  another,  man  is  by  nature  a  social 
being.  He  sympathizes  with  the  feelings  and  experiences  of 


CHAP.  VIII  ]  THE  LOWER  MOT1VIT1ES.  gl 

his  fellow-beings,  and  takes  pleasure  in  doing  so;  and  he 
desires  that  others  should  sympathize  with  him.  When  one 
is  cut  off  from  intercourse  with  others  a  sense  of  lone- 
liness, sometimes  amounting  to  desolation,  is  experi- 
enced, as  was  the  case  with  Crusoe  when  he  found  himself 
the  sole  survivor  of  a  shipwreck.  Even  those  most  inde- 
pendent in  their  habits  of  thought  and  life  have,  at  times,  a 
touch  of  this  feeling,  and  are  sensibly  happier  when  placed 
in  congenial  relations  with  others.  This  social  sentiment 
may  be  carried  to  an  extreme,  so  that  the  want  of  company 
cannot  be  endured  at  all,  or  it  may  be  stifled  by  the  pressure 
of  adverse  influences;  but  it  is  a  normal  element  of  human 
life. 

8.  In  the  foregoing  account  the  social  "  instinct "  or  pro- 
pensity is  considered  as  seeking  one's  own  satisfaction  in  the 
sympathy  of  others  and  in  sympathy  for  them.     But  one 
cannot  fail  to  note  that  the  sympathy  mentioned — the  power 
of  entering  into  the  experience  of  others  and  sharing  in  their 
desires  for  their  own  gratification  or  relief — is  not  a  selfish 
sentiment.    It  is  essentially  altruistic.    It  is  that  tendency  in 
which  charity  and  benevolent  affection  have  their  beginnings. 
It  is  possible  for  this  tendency  to  be  used  in  a  selfish  way, 
but  it  is  not  possible  to  explain  it  as  a  development  of  selfish- 
ness, or  even  of  self-love.     It  is  a  primitive  endowment  of 
spirit. 

As  a  motive  tendency  sympathy  may  be  defined  as  the  al- 
truistic motivity.  It  is  the  desire  which  every  spirit  has  for 
the  immediate  and  specific  gratification  of  its  companions. 

This  propensity  plays  an  important  part  in  the  economy  of 
spiritual  life.  It  doubles  the  aims  of  spirit,  since  it  makes 
those  of  others  our  own,  and,  in  combination  with  the  more 
or  less  rational  pursuit  of  good,  it  gives  birth  to  our  benevo- 
lent affections.  For  this  reason  we  shall  speak  of  it  here- 
after as  one  of  the  general  modifiers  of  motivity. 

9.  Another  important  propensity — and  one  which  assumes 
various  forms — is  desire  for  the  esteem  of  one's  self  and  for 
the  esteem  of  others.     Emulation  and 'the  determination  to 
excel  result  from  the  desire  of  self-esteem  which  mingles 
and  cooperates  with  other  motive  tendencies.    If  one  be  seek- 
ing knowledge  or  power  or  comfort,  employment,  excitement, 
society,  or  any  other  aim,  he  naturally  endeavors  to  obtain 
this  more  fully  or  more  perfectly  than  others  do  that  he  may 
put  a  high  estimate  on  himself  and  enjoy  the  sense  of  his  own 

6 


82  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

superiority.  This  is  an  ingredient  of  ambition.  Then  the 
desire  for  the  esteem  of  others  manifests  itself  variously  ac- 
cording to  the  character  of  different  persons.  It  may  be  an 
honest  wish  to  gain  and  keep  a  good  name,  or  it  may  be  a 
longing  for  admiration  or  for  glory.  In  weak  natures  it 
becomes  silly  vanity  and  showy  ostentation.  Pride  is  an 
irrational  and  selfish  feeling  of  one's  own  excellence  and  im- 
portance. No  matter  how  insignificant  a  proud  person  may 
be,  in  talent,  in  character  and  in  position,  he  will  still  find 
abundant  reasons  for  a  high  opinion  of  himself  and  for  the 
undue  maintenance  of  his  own  claims  to  immunity  and  privi- 
lege. Though  pride  is  easily  distinguished  from  vanity, 
which  seeks  and  delights  in  the  admiration  of  others,  it  is 
not  inconsistent  with  this  latter  sentiment.  It  tends  to  sup- 
press the  more  immediate  manifestations  of  vanity,  but  does 
not  prevent  the  cherishing  of  the  feeling  itself. 

10.  The  desire  for  property  is  not  so  simple  a  propensity 
as  those  already  considered.     It  seems  to  be  a  secondary  ap- 
petency and  to  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  ownership  of 
means  renders  the  gratification  of  many  wishes  possible  and 
easy.     The  love  of  power,  the  desire  for  comforts  and  pleas- 
ures, and  that  for  esteem  and  distinction,  especially  avail 
themselves  of  money  or  possessions  as  a  means  of  their  grati- 
fication.    Through  the  force  of  habit  this  love  of  property 
often  becomes  a  strong  passion  and  is  cherished  to  an  ir- 
rational excess. 

11.  Our  enumeration  of  the  propensities  may  be  concluded 
with  the  mention   of  two  forms  of  motivity,   which  differ 
greatly  from  those  already  considered,  and  which  are  espe- 
cially important  because  of  their  affinity  with  the  affections. 
These  are  gratitude,  or  the  feeling  of  good-will  because  of 
kindness  received,  and  resentment,  or  the  feeling  of  ill-will 
because  of  injury  inflicted. 

Some  may  say  that  these  motivities,  being  directed  to 
persons — or  at  least  to  sentient  beings — rather  than  to 
things,  should  be  classed  with  the  affections  -and  not 
with  the  propensities.  The  question  pertains  chiefly  to 
the  use  of  terms.  We  can  -distinguish  desires  which 
are  conditioned  on  the  distinct  conception  of  a  spirit  to  be 
affected,  from  those  in  whose  aims  the  thought  of  the  person 
or  being  to  be  affected  has  no  prominence,  but  is,  as  it  were, 
withdrawn  from  consideration;  and  we  might  give  the  name 
affection  to  every  motivity  of  the  former  class.  But  gener- 


CHAP.  VIII.J  THE  LOWER  NOTIVITIES,  33 

ally  this  name,  in  its  specific  sense,  indicates  a  permanent  and 
settled  feeling  of  favor  or  of  aversion  towards  some  person 
or  being.  With  this  use  of  language  a  temporary  impulse  of 
gratitude  or  of  resentment  would  not  properly  be  an  affection, 
though  it  might  be  the  beginning  of  one.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  would  not  be  a  propensity,  if  no  propensity  is  consciously 
and  explicitly  directed  towards  persons  or  beings.  In  that 
case  we  might  erect  a  new  class  of  motivities  intermediate 
between  the  propensities  and  the  affections,  and  include  in  it 
such  sentiments  as  sympathy,  or  social  feeling,  gratitude  and 
resentment.  But  for  the  purpose  of  exhibiting  motivities  in 
their  relation  to  degrees  of  mental  endowment  or  develop- 
ment, which  is  our  chief  aim  at  present,  we  may  include  with 
the  propensities  all  motivities,  instinct  and  appetite  excepted, 
which  need  less  intellectual  penetration  and  persistence  than 
the  affections  do.  Mentally,  gratitude  and  resentment,  at 
least  in  their  more  simple  and  primary  forms,  are  on  a  par 
with  the  propensities. 

When  we  compare  these  two  sentiments  together,  the  for- 
mer evidently  has  a  natural  priority  over  the  latter.  This 
attends  the  fact  that  gratitude  seeks  for  and  delights  in  the 
pleasure  and  happiness  of  a  being,  while  resentment  seeks 
to  inflict  pain  or  suffering.  The  former  of  these  aims  is 
a  primary,  while  the  latter  is  only  a  secondary,  tendency  of 
spiritual  life.  For  it  belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  spirit  to 
desire  enjoyment  for  its  own  sake  and  to  shun  pain  or  distress 
on  its  own  account.  This  is  true  of  every  spirit  not  simply 
with  reference  to  its  own  experience,  but  also  with  reference 
to  the  experience  of  others;  sympathetic  desire  for  the  relief 
or  the  gratification  of  a  companion  is  as  original  a  motive 
principle  as  the  desire  for  one's  own  enjoyment.  Gratitude 
founds  on  this  natural  tendency,  intensifies  it,  and  gives  it 
a  specific  direction.  While  we  naturally  seek  the  comfort  and 
pleasure  of  those  about  us,  we  are  particularly  roused  to  this 
feeling  when  we  are  cognizant  that  their  good-will  or  favor 
has  been  exercised  towards  us.  On  the  other  hand,  desire 
for  the  pain  or  suffering  of  another  being  does  not  appear  to 
be  an  original  principle  of  the  spiritual  nature  any  more 
than  a  desire  for  one's  own  suffering  would  be.  Though  a 
natural  principle  of  action  it  arises  in  a  secondary  and  sub- 
ordinate way.  If  one  spirit  never  interfered  with  the  efforts 
of  another  after  enjoyment,  there  never  would  be  any  resent- 
ment or  anger.  Not  even  the  most  savage  beast  shows  anger 


84  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

except  when  its  wishes  are  opposed  and  thwarted.  But  when 
one  being  perceives  another  contending  against  the  comfort 
and  pleasure  of  itself  or  its  companions — and  yet  more 
when  the  second  being  is  discovered  to  be  inflicting  pain  or 
evil — then  there  arises  an  excited  impulse  to  repel  and  sub- 
due the  offender  by  inflicting  pain  upon  him;  this  we  call 
resentment  or  anger.  The  primary  aim  and  operation  of 
this  principle  is  to  check  and  suppress  injurious  activity. 
Whether  we  regard  the  capability  of  such  a  propensity  as  a 
necessary  element  of  spiritual  existence  or  as  implanted 
in  finite  beings  by  creative  wisdom,  or  combine  these  views, 
in  either  case  it  consists  with  the  idea  that  good,  and  not 
evil,  is  the  final  end  of  the  arrangements  of  the  universe. 

If  there  were  creatures  in  whom  the  selfish  sentiment  were 
properly  balanced  with  the  benevolent  or  altruistic,  and  who 
were  so  governed,  either  by  instinct  or  by  wisdom,  as  to  al- 
low every  being  his  due  share  in  the  means  of  happiness,  the 
resentments  of  such  creatures  would  be  instruments  of  good 
only.  Such  a  result  cannot  be  expected  among  those  in 
whom  selfishness  predominates,  and  who  are  too  much  in- 
clined to  seize  every  means  of  enjoyment  for  their  private 
gratification.  As  a  matter  of  fact  resentment  in  many  na- 
tures develops  into  a  morose  savageness,  and  even  forms  the 
•basis  for  permanent  hatred.  As  sympathy  and  gratitude  are 
the  premonitions  and  beginnings  of  the  benevolent,  so  resent- 
ment, through  an  irrational  perversion  and  the  power  of  habit, 
gives  rise  to  the  malevolent  affections. 

12.  We  have  now  considered  those  motivities  which  aim 
at  specific  gratifications  and  not  at  good  or  evil  in  the  general. 
Each  of  them,  except  instinct,  may  be  controlled,  and  most  of 
them  may  be  modified,  by  rational  intelligence;  they  can- 
not therefore  be  called  irrational.  But  as  the  escsential  aim 
of  each  is  designated  by  the  very  constitution  of  spirit,  and 
is  not  a  presentation  of  the  rational  faculty,  we  may,  with 
reference  to  this  fact  rather  than  to  their  development  and 
exercise,  style  them  sub-rational  motivities,  or  the  lower 
motivities. 

Those  tendencies  which  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  aim  at 
happiness,  welfare  or  good  in  the  general,  and  which  may  be 
roughly  distinguished  as  rational,  are  yet  to  be  described. 
They  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  first  those  which  are 
only  partially  founded  on  the  use  of  the  rational  faculty, 
and  which;  somewhat  inadequately,  may  be  designated  the 


CHAP.  VIII.]  THE  LOWER  MOTIVITIES.  85 

affections,  and  secondly,  those  active  principles,  whether  of 
interest  or  of  duty,  which  seem  to  originate  in  our  rational 
operations.  The  investigations  of  discursive  thought  require 
that  we  should  study  first  the  one  and  then  the  other  of  these 
modes  of  motivity.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  in  actual  life  they  mingle  together  and  modify  one  an- 
other, and,  indeed,  that  the  variety  and  complexity  of  man's 
motive  experience  is  greater  than  could  be  represented  in 
philosophical  classifications. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE    HIGHER   MOTIVITIES. 

1.  In  the  division  of  human  motivities  into  the  higher  and  the 
lower,  "  reason  "  and  "  propensity  "  are  used  as  preponderating 
marks,  not  as  characteristics  excluding  one  another.— 2.  The 
term"  affection  "  originally  denoted  passive  feeling,  or  emotion. 
We  now  apply  it  to  that  love  which  emotional  excitement  accom- 
panies.— 3.  Let  it  include  also  love  for  oneself.  This  is  as  natural 
and  proper  as  love  for  others. — 4.  Benevolence,  the  altruistic 
affection,  springs  from  the  propensity  of  sympathy  for  sentient 
creatures. — 5.  Public  spirit  is  a  specific  form  of  benevolent 
affection. — 6.  The  derivation  of  altruism  from  selfishness  is  not 
supported  by  the  analysis  of  consciousness.  It  belongs  to  a 
superficial  and  verbal  kind  of  thought.  Clifford  quoted. — 7. 
Malevolent  affection,  or  animosity,  is  a  development  of  resent- 
ment. It  persistently  seeks  to  return  evil  for  evil. — 8.  It  may 
arise  upon  injuries  done  to  others  as  well  as  upon  those  done  to 
oneself. — 9.  It  is  not  a  specific  form  of  the  disposition  to  promote 
good  and  prevent  evil,  but  a  supplementary  natural  affection. — 
10.  Hatred,  envy  and  jealousy  are  morally  wrong,  not  because  of 
the  essential  nature  of  animosity,  but  because  they  are  extremes 
generated  by  selfishness  and  passion. — 11.  Resentment  and  ani- 
mosity are  the  natural  adjutants  of  punitive  justice.  But  unre- 
strained and  cherished  malevolence  is  devilish. — 12.  Reason  may 
be  motive  as  well  as  intellectual. — 13.  Self-interest  is  the  lowest 
of  the  purely  rational  motivities.— 14.  As  we  distinguish  self- 
interest  from  self-love,  so  we  distinguish  rational  beneficence 
from  benevolent  affection. — 15.  So  also  we  distinguish  merely 
rational  from  moral  beneficence. — 16.  Benevolence  and  benefi- 
cence are  the  highest  modes  of  natural  motivity,  but  neither  of 
them  is  moral  per  se. — 17.  Moral  beneficence  aims  at  good  not 
simply  as  good  but  as  a  right  and  obligatory  end.  It  is  a  specific 
form  of  moral  principle. — 18.  Moral  principle  in  general  is  that 
rational  disposition  which  pursues  the  right  as  an  end,  and 
which  rejects  and  opposes  the  wrong. 

1.  THE  division  of  the  motivities  into  the  higher  and  the 
lower  emphasizes  the  fact  that  some  aims  of  desire  and  pur- 
suit are  the  product  of  reason  more  than  others.  But  we 
must  not  make  too  much  of  this  division.  Every  end  of 
human  seeking  is  modified  by  reason,  so  that  human  pro- 
86 


CHAP.  IX.J  THE  HIGHER  MOTIVITIES.  g? 

pensities  differ  greatly  in  their  scope  and  range  from  those 
of  the  brutes.  Sometimes  they  are  so  rational  that  they  can 
scarcely  be  called  propensities.  For  example,  were  we  to 
think  more  of  the  actual  experience  than  of  the  primitive 
exercise  of  sympathy  and  of  gratitude  we  should  call  them 
affections  rather  than  propensities.  Moreover,  that  affec- 
tion which  brutes  have  for  one  another,  especially  their 
extreme  attachment  for  their  young,  which  the  Greeks  call 
ffropYrjj  may  properly  be  called  a  propensity,  though  it 
originates  in  the  same  way  as  the  natural  affection  of  human 
beings.  In  most  brutes  this  love  disappears  when  it  is  no 
longer  excited  by  the  solicitations  of  a  corporeal  experience 
by  which  the  animals  are  brought  together  in  close  rela- 
tions. In  mankind,  under  the  influence  of  rational  intelli- 
gence, it  lasts  for  years — generally  for  life.  Then,  too,  that 
quieter  kind  of  motivity  which  follows  the  abstract  percep- 
tions of  the  reason,  and  which  we  call  "  principle,"  not  only 
often  combines  with  natural  sympathy  and  affection,  but  may 
even,  through  a  more  perfect  and  thorough-going  apprehen- 
sion of  its  object,  become  love  as  well  as  principle. 

We  must  therefore  bear  in  mind  that  our  higher  and  lower 
motivities  have  no  absolute  line  of  demarcation  between  them, 
and  that  it  is  enough  for  us  to  say  that  some  of  our  motivities 
have  reason  and  others  propensity  for  their  preponderating 
mark. 

2.  Speaking  now  of  the  affections,  let  us  acknowledge  that 
this  word  originally  denoted  emotional  rather  than  motive 
feeling.  It  indicated  the  excitement  produced  by  the  ap- 
prehension of  some  fact  or  the  view  of  some  object.  Even 
yet  it  sometimes  signifies  this  to  the  exclusion  of  any  desire 
for  or  about  the  object  or  fact.  When  we  say  that  one  is 
affected  by  the  death  of  a  friend,  we  mean  simply  that  he  is 
agitated  by  grief;  in  this  case  the  affection  is  an  emotion 
rather  than  a  desire.  But  desire  and  emotion  constantly 
mingle  together  so  as  to  constitute  one  complex  state  of  mind, 
which  also  goes  under  the  name  "  affection  " ;  in  which  case 
the  motivity  often  becomes  the  more  prominent,  and  even 
the  exclusive,  object  of  our  thought.  When  we  speak  of 
parental  or  filial  affection,  or  of  the  affection  of  one  friend 
for  another,  we  have  chiefly  in  mind  one's  desire  for  the 
happiness  of  a  child  or  a  parent  or  a  friend.  At  present  we 
HFC  the  term  to  designate  this  altruistic  desire,  while 
admitting  that  it  frequently  covers  other  feelings  and  even 


88  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  IX. 

other  desires.  For,  while  one  is  sincerely  wishing  for  the 
welfare  of  another,  he  may,  at  the  same  time,  seek  his  own 
pleasure  in  the  fellowship  of  the  other  and  in  help  to  be  re- 
ceived from  his  companion.  All  ordinary  love  and  friend- 
ship is  of  this  complex  character. 

3.  Moreover,  let  us  now  avail  ourselves  of  that  broad  use 
of  language  according  to  which  one  may  be  said  to  have  love 
or  affection  for  himself;  because  the  desire  for  one's  own 
happiness  is  in  some  points  radically  similar  to  the  desire 
for  the  happiness  of  others.     Self-love  and  love  for  others 
may  be  distinguished  from  mere  propensities  and  from  those 
sympathetic  desires  for  the  specific  gratifications    of    others 
which  are  a  kind  of  altruistic  propensities,  in  that  the  former 
makes  some  use  of  the  general  conceptions  of  happiness  and 
welfare,  while  the  latter  do  not:  at  least  such  is  the  case 
with  those  affections  which   we   ascribe   to   human   beings. 
Even  these,  however,  are  conditioned  on  a  more  or  less  definite 
knowledge  of  the  persons  who  are  the  objects  of  our  love. 

Self-love,  too,  in  common  with  our  other  affections,  has  the 
characteristic  of  being  noticeably  accompanied  with  emo- 
tional excitement.  In  this  way  it  may  be  distinguished 
from  cool  self-interest,  though  both  of  these  are  often  com- 
prehended under  the  same  name.  Disappointment  and  grief 
at  the  failure  of  one's  plans  or  the  ruin  of  one's  hopes,  delight 
and  triumph  over  one's  successes,  are  feelings  naturally 
accompanying  affection  for  one's  self. 

Self-love  is  not  an  unwise  or  improper  sentiment;  it  shou,t< 
be  distinguished  from  selfishness,  which  is  an  excessive 
exclusive  regard  for  one's  own  pleasure.  The  selfish  man  cu,,<, 
himself  off  from  the  happiness  of  loving  others  and  of  being 
beloved  by  them,  and  brings  upon  himself  innumerable 
troubles  and  punishments.  Though  he  may  have  a  temporary 
prosperity,  he  is  walking  on  the  way  to  final  failure.  Wise 
care  for  one's  self  leads  one  to  seek  the  good  of  others,  and 
limits  self-love  by  the  cherishing  of  altruistic  desires.  It 
finds  a  great  part  of  one's  own  happiness  in  the  happiness  of 
others. 

4.  Benevolence,  kindness,  or  good-will,  is  the  most  general 
form  of  altruistic  affection.     Like  rational  beneficence,  or 
philanthropy,  it  aims  at  the  comfort,  pleasure  or  relief  of 
others,  but  it  uses  more  definite  conceptions  of  the  good  to 
be  conferred  and  of  the  person  or  persons  to  be  benefited. 
Benevolence  is  a  development  of  the  motive  element  of  that 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  HIGHER  MOTIVITIES.  89 

sympathy  which  one  spirit  naturally  has  for  another  or  for 
others  with  whom  it  is  brought  into  intimate  relations. 
This  altruistic  sentiment,  as  well  as  the  desire  for  one's  own 
enjoyment,  is  manifested  by  the  more  intelligent  brutes;  in 
human  beings  the  exercise  of  it  is  modified  by  rationality. 
But  that  affection  is  excited  by  particular  considerations  and 
objects  is  especially  noticeable  in  the  love  of  parents  for  their 
offspring,  in  the  attachments  which  spring  up  between  the 
members  of  the  same  family,  and  in  the  mutual  regard  of 
kinsmen,  neighbors  and  acquaintances.  Some  natures  are 
more  prone  to  the  exercise  of  these  motivities  than  others, 
but  all  tend  to  experience  them  when  the  proper  occasions 
and  objects  are  presented. 

5.  Public  spirit,  or  the  disposition  to  defend  and  promote 
specific  forms  of  the  welfare  of  the  society  to  which  one  be- 
longs, whether  it  be  a  class  or  a  tribe,  a  city,  a  village,  or  a 
people,  calls  for  more  intelligence  than  other  forms  of  affec- 
tion.    It  is  often  strongly  developed  in  patriotism,  or  in  lives 
devoted  to  some  generous  and  noble  enterprise.     The  rudi- 
ments of  this  sentiment  appear  in  some  of  the  lower  animals, 
as  when  herds  of  cattle  are  defended  by  their  more  powerful 
members ;  the  full  development  of  it  belongs  to  human  life. 

6.  The  existence  of  altruistic  affection  is  so  evident  even 
to  those  authors  who  hold  that  the  essential  aim  of  all  desire 
is  the  gratification  of  self,  that  some  of  them  have  been  com- 
piled to  speak  of  a  "  tribal  self,"  out  of  regard  to  which  each 

•  >mber  of  a  society  seeks  to  protect  and  cherish  his  fellow- 
:mbers.  "  The  savage,"  says  Prof.  Clifford,  "  is  not  only 
Aurt  when  anybody  treads  on  his  foot  but  when  anybody 
breads  on  his  tribe.  He  may  lose  his  hut,  his  wife,  and  his 
opportunities  of  getting  food.  In  this  way  the  tribe  becomes 
naturally  included  in  that  conception  of  self  which  renders 
remote  desires  possible  by  rendering  them  immediate.  .  .  . 
The  tribe,  qita  tribe,  has  to  exist;  and  it  can  only  exist  by  the 
conception  of  the  tribal  self  in  the  minds  of  its  members. 
Hence  the  natural  selection  of  those  races  in  which  this  con- 
ception is  the  most  powerful  and  the  most  habitually  pre- 
dominant over  immediate  desires.  To  such  an  extent  has 
this  proceeded  that  we  may  fairly  doubt  whether  the  selfhood 
of  the  tribe  is  not  earlier  in  point  of  development  than  that 
of  the  individual.  In  the  process  of  time,  it  becomes  a  matter 
of  hereditary  transmission,  and  is  thus  fixed  as  a  specific 
character  in  the  constitution  of  social  man.  ...  In  the  high- 


90  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  IX. 

est  natures  the  tribal  self  is  incarnate  in  nothing  less  than 
humanity.  Short  of  these  heights,  it  places  itself  in  the 
family  and  in  the  city."  In  reading  these  words  one  is  sur- 
prised at  the  confidence  with  which  Prof.  Clifford  asserts, 
as  if  they  were  known  facts,  that  the  love  of  others  was 
originally  developed  from  selfishness  by  means  of  selfishness, 
and  how,  in  the  process  of  prehistoric  time,  this  generous  un- 
selfish selfishness  became  a  fixed  part  of  man's  constitution. 
Such  philosophy  does  not  appear  to  be  legitimately  founded 
on  facts,  nor  even  to  set  forth  probable  conjecture.  For  us 
a  "  tribal  self  "  could,  at  the  best,  be  nothing  more  than  an 
illustrative  fiction  similar  to  that  legal  fiction  whereby  a 
corporation  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  a  person.  The  literal 
truth  is  that  some  forms  of  altruistic  sentiment  are  exercised 
upon  limited  or  exclusive  views  of  social  relations,  and  are 
also  more  mingled  with  personal  wishes  and  ambitions  than 
others.  Such  is  the  case  when  one  loves  his  family,  his 
tribe,  or  his  country.  But  these  sentiments  are  not  really 
selfish,  nor  can  they  be  derived  from  selfishness,  nor  can  they 
be  accounted  for  except  by  assuming  that  altruism,  no  less 
than  selfism,  is  an  original  tendency  of  spiritual  being. 

7.  The    malevolent    affections,    though    generally    accom- 
panied with  aversion  or  dislike,  should  not  be  identified  with 
this  latter  feeling.     Such  aversion  arises  when  the  presence 
or  conduct  of  an  agent  makes  a  disagreeable  impression  upon 
us.     Because  his  life,  it  may  be  without  any  intention  on  his 
part,  interferes  unpleasantly  with  ours,  he  becomes  an  annoy- 
ance and  we  desire  to  be  freed  from  his  influence.     A  person 
who  is  unduly  talkative  or  inquisitive  or  restless,  or  coarse 
in  his  thoughts  and  manners,  or  aggressively  impetuous,  or 
lazily  inefficient,  or  who  is  continually  showing  a  selfish  rude- 
ness, may  be  disliked  without  being  hated.     Malevolent  affec- 
tion -always  seeks  to  cause  pain  or  evil.     It  is  a  continuation 
or  development  of  that  anger  or  resentment  which  is  excited 
when  injury  is  inflicted  or  threatened.     For  when  the  offend- 
ing agent  repeats  or  prolongs  his  injurious  conduct  or  mani- 
fests a  disposition  to  do  so,  or  when  he  is  constantly  thought 
of  as  the  responsible  doer  of  evil,  resentment  also  may  become 
prolonged,  and  even  habitual  and  chronic. 

8.  This  motivity  is  not  exercised  exclusively  in  view  of 
injuries  done  one's  self,  but  is  often  excited  by  the  perception 
of  injuries  done  to  others.     In  other  words,  it  is  an  accom- 
paniment of  altruistic  no  less  than  of  selfish   sentiments. 


CHAP.  IX. J  THE  HIGHER  MOTIVITIES.  91 

The  traveler  who  sees  some  outrage  committed  on  a  weak 
and  helpless  stranger  has  a  feeling  of  anger  towards  the 
perpetrator  similar  to  what  he  would  have  if  the  wrong  were 
done  himself.  In  this  way  we  come  to  cherish  hostility  to 
the  enemies  of  our  country  or  our  race.  This,  too,  was  the 
spirit  of  the  knight-errant  of  old  when  he  leveled  his  lance 
to  avenge  the  wrongs  of  the  unprotected. 

9.  Again,  though  the  desire  to  inflict  evil  on  the  trans- 
gressor has  no  rational  object  except  the  suppression  of  evil- 
doing,  we  cannot  account  for  it  simply  as  a  development, 
or  peculiar  exercise,  of  the  disposition  to  promote  good  and 
to  counteract  evil ;  it  seems  implanted  in  the  nature  of  spirit- 
ual beings  as  a  concomitant  of  the  desire  for  good  and  the  dis- 
like of  evil.     Consciousness  testifies  to  a  radical  difference 
between  anger  or  resentment  and  the  mere  desire  to  suppress 
or  prevent  evil,  and  then  reason  suggests  that  the  former 
motivity  is  not  merely  additional  but  also  supplementary  to 
the  latter. 

In  this  thought  reason  also  finds  the  rule  which  should 
control  our  animosities.  Resentment,  or  the  impulse  to  in- 
flict pain  on  evil-doers,  is  not  always  undesirable  or  improper. 
So  long  as  violence,  oppression  and  lawless  selfishness  exist 
in  the  world,  the  disposition  to  punish  those  guilty  of  these 
disorders  cannot  be  condemned.  But  it  must  be  exercised 
with  care  lest  it  degenerate  into  hatred;  for  then  there  would 
be  an  increase  rather  than  a  decrease  of  the  evils  to  be  sup- 
pressed. The  rule  of  wisdom  is  that  resentment  should  not 
be  cherished  after  the  soul  has  become  fixed  in  the  determina- 
tion to  put  an  end  to  evil-doing  and  to  maintain  the  right. 
There  can  be  no  adequate  excuse  for. protracted  hatred,  for 
permanent  malevolence.  This  is  an  abnormal  spiritual 
growth  which  arises  under  the  influence  of  selfishness  and 
pride;  every  form  of  it  is  condemned  by  the  better  judg- 
ment of  mankind.  Envy,  the  desire  for  the  injury  of  another 
because  he  is  enjoying  a  prosperity  which  one  secretly  claims 
for  himself,  meets  with  universal  reprobation.  So  does  jeal- 
ousy, the  bitter  hatred  for  one  who  is  reen  or  supposed  to 
be  a  successful  competitor  for  love  or  honor.  And  who  does 
not  condemn  revenge,  which  seeks  to  punish  another,  not  as 
a  necessity  demanded  by  justice,  but  as  the  gratification  of 
a  hatred  engendered  by  a  sense  of  injury? 

10.  While  the  malevolent  affections  generally  have  a  moral 
character,  and  that  a  bad  one,  it  will  be  noticed  that  this 


92  TR®  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  IX- 

arises  not  from  the  essential  nature  of  resentment,  but  from 
that  excess  to  which  this  motivity  is  apt  to  run  in  beings 
dominated  by  selfishness.  The  propensity  manifested  alike 
by  men  and  by  animals  to  repel  and  punish  the  transgressor 
is  not  in  itself  more  moral  than  the  tendency  to  tell  the 
truth,  the  sentiment  of  modest  shame,  or  the  love  of  one's 
parents,  children,  country  or  kind;  all  of  which  motivities 
become  "virtues"  when  they  combine  with  moral  principle 
and  are  subjected  to  its  control.  Any  natural  proclivity 
becomes  moral  when  it  is  consciously  exercised  either  in 
harmony  with  moral  law  or  in  opposition  to  it.  But,  inas- 
much as  right  principle  aims  fundamentally  to  promote  the 
good  of  beings  and  to  prevent  pain  and  misery,  and  never 
inflicts  evil  except  as  the  necessary  instrument  of  good,  it  is 
more  likely  to  be  antagonized  by  a  motivity  which  aims  im- 
mediately at  evil  than  by  any  other  tendency,  excepting  per- 
haps that  selfishness  from  which  malevolent  affection  chiefly 
derives  its  sustenance. 

11.  If  resentment  upon  due  provocation  belongs  to  the  very 
nature  of  spiritual  being,  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  premoni- 
tion of  that  moral  judgment  which  calls  for  the  punishment 
of  the  evil-doer;  and  if  it  be  implanted  variously  in  the  con- 
stitutions of  finite  beings  by  a  divine  wisdom,  it  may  be 
considered  also  as  designed  for  the  better  regulation  of  the 
conduct  of  creatures  toward  each  other  and  for  the  stimu- 
lation of  rational  creatures  in  the  maintenance  of  the  moral 
law.       These    suppositions    are   not  inconsistent   with    each 
other;  we  accept  them  both  as  probable  hypotheses. 

12.  The  last  class  of  the  motivities  we  call  the  rational  be- 
cause it  is  purely  through  an  exercise  of  the  reason  that  their 
objects  are  apprehended.     The  human  mind  perceives  things 
and  conceives  of  them  not  only  in  the  specific  or  particular, 
as  animals  appear  to  do,  but  also  in  the  abstract  and  general. 
The  dispositions  of  which  we  now  speak  are  excited  by  this 
latter  kind  of  thinkings;  therefore  the  lower  orders  of  the 
creation  are  incapable  of  them.     We  grant  that  mere  reason- 
that  is,  the  mere  abstract  perception  of  the  nature  and  rela- 
tions of  things — being  a  purely  intellectual  process  cannot 
have  the  efficacy  of  a  desire  or  active  tendency.     At  the  same 
time  the  human  soul  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  often  acts 
on  the  abstract  presentation  of  ends  and  instrumentalities. 
In  other  words,  it  has  a  power  of  motivity  which  is  excited 
by  rational  perceptions.     We  cannot  better  distinguish  such 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  HIGHER  MOTIV1TIES.  93 

motivity  than  by  calling  it  rational  and  by  speaking  of  the 
reason  as  a  motive  power,  even  though  this  should  introduce 
a  use  of  language  different  from  that  in  which  the  word 
"  reason  "  is  primarily  employed.  Therefore  when  men  are 
often  said  to  be  guided  and  controlled  by  reason,  the  term 
reason  is  used  in  a  secondary  sense,  not  for  the  mere  intel- 
lectual faculty,  but  for  the  combination  of  that  faculty  with 
the  motive  tendency  which  it  naturally  excites. 

13.  The  first  and  lowest  form  of  this  rational  motivity  one 
may  style  self-interest.    It  does  not,  like  self-love,  aim  at  this 
or  that  specific  form  of  gratification  or  of  good,  nor  does  it 
strive  so  much  for  immediate  comfort  and  enjoyment.     Its 
effort  is  to  procure  for  one's  self  the  means  of  general  and 
lasting  prosperity.     Comparing  and  combining  different  ends 
of  pursuit  and  different  agencies  and  instrumentalities,  it  fol- 
lows that  course  which,  on  the  whole,  appears  most  conducive 
to  one's  welfare.     For  example,  a  young  man  who  has  not 
yet  even  chosen   a  profession  or  business   occupation  may 
devote  years  to  education  in  order  that  he  may  become  quali- 
fied for  a  successful  life.     He  aims  in  the  most  general  way 
at  prosperity  and  happiness.     So  also  if  property  be  sought 
after  this  manner,  and  not  for  any  specific  end  such  as  the 
immediate  pleasure  of  getting  and  of  having,  there  is  an  exer- 
cise of  self-interest.    This  rational  pursuit  of  one's  personal 
welfare  differs  from  self-love  also,  in  that  it  is  not  so  readily 
accompanied  with  emotional  disturbance.      The  satisfactions 
and  the  disappointments  of  self-interest  may  be  as  great  as 
those  of  self-love;  profound  feeling  often  attends  its  hopes 
and  fears  and  successes  and  failures;  but,  as  a  rule,  this  feel- 
ing is  of  a  quiet  nature.     The  emotions  of  reason  resemble 
the  slow  boiling  of  water  from  a  depth ;  those  of  affection  are 
like  waves  tossing  upon  the  surface. 

14.  Rational  beneficence  may  be  contrasted  with  benevolent 
affection  in  the  same  way  that  self-interest  is  opposed  to 
self-love.    It  arises  when  one  engages  in  wide-spread  schemes 
of  good  without  having  particular  and  specific  knowledge  of 
the  persons  to  be  benefited  and  of  the  good  to  be  conferred. 
Such  was  the  beneficence  of  that  American  banker  already 
mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter,  who  amassed  a  fortune  in 
England  and  who  left  his  millions  as  a  fund  for  the  education 
of  the  slaves  freed  under  the  presidency  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 
A  similar  spirit  actuates  those  who  labor  for  prison  reforms, 
for  tenement-house  improvements,  for  the  establishment  of 


94:  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  CHAP.  IX.] 

hospitals  and  of  public  libraries,  for  the  endowments  of  col- 
leges and  universities,  and.  in  general,  for  the  civilization  and 
advancement  of  their  fellow-men. 

To  some  the  distinction  between  benevolent  affection  and 
rational  beneficence  as  modes  of  motivity  may  appear  insig- 
nificant and  uncalled  for.  It  may  even  be  said  that  benefi- 
cence is  not  a  motivity  to  be  distinguished  from  benevolence, 
but  is  only  that  practice  of  well-doing  in  which  benevolence 
is  manifested.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  word  often  has 
this  meaning.  Nevertheless  we  believe  that  beneficence  often 
signifies  a  mental  disposition  no  less  than  the  course  of  con- 
duct to  which  it  leads;  we  hold  also  that  a  difference  exists 
between  the  performance  of  kind  or  philanthropic  deeds  from 
principle  and  the  doing  of  them  from  feeling  or  affection. 
The  two  modes  of  motivity  thus  indicated  are  distinguish- 
able, although  they  are  not  only  closely  allied  in  nature  but 
also  shade  into  one  another  and  may  even  unite  in  the  same 
motivity.  Our  terminology  designating  them  may  have  a 
technical  savor,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  philosophic 
writers  are  occasionally  compelled  to  an  arbitrary  employ- 
ment of  language.  Benevolence,  as  here  used,  signifies  that 
love,  kindness  or  altruistic  feeling,  which  resembles  the  sym- 
pathy which  brutes  have  for  one  another  and  which  in  man 
is  modified  and  controlled  by  rationality.  It  arises  from  a 
near  or  particular  knowledge  of  other  beings  and  their  cir- 
cumstances. But  the  beneficence  of  which  we  speak  is  rooted 
wholly  in  rationality  and  springs  from  that  abstract  percep- 
tion of  things  of  which  brutes  are  incapable.  It  is  goodness 
as  originating  not  in  affection  but  in  principle,  meaning  by 
this  simply  the  dictate  and  rule  of  rational  intelligence.  For 
this  word  "  principle  "  often  signifies  a  rule  of  procedure  rec- 
ommended by  reason  whether  it  be  a  morally  obligatory  rule 
or  not.  Hence  we  speak  of  the  principles  on  which  agricul- 
ture or  commerce  should  be  conducted  if  one  would  be  suc- 
cessful in  either  of  these  pursuits. 

15.  Such  being  the  case,  we  distinguish  rational  benefi- 
cence not  only  from  benevolence  or  kindness,  but  also 
from  what  may  be  called  moral  beneficence,  or  that  principle 
which  seeks  good,  not  simply  as  good,  but  as  a  right  and  ob- 
ligatory end.  Ordinarily  rational  beneficence  and  moral 
beneficence  coincide  and  coalesce  in  their  operation.  Yet  there 
is  -a  difference  between  aiming  at  good  simply  and  aiming  at 
it  as  a  moral  end.  Sometimes,  even,  a  rational  beneficence 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  HIGHER  MOT1VITIES.  95 

is  so  limited  and  partial  in  its  scope  as  to  infringe  on  the 
rules  of  right.  One  might  be  so  set  on  benefiting  the  poor 
as  to  be  willing  to  rob  the  prosperous.  Through  zeal  for  some 
charity,  or  church,  or  fraternity,  some  persons  have  become 
neglectful  of  their  obligations  to  the  world  at  large.  The 
man  of  wealth  who  provides  generously  but  exclusively  for 
his  kinsfolk,  and  the  good  monarch  who  thinks  of  the  welfare 
of  his  own  subjects  only,  show  a  beneficence  which  is  not  con- 
formed to  true  morality.  In  striving  for  good  one  should 
consider  every  interest  which  may  be  affected  by  one's  course ; 
the  doing  of  a  limited  good  may  be  positively  immoral  if  it 
involve  the  neglect  or  sacrifice  of  some  right  and  obligatory 
end.  We  therefore  distinguish  moral  from  merely  rational 
beneficence,  and  say  that  the  former  is  superior  to  the  latter 
because  it  arises  from  a  more  absolute  exercise  of  the  reason 
both  as  intellectual  and  as  motive. 

16.  The  foregoing  distinctions  between  benevolence   and 
beneficence  and  between    merely    rational    beneficence    and 
moral  beneficence  are  not    sufficiently    recognized    by    two 
classes  of  philosophers,  namely,  those  who  say  that  the  all- 
comprehensive  aim  of  virtue  is  to  love  beings,  and  those  who 
say  that  the  all-comprehensive  aim  of  virtue  is  to  do  good  to 
beings.     The  truth  is  that  benevolence  and  beneficence  are 
primarily  natural  motivities,  neither  of  them  being  moral 
per  se;  but  these  motivities  furnish  the  greater  part  of  right 
living  when  they  are  subordinated  to  and  incorporated  with 
moral  beneficence.     This  is  so  much  the  case  that,  in  a  su- 
premely perfect  intellectual  and  motive  nature,  these  three 
elements  of  life  would  never  be  exercised  separately  from  each 
other,  as  they  often  are  with  us,  but  would  be  united  in  one 
consummate  experience  of  righteousness,  wisdom  and  love. 
For  that  abstract  and  general  consideration  of  things  upon 
which  we  pride  ourselves  really  results  from  the  limitations 
of  our  humanity.    If  there  be  a  powerful  and  searching  mind 
whose  knowledge  of  all  things  and  persons  is  as  particular  as 
it  is  comprehensive  and  whose  aims  are  those  of  the  most  ab- 
solute reason  and  goodness,  we  may  suppose  the  life  of  such 
a  being  to  be  pervaded  equally  with  principle  and  with  affec- 
tion. 

17.  In  discussing  moral  beneficence  we  have  been  brought 
to  consider  that  third  form  of  rational  motivity  which  is 
known  as  ({ moral  principle,"  and  which  is   the    highest    of 
man's  motive  dispositions.     This  moral  beneficence,  the  dis- 


96  THE  MO&AL  LAW.  [CHAP.  IX. 

position  to  do  good  because  that  is  right,  is  a  specific  form  of 
moral  principle ;  and  ordinarily  it  is  conceived  of  as  an  altru- 
istic motivity.  Limiting  it  in  this  way  we  must  connect  with 
it,  as  a  companion  principle,  virtuous  prudence,  or  moral  self- 
interest;  that  is,  a  dutiful  regard  for  one's  own  good.  But 
both  of  these  principles,  by  a  generalization  and  an  enlarge- 
ment of  language,  may  be  included  under  the  comprehen- 
sive virtue  of  beneficence. 

18.  At  the  present  time,  however,  it  is  not  our  purpose  to 
discuss  specific  modes  of  virtue.  We  therefore  conclude  our 
enumeration  of  the  motivities  by  defining  moral  principle. 
Men  commonly  and  correctly  conceive  of  this  principle  as  that 
disposition  which  pursues  the  right  as  an  end,  and  which 
rejects,  avoids  and  opposes  the  wrong.  We  call  this  a  rational 
motivity  because  it  originates  in  preeminently  rational  per- 
ceptions and  convictions;  only  rational  beings  are  capable  of 
it.  The  great  aim  of  Moral  Science  is  to  understand  the  na- 
ture and  developments  of  this  form  of  motivity  and  its  bear- 
ings upon  human  life  and  character.  Ethics  discusses  man's 
unmoral  or  natural  motivities  only  because  of  their  connec- 
tion with  the  moral.  Not  only  does  a  knowledge  of  other 
motivities  throw  light  on  the  moral  and  help  us  to  understand 
them,  but  the  aims  and  rules  of  moral  motivity  are  such  as 
to  bring  our  other  motive  tendencies  into  intimate  relations 
with  the  moral.  Natural  dispositions,  as  objects  of  moral 
cognizance  and  judgment,  are  rightfully  subordinate  and  sub- 
ject to  moral  principle,  and  may  even  be  so  controlled  by  it 
as  to  coalesce  with  it  and  become  entitled  to  the  designation 
"virtues."  Further  discussion  respecting  this  topic  and 
others  relating  to  the  motivities  may  occupy  another  chapter, 
in  which  also  the  emotions  may  receive  some  consideration. 
For  these,  also,  have  a  place  in  moral  life. 


CHAPTER  X. 

MODIFIERS  OF  MOTIVITY. 

1.  Emotion  is  not  necessarily  prior  to  motivity.  It  may  arise  from 
the  gratification  or  disappointment  of  desire  ;  and  it  may  also 
accompany  and  modify  desire. — 2.  Beside  emotion,  reason, 
sympathy,  and  habit,  notably  modify  motivity. — 3.  Principle 
originates  in  the  ordinary  abstract  exercise  of  reason,  but 
tender  affection  may  accompany  principle  when  complete  ra- 
tional comprehension  of  the  specific,  or  individual,  is  possible. — 
4.  While  reason  has  a  motive  action  of  its  own,  it  also  combines 
with  and  regulates  other  motivities. — 5.  A  natural  disposition 
consciously  harmonized  with  moral  reason  is  a  "  virtue."  But 
when  cherished  in  opposition  to  right  reason  it  is  a  "  vice." — 6. 
In  what  way  reason  forms  moral  judgments  will  appear  during 
the  analytic  study  of  the  moral  law. — 7.  Sympathy,  the  altruistic 
propensity,  is  the  basis  of  benevolent  affection  and  also  of  resent- 
ment for  injury  inflicted  on  others.  E.  D.  Scott  quoted. — 8. 
Altruism  whether  of  animals  or  of  men  is  an  ultimate  attribute 
of  spirit.  It  is  not  a  development  of  self-love. — 9.  The  word 
|*  habit  "  has  several  significations,  but  especially  the  two  follow- 
ing, (1)  a  psychical  tendency  produced  by  frequent  repetition; 
(2)  the  mode  of  action  to  which  that  tendency  is  related.  We 
are  chiefly  concerned  with  the  first  of  these. — 10.  As  acquired 
tendencies  controlling  action  habits  may  be  divided  into  (1)  the 
facilitative,  or  executive  ;  (2)  the  motive,  or  incentive. — 11.  The 
action  of  a  facilitative  habit,  though  we  may  be  conscious  of  it, 
is  not  voluntary,  but  automatic  and  self-directed. — 12.  Facilita- 
tive habit  renders  accomplishment  easy  and  rapid. — 13.  It  is  the 
chief  cause  of  the  difference  between  the  intuitive  and  the  dis- 
cursive reason. — 14.  Man  ordinarily  applies  moral  conceptions 
and  rules  by  a  kind  of  intellectual  habit. — 15.  This  habit  serves 
an  excellent  purpose,  yet  we  should  not  be  absolutely  governed 
by  it.  Reason  may  point  out  exceptions  to  her  own  rules. — 16. 
A  facilitative  habit  may  be  an  entirely  new  tendency.  But  a 
motive  habit  is  the  development  of  some  existing  germ  of  appe- 
tency.— 17.  Motive  habits  are  more  immediately  related  to  moral 
life  than  the  facilitative.  Character  is  mainly  made  up  of  such 
habits.  Virtue  is  the  fixed  habit  of  loving  and  doing  the  right. 
— 18.  The  law  of  desuetude  is  correlative  with  that  of  habit. 

1.  THE  emotions — or  the  sensibilities,  as  they  are  often 
7  97 


98  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  X. 

called,  though  this  latter  term  is  sometimes  given  a  wider 
application — are  generally  discussed  prior  to  the  desires  or 
motivities.  This  order  of  thought  would  not  be  objectionable 
were  it  not  accompanied  with  the  view  that  the  emotions  and 
the  phenomena  of  pleasure  and  pain  are  identical  and  co- 
extensive with  one  another  and  also  with  the  doctrine  that, 
in  every  case,  the  development  of  a  desire  is  conditioned  on 
the  exercise  of  a  preceding  and  corresponding  emotion. 
Neither  of  these  opinions  is  well  founded.  The  emotions 
excite  desire  only  when  they  are  pleasurable  or  painful  experi- 
ences; in  this  respect  they  are  like  other  excitants  of  motiv- 
ity.  Moreover  in  themselves — as  mental  agitations  produced 
by  the  perception,  remembrance  or  conception  of  objects — they 
often  mingle  with  our  desires  instead  of  preceding  them  and 
so  are  modifiers  rather  than  originators  of  motivity.  Fre- 
quently, too,  emotions  of  gratification  or  of  disappointment 
arise  when  the  end  of  a  desire  is  perceived  to  be  attained  or  to 
be  defeated ;  in  which  cases  evidently  the  desire  antedates  the 
emotion  and  is  a  condition  of  it. 

2.  Before  discussing  these  sensibilities,  however,  let  us  con- 
clude what  we  have  to  say  directly  respecting  desires  or  mo- 
tive tendencies.    Reason,  sympathy  and  liabit  have  been  men- 
tioned as  modifiers  of  motivity,  and  as  deserving  special  study 
in  this  relation.     Let  us  speak  of  them.     After  that,  three 
questions  may  be  considered ;  first  let  us  ask,  ff  Are  specific 
objects  ever  desired  without  reference  to  the  enjoyment,  com- 
fort or  happines  to  be  obtained  from  them  or  to  the  pain  and 
evil  which  they  may  prevent  ?  "  secondly,  "  Does  pleasure  al- 
ways consist  in  the  gratification  of  desire  or  motive  tend- 
ency ?  "  and,  thirdly,  ""  Is  there  any  special  form  of  thought, 
as  that  of  the  greatest  apparent  good,  which  governs  the  deter- 
minations of  human  desire  ?  "    After  treating  these  topics  we 
shall  be  ready  to  inquire  concerning  the  place  of  the  emotions 
among  our  spiritual  activities,  and  concerning  their  relations 
to  the  moral  life. 

3.  In  studying  the  practical  side  of  human  nature,  we  have 
found  that  reason  is  not  simply  an  intellectual  but  also  a 
motive  faculty.     We  have  also  distinguished  between  reason 
and  affection  as  two  modes  of  motivity — the  latter  being  more 
emotional  and  impulsive  than  the  former.    At  the  same  time 
the  difference  between  these  tendencies  should  not  be  exag- 
gerated, because  reason  may  originate  a  deep  and  tender  feel- 
ing which  may  be — and  often  is — called  love  or  affection, 


CHAP.  X.J  MODIFIERS  OF  MOTIVITY.  99 

though  it  is  founded  on  a  more  thorough  intelligence  and  ap- 
preciation than  ordinary  affection. 

Some  define  reason  as  the  faculty  of  abstract  and  general 
thought ;  this  conception  sets  forth  that  function  or  aspect  of 
reason,  according  to  which  it  produces  principle,  perhaps 
strong  principle,  but  which  does  not  produce  tenderness  of 
feeling.  In  addition  to  this  function  reason  has  another  of 
which  we  should  not  lose  sight.  For  that  same  mental  ability 
by  which  man,  using  general  notions,  forms  judgments  appli- 
cable to  innumerable  like  objects  which  he  could  not  sepa- 
rately consider,  qualifies  him  for  a  more  penetrating  and  com- 
plete knowledge  of  such  individual  objects  and  beings  as  are 
immediately  presented  to  him.  Indeed,  the  abstract  judg- 
ments of  reason  always  take  their  start  in  the  particular  and 
specific  perceptions  of  reason. 

Now  affection  is  excited  by  immediate  and  circumstantial 
cognitions  rather  than  by  those  which  are  general  or  abstract. 
When,  therefore,  reason  perceives  the  attractive  or  moving 
particulars  of  some  case,  there  arises  what  we  may  style  a 
rational  affection.  This  may  be  strong  and  deep  and  tender, 
but  it  has  a  higher  origin  than  that  unthinking  sympathetic 
affection  of  which  brutes  are  capable.  It  is  also  more  pro- 
found and  abiding  than  ordinary  love.  As  the  large  and  mas- 
sive ships  of  modern  days  sink  more  deeply  into  the  sea  and 
are  less  subject  to  the  agitations  of  the  winds  and  waves  than 
the  lighter  craft  of  ancient  times,  so  the  affections  of  reason 
are  more  influential  and  more  stable  than  those  of  sympathy, 
while  they  are  equally  delicate  and  tender. 

4.  The  functions  of  reason  in  man's  motive  nature  appear 
not  only  in  those  motivities  which  spring  directly  from  the 
perceptions  of  this  faculty,  but  also  in  the  part  which  reason 
often  takes  in  controlling,  guiding  and  modifying  our  other 
motivities.  This  function  is  so  important  that  some  conceive 
of  it  erroneously  as  the  only  motive  action  of  reason. 
Thoughtful  regard  for  the  interests  of  one's  self  or  of  others 
is  a  purely  rational  motivity ;  so  also  is  a  sense  of  duty  or  the 
love  of  what  is  right  and  the  desire  for  its  realization.  When 
either  of  these  forms  of  motivity  controls  and  unites  with 
what  may  be  called  a  sub-rational  desire,  such  as  an  ordinary 
affection  or  propensity,  the  latter,  too,  becomes  rational,  or,  to 
express  the  truth  more  exactly,  is  rationalized,  and  is  included 
within  the  sphere  of  man's  higher  life.  After  this  manner 
most  forms  of  human  motivity  may  assume  right  moral  rela- 


100  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  X. 

tions  and  even  come  to  be  called  virtues.  Not  only  domestic 
affection,  benevolence,  generosity,  self-love  and  prudence,  an- 
ger and  indignation,  but  also  modesty,  bravery,  candor,  curi- 
osity, activity,  promptness,  carefulness,  self-esteem,  the  love 
of  praise  and  the  desire  for  distinction,  may  be  so  controlled 
and  so  infused  with  principle  as  to  be  worthy  of  approbation 
and  goodwill. 

5.  So,  also,  other  modes  of  natural  motivity,  being  regu- 
larly and  consciously  exercised  in  opposition  to  moral  prin- 
ciple, become  vices,  and  are  so  called.     Laziness,  cowardice, 
selfishness,  recklessness,  extravagance,  vanity  and  pride,  are 
vices.     These  improper  dispositions  are  often — perhaps  al- 
ways— modifications  of  tendencies  which  might  assume  a  vir- 
tuous character.     As  they  are  not  conformed  to  reason  but 
conflict  with  it  they  cannot  well  be  styled  rationalized;  yet 
as  they  are  exercised  knowingly  in  opposition  to  reason  and 
are,  in  that  ineffectual  way,  accompanied  by  an  exercise  of 
reason,  they  might  be  called  rationated — unless  some  one  can 
propose  a  better  term.    The  above  illustrations  of  rationalized 
and  rationated  dispositions  connect  themselves  with  the  moral 
reason;  but  we  do  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  lower 
function  of  reason  which  aims  at  good  rather  than  at  the  right 
may  also  control  and  modify  our  natural  tendencies. 

With  respect  to  those  exercises  of  motivity  which  take  place 
apart  from  the  judgment  of  reason  and  are  not  consciously 
either  conformed  or  opposed  to  them,  we  have  seen  that  they 
generally  serve  ends  which  reason  approves  and  which  must 
have  been  aimed  at  by  the  supreme  intelligence,  while  the  mo- 
tivities  themselves  form  no  part  of  rational  and  moral  life. 
Such  especially  are  those  instincts  which  in  human  beings 
operate  only  in  infancy. 

6.  Philosophers  with  great  unanimity  ascribe  the  percep- 
tion of  obligatory  ends  and  of  the  laws  of  duty  to  "  right 
reason  "  or  "  the  moral  reason,"  but  they  are  not  fully  agreed 
as  to  the  manner  of  this  perception.    Many  regard  the  opera- 
tions of  reason  concerning  points  of  duty  as  much  .simpler 
than  concerning  other  matters  of  inquiry — indeed  as  being 
strictly  intuitional.    We  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the  moral 
judgments  of  reason  are  neither  more  nor  less  intuitional  than 
are  its  other  judgments  respecting  practical  questions.     A 
clear  understanding  of  this  topic  cannot  be  expected  till  after 
our  discussion  of  the  Moral  Law.    This  law  sets  forth  and  is 
composed  of  the  aims  and  rules  of  right  conduct.    These  can- 


\ 
CHAP.  X.]  MODIFIERS  OF  MOTIVITY.  101 

not  be  philosophically  understood  except  in  connection  with 
the  rational  processes  by  which  they  are  apprehended  and  for- 
mulated. Therefore  the  exact  nature  of  the  operations  of  the 
moral  faculty  must  be  expected  to  reveal  itself  during  the 
analytic  study  of  the  aims  and  rules  of  morality. 

7.  Sympathy  has  almost  as  important  a  place  as  reason  in 
man's  motive  constitution;  it  is  the  fundamental  element  of 
the  social  nature.  In  its  lowest  form  it  is  a  propensity  com- 
mon to  man  and  the  brutes.  Illustrations  of  the  care  of  ani- 
mals for  one  another  are  scarcely  needed;  they  abound  in 
books  on  Natural  History.  The  following  is  taken  at  random 
from  "  an  account  of  the  birds  in  Eastern  North  America," 
by  Wm.  E.  D.  Scott,  which  he  entitles  "Bird  Studies." 
Speaking  of  mocking-birds,  he  says,  "  One  that  I  reared  in 
Arizona,  when  six  weeks  old,  assumed  the  care  of  two  other 
very  young  mocking-birds  and  a  young  oriole  that  were  placed 
in  the  cage  with  him.  He  showed  them  how  to  kill  and  tear 
apart  the  grasshopper  placed  in  the  cage  for  food,  how  to 
moisten  the  fragments  in  the  water  cup,  and  generally  fed 
the  small  birds  and  looked  after  them  before  attending  to  his 
own  wants."  The  disposition  of  some  animals  to  protect  and 
foster  others  and  especially  to  care  for  the  young  and  help- 
less is  often  a  strong,  overmastering  passion. 

Sympathy  is  the  basis  of  the  benevolent  affections  and  even 
of  that  anger  or  resentment  which  arises  when  we  see  one  ill- 
treating  our  friends.  It  is  a  fundamental  propensity  of 
spirit,  but  differs  from  other  propensities  because  of  its  pecul- 
iar power  to  double  man's  desires.  By  reason  of  this  disposi- 
tion whatever  man  seeks  for  himself  he  seeks  for  others  also. 
That  is,  he  would  have  them  partake  of  enjoyments  similar  to 
his  own. 

This  word  "  sympathy/'  however,  is  somewhat  ambiguous, 
In  the  present  connection  it  does  not  signify  that  inborn 
proneness  whch  every  spirit  has  to  participate  in  the  emotions 
of  a  companion — just  as  one  electric  disturbance  is  induced  by 
a  neighboring  one;  nor  even  our  tendency  to  exercise  desires 
or  impulses  in  common  with  those  about  us — a  tendency  ap- 
parent in  excited  mobs,  in  the  fashions  of  popular  taste  and 
favor,  and  even  in  national  and  public  movements.  The  word 
is  often  applied  to  such  experiences;  this,  indeed,  is  its 
original  use.  But  now,  employing  a  secondary  though  not 
uncommon  signification,  we  mean  by  sympathy  the  spontane- 
ous desire  that  another  or  others  of  whose  life  and  experience 


102  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  X. 

one  is  cognizant  should  be  freed  from  pain  or  sorrow  and 
should  have  that  pleasure  or  gratification  of  which  his  or  their 
circumstances  admit. 

This  sympathy  has  been  excellently  named  altruistic  feel- 
ing or  altruism,  and  is  rightly  held  to  be  a  primitive  element 
of  spiritual  life.  We  cannot  agree  with  those  who  teach  that 
man,  primarily  and  radically,  is  a  wholly  selfish  being,  and 
that  his  pity  and  affection  for  others  is  only  an  indirect  way 
of  exercising  love  for  himself.  They  say  that  man  imagines 
himself  in  the  condition  of  another  and  then  feels  for  that 
imaginary  self.  It  is  to  be  admitted  that  many,  perhaps  most, 
men  are  greatly  influenced  by  selfishness,  but  we  cannot  ex- 
plain love  and  pity  for  others  as  a  development  of  that  selfish- 
ness. The  truth  is  that  every  spirit  naturally  or  normally 
wishes  kindred  and  neighboring  spirits  to  have  the  same 
pleasures  and  comforts  as  itself ;  and  this  desire  is  essentially 
disinterested. 

8.  Animals  as  well  as  men  exhibit  altruism.    They  show  an 
interest  in  the  specific  modes  of  enjoyment  and  of  suffering  of 
which  their  companions  are  capable.     With  what  diligence 
and  tenderness  they  care  for  their  young !     How  frequently 
they  share  with  each  other  the  means  of  subsistence!     How 
vigorously  and  even  recklessly  they  act  for  their  common  pro- 
tection and  defense!    But  this  spirit  is  especially  shown  in 
those  modes  of  helpfulness  and  kindness  observable  among 
human  beings.    When  one  provides  a  good  dinner  for  himself 
and  his  friends,  when  he  imparts  knowledge  and  information 
to  others,  when  he  shares  wealth  and  the  means  of  comfort 
with  the  needy,  he  exhibits  altruism. 

Possibly  in  some  persons  this  tendency  becomes  utterly  de- 
stroyed by  reason  of  their  persistent  egotism  and  self-indul- 
gence, yet  we  doubt  whether  any  men  are  so  depraved  as  to  be 
absolutely  incapable  of  sympathy  for  their  fellow-beings. 
Self-sacrifice  and  generosity  are  a  high  development  of  altru- 
ism; but  even  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  unnatural.  What  is 
more  natural  than  that  the  life  of  a  good  mother  should  be  a 
continued  course  of  self-sacrifice  ? 

When  altruistic  desires  are  gratified,  a  pleasure  is  experi- 
enced. But  these  desires  do  not  aim  at  that  pleasure;  they 
seek  the  happiness  of  others,  not  one's  own.  That  they  do  so 
is  a  simple  ultimate  psychological  fact. 

9.  The  third  factor  influencing  the  development  of  the  mo- 
tivities  is  habit.    By  this  we  mean  that  tendency  to  any  form 


CHAP.  X.]  MODIFIERS  OF  MOTIVITT.  103 

of  activity  which  is  induced  by  frequent  repetition.  That 
such  a  tendency  should  originate  in  such  a  way  is  a  radical 
law  of  spiritual  being.  The  word  "  habit,"  which  anglicizes 
the  Latin  "habitus/'  a  translation  of  the  Greek  !£«?,  signi- 
fied primarily  an  acquired  state  or  condition  of  more  or  less 
permanency.  This  meaning  yet  survives  when  men  speak  of 
a  diseased  or  of  a  healthy  habit  either  of  the  body  or  of  the 
mind.  After  this,  being  limited  to  the  sphere  of  psychical 
things,  it  came  to  signify  a  chronic  tendency  induced  by  repe- 
tition, as  also  the  mode  of  action  to  which  such  a  tendency 
leads.  When  we  hear  of  one's  acquiring  the  habit  of  tobacco- 
chewing,  or  whisky-drinking,  or  opium-smoking,  or  of  tell- 
ing falsehoods,  or  reading  novels,  or  idling  away  one's  time, 
and  when  we  speak  of  the  power  of  such  habits  over  conduct, 
we  refer  to  tendencies  established  and  strengthened  by  re- 
peated indulgence;  at  other  times  the  modes  of  action  above 
mentioned  as  related  to  our  dispositions  to  do  them  are  called 
habits. 

While  philosophers  agree  that  habit  is  a  psychical  tendency 
produced  by  repetition,  no  complete  statement  has  yet  been 
given  of  the  relation  of  habit  to  the  motivities.  Some  light 
will  be  thrown  on  this  point,  as  well  as  on  the  nature  of  habits 
in  general,  if  we  distinguish  them  into  two  principal  classes. 
For  some  habits,  which  affect  our  motivities  indirectly,  may 
be  styled  facilitative  and  executive,  while  others,  being  direct 
modifications  and  developments  of  desire,  may  be  styled  mo- 
tive or  incentive. 

10.  We  call  the  former  facilitative  and  executive  because 
they  show  themselves  in  connection  with  acquired  dexterities 
and  aid  us  in  the  performance  of  any  work  or  action  to  which 
we  have  become  accustomed.  We  do  not  agree  with  those  who 
define  habit  as  a  facility  gained  by  practice,  but  we  say  that 
one  kind  of  habit,  in  the  form  of  a  tendency  to  act  without 
premeditation  or  intention,  accompanies,  maintains  and  in- 
creases such  a  facility.  Any  one  watching  a  skilled  mechanic 
at  his  work  can  notice  how  swiftly  he  passes  from  one  step 
of  a  process  to  the  next  without  having  to  deliberate  what 
that  next  should  be.  This  kind  of  habit  may  attach  itself  to 
any  physical  activity,  but  it  preeminently  affects  the  intel- 
lect through  an  increase  given  to  the  power  of  association  or 
suggestion.  Dr.  Thomas  Reid  is  right  in  teaching,  "  That 
trains  of  thinking  which,  by  frequent  repetition,  have  become 
familiar,  should  spontaneously  offer  themselves  to  our  fancy, 


104:  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  X. 

seems  to  require  no  other  original  quality  but  the  power  of 
habit."  These  words,  indeed,  do  not  accurately  state  the  law 
of  the  association  of  ideas;  therefore  they  fail  somewhat  of 
Reid's  purpose  in  using  them;  because  association  may  take 
place  without  any  frequency  of  repetition.  But  association 
and  habit  are  founded  on  the  same  principle,  viz. :  that  the 
mind  tends  to  repeat  that  which  it  has  previously  done.  This 
tendency  is  called  habit  when  it  has  been  strengthened  by 
frequency  of  repetition. 

11.  This  law  of  habit  affects  every  mental  faculty.  Under 
its  influence,  on  the  renewal  of  proper  occasion,  the  same 
memory  or  imagination,  the  same  judgment  or  inference, 
springs  unbidden  into  the  mind;  which  effect,  though  we 
•are  conscious  of  it,  is  not  the  result  of  our  volition.  It  is 
automatic  and  unintentional.  Moreover,  if  the  thought  thus 
recalled  to  consciousness  has  been  previously  used  as  a  guide 
to  conduct,  it  is  accompanied  with  a  tendency  to  act  without 
any  consideration  of  the  end  at  which  the  conduct  originally 
aimed.  It  is  said  that  a  thoroughly  drilled  veteran  soldier 
if  he  suddenly  hear  the  word  of  command  will  instinctively 
obey  it,  even  though  it  be  given  by  a  person  without  authority 
and  whose  control  may  be  immediately  repudiated.  In  the 
spring  of  1865,  while  the  army  of  the  Potomac  lay  before 
Petersburgh,  Virginia,  the  writer  of  this  discussion,  then 
chaplain  of  the  Seventh  New  Jersey  Infantry,  was  called  to 
march  in  company  with  a  poor  fellow,  who  was  about  to  be 
shot  for  desertion  to  the  enemy,  around  a  hollow  square  in 
which  a  division  of  the  Second  Army  Corps  had  been  drawn 
up.  The  man  was  a  Hessian,  and  had  spent  many  years  in 
military  service.  It  was  noticeable  that,  while  his  mind  was 
occupied  with  his  impending  execution,  he  kept  step  most  ac- 
curately with  the  wailing  music  of  the  band;  and,  when  he 
came  to  the  corners,  at  each  of  which  there  was  a  short  cessa- 
tion of  progress,  his  feet  measured  time  till  the  onward  move- 
ment was  renewed.  Illustrations  similar  to  the  foregoing  can 
be  gathered  from  our  daily  experience.  How  often,  after  one 
has  vacated  a  house  or  a  room  for  some  new  quarters,  he  finds 
himself  turning  in  the  familiar  direction!  Sometimes,  too, 
we  listen  for  the  voices  or  look  for  the  coming  of  those  who 
have  gone  away,  and  who  perhaps  are  separated  from  us  for- 
ever! 

12.  Facilitative  habits  add  greatly  to  the  effectiveness  of 
human  effort.  After  a  complicated  process  has  been  frequent- 


CHAP.  X.]  MODIFIERS  OF  MOTIVITY.  105 

ly  repeated  the  mind  tends  to  act  again  in  the  same  way  with 
the  minimum  of  thought  and  exertion.  The  recent  naval  vic- 
tories at  Manila  and  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  are  ascribed  to  the 
skill  of  the  American  gunners.  Their  training  had  been  so 
thorough  that,  when  the  hour  of  battle  came,  they  managed 
the  huge  rifles  and  projectiles  with  the  utmost  ease  and  with 
marvelous  precision  and  celerity.  Though  under  intense  ex- 
citement their  fighting  went  on  with  machine-like  regularity. 
In  like  manner  practice  so  develops  a  bent  of  mind  in  an 
accountant  or  an  orator,  in  a  musician  or  a  swordsman,  or  in 
the  mechanic,  the  merchant,  or  the  professional  man,  that  he 
instinctively  follows  his  accustomed  mode  of  working  and 
could  not  change  from  it  without  special  effort. 

13.  Facilitative  habit  is  the  chief  cause  of  the  difference 
between  the  discursive  and  the  intuitive  reason.     On  the  oc- 
currence of  some  exigency,  intellectual  or  practical,  some  sat- 
isfactory way  of  reaching  a  conclusion  or  of  obtaining  a  result 
has  been  discovered.    On  like  occasions  this  mode  of  procedure 
has  again  and  again  proved  successful.    The  rule  thus  formed 
is  applied  with  quickness  and  ease.    In  using  it  the  parts  of 
the  process  are  conceived  of  synthetically  and  simultaneously 
rather  than  analytically  and  successively.     Hence,  the  action 
of  reason  is  called  intuitive.    Then  also  it  often  happens  that 
an  antecedent  has  been  ascertained  to  be  necessarily  and  regu- 
larly followed  by  a  consequent,  not  at  once,  but  by  reason  of 
certain  intervening  steps,  in  which  case  the  mind,  no  longer 
dwelling  on  these  steps,  immediately  asserts  or  expects  the 
consequent  as  connected  with  the  antecedent.    This  logical  ab- 
breviation adds  to  the  natural  quickness  of  the  intuitive  rea- 
son, as,  for  example,  in  the  different  statements  of  the  multi- 
plication table.    For  each  of  these  is  first  obtained  by  a  suc- 
cession of  additions. 

14.  The  synthetic  rapidity  and  the  abbreviation  of  thought 
of  which  we  have  now  spoken  are  especially  exhibited  in  the 
practical,  moral  judgment  of  men.     It  will  be  remembered 
from  a  previous  discussion  that  an  action  is  right  and  obliga- 
tory, not  as  a  mere  exercise  of  power,  nor  even  as  effectuating 
a  result,  but  as  an  intentional  effectuation  or  doing.    Accord- 
ingly the  thought  of  a  moral  action,  as  used  by  the  intuitive 
reason,  may  be  regarded  as  a  kind  of  condensed  rule  setting 
forth  a  specific  end  and  the  proper  method  of  accomplishing 
it;  or,  if  the  action  be  a  wrong  one,  the  thought  of  it  shows 
the  way  in  which  a  right  end  may  be  violated  and  which  we 


106  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  X. 

are  bound  to  avoid.  Conceptions  such  as  those  of  theft,  mur- 
der, blasphemy,  perjury,  or  such  as  telling  the  truth,  doing 
good,  obeying  one's  parents,  observing  the  Sabbath,  keeping 
one's  word,  are  short,  practical  rules  through  which  rational 
habit  influences  human  life.  These  conceptions  assert  them- 
selves with  the  authority  of  the  ends  which  they  embody  and 
subserve. 

15.  That  men  should  be  guided  by  this  mode  of  moral 
judgment  is  both  natural  and  necessary;  to  submit  to  such 
guidance  is  wise  and  profitable.     We  should  cling  to  those 
rules  which  express  the  wisdom  of  experience.    An  established 
law  of  conduct  should  be  followed  even  in  doubtful  cases.    To 
disobey  it  is  allowable  only  in  circumstances  in  which  an  ob- 
servance of  its  letter  can  be  shown  to  be  a  disregard  of  its 
spirit  and  to  be  plainly  opposed  to  some  more  fundamental 
principle  of  duty. 

At  the  same  time  we  should  not  become  the  slaves  of  habit. 
One  should  seek  a  clear  understanding  of  the  truth  and  should 
make  truth  when  understood  the  master  of  his  conduct.  Eev- 
erencing  accepted  rules,  he  should  interpret  them  according  to 
the  ends  which  they  are  designed  to  serve  and  from  which 
they  derive  their  authority.  We  do  them  no  dishonor  if  we 
find  that  they  admit  of  rare  exceptions,  which,  after  all,  are 
not  exceptions.  In  this  mode  of  judgment  we  may  sometimes 
imitate  Him  who  declared  that  the  Sabbath  was  made  for  man 
and  not  man  for  the  Sabbath,  and  who  spoke  of  those  who  in 
the  service  of  the  temple  profaned  the  Sabbath  and  were 
blameless. 

16.  Facilitative  habit  affects  the  workings  of  the  intellect 
and  in  this  way  indirectly  influences  the  motivities.     The 
other  style  of  habit — the  motive,  or  incentive — operates  di- 
rectly by  increasing  the  readiness  and  strength  of  a  motivity. 

Through  facilitative  habit  difficult, and  irksome  occupa- 
tions may  be  rendered  easy  and  even  agreeable,  as  certain 
finger  movements  on  the  piano  or  certain  modes  of  conducting 
business,  or  of  applying  the  mental  faculties ;  and,  in  this  way 
a  wholly  new  tendency  may  arise.  But  no  motive  habit  ap- 
pears to  be  an  absolutely  new  tendency;  such  a  habit  is  always 
the  growth — it  may  be  the  abnormal  growth — of  some  exist- 
ing germ  of  motivity.  A  principle  of  desire  may  at  first  be 
weak  and  unable  of  itself  to  take  a  leading  part  in  the  direc- 
tion of  one's  conduct.  But  if,  through  favoring  circumstances 
or  intentional  guidance,  its  proper  excitants  be  frequently 


CHAP.  X.J  MODIFIERS  OF  MOTIVITY.  107 

presented — especially,  also,  if  the  object  of  it  be  often  realized 
and  enjoyed — it  may  become  a  strong  and  even  dominant  in- 
clination. 

After  such  a  habit  of  disposition  has  been  established  the 
mode  of  action  which  it  supports  is  also  called  a  habit.  In 
this  secondary  sense,  which  occurs  quite  as  often  as  the  other, 
a  habit  might  be  defined  as  a  mode  of  action  or  doing  which 
naturally  yields  some  kind  of  satisfaction  and  for  which  a  de- 
terminate inclination  has  arisen  through  the  frequent  indul- 
gence of  a  desire. 

17.  The  formation  of  motive  habits  and  the  power  which 
they  sometimes  attain  find  illustration  in  the  way  that  men 
become  addicted  to  the  use  of  stimulants  or  narcotics ;  what  is 
at  first  a  comparatively  trifling  pleasure  is  turned  into  an  im- 
perative necessity.    But  there  are  many  such  dispositions  be- 
sides those  which  are  based  on  bodily  appetites  and  which  are 
reinforced  by  corporeal   conditions.     There    are    ambitious 
habits,  covetous  habits,  envious  habits,  slovenly  habits,  stu- 
dious or  diligent,  humble  or  haughty,  habits,  selfish  or  gener- 
ous habits,  immoral  habits,  conscientious  habits;  in  short, 
every  cultivated  disposition  and  the  mode  of  conduct  which  it 
supports  may  be  called  a  habit. 

The  importance  of  motive  habits  in  practical  affairs  and 
especially  in  moral  life  needs  little  proof.  One's  character  is 
mainly  composed  of  such  habits.  Indeed,  should  we  widen 
our  conception  of  habit  so  as  to  include  under  it  every  perma- 
nent disposition,  whether  natural  or  acquired,  which  results 
in  the  frequent  repetition  of  some  mode  of  conduct,  character 
might  be  defined  as  a  system  of  motive  habits.  The  word 
"habit"  is  occasionally  used  in  this  sense,  which  is  quite 
conformable  with  the  original  meaning  of  &?*$•  and  habitus. 

Character  is  the  fundamental  factor  of  human  destiny;  no 
duty  is  more  vital  than  to  build  up  character  through  the 
development  of  good  and  noble  habits.  Virtue  itself,  the 
fountain  of  spiritual  prosperity  and  blessedness,  has  been  well 
described  as  the  fixed  habit  of  loving  and  doing  what  is  right 
and  good.  Vice  is  the  habitual  love  and  practice  of  evil. 

18.  It  is  no  detraction  from  the  value  of  facilitative  habits 
to  say  that  their  chief  moral  function  is  to  excite  and  to  regu- 
late our  motive  habits  through  the  workings  of  the  intuitive 
reason.    For  that  adds  to  their  importance. 

Having  seen  how  our  powers  of  doing  and  of  desiring  in- 
crease in  strength  and  effectiveness  under  the  operation  of  the 


108  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  X. 

law  of  habit,  we  might  also  discuss  the  workings  of  the  cor- 
relative law,  that  disused  faculties  and  suppressed  or  neg- 
lected motivities  become  weak  and  impotent.  We  content 
ourselves  at  present  with  the  mention  of  this  law,  although  it 
is  almost  of  equal  importance  with  the  law  of  habit. 


CHAPTER  XL 

MOTIVITY  AS   SUBJECTIVELY  RELATED. 

1.  Every  intelligent  motive  tendency  aims  at  some  form  of  good  or 
at  some  form  of  enjoyment,  avoiding  also  evil  or  suffering. 
Bishop  Butler  quoted. — 2.  Instinct  and  appetite  seek  immediate 
bodily  relief  or  gratification. — 3.  The  propensities  are  desires  for 
pleasant  spiritual  experiences  or  for  objects  productive  of  them. 
—4.  Self-love,  benevolence,  public  spirit,  prudence  and  rational 
good  will,  all  aim  at  welfare  and  happiness. — 5.  The  efforts  of 
men  for  a  far  distant  future  spring  partly  from  an  altruistic  sen- 
timent.— 6.  Moreover  their  immediate  satisfaction  in  such 
efforts  is  reinforced  (1)  by  an  acquired  habit  of  desire,  (2)  by  the 
expectation  of  continued  personal  existence. — 7.  Moral  principle 
seeks  the  right  as  being  a  superlative  and  peculiar  kind  of  good. 
Clearer  views  on  this  point  may  be  hoped  for  after  our  analysis 
of  the  moral  law. — 8.  The  theory  that  pleasure  consists  in  the 
satisfaction  of  desire  is  founded  on  a  superficial  observation,  not 
on  a  thorough  examination  of  the  phenomena  involved. — 9.  The 
satisfaction  and  the  disappointment  of  desire  are  only  secondary 
sources  of  pleasure  and  of  pain. — 10.  It  is  not  true  that  man 
always  chooses  the  greatest  apparent  good. — 11.  This  error  is 
associated  with  two  others,  (1)  that  pleasure,  (2)  that  happiness, 
is  the  universal  aim  of  man's  desire  and  pursuit. — 12.  Were 
man  controlled  by  reason  he  would  always  choose  good  in  pre- 
ference to  any  inferior  aim  ;  and  were  he  controlled  by  moral 
reason  he  would  always  choose  the  right  as  being  superior  to  any 
other  good. — 13.  The  doctrine  that  "  virtue  is  knowledge,"  that 
is,  the  necessary  result  of  knowledge,  is  inconsistent  with  fact. 
Mere  instruction  cannot  change  a  depraved  heart  ;  and  vice,  no 
less  than  virtue,  involves  knowledge  of  the  right. — 14.  Right  ends 
and  the  knowledge  of  them  have  no  efficiency  in  themselves. 
The  powers  governing  life  are  the  motivities,  each  of  which 
operates  in  connection  with  its  own  conceptions  and  beliefs. 

1.  PASSING  now  to  the  three  questions  which  proposed' 
themselves  for  consideration  (Chap.  X.  2.),  we  ask,  first,  "Do 
we  ever  desire  objects  without  reference  to  the  enjoyment,  sat- 
isfaction or  happiness  to  be  obtained  from  them  or  the  suffer- 
ing evil  or  misery  which  may  be  avoided  by  means  of  them  ? 

Bishop  Butler,  in  Sormon  XI.,  says,  "  All  particular  appe- 

109 


HO  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XI. 

tites  and  passions  are  towards  external  things  themselves,  dis- 
tinct from  the  pleasure  arising  from  them."  We  incline  to 
question  this  statement,  at  least  if  it  be  not  greatly  qualified. 
We  think  that  every  end  of  motivity  includes — and  that,  too, 
as  an  essential  part — some  reference,  either  immediate  or  re- 
mote, to  an  agreeable  or  to  a  disagreeable,  to  a  desirable  or  to 
an  undesirable,  experience. 

By  this  we  do  not  mean  that  the  actual  fulfilment  of  any 
desire  gives  pleasure  while  the  disappointment  of  it  is  dis- 
tressful. These  things  are  so;  hence  all  men  naturally  seek 
the  pleasure  of  satisfaction  and  shun  the  distress  of  disap- 
pointment. But  our  doctrine  is  that  every  intelligent  motive 
tendency,  aside  from  any  thought  of  success  or  failure,  aims  at 
some  enjoyment  or  good,  or  shuns  some  suffering  or  evil ;  and 
that  upon  this  its  action  as  a  motivity  depends.  . 

Here,  of  course,  we  exclude  from  motivities,  or  desires, 
tendencies  to  action,  whether  original  or  acquired,  which  are 
automatic  and  unintelligent.  Such  are  facilitative  habits  and 
certain  inborn  animal  dispositions,  as  the  inclination  to  yawn 
or  to  sneeze,  to  preserve  one's  balance,  or  to  recover  one's  self 
from  a  sudden  slip.  These  actions  do  not  follow  but  precede 
our  thought.  We  have  in  mind  only  those  tendencies  in 
which  some  end  is  consciously  sought  and  which,  therefore, 
are  properly  called  desires  or  motivities. 

2.  The  least  intellectual  of  these  is  instinct,  or  the  disposi- 
tion to  do  some  useful  work  without  any  understanding  of  its 
nature.  Instinct  being  excluded  from  man's  mature  life  one 
cannot  speak  about  it  from  experience,  yet,  so  far  as  we  can 
judge,  the  motive  element  in  it  is  to  remove  some  uneasiness 
or  to  gain  some  pleasure  through  a  definite  mode  of  action  or 
accomplishment. 

The  aim  of  appetite  can  be  more  confidently  stated.  Some- 
times, as  in  hunger  or  thirst,  we  desire  to  remove  a  distress ;  at 
other  times,  as  when  one  wishes  for  sweetmeats  or  for  ripened 
fruit,  we  seek  bodily  enjoyment.  No  object  of  appetite  is  ever 
longed  for  except  as  it  may  minister  to  our  relief  or  our 
gratification.  The  child  desires  a  lump  of  sugar  because  he 
knows  the  sensation  which  it  will  produce.  A  painted  stick 
of  wood  would  lose  its  attractions  when  he  found  that  it  was 
not  a  stick  of  candy.  Food  is  sought  by  animals  in  order  to 
remove  hunger  and  gratify  taste ;  it  is  no  longer  sought  when 
these  ends  have  been  realized.  Doubtless  the  object  and  the 
satisfaction  obtainable  from  it  are  not  conceived  of  separately ; 


CHAP.  XI.]    MOTIV1TY  AS  SUBJECTIVELY  RELATED,    m 

but  while  the  satisfaction  is  not  thought  of  apart  from  the 
object,  neither  is  the  object  thought  of  apart  from  the  satis- 
faction. 

3.  The  propensities  are  more  complex  and  more  intellec- 
tual than  the  appetites,  but  similar  explanations  apply  to 
them.    Information  is  sought  partly  for  the  pleasure  of  learn- 
ing and  knowing  and  partly  because  knowledge  is  the  means 
of  obtaining  other  satisfactions  in  addition  to  that  pleasure. 
Power  and  influence  are  desired  because  the  exercise  of  con- 
trol and  the  sense  of  personal  importance  are  things  enjoy- 
able, and  also  because  they  make  other    objects    attainable. 
The  propensity  for  property  is  conditioned  on  a  sense  of 
value ;  for  it  is  of  the  essence  of  property  to  have  value,  that 
is,  to  have  the  power  of  procuring  comfort  and  enjoyment. 
This  motivity  through  undue  indulgence  may  become  a  ruin- 
ous passion,  but,  even  so,  it  aims  at  the  means  of  gratifica- 
tion.    Should  money  or  any  other  possession  be  seen  to  have 
lost  this  character  it  would  no  longer  be  cared  for,  even  by  a 
miser;  it  would  be  tossed  aside  as  worthless,  as  the  sack  of 
gold  was  by  Crusoe  on  his  desert  island. 

In  like  manner  adventure,  novelty,  society,  the  praise  and 
good-will  of  others,  are  all  desired  for  the  gratification  which 
they  afford.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  social  feeling,  so  far 
as  it  is  sympathetic  or  altruistic,  does  not  seek  one's  own  en- 
joyment. It  differs  from  other  propensities  in  this  respect. 
Nevertheless  it  does  aim  at  the  relief,  comfort  and  pleasure 
of  others,  and  therefore  comes  under  the  general  rule  that 
gratification  in  some  form  is  the  end  of  every  propensity. 

4.  Turning  now  to  the  affections,  it  is  plain  that  a  benevo- 
lent disposition,  whether  directed  towards  one's  self  or  to 
others,  aims  at  the  happiness  of  its  object.    But  anger,  hatred 
and  the  malevolent  affections  seek  to  inflict  pain  and  misery, 
and  are,  in  this  respect,  exceptional  among  our  motivities. 
Even  they,  however,  at  least  in  their  primitive  genetic  form, 
have  good  or  enjoyment  as  their  ultimate  purpose.     For  re- 
sentment is  an  impulse  to  repel  and  subdue  any  agent  who 
inflicts  injury  or  suffering  by  inflicting  pain  on  him.     It 
aims  to  remove  or  counteract  the  cause  of  evil  and  to  leave 
the  way  open  for  good.    Hatred  is  a  perverse,  irrational  de- 
velopment of  this  disposition. 

Once  more,  those  high  motivities  in  which  one  deliberately 
seeks  his  own  interest  or  the  welfare  of  others  confessedly 
aim  at  happiness. 


112  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XI. 

5.  But,,  it  may  be  said,  "  Do  not  men  sometimes  strive  for 
objects  which  can  be  realized  only  in  a  far  distant  future 
and  in  an  experience  in  which  neither  they  nor  any  other 
actors  now  living  shall  have  any  share?     Do  not  those  en- 
dowed with  genius  seek  for  fame    in    the    coming    ages? 
Do  not  kings  desire  a  dynasty  that  shall  last  for  centuries? 
Do  not  millionaires  leave  fortunes  that  their  descendants  may 
live  in  grandeur  for  generations  to  come  ?  "     Such  ambitions 
undoubtedly  are  a  part  of  human  life.     They    may   be    ac- 
counted for,  in  part,  as  altruistic  longings.     It  would  be  by 
no  means  contrary  to  Nature  that  individuals  of  our  race, 
even  though  they  themselves  should  have  no  expectation  of 
existence  beyond  the  grave,  might  yet  desire  that  their  suc- 
cessors should  enjoy  prosperity  and  wealth  and  power  and 
glory.     The  men  of  one  period  may,  in  this  way,  identify 
themselves  with  the  men  of  a  following  age,  or  of  many  fol- 
lowing ages,  and  thus  labor  disinterestedly  for  the  prosperity 
and  happiness  of  their  unborn  successors. 

These  considerations,  however,  do  not  wholly  explain  the 
phenomena.  Objects  in  the  distant  future  are  sometimes 
striven  for  with  a  genuine  selfishness,  as  when  some  man  of 
genius  seeks  to  have  his  own  fame  and  influence  perpetuated 
throughout  all  coming  time.  Alexander  the  Great  envied 
Achilles  because  Homer  heralded  the  exploits  of  this  hero  in 
eternal  song;  and  Napoleon  cherished  the  intense  ambition 
that  his  throne  and  government  should  have  permanent  su- 
premacy in  Europe. 

6.  For  the  understanding  of  such  aspirations  two  thoughts 
may  prove  helpful.     First  it  is  noticeable  that  no  objects  of 
posthumous  attainment  are  ever  sought  for  except  such  as 
would  confer  pleasure  if  they  were  realized  before  one's  de- 
parture from  this  life.     For  example,  power  and  distinction 
are  originally  sought  because  of  the  keen  personal  gratifica- 
tion expected  from  the  possession  of  them.     It  is  only  when 
the  desire  for  these  objects  has  become  a  developed  passion 
that  it  becomes  directed  to  the  distant  future.     Such  being 
the  case,  it  may  be  that,  through  the  force  of  habit,  a  kind  of 
secondary  motivity  is  engendered  by  reason  of  which  some 
ends  come  to  be  pursued  with  an  irrational  selfishness,  the 
agent  having  no  expectation  of  being  gratified  in  the  future 
at  the  time  when  his  ambitions  shall  be  realized.     In  short, 
have  we  not  here  an  exceptional  case,  which,  because  of  its 
peculiar  origin,  still  supports  the  rule  that  enjoyment,  in 


CHAP.  XI.]    MOTIVITY  AS  SUBJECTIVELY  RELATED.     H3 

some  form  or  in  the  general,  is  the  essential  aim  of  mo- 
tivity  ? 

Secondly,  we  have  to  say  that  the  expectation  of  continued 
personal  existence  accompanies  almost  all,  if  not  all,  of  mans 
hopes  for  the  future.  In  the  forming  of  plans  and  aims  most 
persons  do  not  realize  the  brevity  of  life ;  they  act  on  the  sup- 
position that  they  will  themselves  enjoy  the  fruit  of  their 
earnings  and  savings.  No  matter  how  old  a  successful  man 
may  be,  provided  only  he  have  some  health  and  soundness, 
he  looks  forward  to  a  few  more  years  of  comfort  and  honor. 
Besides,  the  expectation  of  a  life  to  come  arises  naturally  in 
every  rational  spirit.  Sometimes  it  is  a  blind  instinct ;  some- 
times a  confident  hope;  sometimes  an  assured  faith.  This 
belief  is  based  on  the  evident  incompleteness  of  the  present 
life  and  on  man's  conscious  fitness  for  a  continued  existence. 
In  ancient  times,  the  projection  of  man's  plans  into  the  future 
was  considered  a  token  of  his  immortality.  It  was  asked 
"  Why  do  aged  men  plant  trees  of  which  they  themselves  shall 
never  taste  the  fruit?"  They  do  so,  undoubtedly,  for  the 
enjoyment  of  a  generation  yet  to  come;  but  that  only  partly 
explains  their  conduct.  In  addition  there  is  the  hope  that 
they  themselves  shall  hereafter  be  happier  in  perceiving  the 
success  of  their  efforts  to  provide  for  the  happiness  of  others. 

7.  Thus  the  investigation  of  our  natural  (or  unmoral) 
motivities  justifies  the  conclusion  that  objects  are  desired  be- 
cause of  the  pleasure,  relief,  comfort  or  good  which  they  are 
capable  of  yielding,  but  that,  if  any  object  be  otherwise  sought 
it  is  because  of  a  secondary  propensity,  a  proneness  of  spirit, 
produced  by  habit  and  the  association  of  thought. 

The  query  now  presents  itself,  as  needful  to  the  completion 
of  our  discussion,  "  Are  the  aims  of  moral  principle  analogous 
with  those  of  our  other  motivities  ?  "  In  other  words,  "  Does 
this  principle,  in  seeking  the  right,  seek  it  as  being,  in  some 
specific  way,  promotive  of  the  comfort,  happiness  and  blessed- 
ness of  beings?"  An  affirmative  answer  to  this  question 
would  involve — not  that  the  right  in  general  and  the  good  in 
general  are  identical — but  that  the  right  is  a  peculiar  and 
superlative  mode  of  good,  considered  in  its  worthiness  and  as 
claiming  the  service  of  the  soul. 

We  incline  to  some  such  conception  of  the  right;  but  we 
recognize  that  no  satisfactory  definition  of  the  right  can  be 
reached  until  after  an  analytical  understanding  of  the  moral 
law. 
8 


114;  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XI. 

8.  The  second  question  to  be  considered  is  a  kind  of  con- 
verse to  that  which  we  have  now  discussed ;  it  is  "  Does  pleas- 
ure always  consist  in  the  satisfaction  of  desire,  or  motive  tend- 
ency ?  "    Some  authors  assert  this  to  be  so.     Plato's  doctrine 
that  pleasure  is  a  kind  of  reaction  from  a  preceding  uneasi- 
ness or  distress  connects  itself  with  the  belief  that  pleasure 
is  essentially  the  satisfaction  of  a  felt  want.    If  any  motivity 
be  cherished  eagerly,  it  is  attended  with  uneasiness;  and  the 
gratification  arising  from  the  attainment  of  the  end  sought 
for  is  enhanced  by  the  removal  of  this  uneasiness.    But  it  is 
not  true  that  desire  is  always  attended  with  distress;  many 
aspirations,  especially  those  of  a  benevolent  or  noble  character, 
are  sources  of  happiness,  at  least  if  they  are  guided  and  con- 
trolled by  reason.    The  statement  that  pleasure  is  heightened 
by  relief  from  a  preceding  pain  sets  forth  a  specific  law  of 
limited  application ;.  it  does  not  explain  the  origin  of  enjoy- 
ment in  general.    In  like  manner,  the  teaching  that  pleasure 
arises  from  the  gratification  of  desire  is  specific  and  by  no 
means  the  universal  law  of  pleasure. 

9.  The  reason  on  account  of  which  many  define  pleasure 
as  the  satisfaction  of  desire  is  to  be  found  in  the  ordinarily 
observed  sequences  of  life.    In  these,  evidently,  desire  is  fol- 
lowed by  pursuit,  pursuit  results  in  attainment,  and  attain- 
ment is  accompanied  with  pleasure.    This  view  of  phenomena 
is  not  the  result  of  analysis,  but  only  of  that  observation 
which  must  precede  analysis.    It  does  not  go  back  to  the  ori- 
gin of  desire ;  it  does  not  even  scrutinize  the  way  in  which  the 
gaining  of  one's  wish  is  attended  with  enjoyment.    Discrimi- 
native investigation  discloses  the  ultimate  law  of  the  phenom- 
ena; and  gives  the  followng  account  of  them,  in  which  enjoy- 
ment is  placed  prior  to  desire,  and  not  subsequent  to  it,  in  the 
order  of  psychical  development.     First,  there  is  a  pleasure 
experienced  in  connection  with  the  exercise  of  some  power,  or 
on  the  presentation  of  some  fact  or  object,  which  pleasure 
could  not  have  been  previously  desired;  because  it  is  now 
known  only  for  the  first  time ;  or  it  may  be  some  distress  is 
felt  for  the  first  time  and  therefore  before  relief  from  it  is  de- 
sired.   Secondly,  on  a  recurrence  of  like  circumstances,  a  de- 
sire arises  for  a  repetition  of  that  pleasure,  or  that  relief,  or 
for  the  object  productive  of  it.    Thirdly,  the  realization  of  the 
desired  end  gives  an  enjoyment  of  the  same  nature  with  that 
originally  experienced,  and  resulting  not  from  the  mere  fact 
that  one  obtains  what  he  wishes,  but  from  the  same  cause 


CHAP.  XI.]    MOTIVITY  AS  SUBJECTIVELY  RELATED.     H5 

which  produced  the  original  gratification.  And  fourthly,  ac- 
companying this  enjoyment,  and  mingling  with  it,  there  is  a 
peculiar  pleasure  which  may  be,  and  sometimes  is,  distin- 
guished as  satisfaction,  because  it  arises  upon  the  perceived 
fulfilment  of  one's  desire.  This  enjoyment  is  conditioned 
on  perceived  success,  and  has  its  counterpart  in  that  distress, 
called  disappointment,  which  arises  in  view  of  defeat  or  fail- 
ure. Though  not  often  discriminated  from  that  specifically 
desired  pleasure  which  it  accompanies,  it  clearly  is  something 
additional  to  that  pleasure  and  is  the  only  kind  of  gratifica- 
tion for  which  desire  is  a  necessary  prerequisite. 

10.  We  come  now  to  the  third  question  to  be  determined, 
namely,  "  Is  there  any  specific  form  of  thought  which  governs 
the   determinations   of   man's   motivities? — more   definitely, 
"Is  it  true  that  man  always  chooses  the  greatest  apparent 
good?"     Some  hold  that  every  human  desire  seeks  good  in 
one  form  or  another;   quidquid  petitur  petitur  sub   specie 
loni.     This  is  taught  by  those  who  regard  happiness  as  the 
universal  aim  of  man  and  by  those  also  who  say  that  pleasure 
is  the  invariable  object  of  his  pursuit.    For  the  former  define 
good,  or  things  good,  to  be  those  objects  which  yield  happi- 
ness, or  which,  it  may  be,  relieve  or  prevent  wretchedness, 
this  last  being  the  polar  opposite  of  happiness;  the  latter 
make  good  to  be  whatever  produces  pleasure  or  which  re- 
moves or  prevents  pain,  this  being  the  polar  opposite  of 
pleasure.     Thus  both  say  that  man  always  desires  good,  that 
is,  the  production  of  good  or  the  prevention  of  evil.     Both 
schools,  accordingly,  give  the  same  answer  to  the  question 
"Why  does  man  choose  one  out  of  several  conflicting  objects 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  rest  ?  "    They  say  that  the  mind  settles 
on  that  which  appears  to  be  the  greatest  good ;  hence  their 
doctrine  that  man's  will  or  choice  is  determined  by  the  great- 
est apparent  good. 

11.  Neither  of  these  classes  of  thinkers  is  right,  but  those 
are  especially  wrong  who  say  that  pleasure  is  the  only  good 
and  the  only  end  of  human  pursuit.     Such  language  shows 
obscure  and  loose  conceptions  concerning  the  higher  aims 
of  life,  inasmuch  as  there  is  no  proper  sense  in  which  good 
can  be  identified  with  pleasure  and  pleasure-producing  ob- 
jects.    Sometimes,  indeed,  a  thing  is  called  "  good  "  simply 
as  giving  pleasure,  as  when  the  child,  tasting  a  sweetmeat, 
says  it  is  "  good."    This  means  only  that  the  object  is  enjoy- 
able.    But  the  noun  "  good "  never  signifies  "  the  pleasur- 


116  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XI. 

able,"  nor  is  even  the  adjective  "  good  "  ordinarily  applied 
to  objects  simply  as  pleasurable.  Ordinarily,  "  good "  is 
that  which  conduces  to  happiness;  it  includes  whatever  pro- 
vides for  any  part  of  that  experience  which  the  wise  man 
seeks  wisely.  The  pleasurable  may  be  a  good  but  is  not  in- 
variably such.  Pleasure  sometimes  conflicts  with  good;  then 
it  is  an  evil.  In  view  of  this  fact  it  is  possible  for  man  to 
choose  good  in  preference  to  pleasure  or  pleasure  in  prefer- 
ence to  good.  Those,  therefore,  who  say  that  man  always 
chooses  good  because  he  always  chooses  pleasure,  are  mistaken. 
It  is  not  true  that  pleasure  is  always  good,  and  it  is  not  true 
that  man  always  chooses  pleasure. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  also  err  who  speak  of  happiness 
and  good  as  being  universal  aims  of  desire.  They  are  right 
in  defining  good  to  be  that  which  conduces  to  happiness,  but 
they  are  wrong  in  saying  that  man  always  chooses  good  or 
the  greatest  apparent  good.  The  truth  is  not  rightly  ex- 
pressed in  that  saying  of  Jonathan  Edwards,  "  The  will  is 
as  the  greatest  apparent  good." 

12.  Were  man  perfectly  controlled  by  reason  and  never 
governed,  as  he  often  is,  by  appetite,  propensity  or  affection, 
he  would  always  choose  happiness  or  good  in  preference  to 
any  inferior  aim.     Moreover,  were  man  thoroughly  subject 
to  the  absolute  or  moral  reason,  he  would  always  choose  the 
right  as  having  a  supreme  excellence  and  as  being  superior 
to  any  other  good.     All  other  ends,  though  sought  for  their 
own  sakes,  would  be  pursued  in  subordination  to  the  good 
and  the  right,  and  only  so  far  as  they  might  help  to  consti- 
tute these  aims  of  the  reason.    Under  such  circumstances  man 
would  naturally  be  both  prudent  and  virtuous.     His  failure 
to  choose  the  good  or  the  right  could  arise  only  from  igno- 
rance or  want  of  thought.     The  Socratic  doctrine  that  "  vir- 
tue is  knowledge  "  is  founded  on  the  assumption  that  man 
always  chooses  the  good  and  the  right  when  he  distinctly  per- 
ceives them;  in  other  words,  it  teaches  that  virtue  is  the 
necessary  result  of  correct  information  concerning  one's  re- 
lations and  duties.     Socrates  appears  to  have  been  the  first 
advocate  of  the  doctrine  that  man  always  chooses  the  greatest 
apparent  good;  according  to  him,  passion  and  wickedness 
spring  from  disordered  and  erroneous  views,  and  consist  in 
man's  seeking  that  as  the  best  which  is  really  not  the  best, 
but  fundamentally  opposed  to  it. 

13.  We  cannot  accept  this  theory.    We  do  not  believe  that 


CHAP.  XI.J    MOTIVITY  AS  SUBJECTIVELY  RELATED.     H7 

mere  intellectual  instruction  can  change  a  depraved  heart 
into  a  virtuous  one.  Moreover,  though  inordinate  propen- 
sities deceive  the  mind  and  distort  its  judgments,  this  does 
not  take  place  to  such  an  extent  that  one  cannot  knowingly 
reject  the  good  and  choose  the  evil.  Man  is  a  rational  being ; 
in  all  his  moral  life,  whether  virtuous  or  vicious,  he  acts 
with  rational  intelligence.  But  there  is  a  difference  between 
acting  with  the  reason  and  acting  from  (or  according  to)  the 
reason.  To  act  with  the  reason  is  to  act  with  rational  intel- 
ligence; to  act  from  the  reason  is  to  be  governed  by  rational 
intelligence.  The  former  of  these  things  is  the  condition  of 
moral  responsibility;  the  latter  is  the  cause  of  prudent  and 
of  virtuous  living.  In  order  that  a  man  should  act  in  a 
reprehensible  manner  it  is  necessary  that  he  reject  what  he 
knows  to  be  good  for  some  inferior  end  of  selfishness,  of  appe- 
tite, of  propensity,  or  of  passion. 

14.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  ends  in  themselves  are 
entirely  without  influence.  It  is  by  a  figure  of  speech  that 
they  are  said  to  attract  and  to  govern.  They  are  not  "effi- 
cient/' but  only  "  occasional/'  causes.  The  power  really 
controlling  life  lies  in  the  motivities;  in  any  particular  in- 
stance one  acts  according  to  the  strongest  motivity  or  com- 
bination of  motivities.  Each  motivity  has  its  own  specific 
conceptions  setting  forth  the  kind  of  object  and  the  form  of 
gratification  which  it  pursues.  In  every  choice  the  spirit  acts 
according  to  those  thoughts  which  are  proper  to  the  prevail- 
ing motivity.  We  decide  in  favor  of  good,  or  of  the  greatest 
good,  only  when  we  are  governed  by  reason.  As  we  have  said, 
man  often  acts  not  simply  in  disregard  of  this  idea,  but  in  op- 
position of  it.  A  poor  drunkard,  relating  his  experience,  said 
that  he  could  give  no  good  reason  whatever  for  his  course: 
the  arguments  in  the  case  were,  "  like  the  handle  of  his  jug, 
all  on  one  side  " — and  that  the  wrong  side  for  him.  But  he 
could  not  resist  his  appetite.  At  the  time  of  drinking  he  ex- 
perienced relief  and  satisfaction ;  the  thought  of  this,  too,  for 
the  moment  largely  occupied  his  mind.  Yet  even  so  he  knew 
what  he  was  doing,  and  that  it  was  evil.  He  was  not  con- 
trolled by  the  conception  of  good,  but  acted  knowingly  in  op- 
position to  it. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  EMOTIONS. 

1.  An  emotion  is  a  psychical  agitation  consequent  upon  the  per- 
ception or  the  imagination  of  a  suitable  object. — 2.  Emotions  are 
(1)  sometimes  independent  of  desire,  (2)  sometimes  mingled 
with  desire,  (3)  sometimes  consequent  upon  success  or  failure 
to  realize  the  end  desired. — 3.  Emotions  independent  of  desire  are 
excited  by  the  beautiful,  the  sublime,  the  witty,  the  humorous, 
the  unexpected,  the  marvellous,  the  novel,  and  other  objects  the 
contemplation  of  which  affects  some  "  sense  "  or  power  of  feel- 
ing.— 4.  Beauty  and  sublimity,  defined.  Wit  and  humor  dis- 
tinguished— 5.  Surprise,  wonder,  amazement,  a  sense  of  novelty, 
a  sense  of  freedom,  of  danger,  etc.,  denned. — 6.  The  mingling 
of  emotion  with  desire  is  especially  seen  in  the  affections  and 
passions.— 7.  The  passion  of  love  analyzed.  It  is  a  complex  sen- 
timent.— 8.  Emotion  enters  into  anger,  hatred,  dislike,  contempt, 
disdain,  respect,  reverence,  fear,  terror,  hope,  despair,  vanity 
and  pride. — 9.  Hope  and  fear,  pride  and  vanity,  analyzed. — 10. 
Moral  emotions  resemble  the  aesthetic  but  are  vastly  more  im- 
portant. They  include  feelings  of  approbation  and  of  disapprob- 
ation, the  sense  of  innocence  or  of  guilt,  the  happiness  and  the 
wretchedness  inherent  in  virtuous,  and  in  vicious  living,  and  a 
consciousness  of  the  favor  or  of  the  disfavor  of  the  spiritual 
power  of  the  universe. — 11.  Emotions  consequent  upon  the  exer- 
cise of  desire  are  (1)  those  of  satisfaction,  (2)  those  of  disappoint- 
ment.— 12.  Their  intensity  arises  partly  from  the  concentration  of 
thought  and  desire  upon  the  end  desired. — 13.  Partly  because 
man  naturally  delights  in  success  and  grieves  at  failure,  no  matter 
what  the  end  sought  for  may  be.  He  likes  "  to  have  his  own 
way." — 14.  Two  practical  lessons  relate  to  the  interdependence  of 
emotion  and  desire.  (1)  If  we  would  have  gratification  instead 
of  disappointment,  desires  must  be  kept  within  bounds  and 
directed  to  their  proper  objects  ;  (2)  Iff  we  would  not  have  in- 
ordinate or  irrational  desires,  our  emotions  must  be  controlled 
and  regulated. 

1.  AN  emotion  is  a  psychical  agitation  which  arises  upon 
the  perception,  or  upon  the  remembrance,  or  upon  the  imag- 
ination, of  an  object  suitable  to  excite  it.  Sometimes  this 
experience  is  conceived  of  as  containing  an  element  of  desire, 
as  when  we  speak  of  the  emotion  of  love  or  of  hope ;  and,  be- 
118 


CHAP.  XII.]  THE  EMOTIONS.  H9 

yond  question,  desire  is  often  conjoined  with  emotion  in  the 
same  experience.  This  is  preeminently  so  in  that  form  of 
desire  which  is  called  passion.  But  let  us  now  consider  emo- 
tion as  a  simple  element  of  spiritual  life — as  an  exercise  of 
sensibility  distinguishable  from  the  exercise  of  motivity. 
The  existence  of  such  feelings  is  often  plainly  perceptible; 
one  may  be  moved  by  the  view  of  things  sublime  or  beautiful; 
he  may  be  amused  at  witty  or  humorous  thought ;  he  may  be 
glad  because  of  the  happiness  of  others  or  sad  at  the  sight  of 
their  suffering;  or  some  moral  action  or  sentiment  may  com- 
pel his  admiration  or  awaken  his  contempt.  Modern  psychol- 
ogy accords  to  such  emotions  a  place  and  a  nature  of  their 
own.  They  often  mingle  with  motivities  and  form  part  of 
the  same  experience  with  them,  but  they  differ  from  mo- 
tivities in  being  passive  agitations;  they  are  not  strivings  of 
spirit  towards  an  end  or  aim;  and  they  may  take  place  apart 
from  motivities. 

2.  The  ordinary  order  of  investigation  which  considers  the 
emotions  before  the  desires  or  motive  tendencies,  is  not  ob- 
jectionable, provided  it  be  not  understood  as  teaching  an 
order  of  sequence  in  the  phenomena.     We  admit  that  our 
sensibilities  may  be  excited  simply  by  the  presentation  of 
thoughts  or  objects  and  without  any  antecedent  exercise  of 
desire.     But  this  is  so  far  from  indicating  the  only  order  in 
which  emotion  and  motivity  are  related  to  one  another  that 
a   profitable   enumeration   of   emotions   may   mention,   first, 
those  which  naturally  precede  desire,  then  those  which  for 
the  most  part  are  accompaniments  of  desire,  and,  finally, 
those  which  arise  when  the  object  of  the  desire  is  perceived 
either  to  be  attained  or  to  be  defeated,  and  which,  therefore, 
are  conditioned  on  desire.     The  principle  of  classification 
thus  adopted  may  not  be  sufficient  for  a  thorough-going  logi- 
cal division;  nevertheless  it  will  facilitate  consideration  of 
the  different  emotions  according  to  their  true  nature  and  its 
relations. 

3.  Among  emotions  especially  independent  of  the  motivi- 
ties we  mention  first  our  admiration  of  the  beautiful  and  our 
awe  before  the  sublime. 

The  beautiful  comprises  all  objects  of  such  a  nature  that 
the  mere  contemplation  of  them  gives  pleasure.  This  pleas- 
ure does  not  spring  from  any  hope  or  expectation  excited  by 
the  object,  nor  from  any  sense  of  gratified  desire;  it  arises 
simply  upon  the  perception  of  the  object.  Part  of  it  may 


120  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XII. 

come  from  the  exercise  of  the  bodily  senses;  the  richness  of 
color  and  the  sweetness  of  sound  are  elements  of  beauty; 
but  there  are  also  elements  whose  operation  is  more  intellec- 
tual. The  mind  loves  uniformity  or  law  in  the  midst  of  va- 
riety, and  is  pleased  with  the  unity  of  a  system  of  diversified 
parts.  Order,  symmetry  and  a  regularity  that  is  not  mon- 
otonous are  gratifying.  The  graceful,  in  which  ease  and 
effectiveness  combine,  is  delightful,  and  so  are  the  amiable 
and  the  noble  in  conduct  or  in  character.  When  such  objects 
give  pleasure  simply  on  our  beholding  them,  and  not  be- 
cause of  any  practical  end  to  be  served  by  them,  we  call  them 
beautiful.  Objects  the  contemplation  of  which  has  a  con- 
trary effect  are  styled  ugly  or  ungainly. 

After  one  has  enjoyed  the  beautiful  he  desires  to  have  that 
enjoyment  again.  But  evidently  this  gratification  is  not 
conditioned  on  the  desire  for  beauty ;  it  is  itself  the  condition 
of  the  desire.  In  other  words,  the  emotion  of  beauty  is 
independent  of  the  desire  for  beauty  and  prior  to  it :  and  all 
emotion,  so  far  as  it  is  fitted  to  excite  desire,  is  related"  to 
desire  in  this  way. 

The  sense  of  sublimity  is  excited  by  the  presentation  or  the 
suggestion  of  immense  power.  Some  think  that  the  sight  of 
mere  greatness  or  extent  can  produce  this  feeling;  more 
likely  the  object  must  directly  or  indirectly  give  the  im- 
pression of  power.  In  the  presence  of  the  sublime  man  al- 
ways feels  small  and  impotent.  Grandeur,  in  the  strict  sense 
of  that  term,  is  a  lower  form  of  sublimity.  A  rushing  rail- 
way train  is  a  grand  sight ;  the  Falls  of  Niagara  are  a  sublime 
one. 

4.  Another  species  of  emotion  preceding  desire  and  ex- 
citing it,  is  the  appreciation  of  wit  and  humor.  This  in- 
volves some  knowledge  and  understanding,  but  not  necessar- 
ily any  previous  inclination.  Wit,  without  any  intention  to 
deceive,  but  in  mere  wantonness,  constructs  conceptions  and 
statements  which  have  the  appearance  of  being  rational,  but 
which  are  really  sophistical  and  foolish.  That  is  a  witty 
explanation  which  Shakespeare  puts  into  the  mouth  of  the 
gay  gentleman  who,  after  protesting  for  years  that  he  would 
die  a  bachelor,  at  last  met  his  fate  and  became  a  benedict. 
He  declared,  "  When  I  said  I  would  die  a  bachelor,  I  never 
thought  I  would  live  till  I  were  married."  Here  what  had 
really  been  an  expression  of  purpose  is  represented  as  having 
been  a  judgment  respecting  the  future.  The  plausibility  of 


CHAP.  XII. J  THE  EMOTIONS.  121 

this  explanation  in  connection  with  its  evident  falsity  makes 
it  amusing. 

Humor,  also,  amuses  by  directing  our  thoughts  to  incon- 
sistencies which  are  more  or  less  concealed.  It  sets  forth  the 
weaknesses  and  frailties  of  men  as  these  are  unconsciously 
exhibited  in  their  conduct.  When  the  neighbors  of  Sir 
Roger  de  Coverley  asked  his  opinion  concerning  a  contro- 
verted question,  Addison  says  that  the  good  knight  looked 
wise  and  replied  that  "  a  great  deal  might  be  said  on  both 
sides  " ;  in  this  there  was  an  appearance  of  judgment ;  in 
reality,  Sir  Rogers  was  not  capable  of  a  profound  opinion  on 
any  subject.  The  mind,  exercising  its  reason,  delights  to 
perceive  the  ingenious  inconsistencies  of  wit  and  humor. 

5.  Surprise  is  another  feeling  which  occurs  without  pre- 
ceding desire,  though  not  without  preceding  knowledge.  It 
arises  when  an  event  suddenly  takes  place  contrary  to  the 
ordinary  course  of  nature  or  contrary  to  one's  confident  ex- 
pectations. When  we  find  it  difficult  to  account  for  the  event 
by  any  known  causes,  surprise  gives  place  to  wonder;  and 
when  the  case  is  attended  with  agitating  circumstances  which 
disturb  and  confuse  the  mind,  wonder  becomes  amazement 
or  astonishment.  After  our  Saviour's  Sermon  on  the  Mount 
in  which  he  spake  with  superhuman  authority  and  power, 
we  are  told  that  "  the  people  were  astonished  at  his  doc- 
trine " ;  and  when  he  raised  to  life  the  dead  daughter  of  the 
ruler  of  the  synagogue,  the  Evangelists  relate  that  the  spec- 
tators "  were  astonished  with  a  great  astonishment." 

A  sense  of  novelty  or  strangeness  has  something  in  com- 
mon wth  surprise,  but  it  is  a  weaker  experience  and  is  not 
necessarily  preceded  by  expectation.  At  this  point  let  us 
note  a  considerable  class  of  feelings  not  ordinarily  called 
emotions,  but  which  are  indicated  by  this  term  "  sense,"  and 
which  yet  we  must  class  with  emotions  if  we  would  not  leave 
them  out  of  consideration.  Thus  we  hear  of  a  sense  of  free- 
dom or  independence — a  sense  of  power — a  sense  of  danger 
or  of  safety — a  sense  of  subjection  or  of  dependence  or  of 
helplessness — a  sense  of  innocence  or  of  guilt,  of  right  or  of 
wrong.  With  a  kindred  meaning  the  word  \e  consciousness  " 
sometimes  indicates  the  sentiment  produced  in  the  soul  by 
some  intimately  perceived  object;  we  speak  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  wealth  or  beauty,  of  cowardice  or  meanness. 

The  "  sense  "  of  which  we  have  just  spoken  often  has  a 
motive  force,  so  that  we  act  "  from  a  sense  "  of  the  impor- 


122  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XII. 

tance  of  some  business,  or  "  from  the  sense  "  of  a  danger  to 
be  avoided  or  of  an  advantage  to  be  gained.  This  only  illus- 
trates what  has  been  already  noticed,  that  motive  feeling 
frequently  combines  with  sensibility,  as  when  a  desire  for 
company  attends  a  sense  of  loneliness.  But  the  two  feelings 
are  easily  distinguished. 

6.  This   brings   us   to    consider   emotions   of   the    second 
class — those,  namely,  which  are  experienced  as  united  with 
some  form  of  motive  feeling.     Such  exercises  of  sensibility 
are  especially  observable  in  our  affections  and  passions;  for 
these  are  spiritual  movings  of  a  composite  character.     In 
our  day  the  words  affection  and  passion  ordinarily  suggest 
motivity  rather  than   sensibility;   originally  they   set  forth 
the  influence  of  objects  upon  the  spirit  rather  than  the  striv- 
ings of  the  spirit  after  objects.    Etym-ologically,  an  affection 
is  a  psychical  commotion  excited  by  the  view  of  some  ob- 
ject; a  passion  is  such  a  commotion  experienced  in  a  high 
degree;  and,  although  the  words  now  have  more  comprehen- 
sive meanings  than  these,  they  undoubtedly  still  retain  these 
ideas  as  part  of  their  significance. 

7.  While  emotion  enters  into  every  affection  and  every  pas- 
sion, it  is  especially  noticeable  in  that  sentiment  between 
man  and  woman  which  leads  to  the  marriage  relation,  and 
which  poets  and  novelists,  historians  and  philosophers,  recog- 
nize as  a  potent  factor  in  human  affairs.    The  experience  of 
being  "  in  love "  is  by  no  means  a  simple  matter,  but  in- 
volves one's  whole  nature.    The  poet-philosopher  tells  of  its 
complex  composition  when  he  says: 

"  All  thoughts,  all  passions,  all  delights, 
Whatever  stirs  this  mortal  frame, 
All  are  but  ministers  of  Love 
And  feed  his  sacred  flame." 

Little  analysis  is  needed  to  show  how  compounded  the 
tender  passion  is.  It  often  includes  a  sense  of  beauty  and 
physical  comeliness,  and,  as  frequently,  the  admiration  of 
intellectual  and  of  moral  qualities.  There  is  a  delight  in  the 
companionship  of  the  beloved  one  and  a  great  longing  for  it. 
There  is  deep  desire  for  sympathy  and  kind  appreciation; 
and  there  is  an  exalted  pleasure  in  receiving  love  for  love 
and  esteem  for  esteem.  These  feelings,  together  with  that 
attraction  which  is  sexual,  unite  in  a  compounded  affection. 
Sometimes  there  is  an  admixture  of  imagination  and  de- 


CHAP.  XII.]  THE  EMOTIONS. 

lusion  whereby  lovers  who  give  way  to  their  feelings  are  led 
into  absurd  extremes  of  conception  and  of  statement.  But, 
in  the  case  of  well-principled  people,  there  is  always  a  basis 
on  which  good  sense  and  wisdom  found  a  permanent  attach- 
ment. 

Evidently  the  happiness  attending  love  arises  greatly  from 
the  sense  of  a  satisfying  and  agreeable  companionship,  from 
the  contemplation  of  admired  qualities,  and  from  a  sincere 
appreciative  sympathy;  in  other  words,  it  springs  largely 
from  our  emotions.  A  similar  account  may  be  given  of  the 
pleasures  of  domestic  affections  in  general  and  of  those 
which  accompany  congenial  friendship  or  acquaintance. 

8.  The  malevolent  affections,  yet  more  plainly  than  the 
benevolent,  partake  of  the  emotional  character.  Anger  and 
resentment  always  include  an  excitement  either  open  or  sup- 
pressed; even  hatred  and  fixed  dislike  exhibit  emotion  as 
often  as  the  thought  of  the  obnoxious  person  is  recalled.  We 
remember  a  gentleman  who  lost  a  favorite  child  through  the 
malpractice  of  a  drunken  physician;  he  could  not  pass  that 
physician  on  the  street  without  turning  away  his  face  from 
him. 

Other  feelings  in  which  sensibility  mingles  with  motivity 
are  those  of  contempt  and  disdain,  those  of  respect  and  rever- 
ence, those  of  fear  and  terror,  those  of  hope  and  of  despair  and 
those  of  vanity  and  of  pride. 

Contempt  is  the  sentiment  with  which  persons  are  re- 
garded who  show  weakness  of  character  and  who  are  con- 
trolled by  unworthy  motives.  It  is  the  feeling  which  we  have 
for  a  lazy  vagabond,  a  lying  swindler,  or  an  impure  and  pro- 
fane wretch.  Disdain  is  the  decided  feeling  with  which  one 
rejects  proposals  offensive  to  his  sense  of  propriety  and  honor. 
Eespect  is  our  sentiment  towards  one  whose  life  and  conduct 
are  noble  and  honorable.  In  addition  to  this  there  is  also 
an  official  respect,  which  is  merely  deference  to  the  preroga- 
tives of  some  authoritative  position;  this  may  be  exercised 
when  there  is  little  or  no  personal  esteem.  Of  course  official 
and  personal  respect  often  support  one  another.  Reverence 
is  respect  exercised  in  a  very  high  degree;  it  is  directed  to- 
wards one  greatly  superior  to  others  in  character  and  posi- 
tion. We  reverence  God  or  a  thoroughly  good  and  wise  ruler. 
Fear  is  a  passion  in  which  sensibility  and  motivity  evidently 
•unite.  In  fear  we  are  disturbed  by  the  apprehension  of  im- 
pending evil  or  pain,  and  we  strive  to  escape  from  the  evil. 


124  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XII. 

In  fright  or  terror  the  emotional  element  of  fear  predomi- 
nates, and  may  even  interfere  with  the  proper  control  and 
use  of  one's  faculties.  Hope  is  the  expectation  of  good  united 
with  the  desire  of  obtaining  it;  fear  is  the  expectation  of 
evil  united  with  the  desire  to  escape  from  it.  In  despair  the 
emotional  element  occupies  the  mind  almost  exclusively,  be- 
cause the  evil  appears  unavoidable  and  overwhelming. 

9.  In  both  vanity  and  pride — but  especially  in  pride — there 
is  a  determined  desire  to  enjoy  a  high  opinion  of  one's  self 
as  well  as  the  esteem  of  others;  but  pride  aims  chiefly  at  the 
former  and  vanity  chiefly  at  the  latter.     To  these  ends  one's 
thoughts  are  turned  away  from  all  evidences  of  inferiority, 
and  are  made  to  dwell  on  real  or  fancied  points  of  excellence, 
and  in  this  way  these  sentiments  are  cherished  contrary  to 
all  fact  and  reason.     Pride  includes  a  determination  to  be 
independent  and  avoids  the  aid  of  others;  vanity,  without 
any  opinion  or  method  of  its  own,  founds  self-admiration  on 
the  praise  and  even  the  flattery  of  neighbors.    Pride  is  allied 
to  the  ambition  to  rule;  vanity  tends  to  servility.     Pride, 
too,  as  distinguished  from  proper  self-respect,  is  an  intensely 
selfish  sentiment,  for  which  reason  it  is  a  more  reprehensible 
vice  than  vanity.     In  both  passions  the  exercise  of  a  sensi- 
bility based  on  the  appreciation  of  one's  own  excellence,  dis- 
tinction or  success,  is  quite  apparent. 

10.  Finally,  the  mingling  of  passive  with  active  feeling  is 
noticeable  in  moral  life.     While  our  hearts  are  moved  by 
moral  aims,  our  sensibilities  also  are  excited  by  the  percep- 
tion of  moral  facts  and  objects.     The  virtuous  man  delights 
in  the  contemplation  of  things  right  and  honorable,  and  is 
especially  pleased  to  behold  human  conduct  conformed  to  the 
rules  of  rectitude.     He  has  the  happy  consciousness  that  his 
own  life  harmonizes  with  right  principles ;  and  he  rejoices  in 
the  good-will  of  all  other  virtuous  beings  and  of  the  Supreme 
Father  and  Judge  of  all.     But  the  evil-minded  man,  while 
desiring  and  pursuing  evil,  is  conscious  of  his  own  vileness, 
of  the  discord  between  his  life  and  the  moral  law,  of  in- 
creasing  degradation   and   of   approaching  ruin.      Such,   at 
least,  is  the  experience  of  an  awakened  conscience. 

The  moral  sensibilities  as  sources  of  happiness  and  of 
misery  are  of  the  utmost  importance  in  ethics.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  summum  lonum,  or  the  highest  form  of  good, 
cannot  be  answered  without  taking  them  into  consideration; 
and  this  remark  applies  also  to  that  broader  question  which 


CHAP.  XII.]  THE  EMOTIONS.  125 

concerns  the  generic  nature  of  the  right  and  obligatory  and 
the  fundamental  end  of  all  right  aims  and  right  actions. 

11.  Having   discussed  sensibility   as  preceding  and  then 
as  accompanying  motivity,  we  have  yet  to  speak  of  it  as 
arising  after  the  objects  of  desire  are  perceived  either  to  be 
realized  or  to  be  defeated.     Feelings  of  the  class  thus  con- 
templated  at   once   divide   themselves   into  those   attending 
the  success  and  those  attending  the  failure  of  our  wishes,  into 
the  sensibilities  of  satisfaction  and  those  of  disappointment. 

Emotions  originating  in  this  way  differ  from  those  pre- 
ceding desire  and  independent  of  it,  chiefly  because  they 
are  more  intense,  and  not  because  they  are  of  another  nature ; 
they  are  radically  of  the  same  nature.  Two  reasons  may  be 
assigned  for  this  difference. 

12.  In  the  first  place,  the  prolonged  direction  of  one's  de- 
sires towards  one  object  or  mode  of  gratification  results  in 
concentrating   and   accumulating    emotional   capability.      If 
a  gifted  person  were  placed  unexpectedly  in  a  position  of 
honor  which  he  had  not  sought,  he  certainly  would  be  grati- 
fied; or,  should  he  learn  that  such  a  position  might  have  been 
his  if  he  had  only  been  informed  of  his  opportunity,  he  would 
regret  that  a  piece  of  good  fortune  had  been  missed.     But 
how  much  more  vivid  one's  feelings  would  be  if  he  had  ear- 
nestly struggled  for  the  honor  and  had  then  either  achieved 
success  or  encountered  defeat !    In  short,  one's  experience  on 
the  outcome  of  any  course  of  effort  varies  greatly  according 
to  the  degree  in  which  his  heart  has  been  set  upon  the  object 
to  be  attained.     The  lukewarm  lover  is  neither  so  overjoyed 
at  acceptance  nor  so  disheartened  by  repulse  as  he  is  who  has 
surrendered  himself  entirely  to  the  tender  passion. 

An  illustration  of  the  intensity  of  emotion  consequent  on 
the  exercise  of  desire  is  to  be  found  in  the  anger  of  one  who 
conceives  that  his  cherished  plans  or  aims  are  being  unjustly 
antagonized.  Eesentment  .then  becomes  violent,  like  the 
rage  of  Shylock  robbed  of  his  beloved  ducats.  One  evil  re- 
sult of  the  excessive  cultivation  of  any  propensity  is  that 
the  spirit  becomes  unduly  sensitive  and  unfit  to  bear  disap- 
pointments which  must  surely  come.  The  vices  of  ambition, 
avarice,  vanity  and  pride  may  occasionally  yield  a  temporary 
ebullition  of  joy  and  gladness,  but  they  finally  bring  about 
sorrow  and  abiding  distress.  The  man  of  rightly  balanced 
affections  escapes  such  troubles,  and  indeed  is  prepared  for 
any  others  which  may  come  upon  him. 


126  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XII. 

13.  The  second  cause  of  the  increase  of  emotion  upon  the 
gratification  or  disappointment  of  desire  is  that  mankind,, 
altogether  apart  from  the  proper  attractions  of  the  objects 
towards  which  their  efforts  are  directed,  are  naturally  de- 
lighted by  success  and  grieved  by  failure.    There  is  pleasure 
simply  in  having  one's  own  way,  and  pain  at  being  crossed 
or  thwarted.     In  success  one  enjoys  a  sense  of  power,   of 
freedom,  and  of  personal  importance ;  in  failure  the  opposite 
experiences  are  realized.     The  desire  to  accomplish  what  one 
has  undertaken  often  becomes  the  basis  of  a  strong  habitual 
determination;  then  a  man  is  said  to  be  self-willed  or  to  have 
a  strong  will ;  he  is  "  tenax  propositi "   and  is   sometimes 
ready  to  sacrifice  important  interests  for  the  satisfaction  of 
victory  and  triumph.     This  determination  to  have  our  own 
way  and  our  delight  in  having  it  are  not  without  their  uses. 
They  add  to  the  firmness  of  our  pursuit  of  proper  objects  and 
they  increase  our  enjoyment  when  these  objects  have  been  at- 
tained.    At  the  same  time  strength  of  character  should  not 
be  allowed  to  take  the  form  of  mere  self-will.    No  disposition 
is  more  fraught  with  evil,  and  none  is  less  worthy  of  our 
sympathy  and  esteem,  than  that  of  unreasoning  obstinacy. 

14.  The  double  fact  that  emotions  are  frequently  condi- 
tioned on  desire  and  that  desires  yet  more  frequently  are  con- 
ditioned on  emotions  suggests  a  two-fold  practical  lesson.    In 
In  the  first  place  it  is  clear  that  we  should  keep  our  desires 
within  proper  bounds,  and  that  we  should  direct  them  to 
proper  objects.     The  wise   and  virtuous  man   controls   his 
affections  and  seeks  only  things  truly  attainable  and  of  en- 
during value.     He  alone  is  likely  to  have  his  desires  grati- 
fied; and  even  though,  through  the  uncertainty  and  imper- 
fection of  human  affairs,  he  may  fail  in  many  endeavors,  he 
is  certain  of  the  success  of  having  lived  according  to  his 
conscience,  and  he  is  sure  of  that  high  satisfaction  which 
comes  from  noble   living   and   from  uprightness   of   heart. 
Secondly,  while  motivities  must  be  regulated  because  of  the 
emotions  for  which  they  prepare,  our  emotions  also  must  be 
controlled  because  of  their  influence  on  motivities.     This  in- 
deed is  our  principle  ground  of  duty  with  respect  to  them. 
Not  merely  well-grounded  prospects,  but  also  the  wild  dreams 
of  distinction  or  of  love,  of  self-indulgence,  of  wealth,  of 
power  and  greatness  may  modify  one's  character  and  deter- 
mine the  whole  current  of  one's  life.     Motive  ideas  may,  in- 
deed, awaken  desire  without  the  aid  of  any  attending  emo- 


CHAP.  XII.]  THE  EMOTIONS.  127 

tion,  as  when  one  acts  purely  from  principle  or  from  self- 
interest.  But  thoughts  which  arouse  the  sensibility  tend  to 
take  possession  of  the  spirit  to  the  exclusion  of  other  thoughts ; 
for,  while  they  are  entertained,  the  emotions  which  they 
excite  become  a  foretaste  of  the  experience  which  may  be  had 
upon  the  realization  of  their  objects. 

Such  considerations  as  these  show  how  books  and  dis- 
courses, tales,  histories  and  dramas,  exert  an  influence  on 
life.  They  also  warn  us  against  allowing  the  imagination  to 
gloat  over  the  prospect  of  dishonest  gains  or  disgraceful 
pleasures.  Those  especially  whose  characters  are  yet  un- 
formed cannot  be  too  careful  respecting  the  thoughts  which 
they  entertain.  For,  as  a  man  thinketh  in  his  heart,  so  is 


CHAPTEE  XIII. 

ETHICAL  METHODS. 

1.  Progress  in  ethical  theory  depends  on  an  intelligent  use  of 
methods. — 2.  The  fundamental  and  indispensable  method  is  that 
of  analysis  and  generalization,  commonly  called  the  inductive.  It 
examines  the  facts  to  be  explained  in  order  to  obtain  their  laws. 
— 3.  Successful  induction  depends  on  an  analytic  and  discrimin- 
ating judgment  about  facts. — 4.  There  are  five  other  methods 
used  in  philosophy,  (1)  the  dogmatic,  (2)  the  sentimental,  (3) 
the  critical,  (4)  the  dialectic,  (5)  the  derivate.— 5.  The  dog- 
matic, or  intuitional,  method  starts  out  with  general  principles 
as  being  in  some  way  well  known. — 6.  The  sentimental,  or  con- 
templative, method  applies  to  questions  of  taste  and  feeling. — 
7.  The  critical,  or  eclective,  method  seeks  for  progress  through 
the  examination  of  opinions. — 8.  The  dialectic,  or  controversial, 
method  endeavors  to  reach  conclusions  by  arguing  for  and  against 
given  doctrines  and  hypotheses. — 9.  The  derivate,  or  deductive, 
method  seeks  to  base  the  principles  of  one  science  upon  those  of 
another. — 10.  Hegel  derivatively  constructed  a  pantheistic 
ethics  ;  Herbert  Spenser,  an  evolutionistic  ethics. — 11.  While 
each  of  the  five  methods  has  its  use,  they  should  all  be  employed 
in  subordination  to  the  analytic,  or  inductive,  method. 

1.  METAPHYSICAL  and  psychological  thinkers  show  a  more 
persistent  separation  from  each  other  than  students  of  the 
physical  sciences  do.  Great  difficulty  attends  every  effort 
to  bring  those  of  opposite  schools  into  intellectual  sym- 
pathy. The  reason  for  this  lies  partly  in  the  character  of 
the  phenomena  to  be  explained,  which,  though  of  an  abstruse 
nature,  have  a  deceitful,  superficial  simplicity  and  are  easy 
of  misapprehension;  but  it  is  to  be  found  yet  more  in  the 
lack  of  an  understanding  respecting  methods  of  inquiry. 
An  appreciative  consideration  of  the  different  modes  of 
procedure  which  have  been  employed  by  investigators  of 
moral  life  may  tend  to  remove  this  cause  of  the  existing  di- 
vergencies of  opinion. 

Ethics — like  every  other  science,  physical  or  psychical — 
starts  out  with  the  recognition  of  certain  facts.  It  is  based  on 
the  common  knowledge  of  mankind  that  certain  actions 
128 


CHAP.  XIII.]  ETHICAL  METHODS.  129 

are  right  and  obligatory  to  do  and  others  wrong  and 
obligatory  not  to  do,  as  also  that  certain  aims  are  right  and 
obligatory  to  pursue  and  others  wrong  and  obligatory 
to  avoid.  If  the  human  mind  did  not  have  such  perceptions 
and  judgments  there  would  be  no  ground  for  ethical  in- 
quiry. 

2.  As  perceptions  of  right  and  wrong  are  the  facts  with 
which  ethics  starts  out,  so  a  critical  examination  of  these 
preceptions  in  order  to  ascertain  their  essential  elements  and 
laws,  is  the  fundamental  method  which  ethics  must  follow. 
If  this   inductive   work  be    done    in    an    accurate,    com- 
plete and  systematic  way,  we  may  hope  to  obtain  a  satis- 
factory explanation  of  the  facts  from  the  analysis  of  the 
facts  themselves. 

This  method  is  applicable  to  the  investigation  'of  every 
specific  form  of  duty,  but  it  reaches  its  culmination  in  con- 
nection with  the  ultimate  question,  "  How  shall  we  define 
the  right?  What  is  the  nature  common  to  every  action  and 
aim  required  of  us  by  moral  law  ?  " 

The  inductive  process  cannot  be  expected  to  answer  every 
question  concerning  the  assertions  of  reason,  but  it  ought 
to  yield  their  essential  content;  it  ought  to  furnish  true 
definitions  of  the  conceptions  employed.  The  further  in- 
quiries, "  What  is  the  real  value  of  these  conceptions  ?  Does 
the  right  truly  have  that  nature  and  that  importance  which 
we  ascribe  to  it  ?  "  do  not  relate  merely  to  the  actual  opera- 
tions of  our  minds ;  they  involve  the  doctrine  of  the  reliability 
of  our  faculties,  which  cannot  be  established  simply  by  an- 
alysis and  generalization.  But  a  conviction  of  the  validity 
of  our  essential  moral  judgments  follows  so  closely  upon  a 
clear  understanding  of  what  they  are,  -that,  if  the  latter 
can  be  had,  there  will  be  little  need  of  argument  to  show 
their  truthfulness.  For  the  judgments  of  reason  when 
rightly  stated  have  a  way  of  maintaining  their  own  au- 
thority. 

3.  The  most  difficult  part  of  the  method  of  induction  is 
the  analysis  of  the  facts — that  is,  of  our  rational  perceptions 
— and  the  selection  from  them  of  the  ideas  or  propositions  to 
be  generalized.     No  special  ability  is  needed  for  the  obser- 
vation with  which  the  process  begins  or  for  the  principiation 
with  which  it  terminates.     The  success  of  the  investigator 
of  mind  depends  chiefly  on  the  faculty  of  accurate  critical 
analysis.     Moreover,   in   the   wider  generalizations   of   phi- 

9 


130  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP  XIII. 

losophy,  no  matter  how  great  one's  genius  may  be,  he  will 
be  certain  to  fail  if  he  do  not  guard  against  two  sources  of 
error.  First,  he  must  see  to  it  that  no  fact  is  omitted  from 
his  consideration:  not  only  every  fact,  but  every  aspect  of 
every  fact,  must  be  brought  within  the  sweep  of  his  survey  and 
under  the  scrutiny  of  his  judgment.  Otherwise  he  will  for- 
mulate that  for  an  universal  law  which  explains  only  part 
of  the  phenomena.  In  the  second  place,  he  must  not  allow 
any  fancies  or  unwarranted  conjectures  to  mingle  with  the 
facts.  Otherwise  his  theory  may  turn  out  merely  an  in- 
genious delusion. 

Then,  after  a  theory  has  been  elaborated  in  this  way,  it 
must  be  submitted  to  a  process  of  verification;  it  must  be 
applied  to  every  case,  or  form  of  fact,  which  it  is  intended 
to  explain.  It  must  be  fully  tested.  If  it  do  not  yield  a 
complete  and  satisfactory  account  of  the  phenomena,  it  must 
be  reconsidered,  and  the  work  begun  de  novo. 

The  above  described  process  of  investigation  is  as  avail- 
able for  mental  and  moral  as  it  is  for  physical  phenomena. 
The  limitation  which  some  make  of  the  sphere  of  observation 
and  experiment  to  the  exercise  of  the  bodily  senses  and  the  use 
of  mechanical  instruments  is  absurd.  But,  inasmuch  as  the 
success  of  induction  in  psychical  inquiries  depends  chiefly  on 
the  discriminating  judgment  preceding  the  generalization,  the 
inductive  method  is  sometimes  spoken  of  by  philosophers  as 
the  analytic.  These  names,  however,  do  not  indicate  two 
methods.  The  analytic  and  the  inductive  method  are  the 
same. 

In  addition  to  the  method  of  analysis  and  induction  other 
modes  of  procedure  have  been  found  useful  in  philosophical 
investigation.  These  may  be  enumerated  as  the  dogmatic  or 
intuitional,  the  sentimental  or  contemplative,  the  critical  or 
historical,  the  dialectic  or  controversial,  and  the  derivate  or 
deductive.  Few  authors  can  be  said  to  confine  themselves  to 
any  one  of  these  methods,  yet  the  influence  of  each  is  trace- 
able in  metaphysical  and  ethical  writings.  Most  of  these 
methods  would  be  profitless  in  the  construction  of  physical 
science;  they  are  available  principally  in  those  investigations 
which  seek  an  understanding  of  man's  rational  life  and  which 
are  related  more  or  less  immediately  to  wise  and  sensible  do- 
ing. But,  even  in  these,  they  should  be  made  supplementary 
to  the  analytic  method.  Followed  independently  they  do  not 
lead  to  satisfactory  progress. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  ETHICAL  METHODS. 

5.  We  have  designated  the  first  mentioned    method    the 
"  dogmatic "   because   it   starts   out   with   asserting   general 
principles  without  adducing  any  form  of  proof.  But  we  added 
the  alternative  term  "  intuitional "  because  those  using  this 
method  claim  that  the  principles  asserted  do  not  need  proof 
but  are  self-evident,  being  supported  by  some  form  of  "  intui- 
tion."    In  former  times  this  method  was  in  high  esteem;  it 
was  commonly  taught  that  all  philosophy  and  science  should 
rest  on  certain  general  assumptions    of    the  reason    called 
"  precognita."     But  since  Lord  Bacon's  day  it  has  lost  its 
preeminence. 

Mediaeval  thinkers  were  not  unacquainted  with  the  induc- 
tive method.  They  called  it  the  "  regressive  "  and  that  of  de- 
duction from  general  principles  the  "progressive."  But  in 
this  use  of  terms  they  set  forth  the  false  principle  that  scien- 
tific progress  is  chiefly  from  the  general  to  the  particular.  The 
fact  is  that  there  are  only  two  cases  in  which  a  dogmatic  as- 
sertion of  principles  may  contribute  to  advancement  in 
knowledge.  First,  we  may  immediately  enunciate  some  math- 
ematical and  metaphysical  and  some  moral  axioms.  This, 
however,  is  only  because  these  truths  are  obtained  by  a  kind 
of  spontaneous  analysis  from  individual  perceptions.  For  the 
only  sense  in  which  any  general  truth  is  self-evident  is  that 
it  is  the  product  of  a  very  simple  and  unconscious  principia- 
tion.  Secondly,  many  principles  of  greater  or  less  complexity 
may  be  asserted  by  that  intuition  which  is  not  really  imme- 
diate but  only  the  rapid,  habitual,  and  it  may  be,  abbreviated 
exercise  of  the  reason.  These  may  be  held  with  great  confi- 
dence. They  are  the  teachings  of  experience  and  of  common 
sense.  They  have  often  been  tried  and  found  reliable  and 
have  won  the  confidence  of  those  who  have  had  constant  occa- 
sion to  use  them.  Hence  they  are  used  as  arguments  in  prac- 
tical affairs  and  also  have  a  certain  weight  in  theoretic 
thought. 

6.  The  sentimental,  or  contemplative,  method  at  first  sight 
appears  utterly  unphilosophical,  and  fit  only  for  dreamers. 
For  the  man  who  accepts  views  simply  because  they  harmo- 
nize with  his  sensibilities  will  be  certain  to  adopt  an  imagina- 
tive creed.     The  strange  superstitions  of  the  heathen  world 
and  the  yet  stranger  delusions — such  as  theosophy  and  the  so- 
called  Christian  Science — which  find  some  adherents  in  the 
midst  of  a  high  civilization,  have  their  strength,  not  from 
reason,  but  from  sentiment  and  feeling. 


132  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

Nevertheless  there  are  questions  on  which  the  wisest  con- 
clusions are  not  gained  by  the  unassisted  intellect  and  on 
which  the  heart  should  be  consulted  as  well  as  the  head.  Such 
question  arise  whenever  either  the  sensibilities  themselves  or 
the  objects  which  naturally  excite  them  become  the  subjects  of 
our  investigation.  A  man  with  no  more  appreciation  of  beauty 
than  an  ox  would  be  as  incapable  as  an  ox  of  criticizing  a 
landscape  or  a  work  of  art.  In  like  manner  a  person  of  weak 
moral  and  religious  feeling  finds  difficulty  in  understanding 
ethical  and  theistic  truth.  Those  take  an  extreme  position 
who  say  that  belief  on  moral  subjects  is  entirely  the  product 
of  one's  will  and  disposition,  but  it  must  be  admitted  that 
such  belief  is  greatly  modified  by  our  susceptibility  to  right 
sentiments  and  by  his  willingness  or  his  unwillingness  to 
obey  the  suggestions  of  duty.  Hence  the  necessity  of  candor, 
of  humility  and  of  a  sincere  love  of  goodness,  on  the  part  of 
those  who  would  comprehend  the  laws  of  virtue.  Hence,  too, 
the  success  of  some  writers  on  practical  subjects,  whose  intel- 
lects are  rather  brilliant  than  logical.  Their  essays  do  not 
present  any  profound  and  thorough-going  philosophy,  yet 
they  are  replete  with  point  and  force.  The  man  whose  chief 
dependence  is  a  delicate  ethical  sensibility  is  like  one  who 
uses  a  magnet  in  the  neighborhood  of  valuable  ore.  While 
such  an  one  may  not  be  able  to  locate  the  deposits  exactly  he 
may  direct  the  investigations  of  others  towards  a  discovery 
more  perfect  than  his  own. 

7.  The  critical,  or  selective,  method  of  philosophy  is  one  of 
which  Aristotle  made  use  and  which  should  be  employed  by 
every  original  thinker.  Strength  and  manliness  of  mind  are 
not  shown  by  a  neglect  of  the  teachings  of  our  predecessors, 
but  by  a  careful  study  of  them  with  the  desire  to  see  and  to 
accept  all  that  they  contain  of  good,  the  unreasonable  only 
being  rejected.  Many  influential  writers  have  obtained  their 
principal  doctrines  in  this  way  and  then  have  added  to  these 
others  of  more  or  less  importance.  Such  was  the  case  with 
the  N~eo-Platonists  in  ancient  times,  and,  in  modern  times, 
with  the  Neo-Kantians. 

Men  of  well-trained  judgment  and  good  common  sense  but 
without  special  metaphysical  ability  should  not  despise  the 
eclectic  plan.  By  means  of  it  they  may  construct  a  respectable 
doctrinal  system.  No  real  progress,  however,  can  be  expected 
from  eclecticism  unless  it  be  united  with  Aristotelian  keenness 
and  penetration.  Even  then  the  brilliant  teachings  of  the 


CHAP.  XIII.]  ETHICAL  METHODS.  133 

man  of  genius  should  be  allowed  only  provisional  authority 
till  they  have  been  found  consonant  with  the  results  of  obser- 
vation and  analysis. 

This  critical  method — which  has  also  been  called  the  his- 
torical— deals  with  opinions,  not  with  phenomena  directly. 
For  this  reason  it  tends  too  much  to  follow  the  leadership  of 
others.  Nevertheless  the  careful  thinker  prizes  its  sugges- 
tions. 

•8.  The  dialectic,  or  controversial,  method  is  akin  to  the 
critical  and  sometimes  develops  out  of  it.  It  endeavors  to  es- 
tablish general  principles  by  argumentation  for  and  against 
and  about  authoritative  statements.  It  delights  in  fine  dis- 
criminations, not  between  things,  but  between  propositions, 
and  in  refutations  and  the  rednctio  ad  dbsurdum.  One  theory 
after  another  respecting  some  phenomenon  is  discussed  till 
finally  one  is  found  more  or  less  acceptable.  Then  perhaps 
one  interpretation  after  another  of  that  theory  is  shown  to  be 
unsatisfactory.  At  last  a  specific  form  of  statement  is 
adopted  as  the  best.  This  method  is  a  favorite  with  some 
writers  who  are  skilled  in  the  use  of  argument;  it  is  seldom 
pleasing  to  those  who  are  simply  seeking  the  truth.  One  is 
wearied  with  endless  disputations  about  doctrines  and  hypoth- 
eses, while  the  phenomena  to  be  investigated  receive  only  a 
secondary  consideration. 

The  dialectic  method  contributes  to  the  rejection  of  error 
and  the  systematization  of  truth.  But  it  fails  to  provide  for 
philosophic  progress,  and  sometimes  it  leads  men  into  a  state 
of  wise  incompetence.  Learned  lecturers,  who  can  tell  the 
merits  and  demerits  of  different  systems,  are  found  to  have 
no  doctrines  of  their  own.  We  once  questioned  a  student  who 
had  graduated  with  honor  in  a  famous  institution  respecting 
certain  instructions  given  there.  The  young  man  was  elo- 
quent in  the  praise  of  the  lectures  that  he  had  heard  and  of 
the  masterly  way  in  which  the  views  of  all  the  schools  had 
been  handled.  He  gave  the  professor's  criticisms  on  this 
system  and  on  that.  But,  when  requested  to  tell  what  the 
professor's  own  views  might  be,  the  young  man  suddenly 
found  himself  at  a  loss.  After  several  efforts  at  recollec- 
tion he  confessed  himself  unable  to  recall  any  positive  teach- 
ing. 

9.  The  last  method  to  be  mentioned  is  the  derivative,  or 
deductive.  We  give  it  these  names  not  simply  because  it  uses 
deduction,  but  because  it  endeavors  to  deduce  or  derive  ethics 


134  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

from  the  principles  of  some  other  science  or  sciences.  This 
method  is  serviceable  with  respect  to  some  subordinate  truths; 
indeed  it  is  not  possible  to  construct  moral  science  without 
consulting  the  teachings  of  psychology  and  of  the  science  of 
mind.  An  understanding  of  moral  life  involves  a  general 
knowledge  of  spiritual  life  and  its  relations.  At  the  same 
time  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  essential  ideas  of  ethics 
can  be  derived  from  other  sciences,  and  it  is  certain  that  no 
theory,  however  formed,  can  be  satisfactory  which  fails  to 
differentiate  the  moral  from  the  natural,  and  which  robs  the 
moral  of  its  peculiar  characteristics.  To  say  that  virtue  is 
a  wise  regard  for  one's  own  interests,  or  that  it  is  sympathetic 
concern  for  the  interests  of  others,  is  weak  and  insufficient, 
because  it  obliterates  the  distinction  between  moral  principle 
and  a  regard  for  interests.  We  cannot  in  advance  of  exami- 
nation assert  that  the  peculiar  principles  of  ethics  are  simple 
and  underived,  but,  whether  they  be  simple  or  compounded, 
they  are  sui  generis;  they  are  distinctively  moral. 

These  considerations  show  how  unlikely  those  are  to  reach 
the  truth  who  hold  that  ethics  is  wholly  or  chiefly  a  derivative 
science.  Neglecting  direct  analysis,  attempting  to  educe  the 
moral  from  the  unmoral,  they  land  in  imperfect  and  impotent 
conclusions. 

10.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  those  whose  funda- 
mental philosophy  has  no  natural  affinity  for  moral  principle. 
Hegel  made  all  forms  of  entity  the  development  of  thought 
• — and  all  thought  the  development  of  the  thought  of  Being. 
Like  the  ancient  Eleatics,  identifying  Being  with  Unity, — 
the  Existent  with  the  One — he  taught  Pantheism.  In  this 
system  man  is  a  specific  activity  of  the  universal  intelligence. 
Accordingly,  with  Hegel  the  aim  of  all  morality  is  self-real- 
ization. In  order  to  give  this  statement  ethical  character,  it 
is  arbitrarily  assumed  that  the  divine  in  man,  the  essence 
of  man's  being,  is  the  good, — man's  "better  self" — and  so, 
by  this  addition  to  pantheism,  we  have  an  ethics  as  fanciful 
and  as  unfounded  as  the  philosophy  on  which  it  is  based. 

Herbert  Spencer  accounts  for  all  life,  physical  and  psychi- 
cal, as  the  development  of  molecular  action.  Thoughts 
and  cognitions,  feelings  and  desires,  are  exceedingly  complex 
and  delicate  commotions  of  the  nervous  system.  This  implies 
that  moral  experience  also  is  an  evolution  of  the  corporeal. 
And  Spencer  attempts  to  show  that  this  is  so.  Assuming 
that  all  pleasures  and  pains  consist  in  certain  sensations  and 


CHAP.  XIII  ]  ETHICAL  METHODS.  135 

refined  reproductions  of  sensations  (all  of  these  being  identical 
with  complex  molecular  activities)  and  recognizing  that  the 
wise  man  seeks  the  pleasurable  and  avoids  the  painful  for 
himself  and  others,  he  constructs  a  plausible  sensationalistic 
utilitarianism.  But  his  ethics  is  as  unsatisfactory  as  Hegel's, 
because  it  attempts  to  educe  the  moral  from  the  unmoral, 
instead  of  seeking  explanations  from  the  analysis  of  moral 
life  itself.  Both  authors  use  some  of  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness ;  they  could  not  do  otherwise ;  but  their  false  fundamental 
principles  invalidate  their  theorizing.  The  derivate  method 
cannot  be  of  service  when  its  deductions  are  made  from 
erroneous  assumptions  . 

11.  Such  are  the  five  subordinate  modes  of  ethical  research, 
which  may  be  employed  as  auxiliaries  to  the  analytical 
method.  But  no  one  of  these  alone  is  adequate  for  philosophic 
progress,  and  all  of  them  together  would  not  suffice  without 
the  direct  analysis  of  moral  perceptions  and  judgments. 

Some  authors,  looking  at  this  subject  in  their  own  way, 
have  mentioned  the  psychological,  the  metaphysical,  and  the 
evolutionistic  methods.  These  terms — primarily,  at  least — 
designate  different  sources  of  ideas  and  grounds  of  argument 
rather  than  different  modes  of  mental  work.  They  call  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that  a  system  of  ethics  may  be  controlled 
by  a  psychological  or  a  metaphysical  or  an  evolutionistic 
theory.  They  might  also  be  used  to  indicate  specific  appli- 
cations of  the  derivate  method  of  inquiry.  But  our  present 
object  does  not  call  for  further  distinctions.  If  we  bear  in 
mind  the  paramount  importance  of  the  analytic  method  and 
the  limitations  attending  the  subordinate  modes  of  precedure, 
we  shall  have  a  kind  of  ethical  methodology,  according  to 
which  the  value  of  various  systems  may  be  estimated.  For 
the  strength  or  the  weakness  of  any  doctrine  becomes  ap- 
parent when  we  see  to  what  extent  it  has  been  constructed 
in  accordance  with  the  special  logic  of  the  science  to  which  it 
belongs. 


NOTE. — The  next  seven  chapters  (XIV-XX)  discuss  conflicting 
theories  and  may  be  read  either  before  or  after  the  subsequent  part  of 
the  treatise.  Those  who  have  not  already  given  some  attention  to 
ethics  may  advantageously  defer  the  reading  of  these  chapters  till 
after  they  have  studied  the  direct  analysis  of  the  Moral  Law — Chap- 
ters XXI-XXVII, 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

UTILITARIANISM. 

1.  Ethical  systems  should  be  studied. — 2.  As  influenced  by  domin- 
ant ideas  they  may  be  classified  as  follows  :  (1)  Happiness 
Ethics  ;  (2)  Perfection  Ethics  ;  (3)  Motivity  Ethics  ;  (4)  Author- 
ity Ethics  ;  (5)  Duty  Ethics. — 3.  Hedonism,  taught  by  the 
Atomists,  is  the  crudest  form  of  Happiness  ethics.  It  makes 
pleasure  the  end  of  life. — 4.  Eudaemonism,  the  doctrine  of  Aris- 
totle, makes  active  and  prosperous  employment  the  end. — 5. 
Utilitarianism  advocates  "  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number,"  or  the  welfare  in  general,  of  all  concerned. — 6.  Utilitar- 
ians recognize  moral  life  to  be  both  egoistic  and  altruistic,  though 
some  would  make  altruism  a  development  of  egoism. — 7.  The 
charge  that  Utilitarianism  sets  aside  the  accepted  rules  of  moral- 
ity cannot  be  sustained.  It  is  denied  by  Mill  and  Spencer. 
Spencer  quoted. — 8.  Utilitarianism  does  not  sufficiently  distin- 
guish bet  ween  seeking  happiness  or  good  for  its  own  sake  and 
seeking  the  right  for  its  own  sake. — 9.  Nor  between  actions  as 
naturally  good  and  bad  and  as  morally  good  and  bad. — 10.  Util- 
itarianism gives  an  inadequate  account  of  moral  obligation. 
Bentham,  Bain,  Mill,  Spencer,  Darwin,  and  Sidgwick,  quoted. — 
11.  This  system  neglects  the  internal  and  spiritual,  and  does 
not  provide  high  ideals  of  duty. 

1.  BEFORE  attempting  a  difficult  work  it  is  well  to  con- 
sider what  has  already  been  done  in  the  field  of  proposed 
labor.     One  should  study  both  the  failures  and  the  successes 
of  his  predecessors,  and  should  seek  to  understand  how  these 
have  been  brought  about.    To  neglect  this  source  of  aid  does 
not  exhibit  independence  of  mind,  but  stupidity  and  conceit. 

2.  The  various  philosophies  of  morality  devised  by  thought- 
ful men  are  fundamentally  influenced  by  diverse  conceptions 
of  the  essential  aim  of  right  living;  and  they  may  be  classi- 
fied accordingly.     Certain  theories  make  welfare  and  happi- 
ness the  ultimate  end  of  duty;  they  may  be  termed  collec- 
tively the  Happiness  ethics.     Others  teach  that  virtue  con- 
sists in  seeking  an  ideal  excellence,  a  certain  perfection  of 
character  and  life ;  these  may  be  named  the  Perfection  ethics. 

136 


CHAP.  XIV.]  UTILITARIANISM.  137 

Others  say  that  the  regulation  of  one's  motive  tendencies  by 
conscience  or  reason  is  the  all-comprehensive  requirement  of 
the  law;  these  may  be  designated  the  Motivity  ethics.  Others 
hold  that  obedience  to  the  will  of  a  superior,  enforced  by  law 
or  habit,  is  the  foundation  of  morality;  these  may  be  styled 
Authority  ethics.  Others  assert  that  the  aim  of  moral  desire 
and  action  is  to  realize  the  right  or  to  perform  one's  duty, 
this  end  being  distinguishable  from  any  of  those  above  men- 
tioned ;  these  mey  be  spoken  of  as  Duty  ethics.  Other  schemes 
of  life  and  conduct  might  be  added  to  the  foregoing  list,  but 
we  cannot  think  of  any  that  are  worthy  to  be  called  ethical. 

Some  of  the  philosophies  of  moral  life  may  not  at  first 
seem  to  employ  any  of  the  five  ideas  now  presented,  but  we 
believe  that  the  ethical  significance  of  every  system  will  be 
found  to  arise  in  connection  with  the  use  of  one  of  these 
ideas,  or,  it  may  be,  from  the  use,  first  of  one  and  then  of 
another  of  them.  Indeed  it  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  any 
life  should  be  called  moral  unless  it  aim  either  at  the  promo- 
tion and  conservation  of  welfare  and  happiness — or  at  per- 
fection or  excellence  of  life  and  character— or  at  a  wise  regu- 
lation of  our  affections  and  desires — or  at  obedience  to  author- 
ity and  to  the  commands  of  God — or  at  the  realization  of 
those  ends  in  general  which  are  right  and  dutiful. 

3.  Sometimes  the  Happiness  ethics  is  given  the  name 
Hedonism,  because  the  crudest  form  of  this  doctrine  makes 
ydovT],  or  pleasure,  the  great  end  of  existence.  But  a  more 
intelligible  statement  of  views  can  be  presented  if  we  re- 
strict the  term  Hedonism  to  the  earliest  and  least  developed 
form  of  the  Happiness  theory,  and  say  that,  in  addition  to 
this,  there  are  two  other  forms,  Eudcemonism  and  'Utili- 
tarianism. 

That  pleasure  is  the  proper  aim  of  rational  beings  was 
taught  by  those  primitive  Grecian  philosophers  who  were 
called  Atomists,  and  who  lived  in  Ionia  in  the  fifth  century 
before  Christ.  Democritus  and  Leucippus  were  the  founders 
of  this  school.  Asserting  that  the  universe  and  all  objects 
contained  in  it  result  from  the  interaction  of  exceedingly 
minute  and  indivisible  particles,  they  were  the  forerunners 
of  our  modern  materialists.  Those  writers  of  our  day  who 
say  that  all  organic  and  all  psychic  life  have  sprung  from  the 
operation  of  powers  originally  inherent  in  inorganic  matter, 
and  who  call  themselves  Evolutionists  (though  this  name 
may  also  indicate  adherence  to  a  form  of  theistic  theory), 


138  THE  MOUAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

have  done  little  more  than  to  elaborate  the  ideas  of  the 
ancient  Atomists.  In  morals  the  tendency  of  such  philosophy 
is  to  inculcate  the  duty  of  getting  the  greatest  possible  satis- 
faction out  of  this  present  life.  Since  personal  experience 
terminates  when  body  and  brain  are  resolved  into  their  chem- 
ical constituents,  the  dictate  of  Atomistic  wisdom  is,  "  Let 
us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die." 

We  must  not,  however,  suppose  that  the  Hedonist  philos- 
ophers advocated  low  sensuality;  probably  this  was  never 
done  by  any  honest  and  earnest  thinker.  But  Aristippus  of 
Gyrene  (B.  C.  400),  and  after  him  Epicurus  (B.  C.  300), 
taught  that  refined  pleasures,  the  principal  of  which  were 
to  be  intellectual  and  social,  were  the  wisest  aims  of  human 
pursuit.  They  approved  of  bountiful  repasts  at  which  guests 
crowned  with  flowers  and  cheered  with  sweet  music,  dis- 
missed the  cares  of  life  and  indulged  in  songs  and  gaiety. 
At  the  same  time  wise  thoughts  and  noble  sentiments — "  the 
feast  of  reason  and  the  flow  of  soul " — must  ever  be  the  chief 
attraction  of  the  festival;  else  it  would  be  unworthy  of  the 
dignity  of  man. 

4.  The  moral  theory  of  Aristotle  is  distinguished  from 
Hedonism  because  his  conception  of  the  summum  bonum — 

ro  riXsiov  dyaOov the   chief  good   of  life — is  not   that  of 

ease  and  enjoyment,  but  of  the  greatest  attainable  kodai^o^ia 
or  prosperity.  Hence  his  doctrine  has  been  styled  Eudse- 
monism.  According  to  Aristotle  the  principal  part  of  happi- 
ness is  to  be  found,  not  in  passive  experiences,  but  in  active 
employments.  Man's  highest  good  lies  in  ioxpaZia,  or  well- 
doing, that  is,  in  the  suitable  employment  of  his  faculties 
about  their  proper  objects.  The  dispositions  of  the  human 
spirit  to  various  ends  and  modes  of  activity  become  virtues 
when  they  are  properly  exercised ;  for  which  purpose  the  dis- 
creet man  (6  yp6vtp.o<t)  must  avoid  extremes  and  follow  the 
middle  course.  This  teaching  of  Aristotle  about  the  /j.eff6rr^ 
or  middle,  is  regarded  by  some  as  giving  his  definitions  of 
the  right  and  of  virtue,  but  it  is  rather  a  useful  direction 
concerning  the  regulation  of  our  natural  dispositions.  Virtue 
consists  essentially  in  that  ypovyn?,  or  wisdom,  which  chooses 
and  seeks  the  highest  good;  and  the  right  is  the  good  thus 
chosen. 

The  superiority  of  Aristotle  to  the  Atomists  is  apparent. 
He  was  not  a  materialist;  he  presents  a  nobler  ideal  of  life 
than  is  cognate  to  materialism.  Yet  he  fails  to  distinguish 


CHAP.  XIV.]  UTILITARIANISM.  139 

sufficiently  between  prudence  and  virtue — between  the  pur- 
suit of  one's  own  best  interests  and  the  loving  service  of  the 
right  for  its  own  sake.  These  things,  though  closely  related, 
are  not  identical. 

5.  Utilitarianism  is  the  modern  form  of  the  Happiness 
ethics.    Jeremy  Bentham,  the  father  of  it,  taught  that  "  the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number"  is  the  end  by 
which  the  Tightness  of  actions  is  determined.     Later  this 
theory  was  developed  by  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  as  a  system  of  uni- 
versal beneficence.     At  the  present  time  Professor  Sidgwick, 
another  advocate  of  Utilitarianism,  defines  it  as  "the  ethical 
theory  that  the  conduct  which,  under  given  circumstances, 
is  ethically  right,  is  that  which  will  produce  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness  on  the  whole;  that  is,  taking  into  ac- 
count all  whose  interests  are  affected  by  the  conduct."    Ben- 
tham's  method  is  dogmatic  and  looks  towards  the  application 
of  ethics  to  legislative  and  social  problems;  Mill's  is  deduc- 
tive, being  influenced  by  his  psychology;  Sidgwick's,  though 
using  postulates  and  axioms,  is  very  dialectic,  so  that  some- 
times amid  his  keen  discussion  of  doctrines,  his  own  views 
are  obscured. 

6.  Some  have  distinguished  between  egoistic  and  altruistic 
Utilitarianism,  the  former  setting  forth  one's  own  happiness 
as  the  end  of  life,  the  latter  the  happiness  of  others;  but 
neither  of  these  views  is  thoroughly  and  consistently  advo- 
cated by  any  author  of  the  present  day.     Egoism,  the  doc- 
trine of  principled  selfishness,  is  not  taught  now  as  it  was  in 
former  times.     It  is  the  natural  product  of  materialism  and 
sensationalism;  for,  according  to  these  doctrines,  all  human 
desire  arises  in  view  of  pleasant  feelings  (or  agreeable  nerv- 
ous commotions)  and  seeks  a  reproduction  of  them.    We  have 
a  pleasure,  it  has  been  said,  in  seeing  others  happy  and  then 
we  seek  the  happiness  of  others,  not  on  its  own  account,  but 
in  order  to  realize  that  pleasure.    In  opposition  to  this  Utili- 
tarians now  hold  that,  in  addition  to  desiring  his  own  satis- 
faction, man  has  a  disinterested  desire  that  others  should  be 
gratified.     Whether  this  be  an  original   and  primitive  en- 
dowment  (which  seems  the  better  opinion)   or  an  acquired 
disposition — in  either  case  it  is  held  to  be  truly  altruistic. 
Even  Herbert  Spencer  seems  to  recognize  this  truth.    "  Good- 
ness," he  says,  "is  the  conduct  of  one  who  aids  the  sick  in 
re-acquiring  normal  vitality,  assists  the  unfortunate  to  recover 
the  means  of  maintaining  themselves,  defends  those  who  are 


140  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

threatened  with  harm  in  person,  property  or  reputation,  and 
aids  whatever  promises  to  improve  the  living  of  all  his  fel- 
lows." We  cannot  suppose  Mr.  Spencer  to  believe  that  the 
goodness  which  he  describes  seeks  only  its  own  satisfaction  in 
the  alleviation  of  suffering,  and  not  the  alleviation  of  the 
suffering  itself. 

At  the  same  time  we  know  of  no  author  who  advocates 
exclusively  altruistic  Utilitarianism.  The  utmost  that  can 
be  said  is  that  the  best  Utilitarianism  contains  a  strong  al- 
truistic element.  It  calls  upon  every  man  to  do  what  in  him 
lies  not  only  for  his  own  welfare  but  also  for  the  welfare  of 
others.  In  this  teaching  the  modern  Happiness  ethics  far 
excels  the  ancient,  chiefly  owing  to  the  enlightenment  of  the 
moral  faculty  under  the  influence  of  Christianity.  While  the 
philosophers  of  antiquity  honored  the  virtue  of  beneficence, 
they  were  scarcely  conscious  of  its  fundamental  importance. 
The  merit  of  Utilitarianism  is  that  it  insists  upon  the  duty 
of  doing  good  to  man  as  man ;  for  which  reason  it  is  to  be 
regretted  that  the  title  given  this  doctrine  by  its  advocates 
is  but  weakly  expressive  of  its  spirit.  The  term  Utilitarian- 
ism appears  to  elevate  the  useful  above  that  which  is  essen- 
tial to  man's  deepest  needs,  and  the  conveniences  and  com- 
forts of  life  above  its  fundamental  interests.  These  sugges- 
tions are  unjust.  Utilitarianism  seeks  happiness  as  the  all- 
comprehending  good  and  antagonizes  misery  as  the  all-com- 
prehending evil.  It  is  almost  identical  with  humanitarianism, 
because  it  makes  beneficence  the  source  of  all  virtue.  It  aims 
at  the  welfare  of  every  sentient  being,  and  therefore  should  be 
called  "  Bonitarianism,"  or  some  other  name  indicative  of 
goodness. 

7.  Nevertheless  several  objections  have  been  made  to  this 
system.  First,  it  is  said  that  Utilitarianism  sets  aside  the 
common  and  accepted  rules  of  morality  and  substitutes  for 
these  a  calculation  of  results  in  each  particular  instance. 
Undoubtedly  some  advocates  of  this  doctrine  underestimate 
the  value  of  the  practical  moral  reason  of  men,  and  so  leave 
their  statements  open  to  this  objection.  But  J.  S.  Mill, 
Herbert  Spencer,  and  other  careful  utilitarians  allow  the 
authority  of  the  dictates  of  the  "moral  sense,"  and  assert 
that  the  speculative  reason  does  not  set  these  aside,  but  only 
confirms  and  supplements  them.  Holding  that  the  regula- 
tions of  morality  are  the  judgments  of  long  experience  re- 
specting beneficial  modes  of  conduct,  they  teach  that  one 


CHAP.  XIV.]  UTILITARIANISM. 

should  conscientiously  observe  such  rules,  and  that  we  should 
resort  to  "moral  arithmetic"  only  in  cases  in  which  there 
is  ground  to  question  the  proper  applicability  of  the  rule. 
Spencer  says :  "  The  business  of  moral  science  is  to  deduce 
from  the  laws  of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence  what 
kind  of  actions  necessarily  tend  to  produce  happiness  and 
what  tends  to  produce  unhappiness.  Having  done  this,  its 
deductions  are  to  be  recognized  as  laws  of  conduct,  and  are  to 
be  conformed  to,  irrespective  of  a  direct  estimate  of  happi- 
ness or  misery." 

8.  Another  allegation  against  Utilitarianism  is  that  it 
makes  no  distinction  between  the  seeking  of  happiness  or  good 
for  its  own  sake  and  the  seeking  of  the  right  for  its  own  sake. 
As  these  things  appear  'to  be  different,  this  objection  has 
considerable  force.  Utilitarians  define  happiness  as  the  sum 
of  .the  pleasures  of  which  man  is  capable,  and  misery,  which 
is  the  opposite  of  happiness,  as  the  sum  of  the  pains. 
With  these  conceptions  Mill  says,  "  Actions  are  right  in 
proportion  as  they  tend  to  promote  happiness,  wrong  as 
they  tend  to  produce  the  reverse  of  happiness."  In  other 
words,  an  action  is  right  or  wrong  according  to  its  fitness  to 
advance  or  to  retard  the  happiness  of  those  concerned.  This 
language,  and  the  thought  conveyed  by  it,  give  no  basis  for 
distinguishing  the  right  and  the  wrong  from  the  desirable 
and  the  undesirable. 

These  last  two  words,  as  commonly  used  relate  to  those 
enjoyments  which  a  man  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  wisdom 
may  seek  for  himsself  and  others,  and  the  sum  of  which 
is  happiness  as  ordinarily  conceived;  and,  in  the  general, 
a  thing  is  "  desirable "  or  "  undesirable "  just  as  tending 
to  advance  or  to  retard  this  enjoyable  experience.  This 
being  so,  Utilitarianism  teaches  that  the  right  and  wrong 
do  not  differ  from  the  desirable  and  the  undesirable,  unless 
indeed  we  should  say  that  the  right  and  wrong  are  the 
desirable  and  undesirable  as  viewed  from  a  general  and  im- 
personal point  of  view.  But  the  common  judgment  of  man- 
kind does  not  make  moral  Tightness  merely,  a  species  of 
desirableness;  it  distinguishes  it  from,  and  raises  it  above, 
desirableness  viewed  from  any  point  of  view.  It  assigns  to 
the  right — and  also  to  the  wrong — a  nature  and  place  of  its 
own. 

9.  This  same  criticism  of  Utilitarianism  may  be  expressed 
in  connection  with  a  familiar  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the 


142  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

two  words  "  good  "  and  "  bad."  With  regard  to  most  objects, 
"good"  indicates  a  conduciveness  to  what  we  ordinarily 
mean  by  welfare — in  other  words,  a  fitness  to  promote  com- 
fort and  happiness ;  as  when  we  speak  of  a  good  house,  a  good 
business,  a  good  farm,  a  good  horse.  But  sometimes  in  rela- 
tion to  persons  or  personal  actions  the  words  have  an  ethical 
signification,  as  when  we  speak  of  a  good  man  or  a  bad  one, 
a  good  deed  or  a  bad  one.  In  this  moral  application  "  good  " 
and  "  bad "  mean  "  right "  and  "  wrong,"  or,  it  may  be, 
c%  virtuous  "  and  "  vicious." 

Thus,  so  far  as  proposed  actions  and  aims  are  concerned, 
there  is  one  kind  of  good  which  we  may  call  natural,  and 
which  is  the  same  as  the  desirable,  and  there  is  another  which 
we  may  call  moral,  and  which  is  identical  with  the  right; 
and,  in  like  manner,  there  are  two  kinds  of  badness.  Utili- 
tarianism scarcely  recognizes  the  difference. 

10.  A  further  objection  to  this  system  of  doctrine — which, 
however,  is  but  the  logical  consequence  of  that  which  has 
just  been  considered — is  that  Utilitarianism  provides  no  ade- 
quate conception  of  moral  obligation — that,  instead  of  ex- 
plaining,  it  really  explains  away  the  obligation  or  "  ought- 
ness  "  of  the  right.  After  identifying  the  right  with  that 
which  is  conducive  to  happiness  (the  greatest  happiness  of 
the  greatest  number  or  the  greatest  happiness  of  all  con- 
cerned) Utilitarians  identify  the  "oughtness"  of  the  right 
with  the  supreme  desirability  or  importance  of  the  right  as 
an  end.  According  to  this  conception  obligation  is  not  an 
absolute  or  categorical  imperative ;  it  is  only  that  felt  liability 
to  loss  or  evil  which  attends  the  misuse  of  the  means  of 
happiness.  The  constraint  of  duty  is  a  sense  of  the  pressing 
importance  of  that  threatened  loss  or  evil. 

In  order  to  emphasize  this  thought,  Mr.  Bentham,  in  the 
opening  discussion  of  his  Deontology,  altogether  rejects  moral 
obligation  as  an  ethical  idea,  as  if  it  were  only  an  irrational 
bugbear.  "  It  is,  in  fact,"  he  says,  "  very  idle  to  talk  about 
duties;  the  word  itself  has  in  it  something  disagreeable  and 
repulsive. . . .  The  talisman  of  arrogance,  indolence  and  ig- 
norance is  to  be  found  in  a  single  word,  an  authoritative  im- 
posture. ...  it  is  the  word  '  ought.'  ...  If  the  use  of 
the  word  be  admissible  at  all,  it  '  ought '  to  be  banished  from 
the  vocabulary  of  morals."  These  statements,  however,  do 
not  mean  that  the  word  "  ought "  has  absolutely  no  place  in 
morals.  They  only  denounce  it  as  expressing  an  imperative. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  UTILITARIANISM.  143 

Bentham  regards  the  requirement  which  conscience  makes  in 
favor  of  the  right  as  a  support  attached  to  the  right  by  super- 
stition, or  by  the  habit  of  obedience  to  authority.  He  rejects 
that  "  categorical  imperative  "  which  Kant  declares  to  be  an 
immediate  utterance  of  the  reason. 

Notwithstanding  his  condemnation  of  the  imperative 
"  ought,"  Bentham  afterwards  uses  the  word  to  indicate  that 
rational  demand  which  happiness  and  good  make  upon  us 
to  seek  them  for  their  own  sake.  "  Every  pleasure/'  he  says. 
"  is  prima  facie  good,  and  ought  to  be  pursued ;  every  pain  is 
a  prima  facie  evil,  and  ought  to  be  avoided/'  And  again, 
"  if  there  is  no  (  ought '  there  is  no  morality ;  therefore  no 
rights  of  man."  Here  "  ought  "  expresses  the  demand  which 
the  rules  of  well-being  as  distinguished  from  the  principles 
of  morality  make  on  every  intelligent  being.  Beyond  question 
the  word  is  often  employed  in  this  sense.  With  reference 
only  to  desirable  success  we  may  say  that  a  poem  "  ought " 
to  be  written,  that  a  speech  "  ought "  to  be  delivered,  that  a 
business  "  ought "  to  be  conducted,  in  such  or  such  a  manner. 
So  Bentham  holds  that,  for  the  best  interests  of  one's  self 
and  others,  one  "  ought "  to  act  in  accordance  with  practical 
wisdom.  In  fact  he  abolishes  moral  principle  by  making  it 
nothing  more  than  a  serious  regard  for  the  general  welfare, 
and  with  this  he  also  abolishes  moral  obligation  as  the  cate- 
gorical imperative. 

Prof.  Bain,  who  derives  all  moral  relations  from  the  effect 
of  social  forces,  obtains  the  idea  of  obligation  from  that  of 
external  authority  and  restricts  it  to  "  the  class  of  actions  en- 
forced by  the  sanction  of  punishment."  Although  of  the 
same  class  of  thinkers  with  Bentham,  he  includes  this  idea 
within  the  sphere  of  morality.  Bain  defines  conscience  as 
ee  an  imitation  within  ourselves  of  the  government  about  us." 

John  Stuart  Mill,  Bentham's  distinguished  disciple,  makes 
the  "  internal  sanction  of  duty  " — "  its  binding  force  " — to 
be  "  a  feeling  in  our  own  mind,  a  pain  more  or  less  intense,  at- 
tendant on  the  violation  of  duty."  Be  says,  "  The  ultimate 
sanction  of  all  morality  is  a  subjective  feeling  in  our  mind." 
Thus  he  teaches  that  the  pursuit  of  happiness  comes  to  be 
regarded  as  dutiful,  because  a  contemplation  of  the  contrary 
conduct  produces  pain.  In  basing  the  idea  of  obligation  on 
an  internal  feeling  of  pain  rather  than  on  a  sense  of  outward 
authority,  Mill  agrees  with  Bentham  and  differs  from  Bain. 
For  the  "  good,"  in  connection  with  which  Bentham  says  the 


144  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

"  ought "  is  perceived,  is  the  ground  of  pain  if  it  be  not  real- 
ized, or  if  evil  take  its  place. 

The  weakest  possible  account  of  moral  obligation  is  that 
given  by  Charles  Darwin  in  his  "  Descent  of  Man/'  He  says, 
"  The  imperious  word  '  ought '  seems  merely  to  imply  the 

consciousness  of  a  persistent  instinct We  hardly 

use  the  word  in  a  metaphorical  sense  when  we  say  hounds 
ought  to  hunt,  pointers  to  point,  and  retrievers  to  retrieve 
their  game."  Nothing  could  show  less  psychological  dis- 
crimination than  this  identification  of  the  motive  action  of 
reason  with  that  of  a  "persistent  instinct,  either  natural  or 
acquired."  The  more  one  scrutinizes  one's  sense  of  moral 
obligation  the  more  he  is  convinced  that  the  authority  of  duty 
cannot  be  explained  as  the  demand  of  an  unreasoning  in- 
stinct, or  of  a  subjective  feeling,  or  of  an  external  influence, 
or  even  of  the  rational  perception  of  good  and  happiness  in 
general.  It  is  something  sui  generis.  It  is  the  claim  as- 
serted by  the  right  as  such.  It  is  the  demand  of  good  only 
when,  and  so  far  as,  good  may  have  the  character  of  the 
right. 

In  view  of  this  fact  Professor  Henry  Sidgwick,  who  calls 
himself  an  Intuitional  Utilitarian,  must  be  granted  a  pre- 
eminence over  all  others  who  make  happiness  the  end  of 
morality.  "  I  find,"  says  the  Prof  es&or,  "  that  I  undoubtedly 
seem  to  perceive  as  clearly  and  certainly  as  I  see  any  axiom 
in  Arithmetic  or  Geometry  that  it  is  right  and  reasonable 
and  the  dictate  of  reason,  and  my  duty,  to  treat  every  man  as 
I  should  think  I  myself  ought  to  be  treated  in  precisely  simi- 
lar circumstances."  Here,  along  with  the  teaching  that  the 
essential  aim  of  the  moral  reason  is  the  good  or  the  "  felic- 
ific,"  Sedgwick  asserts  that  right,  duty  and  obligation  are 
the  objects  of  a  rational  intuition,  and  evidently  distinguishes 
these  from  lower  motive  perceptions.  This  doctrine  has 
much  merit;  it  does  not  explain  away  the  idea  of  moral 
obligation. 

11.  Finally,  Utilitarianism  has  been  blamed  for  not  pro- 
viding high  ideals  of  duty  and  for  favoring  practical  to  the 
exclusion  of  spiritual  aims.  It  is  said  that  the  greatest  of 
all  duties  is  the  development  of  virtue  and  moral  character, 
and  that  Utilitarianism,  neglecting  this,  demands  only  the 
promotion  of  happiness  or  welfare.  There  is  some  f  oundation^ 
for  this  accusation.  If  the  question  were  whether  spiritual* 
improvement  or  practical  benevolence  should  be  the  exclusive 


CHAP.  XIV.]  UTILITARIANISM.  145 

aim  of  life,  we  believe  that  wisdom  should  decide  for  the 
benevolence,  not  that  it  is  intrinsically  of  more  importance 
than  moral  well-being,  but  because  a  choice  of  this  latter  aim 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  former  would  render  both  impossible 
of  attainment,  whereas  a  moral  growth  must  attend  wise 
philanthropic  effort,  whether  that  growth  is  consciously  de- 
sired or  not.  This,  however,  is  not  the  problem  for  our 
decision;  and  those  who  wish  to  avoid  the  danger  of  seeking 
the  spiritual  in  separation  from  less  elevated  aims  should 
guard  against  the  opposite  extreme  of  concentrating  all 
one's  attention  on  practical  duties  alone. 

Evidently  this  latter  error  will  be  a  natural  one  for  those 
who  make  good  and  happiness,  as  opposed  to  right  and  vir- 
tue, the  essential  objects  of  moral  effort.  This,  however, 
seems  to  be  the  position  of  Utilitarians.  The  beter  thinkers 
of  this  school  do,  indeed,  recognize  virtue  as  a  good,  and  even 
as  the  highest  good,  the  summum  bonum.  But  in  qualifica- 
tion of  this  it  may  be  said  that  their  conception  of  good,  even 
the  highest,  being  subordinated  to  their  conception  of  hap- 
piness, which  they  define  as  the  possible  attainable  sum  of 
pleasures,  they  are  forced  to  regard  virtue  as  having  value  only 
as  the  greatest  means  of  enjoyment.  The  thoughtful  student 
demands  a  doctrine  by  which  the  right  may  be  truly  differ- 
entiated from  all  other  forms  of  good,  and  in  which  virtue 
or  moral  excellence  shall  be  set  forth  as  the  transcendent 
aim  of  rational  desire. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

PERFECTIONISM. 

1.  An  ethical  system  may  mention  more  aims  of  moral  life  than 
one,  but  generally  one  is  fundamental. — 2.  Perfectionism  was 
originated  by  Leibnitz.  Is  widely  taught  at  present.  Janet, 
Mackenzie,  Hickok,  and  Bowne,  quoted.— 3.  Also  Spencer,  Alex- 
ander, and  Leslie  Stephen,  though  they  are  not  true  perfection- 
ists.— 4.  This  doctrine  makes  excellence  of  character  or  being 
the  essential  aim  of  morality. — 5.  No  doubt  personal  perfection 
is  a  high  moral  end. — 6.  The  duty  of  seeking  it  involves  no  im- 
possibility.—7.  Perfectionism  teaches  that  moral  rightness 
belongs  to  external  conduct  not  as  being  excellent  in  itself  but 
only  as  the  expression  of  spiritual  excellence.  Janet,  Mackenzie. 
— 8.  Moral  perfection  is  an  inward  excellence  which  shows  itself 
in  outward  disposals  and  doings. — 9.  As  an  ultimate  end  it  is  not 
necessarily  simple  and  indefinable.  Hickock,  Janet,  Mackenzie, 
Bowne. — 10.  Perfectionism  is  not  a  selfish  doctrine.  It  is  neither 
egoistic  nor  altruistic.  Janet  criticized. — 11.  Notwithstanding 
its  plausibility  this  doctrine  is  inconsistent  with  fact  ;  and  is 
self-contradictory. — 12.  Though  virtue  is  the  supreme  moral  end, 
it  is  an  end  of  secondary  development.  It  implies  the  existence 
of  other  and  more  primary  moral  ends. — 13.  Besides,  perfection- 
ism does  not  identify  perfection  with  virtue.  It  can  give  no 
satisfactory  definition  of  perfection. — 14.  The  sense  of  moral 
dignity,  or  worthiness,  is  not  the  same  as  the  sense  of  the  morally 
right. — 15.  Spiritual  perfection  defined.  But  in  order  to  perfect 
this  definition  the  rightness  of  ends  and  actions  should  also  be 
defined.  DCS  Cartes  quoted. 

1.  THE  arrangement  of  systems  according  to  the  explana- 
tion which  each  gives  of  the  fundamental  or  generic  aim  of 
morality  is  not  intended  to  teach  that  every  system  sets  forth 
an  aim  distinctly,  or  that  it  mentions  only  one  aim.  There 
would  be  no  inconsistency  should  the  same  person  at  the 
same  time  seek  to  promote  happiness,  to  realize  an  ideal,  to 
regulate  his  inward  life,  to  fulfil  the  will  of  a  superior  and 
to  satisfy  his  own  sense  of  duty.  In  like  manner  an  ethical 
theory  may  refer  to  more  than  one  aim,  or  may  use  some  com- 
bination of  aims.  Nevertheless  it  is  true  that  in  every  system 
146 


CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM. 

some  one  principle  is  given  a  preponderance,  even  where  it 
may  not  be  granted  the  absolute  control,  over  all  the  rest. 

2.  The  doctrine  that  excellence  of  spiritual  character  is 
the  essential  aim  of  morality  may  be  named  "  Perfection- 
ism." It  was  held  anciently  by  Plato  and  others.  During 
the  early  days  of  modern  philosophy  it  was  advocated  by 
Leibnitz  and  by  his  able  disciple  Wolf.  Through  the  writings 
of  Wolf  it  became  extensively  current  during  the  first  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  After  that  it  suffered  a  decline 
for  about  one  hundred  years,  being  antagonized  by  the  teach- 
ings of  Kant,  Bentham  and  others.  During  the  latter  part 
of  this  nineteenth  century  it  has  again  become  prevalent.  It 
is  attractive  to  many  who  cannot  accept  pleasure  or  happiness 
as  the  end  of  duty,  and  who  are  not  satisfied  with  dogmatic 
statements  respecting  the  right  and  the  obligatory. 

Professor  Paul  Janet,  in  his  "  Theory  of  Morals,"  says : 
"  According  to  my  view  moral  obligation  is  based  upon  the 
following  principle:  Every  being  owes  it  to  himself  that  he 
should  attain  to  the  highest  degree  of  excellence  and  of  per- 
fection of  which  his  nature  is  capable."  To  the  same  effect 
Prof.  John  S.  Mackenzie,  in  his  "  Manual  of  Ethics/  having 
discussed  "the  standard  as  law"  (in  other  words,  as  the 
right  and  obligatory)  and  then  "  the  standard  as  happiness," 
says,  "  We  see,  in  fact,  that  the  end  must  consist  in  some 
form  of  self-realization,  that  is,  in  some  form  of  the  de- 
velopment of  character;  that  the  end,  in  short,  ought  to  be 
described  rather  as  perfection  than  as  happiness/'  A  similar 
doctrine  is  taught  by  Dr.  Laurens  P.  Hickok  in  his  "  System 
of  Moral  Science."  "We  may,"  he  says,  "  call  this  (the  ob- 
jective rule  of  right)  the  imperative  of  reason,  the  constraint 
of  conscience,  or  the  voice  of  God  within;  but,  by  whatever 
terms  expressed,  the  real  meaning  will  be  that  every  man 
has  consciously  the  bond  upon  him  to  do  that,  and  that  only, 
which  is  due  to  his  spiritual  excellency.  The  motive  to  this 
is  not  any  gratification  of  a  want,  not  any  satisfying  of  a 
craving,  and  thus  to  be  done  for  a  price  in  happiness;  it  is 
solely  that  one  may  be  just  what  the  excellency  of  his  own 
spirit  demands  that  he  should  be.  .  .  .  The  highest  good, 
the  summum  bonum,  is  worthiness  of  spiritual  approbation. 
That  this  is  ultimate  intuitively  appears  in  many  ways." 

These  views  of  Hickok,  as  well  as  those  of  Janet  and 
Mackenzie,  are  connected  with  the  Hegelian  teaching  of  the 
immanence  of  God  in  all  men,  and  represent  all  duty  as  call- 


148  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XV. 

ing  for  the  recognition  and  development  of  the  indwelling 
divine  nature.  This  principle  is  advocated  also  by  two  dis- 
tinguished Hegelians,  Professor  T.  H.  Green,  in  his  "  Pro- 
legomena to  Ethics,"  and  Prof.  F.  H.  Bradley,  in  "  Ethical 
Studies." 

Professor  Borden  T.  Bowne,  in  his  chapter  on  subjective 
ethics,  advocates  a  composite  doctrine.  Allowing  that  the 
objective  rule  of  conduct  requires  the  "  good-will  "  (i.  e.  good- 
ness), and  the  seeking  of  happiness,  he  claims  that  this  rule 
is  insufficient  without  another  drawn  from  within.  He  says, 
"  The  impossibility  of  solving  the  ethical  problem  by  gen- 
eral notions  about  the  good,  pleasure  and  happiness,  has 
abundantly  appeared.  When  we  make  any  of  these  basal, 
we  at  once  find  ourselves  compelled  to  appeal  to  some  ideal 
conception  or  inner  law,  which  shall  interpret  to  us  the  per- 
missible meaning  of  our  terms.  ...  If,  then,  we  are  told 
that  -the  law  of  love  is  the  only  basal  moral  law,  we  assent 
to  this  extent :  the  law  of  love  is  the  only  .  . .  social  law  for 
human  beings,  but  it  presupposes  a  law  for  the  human  being 
himself  which  determines  the  form  of  its  application.  A 
complete  law  of  duty  for  us  must  include  both  a  human  ideal 
and  also  a  law  of  social  interaction.  There  is,  then,  in 
human  morality,  even  supposing  it  perfect,  a  double  element. 
One  is  a  universal  factor  which  we  must  view  as  valid  for 
all  moral  beings  whatever:  the  other  is  related  to  humanity 
and  has  reference  to  human  perfection." 

Probably  Professor  Bowne  would  allow  that  other  rational 
beings  than  man  are  bound  to  consult  ideals,  only  ideals  to 
be  found  in  their  nature  and  not  in  ours.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
he  teaches  that  the  rule  of  perfection  given  by  the  human 
reason  is  not  an  infallible  guide,  but  is  subject  to  variation 
and  growth.  At  the  same  time  he  asserts  that  it  is  not  de- 
rived from  the  contemplation  of  the  results  of  conduct,  but 
from  a  study  of  human  nature;  and  also  that  it  is  the  more 
fundamental  element  of  moral  law.  "  Our  morality,"  he  says, 
"involves  not  merely  the  law  of  love,  but  also  an  ideal  of 
humanity.  If  we  desire  to  make  either  primary,  the  ideal  is 
basal  and  the  law  of  love  is  the  implication.  In  morals  be- 
ing is  deeper  than  doing." 

3.  Strange  as  it  may  appear,  Herbert  Spencer,  also,  holds 
a  kind  of  perfectionism,  though  in  a  way  which  does  not  make 
him  a  true  perfectionist.  For  he  does  not  consider  perfection 
but  happiness  to  be  the  end  of  morality.  "He  says,  "  The 


Jgff 

CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM.  149 

moral  law,  properly  so-called,  is  the  law  of  the  perfect  man 
— is  the  formula  of  ideal  conduct."  This  statement  is  re- 
lated to  Spencer's  definition  of  life  as  "  the  continuous  ad- 
justment of  internal  relations  to  external  relations " ;  by 
which  probably  we  are  to  understand  the  self-adaptation  of  an 
organism  to  its  environment.  While  such  adaptation  may  be 
admitted  as  a  condition  of  the  continuance  of  life,  we  ques- 
tion whether  it  be  life  itself.  Nevertheless  Spencer  makes 
the  highest  form  of  life  to  be  the  perfect  adjustment  of 
rational  beings  to  their  surroundings,  and,  on  this  basis, 
he  conceives  of  "  an  ideal  man  as  existing  in  the  ideal  social 
state."  Of  course  every  man,  to  the  extent  of  his  ability, 
should  conform  to  this  ideal.  Other  evolutionists,  as  Pro- 
fessor Alexander,  in  "  Moral  Order  and  Progress,"  and  Leslie 
Stephens,  in  his  "  Science  of  Ethics,"  explain  moral  ideals 
as  relating  not  to  an  ideal  state,  but  to  the  existing  condition 
of  things.  The  ideal  plan  is  that  according  to  which  "  so- 
ciety, in  the  conditions  in  which  it  is  placed,  can,  with  this 
ideal,  so  live  that  no  part  of  it  shall  encroach  upon  the 
rest."  With  a  change  in  the  social  state  a  change  in  the 
ideal  may  be  necessary.  This  position  is  not  really  antago- 
nistic to  Spencer's.  Evolutionistic  perfection  may  for  the 
present  be  dismissed  from  further  consideration. 

4.  Collating  now  the  statements  of  Perfectionism  proper, 
it  will  be  seen  that  they  set  forth  excellence  of  character  as 
the  essential  aim  of  moral  effort. 

The  "  ideal "  referred  to  in  these  statements  means  more 
than  that  the  object  of  moral  pursuit  is  only  a  thing  con- 
ceived of  and  not  yet  realized.  Those  who  do  not  accept  Per- 
fectionism, as  well  as  those  who  do,  hold  that  every  end  of 
dutiful  desire,  until  it  may  be  realized,  has  this  latter  style 
of  ideality.  The  ideal  now  mentioned  is  the  highest  form  of 
excellence  of  which  the  mind  can  conceive.  It  sets  forth  the 
ethical  end,  not  merely  as  unrealized,  but  as  <tf  perfect." 
Indeed  most  perfectionists  say  that  they  speak  of  an  ideal 
which  in  some  sense  actually  exists. 

Moreover  the  ideal  is  not  that  of  some  particular,  nor  of 
any  generic,  mode  of  conduct  or  doing;  it  is  that  of  the  perfect 
man  or  being.  As  Professor  Bowne  says,  the  perfection 
aimed  at  is  "  subjective."  It  belongs  primarily  and  essen- 
tially to  the  agent.  Conduct  is  right  or  wrong  only  as  con- 
cordant with  or  as  opposed  to  this  inward  excellence.  The 
Perfectionists  teach  that  what  renders  a  desire  virtuous  and 


150  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XV. 

dutiful  is  that  it  seeks  perfection  and  excellence  of  character, 
and  that  conduct  is  desired  as  right  only  as  connected  with 
and  consequent  upon  the  effort  after  spiritual  perfection. 

There  might  be  a  doctrine  of  Perfectionism  other  than 
this.  One  might  teach  that  perfection  resides  primarily  in 
certain  ends  and  actions,  because  of  their  own  nature  and 
operation,  and  that  character  is  perfect  only  as  favoring 
excellent  aims  and  excellent  conduct.  Such  perfectionism 
would  be  the  opposite  of  that  now  considered.  It  would 
make  the  perfection  of  ends  and  actions — not  that  of  char- 
acter— the  initial  principle  of  morality.  Mill,  Spencer  and 
their  associates  would  say  that  the  conception  of  the  perfect 
man  is  consequent  upon  that  of  perfect  conduct;  but  the 
other  authorities  quoted  make  internal  excellence  the  primary 
aim.  They  "base  duty  upon  the  dignity  of  the  moral  per- 
sonality and  upon  the  worth  of  man  regarded  as  an  end  unto 
himself/' 

5.  This  theory  of  Perfectionism  could  not  be  accepted  by 
so  many  able  men  if  it  did  not  have  some  affiliations  with  the 
truth.    It  behooves  those  who  may  not  be  satisfied  with  it  to 
consider  carefully  such  statements  as  can  be  made  in  its  de- 
fense.   First  of  all,  it  is  clear  that  personal  perfection  is  one 
of  the  highest  moral  ends.     Those  who  advocate  spiritual 
development  as  the  end  of  rational  existence  present  a  phase 
of  truth  which  is  apt  to  be  neglected  by  those  who  speak  of 
the  moral  law  as  dealing  exclusively  with  conduct.     They  re- 
mind us  that  being  as  well  as  doing  is  obligatory  upon  us  and 
that  being  is  the  more  vital  obligation.     Their  teachings  agree 
with  that  Scriptural  injunction,  "Keep  thy  heart  with  all 
diligence,  for  out  of  it  are  the  issues  of  life,"  and  with  that 
command  of  the  Almighty,  "  Be  ye  perfect,  for  I,  the  Lord 
your  God,  am  perfect." 

6.  In  the  next  place,  it  cannot  properly  be  objected  to  this 
doctrine  that  it  prescribes  for  us  and  expects  from  us  an 
impossibility.     Divine   perfection   is   unattainable   by   man. 
The  human  mind  cannot  even  form  an  absolutely  faultless 
spiritual  ideal;  nor  could  it  fully  comprehend  such  an  ideal 
should  it  be  presented.     The  best  of  men,  during  this  earthly 
life,  are  willing  to  confess  that  they  know  only  in  part,  and 
that  they  must  look  to  a  future  state  of  existence  for  knowl- 
edge   unmingled    with    error.     Perfectionists    do    speak    of 
"  an  absolute  ideal  type,"  but  they  add  "  perhaps  such  a  type 
can  never  be  perfectly  understood  by  humanity."     The  per- 


CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM.  151 

fection  which  mortals  conceive  of  and  attempt  to  realize  is 
only  an  approximation  to  that  type.  Hence  Janet  and  others 
use  the  alternative  term  "  excellence,"  and  represent  the  per- 
fection which  duty  seeks  as  admitting  of  degrees.  In  short, 
the  end  proposed  is  that  of  the  highest  excellence  conceivable 
by  the  moral  agent.  This  is  called  perfection  because  every 
man  in  developing  for  himself  the  conception  of  it  must  be 
content  with  nothing  less  than  the  best  development  possible 
for  him.  The  ultimate  goal  is  absolute  perfection;  if  the 
standard  followed  fall  short  of  this,  it  must  nevertheless  be 
the  nearest  approach  to  perfection  within  our  power.  So  it 
is  perfection  for  us. 

7.  In  the  third  place,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  while  the  ideal 
advocated  is  that  of  character  or  condition,  and  not  that  of 
doing,  the  thought  of  doing  is  by  no  means  excluded  from  the 
conception.     Excellence  of  character  has  its  importance  in 
qualifying  for  action,  or,  at  least,  is  manifested  in  activity. 
Hence  Janet  says,  "  The  idea  of  perfection  involves  not  only 
the  idea  of  activity,  but  also  that  of  order,  of  harmony,  of 
regular  and  proportionate  relations  " :  that  is,  it  shows  itself 
in   an   orderly,   harmonious   and   well-proportioned  activity. 
And,  when  he  says,  "  Each  one  of  us  according  to  his  circum- 
stances and  according  to  the  different  conditions  in  which  he 
is  placed  is  under  obligation  to  raise  himself  to  the  highest 
possible  degree  of  perfection  and  to  be  a  saint  or  a  hero 
according  as  the  nature  of  things  may  require,"  he  evidently 
means  one  to  be  a  saint  or  a  hero  in  the  doing  of  saintly  or 
heroic  deeds.     Perfection  of  inward  state  is  set  forth  as  the 
essential  end;  one  is  reminded  that  accomplishment  apart 
from  personality  would  be  as  meritless  as  the  action  of  an 
automaton.     Yet  it  is  also  taught  that  doing  is  the  necessary 
outcome  of  being;  that  being  reaches  its  perfection  only  in 
activity. 

In  a  like  spirit  Mackenzie,  after  saying  that  "the  end  at 
which  we  are  to  aim  is  the  realization  of  the  self  or  the  de- 
velopment of  character,"  explains  that  this  end  is  to  be 
attained  by  living  within  the  "universe,"  or  sphere,  of  the 
moral  reason.  We  must  endeavor  "  to  understand  completely 
the  world  in  which  we  live  and  our  relations  to  it  and  to 
act  constantly  in  the  light  of  that  understanding.  ...  So  to 
live  is  to  be  truly  ourselves" 

8.  Fourthly;  it  is  almost   superfluous  to  say  that  while 
moral  perfection  exhibits  an  adaptation  of  one's  spirit  to  the 


152  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XV. 

requirements  of  his  station,  it  does  not  consist  merely  in  a 
relation,  but  is  rather  that  condition  or  habit  upon  which 
the  relation  is  founded.  This  remark  refers  to  that  defini- 
tion which  makes  perfection  the  adjustment  of  one's  life  to 
one's  environment.  Plainly,  in  order  to  such  an  adjustment, 
the  life  must  have  a  given  character  and  be  exercised  in  a 
given  way.  When  a  man  is  a  good  neighbor,  he  not  only 
does  those  things  which  an  honest  friendship  suggests,  but 
has  also  a  heart  in  which  faithful  kindness  dwells;  so,  in 
general,  he  who  is  virtuous  is  not  only  rightly  related  to  others 
but  is  also  rightly  disposed  within. 

This  thought  may  be  expressed  by  saying  that  moral  per- 
fection is  an  inward  excellence  which  shows  itself  in  outward 
disposals  and  doings.  The  description  of  perfection  as  an 
adjustment  in  which  an  ideal  is  realized,  resembles  the  defi- 
tion  that  Tightness  is  conformity  to  the  moral  law.  As  that 
which  is  right  not  only  conforms  to  a  rule,  but,  yet  more,  par- 
ticipates in  the  nature  which  the  rule  sets  forth,  so  the  perfect, 
in  realizing  the  ideal,  embodies  in  itself  the  excellence  of  the 
ideal. 

9.  Again,  and  in  the  fifth  place,  it  is  not  essential  to  a 
theory  of  morals  that  the  conception  of  the  ultimate  aim 
should  be  simple  or  that  it  should  be  complex,  but  only  that  it 
should  be  intelligible  and  correct.  Were  the  question 
whether,  in  some  analysis  of  thought,  we  had  come  to  an  ulti- 
mate idea,  this  could  not  be  answered  affirmatively  unless  the 
idea  were  uncompounded.  But,  in  comparing  the  ends  of 
some  department  of  motivity,  that  aim  must  be  considered 
ultimate  which  imparts  the  common  character  to  all  the 
specific  ends — which  is  generic  to  the  others — whether  it 
be  an  absolutely  simple  idea  or  not.  For  of  two  cognate 
ends,  both  ultimate  to  the  practical  reason,  if  one  be  generic 
to  the  other,  it  is,  in  a  sense,  ulterior  to  the  other,  and 
therefore  preeminently  ultimate;  it  is  the  explanatory  end; 
and  as  such  ultimate  in  the  philosophy  of  motivity. 

Some  perfectionists  hold  that  this  ultimate  or  explanatory 
end  of  moral  life  is  simple.  Dr.  Hickok  says,  "  In  all  pos- 
sible cases  of  obligation  the  ultimate  right  vests  in  the  excel- 
lency of  rational  spirit  itself^  .  .  .  With  this  precise  intui- 
tion of  the  ultimate  right  it  is  important  that  we  apprehend 
some  of  the  attributes  which  it  possesses.  First,  it  is  simple. 
By  this  is  meant  that  it  is  wholly  uncompounded  and  thus 
incapable  of  any  analysis."  Then  he  adds  that  it  is  im- 


CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM.  153 

mutable  and  that  it  is  univ&rsal.  On  the  other  hand,  Pro- 
fessor Janet  says,  "  While  I  admit  that  perfection,  like  every 
other  primitive  idea,  is  very  difficult  to  define,  it  may  be 
explained  and  analyzed  in  such  a  way  as  to  remove  some  of 
the  indefiniteness  which  it  has  at  first."  He  then  describes 
perfection  as  composed  of  two  elements  "  (1)  an  activity 
whose  excellence  is  in  proportion  to  its  intensity;  (2)  the 
harmony,  or  agreement,  of  the  elements  or  parts  of  which  the 
being  is  composed."  Subsequent  discussions  lead  one  to 
interpret  this  vague  language  to  mean  that  moral  perfection 
is  the  activity  of  the  reason  controlling  the  powers  of  the 
spirit  and  correlating  their  operations.  The  perfection  thus 
produced  is  identified  with  a  kind  of  "  good/'  but  this  is  not 
"  good  "  in  the  ordinary  sense.  The  professor  calls  it  "  an 
absolute  good,  a  good  in  itself,  superior  to  all  relative  goods." 
Though  this  perfection,  or  that  excellence  which  approaches 
it,  is  the  most  prolific  cause  of  happiness  and  the  indispens- 
able source  of  lasting  felicity,  it  is  not  the  highest  form  of 
good  on  this  account ;  nor  is  it  to  be  sought  primarily  on  this 
account,  but  simply  because  of  its  own  nature  as  the  out- 
working of  absolute  and  eternal  reason.  (Compare  Chap  II.) 

Professor  Mackenzie  defines  perfection  more  simply  than 
Professor  Janet;  he  calls  it  self-realization.  But,  when  his 
explanations  are  considered,  we  find  that  Janet  and  Mackenzie 
hold  the  same  view.  For  the  self  to  be  realized  is  the  "  ra- 
tional or  higher  self,"  in  other  words,  one's  life  as  governed 
by  reason  and  as  connected  with  the  divine  and  universal  in 
man.  Professor  Bowne,  also,  speaks  of  the  end  as  self-realiza- 
tion ;  and  he  add  that  human  beings  have  no  determinate  con- 
ception of  it.  "  If,"  he  says,  "  the  moral  ideal  were  clearly 
defined  or  sharply  conceived,  the  ethical  problem  would  be  a 
simple  one:  and  it  is  conceivable  that  there  should  be  moral 
beings  for  whom  this  should  be  the  case.  .  .  .  Unfortunately 
this  is  not  the  case  with  men.  .  .  .  The  ideal  exists  in  any 
given  circumstances  chiefly  in  a  perception  of  the  direction  in 
which  human  worth  and  dignity  lie.  .  .  .  For  the  authority 
of  this  ideal  there  is  no  warrant  but  the  soul  itself." 

Such  definitions  as  those  above  considered  have  some  com- 
plexity, but  this  does  not  show  that  perfection  cannot  be  an 
ultimate  end.  Absolute  simplicity  is  not  necessary  to  an 
ultimate  end,  though  it  is  to  an  ultimate  idea. 

10.  In  the  sixth  place,  Perfectionism  cannot  be  justly  con- 
demned as  a  selfish  doctrine.  Aristotle  raises  a  question  bear- 


154  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XV. 

ing  on  this  point.  "  If,"  he  says,  "  a  man  should  seek  only 
to  acquire  justice,  wisdom,  or  some  other  virtue  ...  it 
would  be  impossible  to  call  him  an  egotist  and  to  blame  him. 
Nevertheless  is  he  not,  in  a  certain  sense,  more  egotistical 
than  other  men,  since  he  desires  for  himself  the  best  and  most 
beautiful  things,  and  since  he  enjoys  the  most  exalted  part 
of  his  being?  .  .  .  But  this  noble  egotism  is  as  much  super- 
ior to  common  egotism  as  reason  is  to  passion,  or  as  the  good 
is  to  the  merely  useful."  In  the  same  spirit  Janet  writes, 
"  If  we  understand  by  happiness,  not  pleasure  in  general,  but, 
like  Aristotle,  Des  Cartes  and  Leibnitz,  regard  it  as  the  feel- 
ing of  our  own  perfection  and  excellence,  it  is  clear  that  it  may 
be  an  end  for  us.  For  why  should  it  not  be  an  end  to  seek 
our  own  perfection?  And  how,  if  we  have  attained  it,  could 
we  help  enjoying  it?  " 

At  first  glance  these  statements  seem  tinged  with  the  doc- 
trine that  virtue  consists  in  seeking  our  own  excellence  for  the 
sake  of  our  own  happiness.  That,  however,  would  not  be  a  just 
judgment ;  certainly  not  in  the  case  of  Professor  Janet.  He 
would  say  that  a  good  man  seeks  justice,  wisdom,  temperance, 
charity  and  all  other  forms  of  moral  perfection,  simply  for 
their  own  sake,  for  their  own  excellence;  and  that  then,  after 
that,  finding  true  happiness  to  arise  from  these  virtues,  he  may 
properly  desire  them  on  that  account.  While  recognizing 
that  the  original  desire  for  perfection  must  relate  to  our  own 
virtue  the  professor  holds  that  this  is  free  from  self-love 
because  not  happiness  but  excellence  is  sought.  Janet  adds 
that  one  may  desire  the  virtue  of  others  and  strive  for  their 
perfection  as  well  as  for  his  own.  But  this  movement,  al- 
though in  one  sense  altruistic,  does  not  include  altruism  in 
the  ordinary  sense,  that  is,  a  desire  for  the  happiness  of  others. 
Both  our  own  virtue  and  that  of  others  are  to  be  sought  pri- 
marily for  their  own  sake  simply;  after  that,  and  in  addition 
to  that,  they  may  be  sought  from  self-love  and  from  benevo- 
lence. Such  is  Janet's  doctrine.  But  his  language  is  some- 
what rhetorical  when  he  says,  "  The  two  ideas  of  perfection 
and  of  happiness  .  .  .  are  really  but  one  and  the  same  idea 
considered  under  two  different  aspects/'  What  his  writings 
teach  is  that  moral  excellence  and  true  happiness  are  indis- 
solubly  united,  are  two  inseparable  developments  of  the  one 
virtuous  life. 

11.  The  strength  of  Perfectionism  lies  in  the  truth  that 
virtue  is  the  supreme  moral  end  and  in  the  consideration  that 


CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM.  155 

the  realization  of  this  end  would  secure  the  realization  of 
all  other  moral  ends.  In  these  positions  it  has  the  support 
of  common  sense.  The  weakness  of  this  doctrine  is  that 
its  fundamental  assertion  is  inconsistent  with  fact  and  even 
contains  within  itself  an  element  of  self-contradiction. 

We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  problem  before  us  is  not 
respecting  the  supreme  excellence  of  virtue  but  respecting  the 
essential  aim  of  moral  activity.  We  wish  to  know  what  is  the 
end  sought  for  in  all  dutiful  desire.  The  perfectionists  say 
that  the  end  is  excellence  of  being  or  of  character.  This 
answer  is  incorrect  if  there  are  other  aims  besides  inward 
perfection  that  are  right  and  obligatory.  Is  it  not  evident 
that  there  are?  Beyond  question  the  virtues  of  benevolence 
and  beneficence,  of  honesty,  veracity,  fidelity  and  justice, 
should  be  cultivated  as  excellencies  of  character,  but  do  not 
they  themselves  have  right  ends  of  their  own  other  than 
spiritual  perfection?  They  seek  to  help  the  needy  wisely,  to 
cherish  proper  regard  for  one's  neighbor,  to  pay  one's  debts, 
to  speak  the  truth,  to  observe  contracts,  to  give  to  every  man 
his  due ;  and,  in  every  case,  thev  may  be  exercised  without  any 
thought  of  one's  spiritual  improvement. 

12.  This  last  may  be  a  moral  end  of  superior  dignity  to  the 
others,  but  it  is  an  end  of  secondary  development.  It  is  an 
aim  which  could  not  come  into  existence  till  after  the  more 
primary  aims  were  appreciated  and  pursued;  nor  could  it 
continue  in  existence  if  the  primary  aims  were  to  be  aban- 
doned. To  cultivate  virtues,  if  there  were  no  virtues  to  culti- 
vate, would  be  an  absurdity.  To  cherish  moral  excellencies 
involves  that  moral  excellencies  can  exist,  each  with  its  own 
right  aim.  In  like  manner  to  seek  virtue  in  general  as  a 
right  end  involves  that  virtue  can  primarily  exist  as  the  dis- 
position  to  seek  and  do  what  is  right  and  obligatory. 

It  may  be  said  that  he  who  promotes  virtue  seeks  all  right 
ends;  since  virtue  ensures  the  fulfilment  of  the  law.  This, 
however,  is 'true  only  in  a  secondary  way,  because  the  promo- 
tion of  virtue  is  conditioned  on  the  direct  operation  of  specific 
virtues,  and  because  the  promoter  of  virtue  immediately  seeks 
not  the  primary  ends  but  only  those  dispositions  which  im- 
mediately seek  them.  The  dutiful  seeking  of  virtue  there- 
fore is  not  only  consistent  with  the  existence  of  other  right 
ends  than  virtue,  but  assumes  the  existence  of  them. 

There  are  other  forms  of  material  wealth  than  money. 
Yet,  because  money  is  easily  exchangeable  for  diverse  worldly 


156  ?8E  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XX. 

goods,  "  the  making  of  money  "  is  sometimes  identified  with 
the  acquisition  of  riches.  This  does  not  mean  that  money 
is  the  only  form  of  wealth ;  there  are  other  and  more  directly 
enjoyable  valuables  than  money.  In  a  somewhat  similar 
manner  moral  excellence  is  not  the  only  right  end. 

13.  Let  us  now,  digressing  a  little  from  our  main  conten- 
tion, contemplate  spiritual  excellence  as  a  moral  end,  and 
let  us  inquire  whether  perfection  ethics  gives  any  satisfactory 
explanation  of  what  this  end  is. 

Perfection  in  general  is  the  highest  excellence  of  which  the 
nature  of  a  thing  admits.  Excellence  is  that  quality  whereby 
an  object  is  highly  fitted  to  gratify  some  desire  natural  to 
rational  beings  or  to  yield  some  natural  satisfaction  to  such 
beings.  Wealth,  power,  truth,  beauty,  order,  law,  peace,  com- 
fort, friendship,  love,  are  excellent  things.  The  goodness  or 
excellence  of  material  things  exists,  not  in  themselves  alone, 
but  in  their  adaptation  in  some  way  to  the  nature  and  needs 
of  spirit.  We  are  now  concerned  with  moral  perfection. 
What  can  this  be  but  the  complete  adaptation  of  a  person  to 
seek  the  ends  and  to  realize  the  requirements  of  moral  life? 
A  man  would  be  morally  perfect  if  he  wholly  desired  and 
wholly  accomplished  all  things  that  are  right  and  dutiful. 
This  statement  seems  plain  enough.  But  it  is  not  satisfactory 
to  the  perfectionists. 

And  it  is  not  possible  for  them,  because  they  define  the 
Tightness  of  conduct  from  the  relation  of  conduct  to  inward 
perfection  and  do  not  define  the  inward  perfection  by  its  rela- 
tion to  right  conduct.  They  say  that  perfection  is  a  combi- 
nation of  activity  with  harmony — the  realization  of  the  true 
self — a  conformity  to  the  type,  model  or  standard  of  human- 
ity— the  development  of  personality — that  worth  which  ren- 
ders the  soul  fit  for  moral  approbation — a  participation  in 
the  Thought,  the  Idea,  the  Essence,  the  Unity,  which  exists 
in  Nature — the  conjunction  or  union  of  one's  being  with  the 
Absolute,  the  Eternal,  the  Divine.  For  us  these  fine  phrases, 
and  others  like  them,  are  valueless  as  definitions.  Some  of 
them  may  indicate  a  direction  in  which  the  nature  of  moral 
excellence  is  to  be  discovered,  but  none  of  them  give  any 
clear  idea  of  what  moral  excellence  is.  As  definitions  they 
are  philosophical  vacuities. 

Moreover,  being  coupled  with  the  doctrine  that  perfection 
is  immediately  perceived  as  an  attribute  of  the  essence  of  the 
soul,  and  is  primarily  understood  apart  from  the  consideration 


CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM.  157 

of  right  doing,  these  statements  prohibit  one  from  attempting 
any  definition  of  a  less  metaphysical  character. 

The  best  of  the  definitions  quoted  is  that  of  President 
Hickok,  who  says  that  the  right  end  to  be  sought  is  "  worthi- 
ness of  spiritual  approbation."  This  points  in  the  true  direc- 
tion,, because  nothing  but  moral  excellence  has  spiritual 
worthiness.  Desert  of  approbation,  however,  is  a  property — 
it  is  not  the  essence — of  moral  perfection.  That  essence  is 
to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it  is  the  nature  of  the  perfect 
man  to  desire  and  to  do  those  things  which  are  right  and  good. 
But  Dr.  Hickok  forbids  this  conception  of  perfection.  He 
says,  "  In  all  possible  cases  of  obligation  the  ultimate  right 
vests  in  the  excellency  of  the  rational  spirit  itself." 

14.  Here,  also,  let  us  consider  an  error  into  which  those 
naturally  fall  who  make  perfection  the  ultimate  aim  of 
morality.  They  identify  the  sense  of  right  and  duty  with  the 
sense  of  moral  worth  and  dignity.  Janet  says,  "  The  Scotch 
philosopher  Hutcheson,  who  maintained  the  doctrine  of  the 
moral  sense,  recognized  also  another  sense  which  he  called  the 
sense  of  dignity,  and  which  he  distinguished  from  the  former. 
It  is  this  sense  according  to  him  by  which  we  recognize  the 
decency  or  dignity  of  actions.  In  my  view  the  moral  sense 
is  identical  with  the  sense  of  dignity."  Probably  Hutcheson 
(the  able  founder  of  Scotch  philosophy)  would  not  deny  that 
the  appreciation  of  a  kind  of  dignity  and  worth  is  a  frequent 
product  of  the  moral  faculty,  but  doubtless  he  would  distin- 
guish this  from  that  exercise  of  the  moral  sense  in  which 
right  and  wrong  are  apprehended. 

The  practical,  as  opposed  to  the  merely  speculative,  reason 
has  two  forms,  the  non-moral  and  the  moral,  and  each  of 
these,  in  addition  to  its  intellectual  action,  has  two  develop- 
ments,  the  motive  and  the  sensitive.  Non-moral  reason,  as 
motive,  conceives-  of  interests  and  ordinary  forms  of  welfare 
and  pursues  these  according  to  methods  of  its  own  discovery 
and  device.  And  this  same  reason,  as  sensitive,  not  only 
approves  of  what  is  good  and  valuable  and  feels  its  worth,  but 
also  exercises  respect  for  personal  beings  as  capable  of  good 
or  as  the  actual  or  possible  agents  of  good.  Thus  there  arises 
a  non-moral  sense  of  dignity,  a  natural  respect  for  things  as 
important  and  for  persons  -so  far  as  they  are  identified  with 
the  desirable  and  good.  In  like  manner  the  moral  reason,  as 
motive,  contemplates  and  seeks  those  things  which  are  right 
and  good  in  the  most  absolute  sense.  In  this  exercise  of 


158  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XV. 

reason  all  virtue  dwells.  And  this  same  moral  reason, 
as  sensitive,  not  only  approves  of  things  right  and  good 
as  worthy  of  esteem,  but  also  originates  .feelings  of  appro- 
bation regarding  the  character  and  life  of  men  as  virtuous 
and  as  vicious.  The  sense  of  dignity  and  worth  thus  aris- 
ing is  moral  because  it  is  an  exercise  of  the  moral  faculty  as 
sensitive,  and  because  it  is  directed  towards  things  as  right  or 
wrong,  and  towards  persons  as  moral  agents.  Yet  it  is  not 
virtuous  per  se;  it  becomes  virtuous  as  controlled  by  and 
united  with  the  motive  action  of  the  moral  sense.  For  the 
very  essence  of  virtue  is  to  desire  that  which  is  right  and 
good.  If  all  this  be  so,  it  is  clear  that  the  sense  of  dignity 
is  a  kind  of  adjunct  to  that  which  is  commonly  known  as  the 
moral  sense. 

15.  In  summing  up  let  us  say  that  spiritual  perfection  is 
a  moral  end,  but  that  it  cannot  be  the  ultimate  moral  end 
because  any  satisfactory  definition  of  it  presupposes  other 
moral  ends  on  which  it  is  conditioned.  In  order  to  define 
virtue  or  spiritual  excellence  in -general,  we  should  adopt  the 
method  of  Socrates,  who  determined  the  nature  of  any  single 
virtue  by  considering  individual  cases  and  specific  forms  of 
it.  We  must  compare  different  moral  perfections  so  that 
their  common  character  may  be  ascertained.  In  this  way  we 
may  form  a  correct  conception  of  that  general  and  compre- 
hensive virtue,  which — though  it  is  not,  philosophically 
speaking,  the  ultimate  end  of  morality — is  yet  the  supreme 
good,  the  summum  bonum,  of  rational  existence.  For,  as 
Des  Cartes  says,  "  The  supreme  good  consists  in  the  exercise 
of  virtue,  or,  what  is  equivalent  to  the  same  thing,  in  the 
possession  of  all  the  perfections  whose  acquisition  depends 
on  our  free-will." 

What,  then,  are  moral  perfections  but  honesty,  veracity, 
beneficence,  charity,  justice,  temperance,  industry,  prudence, 
purity,  loyalty,  reverence,  piety,  each  of  which  has  for  its 
immediate  and  proper  aim  the  realization  of  some  form  of 
right  and  duty?  Such  being  the  case,  virtue  in  general  is 
that  disposition  which  loves  and  seeks  every  form  of  the 
right  and  good.  But  this  statement  presupposes  right  ends 
as  the  conditions  of  virtue;  which  thereafter  becomes  the  su- 
preme right  end. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  foregoing  definition  of  virtue  will 
be  lacking  in  completeness  unless  it  be  made  clear  wherein 
that  Tightness  consists  on  account  of  which  the  specific  aims 


CHAP.  XV.]  PERFECTIONISM. 

of  duty  are  attractive  and  obligatory.  This  may  be  conceded. 
Exhaustive  ethical  inquiry  should  either  establish  the  abso- 
lute simplicity  of  the  idea  of  moral  lightness  or  should  fur- 
nish an  analytical  definition  of  it.  We  shall  endeavor  to  give 
such  a  definition  at  the  proper  time.  But  even  if  this  at- 
tempt should  fail,  it  would  still  be  true  that  spiritual  perfec- 
tion is  not  the  essential  and  universal  end  of  morality. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

MOTIVITY  ETHICS. 

1.  Motivity  and  Perfection  ethics  may  be  classed  together  as  sub- 
jective systems. — 2.  Motivity  Ethics  includes  Butlerism  and 
Edvardianism,  the  former  advocated  of  late  by  Martineau,  the 
latter  by  Hopkins.  Butler  quoted. — 3.  Martineau's  doctrine 
stated  and  discussed,  especially  his  view  of  moral  Tightness  and 
of  the  functions  of  the  moral  reason.— 4.  Hopkins  adopts  the 
Edvardian  definition  of  "  moral  love  "  ;  it  is  supreme  regard  for 
the  happiness  of  beings.  Hopkins  and  Martineau  compared. — 5. 
Motivity  ethics  is  more  intelligible  and  defensible  than  Perfection 
ethics. — 6.  But  its  conception  of  duty  is  too  exclusively  subject- 
ive.— 7.  It  does  not  recognize  the  motive  power  of  the  moral 
reason. — 8.  It  incorrectly  explains  the  function  of  that  reason. 
—9.  And  it  is  confused  in  its  teachings  concerning  moral  right- 
ness. — 10.  Professors  Seth  and  Muirhead  criticized. 

1.  IT  may  be  assumed  that  every  earnest  student  of  phil- 
osophical questions  sees  something  of  the  truth,  and  that  no 
doctrine  which  has  commended  itself  to  many  thinkers  can 
be  devoid  of  value.  Believing  this  to  be  so  we  should  en- 
deavor to  ascertain  the  points  of  excellence  in  every  hypoth- 
esis, and  should  use  these  in  the  upbuilding  of  our  own 
belief.  Such  a  course  is  more  pleasant  and  more  profitable 
than  one  which  aims  chiefly  at  the  exposure  of  error.  But 
even  were  one  bent  on  the .  refutation  of  a  mistaken  theory, 
he  could  not  serve  his  purpose  better  than  by  showing  wherein, 
and  how  far,  it  may  conform  to  fact  and  reason.  In  this 
way  the  falsely  assumed  principle  of  the  theory  can  be  sepa- 
rated from  those  verities  upon  which  the  falsehood  rests  for 
acceptance,  and  can  be  presented  in  its  own  insufficiency.  We 
may  add  that  the  controversial  spirit,  whose  whole  effort  is 
to  discover  defects  and  inconsistencies,  contributes  very  little 
to  philosophical  progress. 

The  perfection  ethics,  which  we  have  discussed,  and  the 
motivity  ethics  which  we  are  about  to  discuss,  may  be  classed 
160 


CHAP.  XVI.J  MOTIVITY  ETHICS. 

together  as  subjective  systems,  because  both  direct  moral  effort 
towards  something  in  the  agent  himself,  while  utilitarianism 
and  the  systems  which  make  either  obedience  to  authority  or 
devotion  to  right  and  duty  the  essence  of  morality,  might  be 
called  objective  since  part  of  their  aim,  at  least,  is  outside 
of  the  subject,  or  moral  agent.  Perfection  ethics,  however, 
is,  in  a  way,  more  subjective  than  motivity  ethics,  inasmuch 
as  the  former  declares  the  end  of  duty  to  be  the  realization  of 
a  character  which  is  to  find  expression  in  active  duty,  while 
the  latter  asserts  that  the  end  is  the  regulated  exercise  of  the 
desires,  and  that  the  office  of  conscience  or  the  moral  reason 
is  to  provide  that  regulation.  Moreover,  motivity  ethics 
regards  our  internal  dispositions  not  simply  as  perfections 
to  be  cherished  on  their  own  account,  but  as  activities  seeking 
ends  external  to  the  agent.  Thus  President  Hopkins,  reject- 
ing President  Hickok's  doctrine  respecting  "  worthiness  of 
spiritual  approbation/'  says,  "  Man  was  not  made  to  find 
the  ultimate  ground  of  his  action  in  any  subjective  state  of 
his  own  of  whatever  kind.  He  was  made  to  promote  the 
good  of  others  as  well  as  his  own;  and  the  apprehension  of 
that  good  furnishes  an  immediate  ground  of  obligation  to 
promote  it."  At  the  same  time  Hopkins  makes  the  im- 
mediate end  of  all  duty  to  be  the  subjection  of  one's  affec- 
tions and  desires  to  the  control  of  "  rational  love  " ;  so  that 
his  system  is  subjective. 

2.  Two  forms  of  motivity  ethics  are  to  be  distinguished. 
According  to  one  of  these  Conscience,  according  to  the  other 
Love,  is  the  prominent  and  formative  element  of  moral  life. 
The  first  of  these  modes  of  doctrine  might  be  designated 
"  Butlerism,"  because  of  its  advocacy  by  Bishop  Joseph  But- 
ler, the  author  of  "  The  Analogy  of  Keligion,  Natural  and  Ee- 
vealed,  to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature/'  In  certain 
sermons  and  essays  Butler  asserted  the  legal  supremacy  of 
conscience  over  all  our  other  motive  principles.  A  low  Epicu- 
rean morality  prevailed  in  his  day ;  the  theory  was  advocated 
that  man  is  essentially  a  selfish  being.  Butler  contended  that 
benevolence,  no  less  than  self-love,  is  an  inherent  part  of  hu- 
man nature.  He  taught  that  man  has  "  an  inward  frame,  .  .  . 
a  system  or  constitution,  whose  several  parts  are  united,  not 
by  a  physical  principle  of  individuation,  but  by  the  respects 
they  have  to  each  other,  the  chief  of  which  is  the  subjection 
which  the  appetites,  passions  and  particular  affections  have 
to  the  one  supreme  principle  of  reflection  or  conscience."  By 
ii 


162  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 

this  principle  every  man  "  distinguishes  between  the  internal 
principles  of  his  heart  as  well  as  his  external  actions.  This 
principle,,  by  which  we  survey  and  either  approve  or  disap- 
prove our  own  heart  temper  and  actions,  is  not  only  to  be 
considered  as  what  is,  in  its  turn,  to  have  some  influence 
(which  may  be  said  of  every  passion,  of  the  lowest  appetites) 
but  likewise  as  being  superior,  as,  from  its  very  nature,  mani- 
festly claiming  superiority  over  all  others ;  insomuch  that  you 
cannot  form  a  notion  of  this  faculty,  conscience,  without  tak- 
ing in  judgment,  direction,  superintendency.  This  is  a  con- 
stituent part  of  the  idea,  that  is,  of  the  faculty  itself ;  and  to 
preside  and  govern,  from  the  very  -economy  and  constitution 
of  man,  belongs  to  it.  Had  it  strength  as  it  has  right — had  it 
power  as  it  has  manifest  authority — it  would  absolutely  gov- 
ern the  world."  (Sermon  II.) 

Thus  Butler,  appealing  to  common  sense,  and  using  the 
dogmatic  or  intuitional  method,  lays  down,  as  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  ethics,  the  supremacy  of  conscience  over  all  our  pas- 
sions and  affections.  His  aim,  however,  was  more  practical 
than  theoretical. 

3.  In  our  own  day  Dr.  James  Martineau,  a  good  man,  who 
has  just  died,  full  of  years  and  full  of  honors,  has  more  thor- 
oughly developed  the  doctrine  of  a  subjectively  directed  moral 
aim.  The  system  advocated  in  his  "  Types  of  Ethical  The- 
ory "  is  based  on  several  characteristic  positions. 

First,  having  premised  that  "the  broad  fact  of  which  we 
have  to  find  the  interpretation  is  this;  that,  distinctively  as 
men,  we  have  an  irresistible  tendency  to  approve  and  disap- 
prove, to  pass  judgment  of  right  and  wrong,"  he  says,  "  What 
we  judge  is  always  the  inner  spring  of  action  as  distinguished 
from  its  outer  operation"  On  a  subsequent  page  he  re- 
peats this  statement,  saying,  "  That  in  which  we  discern  the 
moral  quality  is  the  inner  spring  of  action.  And,  at  the  close 
of  his  explanations,  he  recapitulates  as  follows :  "  This  com- 
pletes what  I  have  to  say  about  the  objects  of  our  moral  judg- 
ment. They  are  originally  our  own  inner  principles  of  self- 
conscious  activity  as  freely  preferred  or  excluded  by  our  will." 
Dr.  Martineau,  as  might  be  expected,  rejects  the  opinion  of 
Professor  Sidgwick  that,  "both  in  the  individual  and  in  the 
race,  moral  judgments  are  first  passed  on  the  outward  acts, 
and  that  motives  do  not  come  to  be  considered  till  later ;  just 
as  external  perceptions  of  physical  objects  precede  introspec- 
tion." Martineau's  doctrine  may  also  be  contrasted  with  that 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MQTIVITY  ETHICS.  163 

of  Whewell,  who  says,  "Kightness  and  wrongness  are  the 
moral  qualities  of  actions." 

Secondly,  Dr.  Martineau  teaches  that  reason  obtains  the 
law  of  moral  conduct  by  intuitively  apprehending  the  rela- 
tive worth  of  "  the  springs  of  action"  "  Immediately  on  the 
juxtaposition  of  impulses,"  he  says,  "  we  intuitively  discern 
the  higher  quality  of  one  than  another,  giving  it  a  divine  and 
authoritative  preference.  .  .  .  We  are  now  prepared  for  an 
exact  definition  of  right  and  wrong:  every  action  is  RIGHT 
which  in  presence  of  a  lower  principle,  follows  a  higher;  every 
action  is  WRONG  which  in  presence  of  a  higher  principle  fol- 
lows a  lower.  Thus  the  act  attributed  to  Kegulus,  in  returning 
back  to  death  at  Carthage,  was  right  because  the  reverence  for 
veracity  whence  it  sprung  is  a  higher  principle  than  any  fear 
or  personal  affection  which  might  have  suggested  a  different 
course,  and  which  we  tacitly  conceive  as  competing  with  the 
former.  And  the  act  of  St.  Peter  in  denying  Christ  was 
wrong,  because  the  fear  to  which  he  yielded  was  lower  than  the 
personal  affection  and  reverence  for  truth  which  he  dis- 
obeyed." 

Thirdly,  Prof.  Martineau  tabulates  principles  of  action  ac- 
cording to  the  order  of  their  excellence,  and  claims  that  our 
moral  judgments  naturally  support  such  an  arrangement. 
"  The  whole  ground  of  ethical  procedure,"  he  declares,  "  con- 
sists in  this :  that  we  are  sensible  of  a  graduated  scale  of  ex- 
cellence among  our  natural  principles,  quite  distinct  from  the 
order  of  their  intensity  and  irrespective  of  the  range  of  their 
external  effects."  His  table  of  springs  of  action,  from  the  low- 
est to  the  highest,  is  as  follows:  (1)  Censoriousness,  vindic- 
tiveness,  suspiciousness ;  (2)  Love  of  ease  and  sensual  pleas- 
ure; (3)  Appetites;  (4)  Spontaneous  (animal)  activity;  (5) 
Love  of  gain;  (6)  Sentimentally  sympathetic  feelings;  (7) 
Antipathy,  fear,  resentment;  (8)  Love  of  power,  or  ambition; 
Love  of  liberty;  (9)  Love  of  culture;  (10)  Wonder  and  ad- 
miration; (11)  Parental  and  social  affections;  generosity; 
gratitude;  (12)  Compassion;  (13)  Keverence. 

Fourthly,  as  corollary  to  the  foregoing,  Martineau  holds 
that  moral  judgment  and  action  cannot  talce  place  till  at  least 
two  springs  of  action  compete  with  each  other.  For  then  only 
the  conscience  can  decide  that  one  principle  is  superior  to  an- 
other. Moral  Tightness  lies  in  that  superiority  as  appealing 
to  the  rational  agent;  moral  wrongness  in  the  opposition  of 
the  lower  to  the  higher  principle.  He  says,  "  All  our  moral 


164:  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 


ients  are  preferential ;  two  terms  must  always  be  present 
as  the  objects  of  the  comparison.  ...  It  is  not  till  two  in- 
compatible impulses  appear  in  our  consciousness  and  contest 
the  field,  that  we  are  made  aware  of  their  difference  and  made 
to  judge  between  them.  But  the  moment  this  condition  is 
realized,  we  are  sensible  of  a  contrast  between  them  other  than 
that  of  mere  intensity  or  of  qualitative  variety,  .  .  .  that  one 
is  higher,  worthier,  than  the  other,  and,  in  comparison  with 
it,  has  the  clear  right  to  us.  This  apprehension  is  no  mediate 
discovery  of  ours  of  which  we  can  give  an  account ;  but  is  im- 
mediately inherent  in  the  very  experience  of  the  principles 
themselves.  .  .  .  By  simply  entering  the  stage  together  and 
catching  the  inner  eye,  they  disclose  their  respective  worth  and 
credentials.  .  .  .  There  is  no  analysis  or  research  required ;  it 
is  a  choice  of  Hercules,  only  without  the  reasoning  and  the 
rhetoric;  their  claims  are  decided  by  a  glance.  We  cannot 
follow  both;  and  we  cannot  doubt  the  rights  and  place  of 
either.  Their  moral  valuation  results  from  their  simul- 
taneous appearance." 

In  the  fifth  place,  the  function  of  reason,  or  conscience,  as 
understood  by  Martineau,  is  partly  presented  in  his  assertion 
fe I  do  not  admit  reason  to  be  a  spring  of  action  at  all"  But 
to  understand  this  denial  we  must  consider  the  following  ex- 
planation: "By  springs  of  action  (in  the  exact  sense  required 
for  theory)  I  mean  an  impulse  towards  any  unselected  form 
of  activity,  that  is,  any  which  might  instinctively  arise 
though  there  were  no  other  possible  to  the  same  nature,  or, 
at  all  events,  present  at  the  same  time."  So  conscience  or  the 
moral  reason,  according  to  Martineau,  is  not  an  original 
spring  of  action.  Yet  this  faculty  is  not  wholly  denied  motive 
influence,  for  it  urges  the  person  to  choose  the  better  motivity 
and  its  end.  The  professor  says,  "  Throw  the  two  springs 
together;  here  steps  in  a  new  factor  which  gets  rid  of  sus- 
pense and  gives  the  act  its  determinate  direction.  What  are 
we  to  call  this  intruder?  Is  it  a  third  spring?  Does  it  earn 
that  name  by  possessing  the  defining  characteristics  of  the 
other  two  ?  Not  so ;  for  each  of  them  is  unconditioned  by  the 
presence  of  the  other,  whereas  here  is  something  impossible 
without  them  both.  They  have  no  selective  function;  it  has 
nothing  else.  They  are  blind  to  their  own  resulting  experi- 
ences ;  it  consists  in  seeing  and  measuring  them.  It  is,  there- 
fore, not  a  fresh  impulse  but  a  preference  between  two  given 
ones."  In  one  of  his  discussions  (Vol.  II.,  page  227)  Mar- 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MOTIVITY  ETHICS.  165 

tineau  makes  conscience  a  mere  faculty  of  judgment  without 
any  motive  force,  but  this  position  becomes  a  mere  verbal  one 
when  united  with  the  subsequent  teaching  that  moral  reason 
gives  rise  to  reverence  or  the  love  of  right.  The  actual  doc- 
trine of  Professor  Martineau  is  that  conscience  is  not  an  in- 
dependent, but  only  a  preferential,  spring  of  action. 

But  while  reason  exerts  an  influence,  we  are  told  that  the 
choice  of  one  mode  of  activity  in  preference  to  another  is  de- 
termined neither  by  the  reason,  nor  by  the  more  primary 
springs  of  action,  nor  by  their  joint  operation,  but  by  the  per- 
sonality or  the  will.  The  springs  of  action  occupy  places,  as 
it  were,  in  front  of  the  will,  each  with  its  own  solicitation  or 
insistence ;  reason  stands  behind  the  will,  and  gives  wise  coun- 
sel; but  the  determination  to  one  course  or  to  another  comes 
from  the  "  personality."  Martineau  says,  "  Moral  judgment 
postulates  moral  freedom.  By  this  we  mean  not  the  absence 
of  foreign  constraint  but  the  presence  of  a  personal  power  of 
preference  in  relation  to  the  inner  suggestions  and  springs  of 
action  that  present  their  claims.  .  .  .  Either  free-will  is  a 
fact  or  moral  judgment  is  a  delusion.  .  .  .  We  evidently  feel 
the  solicitations  which  visit  us  to  be  mere  phenomena  brought 
before  a  personality  that  is  more  than  a  phenomenon — a  fair 
and  judicial  ego  able  to  deal  with  the  problem  offered  and 
decide  between  the  claimants  that  have  entered  our  court." 

Such  a  teaching  regarding  freedom  is  not  peculiar  to  mo- 
tivity  ethics;  indeed  the  doctrine  of  the  voluntary  self-deter- 
mination, or  free-agency,  of  rational  beings  belongs  to  all 
ethics.  But  the  limitation  of  the  function  of  reason  to  that  of 
a  judge  between  contending  motivities  is  a  distinctive  charac- 
teristic of  the  system  now  considered. 

Another  noticeable  feature  of  the  motivity  school  is  that  it 
identifies  the  Tightness  of  an  action  with  its  moral  worth  or 
dignity.  Dr.  Martineau  writes :  "  In  treating  as  ultimate 
and  essential  the  attribute  which  these  words  designate — duti- 
fulness,  Tightness,  morality — I  support  myself  on  the  judg- 
ment of  Professor  Sidgwick,  who  regards  it  '  as  a  clear  result 
of  reflection  that  the  notions  of  right  and  wrong,  as  peculiar 
to  moral  cognition,  are  unique  and  unanalyzable' " ;  then  he 
adds,  "  Of  the  several  words  available  for  naming  this  qual- 
ity, moral  worth  seems  the  most  eligible."  No  distinction  is 
made  in  Martineau's  writings  between  a  right  action  and  a 
virtuous  one,  or  between  a  wrong  action  and  one  that  is 
wicked  and  blameworthy.  According  to  him  an  action  is 


166  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 

right  or  wrong,  worthy  or  unworthy,  as  proceeding  from  a 
virtuous  or  from  a  vicious  animus  in  the  personal  agent. 

4.  The  second  phase  of  motivity  ethics  makes  Love  the  all- 
controlling  duty.  It  might  be  called  Edvardianism,  because 
Jonathan  Edwards,  the  distinguished  New  England  divine, 
brought  it  into  prominence.  His  "  Treatise  on  the  Nature 
of  Virtue"  teaches  that  the  essence  of  virtue  and  duty  con- 
sists in  the  love  of  Being  according  to  the  degree  of  its  capac- 
ity and  worthiness  of  good.  This  love,  however,  is  more  than 
sentimental  good-will  or  affection;  it  is  the  wisely  exercised 
desire  for  the  happiness  of  sentient  existences.  Moreover,  it 
includes  a  desire  for  one's  own  happiness  as  well  as  for  that 
of  others.  "  A  man,"  says  Edwards,  "  may  love  himself  as 
much  as  one  can,  and  may  be  in  the  exercise  of  a  high  degree 
of  love  to  his  own  happiness,  ceaselessly  longing  for  it,  and 
yet  he  may  so  place  that  happiness  that,  in  the  very  act  of 
seeking  for  it,  he  may  be  in  the  highest  exercise  of  love  to 
God;  as,  for  example,  when  the  happiness  that  he  longs  for 
is  to  glorify  God  or  to  behold  his  glory  or  to  hold  com- 
muion  with  him."  Edwards  teaches  also  that,  because  God 
is  the  greatest  and  best  of  spirits,  "  the  divine  virtue,  or  the 
virtue  of  the  divine  mind,  must  consist  principally  of  love 
to  himself."  This  self-love  of  God  is  consistent  with  an  in- 
finite love  for  his  creatures,  and  with  an  especial  love  for 
those  who,  like  himself,  are  rational  and  righteous.  Only 
hopeless  and  perverse  depravity  forfeits  the  divine  good-will. 

The  ideas  of  Edwards  have  widely  influenced  New  England 
thought.  Of  late  years  they  have  been  developed  by  President 
Mark  Hopkins  of  Williams  College.  In  his  treatise,  "  The 
Law  of  Love  and  Love  as  a  Law,"  Hopkins  says :  "  The  law 
of  love  and  of  obligation  or  duty  are  coincident.  The  reason 
is  that  love  is  that  which  the  law  requires  and  with  which,  if 
love  be  perfect,  it  is  satisfied."  The  first  part  of  the  book 
presents  a  theory  of  morals  as  "  the  law  of  love  " ;  the  second 
part,  "  love  as  a  law,"  discusses  the  rules  of  morality  under 
love  as  the  universal  principle.  The  statement  that  love  "  is 
that  which  the  law  requires  "  does  not  mean  that  love  is  the 
only  requirement  of  duty,  but  that  it  is  the  supreme  require- 
ment to  which  all  others  are  subordinate  and  ministerial,  and 
from  which  all  others  derive  their  moral  character.  Love  is 
the  principle  by  which  all  motive  life  is  to  be  regulated.  We 
are,  indeed,  to  obey  reason  and  duty,  but  reason  affirms  that 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MOTIVITY  ETHICS.  167 

the  fundamental  and  all-pervading  duty  is  to  conform  our- 
selves to  the  law  of  love. 

With  the  exception  of  this  teaching  respecting  love,  the 
ideas  of  Hopkins  closely  conform  to  those  of  Martineau,  as 
will  be  evident  from  the  following  statements  taken  here 
and  there  from  the  book  of  President  Hopkins.  He  says, 
"  Obligation  is  primarily  obligation  to  choose  and  it  always 
demands  the  choice  of  the  higher  principle  of  action  and  of 
the  higher  good. — Obligation  is  primarily  obligation  to 
choose,  and  choice  must  always  be  between  two  objects  re- 
garded as  good,  or  between  two  principles  of  action  regaided 
as  productive  of  a  good. — The  law  of  obligation  respects  prin- 
ciples of  action  as  higher  and  lower,  and  good  as  varying  in 
its  quality  and  as  greater  or  less.  Its  precept  is,  '  Choose  for 
yourselves  and  for  others  the  higher  principle  of  action  and 
the  nobler  and  greater  good.'  These,  taken  together,  are  the 
moral  law  as  derived  from  the  moral  nature.  .  .  .  When 
moral  law,  in  either  form  of  it  as  presented  above,  is  placed 
before  an  unperverted  moral  being  capable  of  understanding 
ir,  obligation  to  obey  it  is  intuitively  and  necessarily  affirmed. 
The  moral  nature,  as  affirming  obligation,  is  not  an  active 
principle  having  its  own  object,  but  it  acts  directly  upon 
the  will,  or  rather  upon  the  man  himself,  to  determine  him 
in  his  choice  between  two  or  more  active  principles  or  ends. 
If  there  were  not  principles  of  action  besides  itself  between 
which  the  man  might  choose,  the  conscience  would  have  no 
scope. — No  action  can  have  moral  quality  in  itself.  The  only 
meaning  that  can  be  attached  to  that  phraseology  is  that  the 
person  doing  the  act  is  praiseworthy  or  blameworthy.  .  .  . 
Not  in  the  action,  but  in  the  doer  of  it,  do  we  find  moral 
quality,  and  him  it  is  that  we  reward  and  punish.  In  him  we 
find  righteousness  or  unrighteousness,  goodness  or  wicked- 
ness/' Elsewhere — in  a  letter  to  Dr.  McCosh — Dr.  Hopkins 
denies  that  "  the  moral  quality  of  an  action  can  be  its  end," 
that  is,  its  designed  result,  "  or  that  the  quality  of  an  action 
may  be  the  ground  of  obligation  to  do  that  action."  In  other 
words,  the  only  moral  quality  of  actions  comes  from  the  ani- 
mus in  which  they  originate  and  is  identical  with  the  right- 
eousness or  unrighteousness  of  the  agent. 

Evidently  Hopkins,  as  well  as  Martineau,  advocates  mo- 
tivity  ethics.  The  former,  indeed,  more  decidedly  than  the 
latter,  allows  -that  duty  may  take  the  form  of  obligation  to 
choose  the  higher  good  instead  of  the  form  of  obligation  to 


168  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 

choose  the  higher  principle  of  action.  If  this  means  that 
the  moral  agent  can  choose  good  simply  without  choosing 
the  principle  within  him  that  seeks  it,  then  the  theory  of 
Hopkins  would  not  be  purely  subjective,  but  partly  objec- 
tive. In  this  case  the  teachings  of  Hopkins  and  Sidgwick 
would  intersect  each  other  and  extend  over  a  common  utili- 
tarian ground.  For,  though  utilitarianism  is  objective, 
Sidgwick  says,  "  The  question  of  duty  is  never  raised  except 
when  we  are  conscious  of  a  conflict  of  impulses  and  wish  to 
know  which  to  follow."  Probably,  however,  Hopkins  would 
hold  that  the  choice  of  the  higher  good  and  of  the  higher 
principle  of  action  are  inseparable,  and  that,  in  morals  at 
least,  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  In  the  closing  part 
of  his  discussion,  in  a  chapter  concerning  "  Alternatives  and 
Law,"  he  gives  a  table  of  active  principles  like  that  of  Mar- 
ti neau  and  places  all  duty  in  choosing  between  such  prin- 
ciples. 

The  only  important  difference  between  these  authors  re- 
lates to  the  law  according  to  which  reason  seeks  to  regulate 
the  action  of  our  motivities.  Martineau  derives  it  from  an 
immediate  intuition  of  their  relative  worth  as  compared  with 
each  other;  Hopkins  from  an  intuition  of  their  worthiness  as 
related  to  love,  the  supreme  principle.  This  love,  however, 
is  that  mentioned  by  President  Edwards,  and  is  more  intel- 
lectually comprehensive  than  intelligent  affection,  or  even 
than  ordinary  benevolence.  It  is  "  the  choice  of  the  good  of 
conscious  being  impartially  and  for  its  own  sake."  As  such 
it  "includes  self-love  as  well  as  love  to  others."  This  wise 
love  calls  upon  each  motivity  to  operate  only  in  the  service  of 
"  the  good  of  conscious  being  " ;  thus  it  becomes  the  supreme 
law  of  morals. 

M.artineau  gives  reverence  the  same  position  that  Hopkins 
/  gives  to  love.  He  defines  reverence  as  "  the  love  of  right  or 
>-of  virtue,"  highly  developed ;  and  he  places  it  at  "  the  very 
apex  of  human  motives."  At  first  the  action  of  the  reason,  in 
deciding  between  two  motivities,  is  "judicial,  not  dynamic, 
not  executive;  to  find  the  motive  (i.e.,  the  motivity)  you 
must  go  to  the  impulses  on  which  the  conscience  pronounces ; 
to  find  the  determining  agent  you  must  go  to  the  subsequent 
will."  But,  as  the  mind  becomes  accustomed  to  the  order  of 
preference  assigned  to  the  principles  of  action,  and  admires 
those  beings  by  whom  that  order  is  observed,  the  love  of  right 
or  virtue  arises ;  this  is  reverence.  "  For,"  says  Martineau, 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MOTIVITY  ETHICS. 

"reverence  is  nothing  but  the  supreme  form  of  the  love  of 
right." 

5.  Comparing  motivity  ethics  with  perfectionism,  we  find 
the  statements  of  the  former  regarding  the  moral  end  more 
intelligible  and  more  in  accord  with  ordinary  thought  and 
speech.  We  can  understand  a  doctrine  which  gives  a  legal 
supremacy  either  to  rational  beneficence  or  to  a  reverential 
regard  for  virtue,  and  which  would  subordinate  the  exercise 
of  every  motivity  to  that  of  the  supreme  principle.  This  is 
better  than  that  inconceivable  excellence  which  produces  aims 
and  actions,  but  which  is  not  to  be  defined  as  the  love  of  what 
is  right  and  good. 

It  is  also  to  be  allowed  that  the  rules  even  of  practical  duty 
are  often  expressed  subjectively.  Frequently  we  are  told  not 
to  act  honestly,  but  to  be  honest ;  not  to  speak  the  truth,  but 
to  be  truthful ;  not  to  obey,  but  to  be  obedient ;  not  to  do  right 
and  seek  the  welfare  of  others,  but  to  be  virtuous  and  good. 
Such  language  does  not  justify  the  conclusion  that  there  is 
no  difference  between  practical  and  affectional  duty,  but  it 
indicates  how  practical  duty  may  lose  its  place  in  a  theory 
of  morals. 

Moreover,  no  one  can  question  that  self-regulation  is  a 
most  comprehensive  requirement  of  the  moral  law,  and  that 
this  regulation  is  sometimes  effected  by  making  goodness, 
sometimes  by  making  righteousness,  supreme  over  other 
motive  tendencies.  So  far  as  internal  duty  is  concerned, 
either  plan  is  an  excellent  one,  though  perhaps  a  system  in 
which  reverence  for  right  should  be  united  with  impartial 
and  rational  love  in  the  supreme  authority  would  have  much 
merit.  For  that  love  which  seeks  only  what  is  absolutely 
good  is  indissolubly  connected  with  that  conscientiousness 
which  seeks  only  the  absolutely  right. 

Motivity  ethics  calls  attention  to  the  importance  of  the 
inner  life  and  to  the  duty  of  caring  for  that  life.  It  enforces 
a  phase  of  morals  apt  to  be  neglected  by  those  who  adopt 
utilitarian  views,  or  who  look  to  the  dictates  of  authority,  or 
who  simply  feel  bound  to  do  what  is  right.  Moreover,  it 
furnishes  a  basis  not  only  for  self-culture,  but  also  for  the 
general  direction  of  conduct.  The  advocates  of  this  theory 
show  much  moral  insight;  they  develop  views  of  a  pure  and 
lofty  excellence.  Nor  do  they  neglect  the  practical  and  out- 
ward side  of  duty;  they  give  wise  instructions  respecting 
every  part  of  human  life. 


170  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 

6.  Nevertheless,  as  a  philosophy,  motivity  ethics  fails  to 
satisfy  inquiry  in  several  respects.    In  the  first  place,  its  con- 
ception of  duty  is  not  sufficiently  objective. 

Dr.  Hopkins  insists  that  whatever  is  right  and  good  to  seek 
is  so  sought  because  it  either  is,  or  causes,  or  conditions,  some 
form  of  sentient  experience.  This  teaching  may  be  accepted 
as  describing  correctly  every  end  of  motivity,  whether  moral 
or  unmoral.  At  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that  the  personal 
agent  often  aims  at  objects  outside  of  his  own  present  expe- 
rience, and  that,  for  this  reason,  some  of  his  desires  may  be 
said  to  be  objectively,  while  others  are  subjectively,  directed. 
After  this  same  fashion  some  of  the  ends  of  duty  may  be 
styled  objective  and  others  subjective. 

It  is  not  true,  in  any  literal  sense,  that  the  control  of  our 
own  motivities  or  the  cherishing  of  our  inner  dispositions  is 
the  only  requirement  of  moral  law.  We  are,  indeed,  bound 
to  control  our  appetites  and  passions  and  to  cultivate  love 
and  reverence  and  every  virtue.  But  the  doing  of  good,  the 
telling  of  truth,  the  payment  of  debts,  the  instruction  of  the 
ignorant,  the  assistance  of  the  needy,  the  relief  of  the  suffer- 
ing, the  strengthening  of  the  weak,  are  things  right,  obli- 
gatory and  incumbent  upon  us,  not  simply  as  the  consequence 
and  expression  of  spiritual  activities,  but  by  reason  of  their 
own  nature.  Indeed  the  activities  which  aim  at  these  things 
have  their  moral  character  because  the  things  aimed  at  are 
in  themselves  right  and  obligatory.  Such  being  the  case,  the 
regulation  of  motivity  is  not  the  only,  nor  even  the  primary, 
end  of  morality. 

7.  This  point  will  become  plainer  if  we  consider  a  second 
objection  to  motivity  ethics,  viz.,  that  it  does  not  recognize 
the  moral  reason  as  an  original  spring  of  action.    We  do  not 
now  refer  to  the  teaching  that  conscience  is  a  purely  intellec- 
tual faculty  and  without  motive  power,  for  this  position  is 
not  consistently  maintained ;  we  find  a  fundamental  error 
in  the  doctrine  that  moral  principle  does  not  aim  at  any  ends 
originally  its  own,  but  only  at  the  proper  exercise  of  our 
other  motivities.     This  error  may  be  accounted  for  partly 
from  an  imperfect  understanding  of  the  conceptional  action 
of  the  moral  reason  and  partly  from  a  one-sided  view  of  the 
right  as  the  object  of  moral  pursuit. 

We  grant  that  the  end  conceived  of  and  sought  for  by  right 
reason  does  not  exist  separately  from  other  ends  which  we 
desire,  and  that  it  is  constituted  by  a  peculiar  selection  and 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MOTIVITY  ETHICS. 

arrangement  of  elements.  Nevertheless  it  is  a  distinct  object 
and  not  to  be  confounded  with  any  other.  As  some  ideal  para- 
dise whose  elements  have  been  drawn  from  many  beautiful 
scenes  may  be  distinguished  from  each  of  them  and  from  all 
of  those  scenes  together,  so  the  end  aimed  at  by  the  moral 
nature  cannot  be  identified  with  any  specific  end  nor  with 
all  specific  ends  collectively;  it  has  a  nature  and  constitu- 
tion of  its  own.  It  is,  moreover,  pursued  by  means  of  a  con- 
ception formed  by  the  moral  reason;  as  becomes  especially 
apparent  when  we  speak  of  it  in  the  general.  For  as  the 
idea  of  ordinary  good,  or  interest,  formed  by  the  practical 
reason,  is  not  that  of  any  particular  source  of  gratification 
nor  of  all  such  sources  taken  collectively,  so  the  idea  of 
right,  formed  by  the  moral  reason,  is  distinct  and  sui  generis. 
If  this  be  so,  conscience,  in  seeking  the  right,  primarily  pur- 
sues its  own  ends  and  not  those  of  other  motivities.  After 
that  its  secondary  action  stimulates  our  natural  tendencies 
to  pursue  their  own  proper  aims  so  far  as  these  may  be  con- 
sentaneous with  the  right. 

But  the  motiyity  school  say  that  the  idea  of  Tightness 
offers  no  object  of  rational  pursuit — that  it  is  "empty  of 
content,"  because  Tightness  is  nothing  but  conformity  to  a 
rule,  and  because  conformity  to  a  rule  can  give  no  direction 
unless  we  can  know  what  that  is  which  the  rule  requires. 
This  reasoning  is  good,  but  it  is  founded  on  a  one-sided  con- 
ception of  the  right.  Moral  Tightness  is  not  mere  conformity 
to  a  rule ;  it  is  that  quality  in  an  action  or  end  on  which  con- 
formity to  the  rule  depends.  It  is  an  excellence  inhering  in 
the  action  or  end.  Conformity  to  rule  is  not  the  essence,  but 
only  a  property,  of  Tightness.  If  such  be  the  case,  there  is 
no  absurdity  in  saying  that  reason  seeks  right  things  directly 
and  simply  because  they  are  right. 

8.  A  third  fault  of  motivity  ethics,  closely  connected  with 
its  failure  to  recognize  reason  as  an  original  spring  of  action, 
is  its  inadequate  account  of  the  function  of  reason  in  her 
attempt  to  regulate  our  other  motivities.  We  are  told  that, 
just  as  soon  as  two  impulses  come  into  conflict  with  each 
other,  they  are  intuitively  distinguished  as  "higher  and 
lower,"  or  as  more  or  less  "  worthy,"  and  that  then  conscience 
affirms,  "follow  the  one;  disregard  the  other."  But  this 
alleged  intuition  does  not  result  in  axioms  like  those  of 
mathematics  and  metaphysics,  nor  does  it  show  any  other 
mark  of  the  immediate  perception  of  necessary  truth.  The 


THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 

tabulations  of  Hopkins  and  Martineau  agree  with  the  general 
fact  that  our  natural  "  springs  of  action/5  considered  as  hab- 
itual and  cherished  dispositions,  have  different  degrees  of 
dignity,  or  are  rationally  held  in  different  degrees  of  esteem. 
But  they  scarcely  go  farther  than  that.  They  are  somewhat 
arbitrary  in  their  details.  No  one  could  use  either  table  as  a 
rule  for  giving  greater  honor  to  one  of  two  closely  related 
motivities.  And,  as  laws  for  determining  the  right  and  wrong 
of  action,  they  are  extremely  insufficient. 

For  example,  Martineau  places  reverence  far  above  appetite 
in  point  of  dignity;  in  which  judgment  he  is  undoubtedly 
correct.  But  are  there  not  cases  in  which  reverence  should 
give  place  to  appetite?  A  starving  man  should  not  be  ex- 
horted to  pray  till  after  he  has  partaken  of  food.  It  may  be 
said  that  the  necessities  of  the  case  call  for  this  inverted  order 
of  preference.  This  is  true,  but  this  also  shows  that  appetite 
and  reverence  do  not  settle  the  question  of  duty  "merely  by 
their  juxtaposition  " ;  though  the  question  of  dignity  may  be 
settled  that  way.  Again,  Martineau  places  "  vindictiveness, 
or  the  cherishing  of  resentment,"  at  the  bottom  of  his  scale, 
and  compassion,  immediately  next  to  reverence,  at  the  top. 
Thus  he  expresses  condemnation  for  habitual  malice  and 
honors  the  spirit  of  tender  kindness.  But,  in  a  case  of 
atrocious  crime,  is  it  not  our  duty  to  restrain  our  pity  and  to 
maintain  a  sort  of  determined  resentment  till  the  crime  is 
punished  and  suppressed? 

In  a  previous  part  of  the  present  treatise  (Chap.  VIII.)  the 
motivities  were  considered  (in  the  order  of  their  dignity)  as 
instincts.,  appetites,  propensities,  affections,  rational  benefi- 
cence (or  the  wise  seeking  of  good,  including  one's  own 
good),  and  moral  principle.  This  list,  which  resembles  those 
of  Martineau  and  Hopkins,  does  not  yield  any  universal  law 
of  morality,  nor  even  sufficient  direction  for  the  regulation  of 
our  "  springs  of  action."  It  does,  however,  place  moral  prin- 
ciple at  the  head  of  our  motivities ;  and  it  recalls  the  doctrine 
of  Bishop  Butler  respecting  "  the  subjection  which  the  appe- 
tites, passions  and  particular  affections  have  to  the  one  su- 
preme principle  of  reflection  or  conscience."  It  suggests  also 
the  simple  practical  rule  that  the  judgment  of  reason  must 
govern  in  the  inner  as  well  as  in  the  outer  life.  This  is  the 
rule  followed  in  the  actual  experience  of  good  men;  and  it 
works  as  follows:  In  the  first  place  reason  favors  those  exer- 
cises of  motivity  which  harmonize  and  co-operate  with  her  own 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MOTIVITY  ETHICS.  173 

conception  and  pursuit  of  right  ends  and  actions;  and  she 
condemns  those  by  which  these  are  antagonized.  Hence  not 
only  particular  experiences  become  right  and  dutiful,  but 
various  modes  of  natural  disposition,  blending  with  moral 
principle,  become  "  virtues,"  while  others  of  an  opposite 
character  are  called  vices.  But  no  natural  disposition,  ex- 
cept as  thus  combined  with  moral  principle,  or  as  conflictive 
with  it,  is  either  a  virtue  or  a  vice.  In  the  second  place, 
reason  finds  given  exercises  of  natural  feeling  to  be  things 
right  and  good  in  themselves — simply  as  matters  of  imme- 
diate internal  experience — and  so  dutifully  cultivates  them 
on  their  own  account,  each  in  its  proper  sphere. 

Indeed  even  the  gradation  of  principles  as  higher  and 
lower,  as  more  or  less  worthy,  is  determined  quite  as  much 
by  their  relation  to  reason  as  by  their  relation  to  each  other. 
It  is  noticeable  that  malicious  censoriousness,  vindictiveness 
and  suspiciousness,  which  Dr.  Martineau  grades  as  the  lowest 
of  all  motivities,  are  not  simple  springs  of  action,  but  modi- 
fications of  sentiments  which  he  places  in  the  center  of  his 
list,  and  calls  "the  primary  passions  of  antipathy,  resent- 
ment and  fear."  These  modifications  fall  to  the  lowest  rank 
simply  because  they  are  inherently  immoral — because  they 
are  conceived  of  as  conflicting  with  moral  principle. 

9.  Finally,  the  motlvity  ethics  shows  both  confusion  and 
error  respecting  the  nature  of  moral  Tightness.  This  nature 
cannot  be  scientifically  defined  till  the  moral  law  has  been 
analyzed,  but  some  points  respecting  it  have  already  been 
made  clear.  In  an  earlier  chapter  a  distinction  was  noticed, 
which  reason  naturally  makes,  between  actions  as  intentional 
and  actions  as  desiderative.  Both  these  modes  of  activity 
pursue  an  end  intelligently,  but  the  former  includes  only  the 
intellectual  and  executive  activity,  while  the  latter  embraces 
also  the  specific  desire  for  the  end  for  its  own  sake.  As  a 
rule  these  actions  have  not  been  carefully  distinguished  by 
philosophers,  so  that  we  hear  only  of  "  the  intentional  action." 
We  now  oppose  the  one  to  the  other;  we  contrast  the  in- 
tentional with  the  desiderative.  The  importance  of  this 
distinction  is  that  actions  are  right  or  wrong  simply  as 
intentional — or  as,  at  least,  intentionable — while  they  are  vir- 
tuous or  vicious  and  meritorious  or  blameworthy  only  as  de- 
siderative. Thus  rational  conduct  has  two  modes  of  morality, 
one  of  which  in  thought  conditions  the  other,  yet  which  are 
so  related  that  the  one  can  exist  without  the  other.  A  man 


174  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVI. 

may  do  a  right  action  as  such — that  is,  intentionally,  and 
knowing  it  to  be  right — but  if  he  does  not  do  it  for  its  own 
sake  it  is  not  virtuous ;  it  may  even  be  vicious.  And,  though 
one  cannot  virtuously  do  a  wrong  action  intentionally — know- 
ing it  to  be  wrong — he  may  do  it  virtuously  with  a  mistaken 
intelligence,  supposing  it  to  be  right ;  in  which  case  the  action 
is  wrong,  not  as  intended,  but  only  as  intentionable,  that  is, 
as  it  must  appear  if  fully  understood.  Thus  we  suppose  Soc- 
rates showed  sincere  piety  while  worshiping  false  gods. 

This  distinction  which  opposes  the  right  and  the  wrong  on 
the  one  hand  to  the  virtuous  and  the  vicious  on  the  other,  has 
eluded  the  motivity  moralists.  They  identify  the  Tightness 
of  an  action  with  its  virtuousness  or  its  merit,  and  the  wrong- 
ness  of  an  action  with  its  wickedness  or  its  demerit.  Of 
course,  after  doing  that,  they  are  compelled  to  say  that  right- 
ness  attaches  only  to  "  the  inner  spring  of  action." 

This  school  argues  from  the  fact  that  moral  quality  can 
exist  only  in  relation  to  the  rational  person,  but  it  fails  to 
note  that  a  proposed  action  or  end  may  be  related  to  a  person 
in  two  ways;  first,  as  suitable  or  unsuitable  for  his  adoption 
and  pursuit;  and,  secondly,  as  desideratively  accepted  and 
attempted  by  him.  Rightness  belongs  to  the  first  of  these 
relations ;  virtuousness,  or  righteousness,  to  the  other. 

Motivity  ethics  contains  high  instruction,  yet  is  not  theo- 
retically satisfactory.  It  does  not  perceive  that  outward  ac- 
tions and  aims  are  in  themselves  right  and  obligatory  upon 
us.  It  denies  that  reason,  as  motive,  pursues  ends  originally 
its  own.  It  gives  no  usable  law  or  rule  for  the  regulation  of 
the  inner  life.  And  it  confounds  the  Tightness  of  actions 
and  ends  with  the  virtuousness,  or  worthiness,  which  belongs 
to  the  animus  with  which  duty  is  performed  or  to  the  person 
as  loving  and  doing  what  is  right. 

For  additional  criticism  of  the  motivity  school  see  Sidg- 
wick's  "  Methods  of  Ethics,"  Book  III.,  Chap.  XII. 

10.  In  connection  with  Martineau  and  Hopkins  some  remarks  may 
be  added  respecting  Professor  James  Seth.  In  his  well-written 
work,  "  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,"  the  radical  conception  of 
Motivity  ethics  is  combined  with  that  of  Perfectionism.  Prof. 
Seth  profoundly  admires  Hegel  ;  he  says,  "  It  is  Hegel,  who,  of  all 
philosophers,  has  given  most  adequate  expression  to  the  essential 
principles  of  the  Ethical  Life."  The  perfectionism  of  Seth,  and 
some  metaphysical  ideas  connected  with  it,  are  decidedly  Hegelian. 


CHAP.  XVI.]  MOTIV1TY  ETHICS.  175 

"  In  ethics  as  in  metaphysics,"  continues  the  professor,  "  Hegel 
finds  the  universal  in  the  particular,  the  rational  in  the  sensible.  In 
the  evolution  of  the  moral,  as  of  the  intellectual  life,  he  discovers 
the  dialectical  movement  of  affirmation  through  negation,  of  life 
through  death.  *  *  It  is  of  the  essence  of  his  pantheistic  metaphy- 
sic  to  sink  the  personality  of  man  in  the  universal  life  of  God,  and 
to  conceive  of  human  life  as  ultimately  modal  and  impersonal 
rather  than  as  substantive  and  personal.  Yet  Hegel  does  much  for 
the  conception  of  personality  both  in  the  intellectual  and  in  the 
moral  reference  ;  and,  even  if  we  disregard  his  final  metaphysical 
construction,  we  shall  find  in  his  philosophy  as  striking  and  adequate 
ethical  statements  as  are  to  be  found  anywhere.  Take,  for  example, 
this  statement  of  the  distinction  between  the  individual  and  the 
person  :  *  In  personality,  indeed,  it  lies  that  I,  as  on  all  sides  of  me, 
in  inward  desire,  need,  greed  and  appetite,  and  in  direct  outward 
existence,  this  perfectly  limited  and  finite  individual,  am  yet  as 
person,  infinite,  universal,  and  free,  and  know  myself,  even  in  my 
finitude,  as  such.'  "  (page  220.) 

This  peculiar  description  of  the  person  may  have  meaning  for 
those  who  believe  that  Thought  and  Being  are  one  and  that  the 
Universe  is  the  dialectical  self-development  of  the  "  Idea  "  ;  for  us 
it  is  valuable  chiefly  as  illustrating  the  derivate  method  of  philoso- 
phizing. Hegelianism  is  the  product  of  a  venerable  style  of  think- 
ing such  as  was  practised  by  good  old  Parmenides.  The  discussion 
of  it  belongs  to  mental  rather  than  to  moral  science,  and  cannot  be 
undertaken  here.  It  would  involve  an  estimate  of  ancient  "  Real- 
ism." (See  a  chapter  in  "  THE  PERCEPTIONALIST  "  on  this  topic). 

It  would,  however,  be  unjust  to  suppose  that  Professor  Seth's 
book  is  devoted  to  paradoxical  profundities.  On  the  contrary,  his 
general  teaching  is  quite  intelligible,  and  is  derived,  not  from  Hegel 
and  Plato,  but  from  Butler  and  Aristotle.  He  names  his  own 
theory.  **  Eudaemonism,"  to  indicate  its  affinity  to  the  Peripatetic 
ethic,  but,  on  examination,  it  really  seems  to  be  more  nearly  that 
of  Butler.  Having  defined  the  words  "  person  "  and  "  self  "  in  a 
peculiar  Hegelian  sense,  to  signify,  not  what  we  ordinarily  mean  by 
these  terms  (the  self-conscious  rational  agent)  but  that  agent  as 
controlled  by  right  reason,  he  says  that  the  fundamental  duty  of  man 
is  to  "  be  a  person,"  or  to  "  realize  the  self."  What  is  this  but  the 
doctrine  that  reason  and  conscience  should  be  supreme  in  man's 
motive  life  ?  The  professor  insists  that  reason  does  not,  and  cannot, 
operate  independently  of  the  rest  of  man's  nature,  but  should  sup- 
erintend the  healthful  exercise  of  our  natural  tendencies  and  sen- 
sibilities ;  and  he  claims  that,  in  his  teaching,  Eudaemonism  is 


176  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  xvi. 

superior  to  some  other  systems  to  which  he  gives  the  collective  des- 
ignation "Rationalism."  Rethinks  that  these  latter  do  not  suffi- 
ciently recognize  that  synthesis  in  which  all  our  motive  tendencies 
should  be  united  in  one  perfectly  rationalized  life.  It  may  be 
questioned,  however,  whether  either  the  ancient  Stoics  or  the 
modern  "  Intuitionalists,"  would  seriously  differ  with  Prof essor  Seth 
regarding  the  function  of  the  moral  faculty. 

The  doctrine  of  Professor  Seth  concerning  the  dependence  of  the 
virtuous  life  on  reason  is  quite  true.  Nevertheless,  as  a  solution  of 
"  The  Ethical  Problem,"  it  is  totally  inadequate.  Even  though  our 
main  desire  were  to  investigate  "  the  nature  of  virtue, "rather  than 
the  nature  of  the  right  and  obligatory,  it  would  yet  be  insufficient 
to  say  that  virtue  consists  in  the  government  of  our  lives  by  reason. 
The  questions  would  yet  remain.  "  What  rules  does  the  moral  rea- 
son follow  and  what  ends  does  it  seek  ?  And  what  is  that  universal 
principle  which  sets  forth  the  fundamental  end  ?  "  A  philosophical 
understanding  of  virtue  is  conditioned  on  a  philosophical  under- 
standing of  the  right.  To  say  that  we  must  be  governed,  both  in- 
ternally and  externally,  by  reason,  and  not  by  selfishness,  affec- 
tion or  passion,  is  a  true  and  useful  doctrine.  But  it  is  more  prac- 
tical than  theoretical.  It  is  not  the  ultimate  explanation  of 
morality. 

Some  remarks  might  be  added  respecting  Professor  Muirhead's 
able  "  Manual"  of  Ethics.  But  his  views,  being  practically  the 
same  with  those  of  Professor  Seth,  scarcely  need  a  separate  dis- 
cussion. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

AUTHORITY  ETHICS    (STATED). 

1.  Ethics  abounds  in  linguistic  perplexities.  The  words  "  duty  " 
and  "  obligation  "  have  sometimes  a  restricted  meaning,  accord- 
ing to  which  a  man  in  acting  rightly  and  nobly  may  do  more 
than  he  is  bound  to  do. — 2.  But  ordinarily  these  terms 'are  co-ex- 
tensive with  every  possibility  of  virtuous  conduct. — 3.  The 
Authority  school  of  ethics  employs  the  broad  conception  of 
obligation  and  defines  it  in  a  peculiar  way. — 4.  The  word  "  duty  " 
sometimes  signifies  the  right  and  obligatory.  But  obligatoriness 
is  a  property,  rather  than  the  essence,  of  the  right.  The  verb 
"  ought." — 5.  Authority  ethics  is  either  anthropic  or  theistic. 
Hobbes,  Darwin,  and  Spencer,  quoted. — 6.  Kirchmann  and 
Janet,  quoted. — 7.  The  theistic  theory  of  obligation.  William 
of  Occam,  Bishop  Cumberland,  Bishop  Warburton,  Dr.  Paley, 
Richard  Hooker,  and  Stephen  Charnock,  quoted. — 8.  Also  John 
Locke  and  Charles  Hodge. 

1.  No  study  is  more  affected  with  linguistic  obscurities 
than  theoretical  morals-.  The  principal  terms  used  in  it  have 
several  ethical  significations,  besides  others  that  are  non- 
ethical.  The  nouns  right,  good,  duty,  interest,  obligation, 
virtue,  sense,  reason,  justice,  and  diverse  verbs  and  adjectives 
as  well,  seek  every  opportunity  to  give  doubtful  directions 
to  the  inquiring  mind.  The  apparent  innocence  of  these 
terms  and  their  intelligibility  in  practical  statements  induce 
an  easy  confidence  in  many  with  respect  to  a  somewhat  diffi- 
cult undertaking.  Unwary  persons  are  apt  to  meet  with  an 
experience  like  that  of  the  European  traveler  who  is  charmed 
with  the  unaffected  courtesy  of  some  Oriental  merchants. 
If  one  does  not  wish  to  make  a  bad  bargain  in  ethics,  he  will 
find  it  a  safe  rule  to  expect  some  kind  of  subtle  deceit  in 
every  statement  offered  for  his  acceptance.  Above  all  he  must 
resolve  not  to  be  satisfied  with  words,  but  to  deal  only  with 
thoughts  and  the  objects  of  thought. 

At  present  we  call  attention  to  a  specific  use  of  the  terms 
duty  and  obligation,  the  confusion  of  which  with  a  wider  use 
12  177 


178  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVII. 

has  occasioned  some  controversy.  Sometimes  when  one,  either 
through  the  operation  of  law  or  the  pledges  of  a  contract, 
is  bound  to  a  certain  amount  of  service,  he  may  voluntarily 
give  more  than  that  amount,  in  which  case  we  say  that  he 
is  doing  more  than  duty  or  obligation  calls  for,  and  that  he 
merits  honor  for  his  liberality  or  beneficence.  So  also  a 
civil  or  religious  ruler  may  lay  positive  injunctions  upon 
those  subject  to  his  authority,  adding  only  advice  regarding 
matters  which  should  be  left  to  one's  own  determination. 
Magistrates  enforce  the  payment  of  taxes  and  the  fulfilment 
of  contracts,  but  leave  it  largely  to  the  citizen's  own  pleas- 
ure to  say  how  far  he  shall  participate  in  patriotic  and  phil- 
anthropic movements.  The  Apostle  Paul  absolutely  con- 
demned those  Christians  of  his  day  who  went  to  law  with 
one  another,  before  unbelievers,  saying :  "  Now,  therefore, 
there  is  utterly  a  fault  among  you,  because  ye  go  to  law  one 
with  another."  But,  with  respect  to  marriage  during  those 
troublous  times,  he  merely  used  dissuasion ;  for  he  added,  "  If 
thou  marry,  thou  hast  not  sinned;  and  if  a  virgin  marry,  she 
hath  not  sinned." 

In  an  analogous  manner,  with  reference  to  the  conduct  of 
life  in  general,  we  sometimes  say  that  certain  things  are 
required  of  us  by  strict  duty,  while  other  things  may  be 
good  and  excellent,  yet  are  not  absolutely  obligatory.  We 
are  bound  to  pay  our  debts,  to  be  faithful  to  our  word,  to 
aid  the  poor  and  to  show  some  benevolence,  but  we  are  not 
under  obligation  to  devote  the  greater  part  of  our  means  to 
Christian  charities  or  the  greater  part  of  our  time  and 
strength  to  philanthropic  labors.  Some  persons,  making  a 
practical  rule  out  of  such  ideas,  carefully  observe  what  they 
consider  to  be  the  requirements  of  justice  and  duty,  but, 
after  that,  hold  themselves  at  liberty  to  pursue  their  own 
pleasure  in  doing  or  not  doing.  If  they  show  liberality  and 
beneficence  they  claim  special  credit  for  this;  they  do  not  in- 
clude such  things  within  their  bounden  duty.  Others  fashion 
these  views  into  a  theory  and  say  that  the  field  of  duty  or 
obligation  is  less  extensive  than  the  field  of  virtue  or  good- 
ness. They  compare  these  fields  to  two  circles  with  a  common 
center,  but  with  the  circumference  of  one  much  wider  than 
that  of  the  other.  The  inner  circle  contains  the  right  and 
good  things  which  are  required  of  us;  the  outer  embraces 
also  excellent  aims  which  are  worthy  of  our  pursuit,  but 
which  we  are  not  strictly  bound  to  adopt. 


CHAP.  XVII.]     AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (STATED).  179 

2.  This  theory  cannot  be  accepted  as  a  full  account  of  moral 
obligation.  Duty,  in  the  ordinary  wide  conception  of  it, 
covers  all  the  possibilities  of  human  achievement.  We  are 
under  obligation  to  make  the  very  best  of  ourselves  and  of 
our  opportunities,  and  to  advance  every  good  cause  to  the 
extent  of  our  means  and  abilities.  Yet  a  distinction  must 
be  admitted  between  two  modes  of  duty  or  obligation.  This 
may  be  stated  by  saying  that  some  duties  are  definite  and 
mandatory  in  their  scope,  while  others  are  indefinite  and  com- 
mendatory; it  has,  also,  in  less  exact  speech,  been  expressed 
by  speaking  of  certain  legal  developments  of  right  conduct 
as  "  duty  "  and  of  other  higher  and  nobler  exercises  of  moral 
principle  as  "virtue."  Language  like  this  appears  in  the 
following  statement  of  our  Saviour,  taken  from  St.  Luke's 
gospel :  "  So  likewise  ye,  when  ye  shall  have  done  all  those 
things  which  are  commanded  you,  say,  'We  are  unprofitable 
servants ;  we  have  done  that  which  it  was  our  duty  to  do/  ': 
These  words  imply  that  one  would  be  a  profitable  servant  and 
worthy  of  commendation,  if  he  should  do  more  than  was  com- 
manded— more  than  it  was  his  duty  to  do. 

We  must  note,  however,  that  the  limited,  as  distinguished 
from  the  comprehensive,  conception  of  duty,  includes  not 
merely  conduct  definitely  commanded,  but  all  conduct  so 
definitely  known  to  be  obligatory  that  it  cannot  be  disre- 
garded without  a  protest  from  one's  conscience.  The  neglect 
of  such  duty  is  necessarily  accompanied  with  self-condemna- 
tion. But  when  duties  are  not  exactly  defined,  for  example, 
when  they  are  suggestions  for  those  only  who  may  find 
themselves  qualified  for  them,  and  who  must  determine 
in  what  form  the  suggestion  is  to  be  carried  out,  it  is  pos- 
sible to  exclude  them  from  conscientious  consideration  and 
to  treat  them  as  if  they  were  not  duties  at  all.  The  same 
thought  applies  to  conduct  not  imperatively  prescribed  by 
the  accepted  code  of  the  society  to  which  an  individual  be- 
longs, and  which,  for  that  reason  or  for  any  other,  has  not 
been  definitely  brought  home  to  one's  conscience.  More  in- 
telligence and  more  principle  would  be  needed  for  the  under- 
taking of  such  duty  than  for  a  service  expected  from  one  by 
himself  and  by  his  associates. 

These  remarks  show  that  the  point  at  which  the  conduct 
of  "  duty "  passes  up  into  that  of  "  virtue "  is  not  a  fixed 
one,  but  varies,  at  different  times  and  in  different  persons, 
according  to  the  development  and  the  standard  of  morality 


180  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVII. 

to  which  it  is  related.  We  only  can  place  under  "  duty " 
whatever  one  must  do  from  "  a  sense  of  duty  " — from  the 
constraint  of  obligation — even  while  he  may  have  no  great 
love  for  the  right,  and  under  "  virtue  "  what  calls  for  a  more 
earnest  and  progressive  spirit.  With  this  understanding  the 
words  of  the  French  author,  M.  Ad.  Franck,  may  be  accepted, 
not  as  defining  duty  in  general,  but  as  expressing  a  truth. 
"  Duty,"  he  says,  "  is  the  limit  below  which  we  may  not 
descend  without  losing  in  the  moral  world  our  standing  as 
men."  But  it  is  evident  that  the  lower  demands  of  moral- 
ity, as  well  as  the  higher,  may  be  complied  with  from  an 
absorbing  love  of  right ;  as  it  is  conceivable,  also,  that  highly 
meritorious  deeds  may  be  performed  by  a  well-informed  per- 
son from  a  mere  "  sense  of  duty." 

3.  Ordinarily  in  ethical  discussions  the  conception  of  obli- 
gation is  not  the  limited  one  above  described,  but  that  set- 
ting forth  the  relation  of  rational  beings  to  every  form  and 
degree  of  the  right  and  good.  This  idea  was  used  in  the 
heading  of  a  former  chapter  which  discussed  "  The  Eight 
and  Obligatory  " ;  for  these  words  were  not  intended  to  pre- 
sent two  objects,  but  only  two  aspects  or  characteristics  of 
one  object.  They  were  designed  to  teach  that  whatever  has 
the  nature  of  the  right  is  also  by  consequence  of  that  nature 
obligatory  upon  the  rational  agent.  The  French  say,  "  La 
noblesse  oblige,"  that  is,  nobility  of  rank  binds  the  possessor 
of  it  to  act  nobly.  In  a  similar  way  right  obligates  the 
rational  agent  to  act  rightly.  This  is  a  property  of  the  right, 
a  universal  and  inseparable  characteristic.  Such  is  the  com- 
mon idea  of  moral  obligation,  and  such  is  the  conception  of 
it  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  our  discussion  of  Authority  Ethics. 
For  the  essential  point  of  this  form  of  theory  is  that  the 
sense  of  duty  or  obligation  is  in  all  cases  a  recognition  of 
external  authority,  or  else  a  feeling  engendered  through 
subjection  to  such  authority. 

When  we  compare  this  hypothesis  with  the  four  from  which 
it  has  been  distinguished,  we  see  that  it  relates  primarily  to 
the  obligatoriness  of  the  right,  while  each  of  the  other 
theories  is  more  concerned  with  the  nature  of  that  which  is 
obligatory;  whether  it  be  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  or  the 
realization  of  the  self,  or  the  regulation  of  one's  motivities, 
or  simply  the  right  as  undefined  and  as  dogmatically  con- 
ceived and  asserted. 

The  question  may  now  be  asked,    "  Does  authority  ethics 


CHAP.  XVII.]    AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (STATED). 

have  a  conception  of  the  right  peculiar  to  itself y  or  does  it 
simply  attach  its  own  explanation  of  obligation  now  to  this 
and  now  to  that  conception  borrowed  from  one  of  the  other 
theories  ?  "  Of  these  alternatives  the  second  seems  to  state 
the  truth.  Nevertheless  we  have  to  add  that  any  of  the 
foregoing  conceptions  of  the  right  may  be  so  modified  by 
an  addition  as  to  be  specially  acceptable  to  the  advocates  of 
authority  ethics.  For  they  naturally  think  of  ethics  as  the 
science  of  duty.  To  explain  this  statement  we  must  say 
something  respecting  conceptions  and  the  definition  of  theni, 
and  must  refer  to  another  ambiguity  of  the  term  "  duty." 

4.  When,  in  our  perceptions  of  fact,  a  number  of  elements 
are  found  in  systematic  union,  the  synthetic  thought  then 
produced  is  an  ordinary  conception;  and  a  statement  of  the 
elements  of  the  system  in  their  relations  to  it  and  to  each 
other  is  a  definition  of  the  conception,  or  of  its  object.  A 
selection,  however,  commonly  takes  place  in  the  synthetic 
contemplation  of  elements.  Some  elements,  though  con- 
stantly and  necessarily  present  with  others,  are  regarded  not 
as  parts,  but  only  as  adjuncts,  of  the  system,  and  so  are  ex- 
cluded from  the  essence  or  definition  of  the  object.  In  this 
way  a  distinction  arises  in  logic  between  attributes,  which 
are  the  component  parts  of  the  essence,  and  properties,  which 
are  only  its  necessary  adjuncts.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  a 
property  is  always  present  with  the  system  or  nature  to 
which  it  belongs,  it  is  possible  for  the  mind,  when  any  pur- 
pose is  to  be  served  thereby,  to  enlarge  its  conception  of  the 
essence  by  taking  in  some  inseparable  adjunct;  which  there- 
upon ceases  to  be  "  property "  and  becomes  "  attribute." 
This  modification  of  a  conception  has  been  commented  on  in 
a  logical  treatise  as  follows :  "  Property  being  inseparable 
from  essence,  our  conception  of  an  essence  may  easily  be 
enlarged  by  incorporating  with  it  that  of  some  property.  .  .  . 
For  this  reason,  and  because  our  conceptions  vary  in  com- 
prehensiveness, it  may  sometimes  be  difficult  to  say  whether 
some  necessarily  ascript  be  a  property  or  an  attribute.  .  .  . 
The  only  way  to  determine  whether  a  necessary  characteristic 
be  a  property,  is  to  ascertain  whether  it  be  something  addi- 
tional to  our  conception  of  the  object."  (THE  MODALIST, 
page  56.)  These  considerations  explain  how  obligatoriness, 
which  is  commonly  only  a  property  of  the  right,  sometimes 
is  regarded  as  an  attribute,  that  is,  as  part  of  its  very  es- 
sence. 


182  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XVII. 

This  brings  before  us  that  use  of  the  word  "  duty  "  in  which 
it  is  employed  as  equivalent  to  "  the  right/7  and  also  that 
definition  which  declares  ethics  to  be  "  the  science  of  duty," 
or  of  "  what  ought  to  be  done.'7  Primarily  duty  signifies 
that  which  is  owed,  or  due;  it  applies  to  desire  and  conduct 
as  obligated.  This  conception  arises  when  the  law  is  con- 
ceived of  as  demanding  from  us  conduct  corresponding  to  its 
own  contents.  But,  as  this  very  same  conduct  may  be  con- 
templated not  as  the  realization  of  ideals,  but  as  ideals  to  be 
realized,  that  is,  as  the  contents  of  the  law,  the  term  duty 
often  signifies  that  form  of  conduct  which  obligates,  or  is 
obligatory. 

A  corresponding  doubleness  of  use  attaches  to  the  verb 
"ought."  "The  truth  ought  to  be  told"  signifies  either 
that  truth-telling  is  due  as  the  realization  of  an  ideal,  or  that 
truth-telling  as  an  ideal  is  obligatory  upon  us. 

As  each  of  these  meanings  of  "  duty  "  involves  the  other, 
either  might  serve  in  a  working  definition  of  moral  science. 
Commonly,  however,  with  ethical  writers,  "the  science  of 
duty  "  signifies  "  the  science  of  the  obligatory  " ;  and  this  is 
the  better  use  of  terms,  since  it  brings  before  us  the  right 
as  an  end  and  as  obligatory  upon  us.  Even  with  this  under- 
standing the  fact  is  somewhat  obscured  that  ends  as  well  as 
actions  are  binding  upon  us.  Nevertheless  this  fact  is  intro- 
duced indirectly  in  connection  with  those  ends  at  which  inten- 
tional actions  aim,  and  so  the  definitions  "  science  of  duty  " 
and  "  science  of  the  right "  are  really  synonymous,  the  only 
difference  being  that  in  the  former  the  obligatory  power  of 
Tightness  is  made  prominent  and  is  given  an  essential  place. 

But  while  recognizing  a  use  of  the  word  "  duty  "  in  which 
it  may  designate  the  essential  aim  of  morality,  we  can  by  no 
means  allow — what  many  seem  to  teach — that  Tightness  and 
oughtness  are  precisely  the  same  thing  or  that  the  term  duty, 
as  used  above,  denotes  merely  the  obligatory.  For  although, 
as  we  have  seen,  obligatoriness,  by  an  enlargement  of  concep- 
tion, may  become  a  constituent  characteristic  of  Tightness,  it 
never  is  all  of  Tightness,  nor  is  it  even  the  more  fundamental 
part.  And  whether  our  conception  of  Tightness  includes,  or 
whether  it  excludes,  that  of  obligatoriness,  it  will  still  be 
true  that  Tightness  and  obligatoriness  are  distinguishable  and 
that  the  former  of  these  is  the  condition  and  ground  of  the 
latter.  To  do  good  and  to  act  justly  are  obligatory;  but  they 
are  obligatory  because  they  are  right. 


CHAP.  XVII.]       AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (STATED).  183 

5.  As  already  stated,  the  peculiar  teachings  of  authority 
ethics  are  related  immediately  to  moral  obligation  rather  than 
to  moral  Tightness.  These  teachings  may  be  roughly  divided 
into  two  classes,  the  anthropic  and  the  theistic.  While  all 
advocates  of  this  doctrine  treat  obligation  as  a  sort  of  relation 
to  an  authority  external  to  the  moral  agent,  some  make  that 
authority  mostly  human,  while  others  make  it  mostly  divine. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  the  anthropic  moralists  make  no  use 
of  divine  authority  in  explaining  the  sense  of  obligation  or 
that  the  theistic  moralists  make  no  use  of  human  authority. 
There  is  a  variety  of  opinion  between  two  extremes.  But 
generally  those  who  make  human  authority  prominent  bring 
in  the  divine  only  as  a  superstition,  while  those  who  base  on 
divine  authority  adduce  the  human  only  as  an  expression  and 
consequence  of  the  divine. 

The  identification  of  the  sense  of  obligation  with  the  sense 
of  authority  has  always  commended  itself  to  materialistic 
philosophers.  In  this  way  man's  natural  selfishness  devel- 
oped from  a  life  of  mere  bodily  sensation  is  supposed  to  have 
been  refined  and  made  conformable  to  social  rules.  Thomas 
Hobbes,  a  thinker  of  this  school,  in  his  "  Leviathan " 
(A.  D.  1651),  contended  that  the  presocial  state  of  mankind 
was  one  of  war  in  which  every  man  fought  for  his  own  in- 
terests, and  that  this  state  of  things  was  terminated  by  a 
compact  or  covenant  whereby  civil  government  was  instituted 
to  care  for  the  welfare  of  all.  The  rules  of  morality  are 
those  of  the  sovereign  power ;  they  are  excellent  in  themselves 
but  are  obligatory  only  as  enacted  and  enforced  by  govern- 
mental authority.  "Before  the  names  of  just  and  unjust 
can  have  place,"  says  Hobbes,  "there  must  be  some  coercive 
power  to  compel  men  equally  to  the  performance  of  their 
covenants  by  the  terror  of  some  punishment  greater  than  the 
benefits  they  expect  by  the  breach  of  their  covenant,  and  to 
make  good  that  propriety  which  by  mutual  contract  men 
acquire  in  recompense  of  the  universal  right  they  abandon. 
And  such  power  there  is  none  before  the  erection  of  a  com- 
monwealth." Bentham  and  others  were  much  influenced  by 
Hobbes. 

At  the  present  day  the  anthropic  doctrine  is  chiefly  advo- 
cated by  that  materialistic  and  sensationalistic  school  who 
call  themselves  agnostics,  and  who  hold  that  the  Universe 
and  its  forms  have  self-evolved  from  an  infinity  of  atoms 
without  any  creative  interference  or  superintendency. 


184  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XVII. 

Charles  Darwin,  the  founder  of  Evolutionism,  accounts  for 
conscience  .as  the  outgrowth  of  a  social  instinct  whereby  one 
seeks  the  society  and  good-will  of  his  fellows,  and  of  a  natural 
sympathy  whereby  he  desires  their  comfort  and  satisfaction. 
He  says,  "  Any  animal  whatever  endowed  with  well-marked 
social  instincts,  the  parental  and  filial  affections  being  here 
included,  would  inevitably  acquire  a  moral  sense  or  conscience 
as  soon  as  its  intellectual  powers  had  become  as  well  or 
nearly  as  well  developed  as  in  man.  .  .  .  The  social  instincts 
lead  an  animal  to  take  pleasure  in  the  society  of  its  fellows, 
to  feel  a  certain  amount  of  sympathy  with  them,  and  to  per- 
form services  for  them.  The  services  may  be  of  a  definite 
and  evideatly  instinctive  character;  or  there  may  be  only  a 
wish  and  readiness,  as  with  most  of  the  higher  animals,  to 
aid  their  fellows  in  certain  general  ways.  But  these  feelings 
and  services  are  by  no  means  extended  to  all  the  individuals 
of  the  same  species — only  to  those  of  the  same  association. 
.  .  .  After  the  power  of  language  had  been  acquired  and 
the  wishes  of  the  community  could  be  expressed,  the  common 
opinion  how  each  member  ought  to  act  for  the  public  good 
would  naturally  become  in  a  paramount  degree  the  guide  to 
action/'  Thus  Darwin  derives  conscience  from  social  sym- 
pathy and  the  instinct  to  aid  one's  associates,  but  he  unites 
with  this  deference  to  the  opinion  of  the  community  and 
desire  for  its  good-will. 

Herbert  Spencer,  who  believes  that  the  only  really  moral 
motive  is  the  advancement  of  happiness  and  the  prevention 
of  misery,  regards  "the  sense  of  duty  or  obligation"  as  an 
adventitious  sentiment  of  fear  which  will  disappear  after 
men  have  become  more  enlightened.  He  says  (DATA  OF 
ETHICS,  Chap.  VII.) :  "The  element  of  coerciveness  (in  con- 
science) originates  from  experience  of  those  several  forms  of 
restraint  that  have  established  themselves  in  the  course  of 
civilization — the  political,  religious  and  social.  .  .  .  For 
since  the  political,  religious  and  social  restraints  are  mainly 
formed  of  represented  future  results,  and  since  the  moral 
restraining  motive  is  mainly  formed- of  represented  future 
results,  it  happens  that,  the  representations  having  much  in 
common  and  being  often  aroused  at  the  same  time,  the  fear 
joined  with  three  sets  of  them  becomes  by  association  joined 
with  the  fourth.  Thinking  of  the  extrinsic  effects  of  a  for- 
bidden act  excites  a  dread  which  continues  present  while  the 
intrinsic  effects  of  the  act  are  thought  of,  and  being  thus 


CHAP.  XVII. J      AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (STATED).  185 

linked  with  these  intrinsic  effects  causes  a  vague  sense  of 
moral  compulsion.  Emerging  but  slowly  from  among  the 
political,  religious  and  social  motives,  the  moral  motive  long 
participates  in  that  consciousness  of  subordination  to  some 
external  agency  which  is  joined  with  them;  and  only  as  it 
becomes  distinct  and  predominant  does  it  lose  this  associated 
consciousness — only  then  does  the  feeling  of  obligation  fade." 
As  a  conclusion  from  these  premises  Spencer  holds  that  "  the 
sense  of  duty  or  obligation  is  transitory  and  will  diminish  as 
fast  as  moralization  increases."  Evidently  Spencer  is  like- 
minded  with  Darwin,  yet  perhaps  he  gives  external  authority 
a  larger  share  than  Darwin  does  in  the  production  of  the  sense 
of  obligation. 

6.  Mr.  Kirchmann,  a  German  author  quoted  by  Janet, 
states  the  authority  theory  very  succinctly.  According  to 
him  "  morality  originates  in  the  sentiment  of  respect 
(Achtung)  which  man  feels  in  the  presence  of  a  power  which 
he  feels  to  be  immeasurably  stronger  than  himself.  This 
power  becomes  for  him  an  authority  whose  commands  consti- 
tute the  moral  law.  These  authorities  may  be  reduced  to 
four — that  of  God,  of  the  prince,  of  the  people,  and  of  the 
father  of  the  family.  All  morality  is  positive,  and  is  based 
on  the  will  of  some  authority."  (DiE  GRUNDBEGRIFFE  DES 
KECHTS,  1869.) 

M.  Janet  rejects  the  doctrine  which  derives  moral  obliga- 
tion from  the  constraint  exercised  by  parental,  tribal,  civil 
and  religious  authority,  but  he  very  clearly  states  the  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  this  opinion;  and  we  shall  quote  his  state- 
ment at  length.  Having  premised  that  "  Some  attempt  to 
show  that  the  idea  of  duty  is  developed  in  a  purely  historical 
way,"  he  continues :  "  Mankind,  they  say,  began  by  yielding 
to  their  senses  and  their  appetites;  but  no  long  time  was 
needed  to  teach  them,  as  it  does  even  animals,  that  certain 
things  are  injurious,  although  agreeable  to  the  senses,  while 
others  are  useful,  though  they  are  painful  and  disagreeable. 
Moreover,  men  have  a  natural  sympathy  which  inclines  them 
toward  one  another ;  and  they  spontaneously  obey  the  instinct 
of  kindness  and  of  pity. 

"  From  this  two-fold  source — from  interest  and  sympathy — 
morals  were  born.  Men  became  accustomed  to  abstain  from 
certain  actions,  to  try  to  perform  others,  to  approve  and  to 
blame,  according  as  these  actions  were  in  conformity  with, 
or  were  contrary  to,  sympathy  or  interest.  .  .  .  Thus  men 


186  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVII. 

formed  maxims  which  grew  more  and  more  abstract  and 
general;  and  these  rules,  losing  more  and  more  the  personal 
and  individual  character  which  they  had  at  first,  took  the 
form  of  laws,  of  universal  and  impersonal  principles.  These 
principles  were  transmitted  by  tradition  as  self-evident 
truths ;  and,  as  the  new  generation  were  not  conscious  of  hav- 
ing formed  these  maxims  for  themselves,  from  their  own  per- 
sonal experience,  they  were  regarded  as  absolute  and  neces- 
sary verities — in  a  word,  as  innate  truths,  because  their  his- 
torical origin  had  been  lost  sight  of  in  the  night  of  time." 
So  far  the  argument  is  utilitarian;  it  makes  moral  principle 
the  outgrowth  of  interest  and  sympathy.  But  what  follows 
belongs  to  authority  ethics. 

"When  men  had  formed  the  general  laws  of  which  we 
speak  for  their  own  personal  benefit,  they  were  led  to  impart 
them  to  one  another.  Now  men  are  either  equal  or  unequal. 
If  they  are  equal  they  give  each  other  counsels,  but  if  they 
are  unequal  they  give  each  other  orders.  Thus,  for  example, 
parents  wishing  to  see  their  children  escape  all  the  trials 
and  miseries  through  which  they  had  passed  themselves,  gave 
them  beforehand  a  synopsis  of  the  rules  of  experience;  and 
these  they  presented  in  the  form  of  orders — as  the  expression 
of  an  imperative  necessity  which  it  was  impossible  to  escape. 
In  the  same  way  the  chiefs  of  peoples,  whether  legislators, 
priests,  or  warriors,  having  an  interest  in  the  preservation  of 
the  society  of  which  they  were  the  rulers,  either  for  self- 
interest  or  for  humanity's  sake,  prescribed,  under  the  form  of 
orders  and  laws,  everything  that  experience  had  taught  to 
them  and  to  their  fathers  as  to  the  means  of  preserving  life 
and  making  it  happy. 

"  Doubtless  to  these  maxims  of  general  interest  the 
princes  of  the  people  may  have  added  others  which  concerned 
only  their  own  individual  interests  and  which  were  even 
directly  opposed  to  the  interest  of  their  subjects.  But  what- 
ever share  selfishness  and  oppression  may  have  had  in  the 
first  human  legislation,  the  fact  that  these  societies  were  per- 
manent proves  that  the  greater  number  of  these  primitive 
laws  were  really  useful  to  the  people;  for  they  could  have 
endured  only  through  certain  conservative  principles;  and 
these  are  the  principles  which  afterwards  formed  the  basis 
of  moral  science. 

"  Finally,  at  the  same  time  that  these  rules  of  wisdom  were 
enjoined  upon  the  family  by  domestic,  and  in  the  state  by 


CHAP.  XVII.]     AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (STATED).  187 

political  authority,  they  were  also  enjoined  by  religious  au- 
thority, which,  in  those  early  days,  was  not  distinct  from  the 
political  power;  so  that  everything  which  man  holds  most 
sacred — the  father,  the  prince,  the  priest,  and  God — com- 
manded the  same  things  at  the  same  time.  Moral  laws  do 
not,  then,  present  themselves  merely  as  general  and  specula- 
tive truth,  but  as  commands,  and  they  always  emanate  from 
some  will,  either  sacred  or  secular. 

"We  understand  very  well  to-day  what  power  the  associa- 
tion of  impressions  and  of  ideas  has  over  human  beliefs. 
These  rules,  always  accompanied  by  orders,  'assumed  the  char- 
acter of  necessary  and  obligatory  laws.  Now  that  we  have  for- 
gotten the  wills  which  at  first  commanded  them,  we  still  con- 
tinue to  regard  them  as  commands;  and,  as  they  are  really 
in  close  conformity  with  reason,  since  they  are  the  result  of 
a  long  and  unanimous  experience,  it  is  quite  natural  that  we 
should  regard  them  as  having  been  dictated  a  priori  by  reason 
itself — as  the  work  of  an  internal  legislation  without  any 
legislator."  These  words  of  Janet  may  be  taken  as  a  fair 
statement  of  the  doctrine  of  Professor  Paulsen  of  Berlin, 
who  defines  conscience  as  the  inherited  consciousness  of  cus- 
toms enforced  by  the  authority  of  parents,  teachers  and  magis- 
trates, and  by  the  fear  of  the  gods. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  anthropic  moralists  acknowledge 
that  conscience  and  the  right  are  apparently  obligatory  of 
themselves;  but  they  explain  this  as  a  delusion  consequent 
upon  an  association  of  ideas  in  a  prehistoric  experience. 

7.  The  theistic  theory  of  obligation  has  always  been  attrac- 
tive to  the  more  devout  thinkers  of  the  world.  Anciently  the 
conceptions  of  "  fas  "  and  "  nefas  "  set  forth  the  requirements 
and  the  prohibitions  of  a  supreme  will.  But  Christian 
theologians,  especially,  have  maintained  this  doctrine,  sup- 
posing it  to  be  involved  in  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the 
divine  Being.  William  of  Occam,  the  Nominalist  schoolman, 
said,  "  Nullus  est  actus  malus  nisi  quatenus  a  Deo  prohibitus 
est  et  qui  non  potest  fieri  bonus  si  a  Deo  prascipiatur ;  et  e 
converse.  Ea  est  boni  et  mali  natura  ut,  cum  a  liberrima 
Dei  voluntate  sancita  sit  ac  definita,  ab  eadem  facile  possit 
•  emoveri  et  refigi,  adeo  ut,  mutata  ea  voluntate,  quod  sanctum 
et  justum  est,  possit  evadere  injustum."  (Lib.  II.,  qu.  19.) 
This  may  be  rendered  "  No  act  is  evil  except  so  far  as  it  is 
forbidden  of  God ;  and  there  is  no  act  which  cannot  be  made 
good  if  it  be  enjoined  by  God.  The  nature  of  good  and  evil 


188  ^#£  tiO&AL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVII. 

is  such  that  after  it  has  been  made  obligatory  and  definite 
by  the  most  free  will  of  God,  it  can  easily  be  altered  in  its 
status  and  relation  so  that,  by  a  change  in  that  will,  what  is 
obligated  and  just  can  become  unjust/7 

Bishop  Cumberland  and  some  others  who  have  based 
nuorality  on  "  the  nature  of  things/7  have,  at  the  same  time, 
taught  that  it  depends  on  the  will  of  God,  because,  say  they, 
the  nature  of  things  depends  on  God's  will.  Bishop  War- 
burton  held  that  law  implies  a  law-giver,  "obligation  an 
obliger."  He  says  that  Shaftesbury,  Clark  and  Wollaston 
are  "  wrong  in  making  obligation  arise  from  this  or  that 
property  of  virtue,  such  as  its  beauty,  its  fitness,  or  its  truth, 
...  in  making  it  arise  from  an  abstract  idea  at  all,  or, 
indeed,  from  anything  but  personality  and  the  will  of  another 
different  and  distinct  from  the  person  obliged."  (LETTERS, 
p.  57.)  Dr.  Paley,  who  is  sometimes  denounced  as  an  egoistic 
utilitarian,  really  taught  that  the  divine  will  is  the  founda- 
tion of  right  and  duty.  He  says,  "  Since  moral  obligation 
depends  on  the  will  of  God,  right,  which  is  correlative  to  it, 
must  depend  on  the  same.  Right,  therefore,  signifies  consist- 
ency with  the  will  of  God."  (MoR.  AND  POL.  PHIL.,  Bk.  II., 
Ch.  IX.)  Other  great  English  theologians  have  dissented 
from  these  views.  Eichard  Hooker  writes,  "They  err  who 
think  that  of  the  will  of  God  to  do  this  or  that,  there  is  no 
reason  besides  his  own  will.  .  .  .  The  being  of  God  is  a  kind 
of  law  to  his  working;  for  that  perfection  which  God  is, 
giveth  perfection  to  that  he  doeth."  (EccLES.  POL.,  Bk.  I., 
section  2.)  Stephen  Charnock  (ON  THE  BEING  AND  ATTRI- 
BUTES OF  GOD)  says,  "  The  moral  law  is  not  properly  a  mere 
act  of  God's  will  considered  in  itself,  or  a  tyrannical  edict 
like  those  of  which  it  may  be  said,  "  Stat  pro  ratione  volun- 
tas"  But  it  commands  those  things  which  are  good  in  their 
own  nature  and  prohibits  those  things  which  are  in  their 
nature  evil." 

8.  Among  philosophers  the  teaching  of  Locke  on  this  sub- 
ject is  peculiar.  He  says,  "Moral  good  and  evil  is  only  the 
conformity  or  disagreement  of  our  voluntary  action  to  some 
law  whereby  good  and  evil  are  chosen  as  from  the  will  and 
power  of  the  lawmaker;  which  good  or  evil,  attending  our 
observance  or  breach  of  the  Law  by  the  decree  of  the  law- 
maker, is  what  we  call  reward  or  punishment."  (  ESSAY,  Bk. 
II.,  Ch.  26.)  He  says  further  that  there  are  three  laws  to 
which  men  refer  their  actions,  the  divine  law,  the  civil  law, 


CHAP.  XVII.]     AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (STATED).  189 

and  the  law  of  opinion  or  reputation,  and  that  the  first  of 
these  "  is  the  only  true  touchstone  of  moral  rectitude." 
According  to  these  statements  one  would  take  Locke  to  be 
an  authority  moralist,  but  elsewhere  he  allows  that  there  is  a 
law  or  light  of  nature  distinct  from  the  three  laws  above 
mentioned.  By  "moral  good  and  evil/'  as  opposed  to  good 
and  evil  in  the  general,  Locke  means  virtue  and  vice. 

Theistic  ethics,  as  held  at  the  present  day,  is  stated  as 
follows  by  Dr.  Charles  Hodge,  in  his  "  Systematic  Theology." 
(Vol.  I.,  page  406.)  "The  common  doctrine  of  Christians 
is  that  the  will  of  God  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  moral  obli- 
gation to  all  rational  creatures.  No  higher  reason  can  be 
assigned  why  anything  is  right  than  that  God  commands  it. 
This  means  (1)  that  the  divine  will  is  the  only  rule  for 
deciding  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong;  (2)  that  his  will 
is  that  which  binds  us,  or  that  to  which  we  are  bound  to  be 
conformed."  Then  Dr.  Hodge  adds,  "  By  the  word  '  will '  is 
not  meant  any  arbitrary  purpose  or  that  it  were  conceivable 
that  God  should  will  right  to  be  wrong  or  wrong  right.  The 
will  of  God  is  the  expression  or  revelation  of  his  nature  or  is 
determined  by  it;  so  that  his  will  as  revealed  makes  known 
to  us  what  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  demand.  Some- 
times things  are  right  simply  because  God  has  commanded 
them ;  as  circumcision  and  other  ritual  institutions  were  to  the 
Jews.  Other  things  are  right  because  of  the  present  consti- 
tution of  things  which  God  has  ordained;  such  as  the  duties 
relating  to  property  and  the  permanent  relations  of  society. 
Others,  again,  are  right  because  they  are  demanded  by  the 
immutable  excellence  of  God.  In  all  cases,  however,  so  far 
as  we  are  concerned,  it  is  his  will  that  binds  us  and  con- 
stitutes the  difference  between  right  and  wrong;  his  will, 
that  is,  as  the  expression  of  ^  his  infinite  perfection.  So  that 
the  ultimate  foundation  of  moral  obligation  is  the  nature 
of  God." 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

AUTHORITY   ETHICS    (DISCUSSED). 

1.  The  phrase  "  legal  obligation  "  is  ambiguous.  We  distinguish 
obligation  which  is  merely  coercive  and  governmental  from  that 
which  is  conscientious  and  moral. — 2.  The  obligation  of  compul- 
sion and  that  also  of  duty  are  sometimes  called  necessities. 
This  language  is  metonymical  and  does  not  express  a  true  neces- 
sity. It  refers  to  the  necessary  voluntary  action  of  the  perfectly 
discreet  or  perfectly  virtuous  man  under  given  circumstances. 
— 3.  Non-moral  and  moral  obligation  frequently  coalesce. — 4. 
Authority  often  signifies  the  power  to  impose  coercive  obliga- 
tion, but  often,  also,  this  power  as  rightfully  possessed. — 5.  Just 
authority  exists  in  order  to  maintain  and  promote  the  right,  and 
derives  its  own  Tightness  from  that  end.  But  while  fulfilling 
this  function  it  sometimes  confers  a  new  Tightness  on  tilings 
commanded  by  it. — 6.  Even  properly  constituted  authority 
should  be  disobeyed  if  it  require  what  is  contrary  to  right  and 
conscience. — 7.  Just  authority  presupposes  moral  Tightness  and 
moral  obligation.  It  is  not  the  first  foundation  of  these  things. 
Even  God  who  is  subject  to  no  authority  recognizes  the  supre- 
macy of  the  right  over  every  other  possible  aim. — 8.  The  views 
of  Herbert  Spencer,  considered. — 9.  Also  those  of  Dr.  Charles 
Hodge. 


1.  A  FAIR  estimate  of  authority  ethics  could  scarcely  be 
comprised  in  a  single  statement.  But  we  may  attempt  it 
in.  a  series  of  remarks. 

Our  criticisms,  too,  may  be  more  intelligible  if  we  bear 
in  mind  the  views  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  and  of  Dr.  Charles 
Hodge  as  two  eminent  -hough  widely  separated  advocates  of 
the  Authority  hypothesis. 

In  our  discussion  we  shall  endeavor  to  substantiate  the 
following  points:  (1)  there  is  a  difference  between  legal 
and  moral  obligation;  (2)  though  both  legal  and  moral 
obligation  are  often  expressed  in  terms  of  necessity, 
this  language  is  not  strictly  and  literally  true,  but  meto- 
nymical; (3)  legal  and  moral  obligation  frequently  operate 
190 


CHAP.  XVIII.]     AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED).  191 

together,  for  which  reason  they  are  sometimes  confounded, 
as  if  they  were  essentially  the  same;  (4)  two  conceptions  of 
authority,  one  generic  and  primary,  the  other  secondary  and 
specific,  should  be  distinguished  from  each  other;  and  (5) 
moral  obligation,  or  "  oughtness,"  is  a  relation  sui  generis, 
which  arises  between  a  rational  being  and  the  morally  right, 
whenever  this  latter  offers  itself  as  an  end  of  desire  and  effort. 

The  word  "  legal "  sometimes  indicates  that  which  the  law 
conceives  of  and  demands  whether  it  be  realized  or  not.  One 
might  be  the  legal  owner  of  some  property  of  which  some  one 
else  is  the  actual  possessor ;  liberty  is  the  legal  right  of  a 
man  unjustly  imprisoned.  This  style  of  legality  often  im- 
plies that  a  thing  is  just — or,  as  we  say,  lawful  and  right — 
because  governmental  institutions  generally  aim  to  enforce 
the  right.  But  sometimes  laws  are  unjust  and  wrong;  in 
that  case  a  claim  under  them  might  be  legal  without  being 
right. 

In  the  present  connection  the  word  denotes  that  which  the 
law  actually  effects  or  which  is  in  actual  accordance  with  the 
law.  This  sense  of  the  term  appears  when  one  speaks  of 
the  legal  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  purchase  of  some  prop- 
erty or  of  the  legal  settlement  of  a  dispute.  To  say  that  one 
is  under  legal  obligation  to  do  this  or  that  ordinarily  means 
merely  that  the  law  puts  him  under  constraint  to  follow  its 
directions.  Such  obligation  is  simply  the  condition  of  a 
subject  of  government  as  being  under  compulsory  inducement 
to  do  or  not  to  do.  Beyond  question  such  an  obligation 
arises  under  those  influences — political,  social  and  religious 
— of  which  Spencer  speaks.  But  we  must  deny  that  this 
is  the  same  as  moral  obligation. 

Mr.  Spencer  sees  no  difference  between  these  things.  He 
says,  "  Since,  with  the  restraints  thus  generated,  is  always 
joined  the  thought  of  external  coercion,  there  arises  the 
notion  of  obligation ; "  then  he  identifies  this  notion  with 
"  the  sense  of  duty  or  moral  obligation,"  and,  on  the  strength 
of  this  identification,  declares  the  latter  to  be  "  transitory." 
(See  the  quotations  in  Chapter  XVII.) 

That  coercive  and  governmental  is  distinguishable  from 
conscientious  and  moral  obligation^  evident.  The  subjects 
of  an  established  tyranny  under  which  cruel  punishment  fol- 
lows the  refusal  of  taxes  or  services  feel  themselves  obliged 
to  comply  with  iniquitous  exactions,  and,  as  time  goes  on,  this 
their  sense  of  obligation  becomes  habitual.  Under  these  cir- 


192  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

cumstances  the  payment  of  taxes  and  the  rendering  of  services 
are  done  from  fear,  not  from  duty.  So  the  member  of  a 
social  organization,  a  lodge,  or  club,  or  fraternity,  in  which 
a  man  of  strict  principle  cannot  be  popular  or  even  avoid 
being  obnoxious,  feels  himself  bound,  unless  he  be  a  very 
strong  character,  to  comply  with  the  expectations  of  his  com- 
panions. Sometimes  this  social  constraint  has  coerced  the 
adherents  of  conspiracy  into  the  commission  of  atrocious 
crimes.  Or,  should  one  profess  some  creed  or  adopt  some 
mode  of  life,  as  prerequisite  to  an  eternal  salvation,  he  would 
act  from  a  sense  of  religious,  but  not  from  a  sense  of  moral, 
obligation.  In  each  of  the  above  cases  the  relation  mentioned 
is  that  of  compulsory  inducement, — or  of  practical  necessity, 
as  it  is  often  called — to  do  this  or  that. 

This  obligation,  legal  in  the  sense  of  being  imposed  by 
established  dominion  or  authority,  is  essentially  similar  to 
that  compulsion  which,  in  the  absence  of  authority,  results 
from  the  foresight  of  impersonal  causation.  If  one's  path 
led  directly  over  a  precipice,  he  would  find  himself  under 
a  necessity  to  turn  to  the  right  hand  or  to  the  left. 
If  your  life  depended  on  taking  an  offensive  drug  or  on 
submitting  to  a  severe  operation,  you  would  feel  obliged 
to  accept  the  means  of  cure.  When  there  is  a  prospect 
of  great  loss  or  suffering,  a  sensible  person  is  bound 
to  do  what  he  can  to  prevent  it.  The  compulsory  ele- 
ment in  such  cases  is  precisely  the  same  as  in  the  penalties 
prescribed  by  authority.  And  the  obligation  mentioned  by 
Spencer  is  of  this  nature;  he  says,  "The  fear  joined  with 
three  sets  of  representations  becomes,  by  association,  joined 
with  the  fourth."  All  such  obligation  is  different  from  that 
of  duty  because  the  latter  appeals,  not  to  fear  nor  to  interest, 
but  to  one's  respect  for  the  right.  It  does  not  operate 
through  a  dread  of  threatened  evil,  but  through  a  sense  of  the 
absolute  superiority  of  the  right  over  every  competitive  end. 
While  rewards  and  punishments  add  their  weight,  the  right 
obligates  of  itself  and  altogether  aside  from  governmental 
inducements. 

2.  That  obligation  which  results  from  external  power  and 
its  threats  of  penalty  or  evil  is,  as  we  have  said,  often  spoken 
of  as  "practical  necessity."  It  is  allied  to  the  compulsory 
of  which  Aristotle  speaks  as  a  mode  of  the  necessary;  for 
compulsory  obedience  results  from  a  sense  of  this  kind  of 
obligation.  Then,  too,  that  obligation  which  arises  upon  the 


CHAP.  XVIII.]    AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED).          193 

contemplation  of  right  ends  and  actions  is  occasionally 
described  as  a  moral  necessity,  and  it  is  said  that  every  human 
being  is  under  a  necessity  to  obey  the  moral  law.  The  fact 
also  is  cited  that  men  in  view  of  considerations  of  interest 
or  of  duty  frequently  say,  "  I  must  do  so ;  I  cannot  do  other- 
wise." 

Notwithstanding  this  use  of  terms  there  seems  to  be  no  true 
and  absolute  necessity  either  in  non-moral  or  in  moral  obli- 
gation. Falstaff  correctly  held  that  it  was  not  necessary 
for  him  to  give  a  reason  on  compulsion.  A  man  if  he  chose 
might  walk  over  a  precipice  without  turning  to  the  right 
hand  or  to  the  left.  Patients  seriously  ill  might  reject  the 
indispensable  means  of  cure.  Fools  have  despised  necessary 
precautions  and  brought  ruin  on  themselves.  Desperadoes 
have  defied  officers  of  justice  and  been  shot  down.  Patriots 
and  martyrs  have  accepted  the  stake  and  the  rack  rather  than 
betray  their  country  or  their  faith.  So  also  one  may  clearly 
understand  the  requirements  of  duty  or  of  God's  law,  and 
yet  deliberately  disregard  them.  Why,  in  such  cases,  do  we 
speak  of  the  agent  being  under  a  necessity  to  do  this  or 
that  when  the  event  shows  that  no  necessity  exists? 

We  answer  this  question  by  saying  that  all  obligation, 
whether  non-moral  or  moral,  is  immediately  related  to  a  true 
motive  necessity  the  language  of  which  it  borrows.  The 
necessity  thus  referred  to  is  not  that  connecting  any  external 
consequent  with  its  antecedent.  For  example,  it  is  not  the 
necessity  whereby  death  would  certainly  follow  the  fall  over 
the  precipice  or  the  defiance  of  the  officers  of  justice,  or  where- 
by self-condemnation  and  wretchedness  will  result  from  vio- 
lating the  moral  law.  These  necessities  are  closely  connected 
with  that  now  to  be  considered;  they  are  conditions  of  it, 
but  yet  are  to  be  distinguished  from  it.  Our  thought  is  now 
directed,  not  to  the  necessity  of  the  result  of  one's  action  or 
inaction,  but  to  the  necessity  operating  in  the  agent  himself 
~by  reason  of  his  foresight  of  that  result.  This  necessity 
affects  voluntary  action,  rendering  it  inevitable  and  certain. 
The  well-trained  pilot,  knowing  that  neglect  of  duty  may 
lose  the  ship,  is  necessarily  careful.  The  intelligent 
merchant,  aware  of  the  requirements  of  his  customers,  neces- 
sarily keeps  a  proper  stock  of  goods.  Even  the  prudent  man 
of  pleasure,  through  this  voluntary  necessity,  is  certain  to 
avoid  excesses  because  he  sees  that  otherwise  his  health  will 
be  destroyed.  So  the  virtuous  man  necessarily  obeys  the 


194:  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

moral  law,  because  he  is  governed  by  the  love  of  righteousness 
and  a  hatred  of  evil.  In  like  manner  the  conduct  of  the 
divine  being  is  inevitably  holy  and  just  and  good. 
•  The  necessity  now  mentioned  is  not  referred  to  in  our 
judgments  respecting  obligation  as  actually  existing,  but, 
according  to  a  very  common  mode  of  thought,  as  a  thing  con- 
ceived of — it  is  an  hypothetical  necessity.  In  the  case  of  the 
non-moral  voluntary  necessity  the  inducements  are  supposed 
to  be  addressed  to  a  person  who  will  certainly  act  according 
to  the  dictates  of  prudence  and  interest;  in  other  words  the 
ordinary  operation  of  reason  and  fear  is  taken  for  granted. 
The  assertion  is  that  man,  acting  under  that  operation,  cannot 
but  comply  with  given  requirements  of  power  or  of  exigency. 
The  necessity  of  moral  conduct  differs  from  the  foregoing 
only  because  it  arises  from  different  inducements  and  operates 
through  a  different  part  of  man's  nature.  A  certain  action 
is  seen  to  be  right  and  the  opposite  of  it  wrong,  whereupon 
it  is  necessarily  performed  by  "the  wise  man,"  the  man  of 
principle.  The  agent,  being  by  supposition  not  merely  a 
moral  being  but  also  controlled  by  his  moral  disposition,  is 
so  inclined  that  he  inevitably  seeks  the  right.  Here  again 
we  have  a  true  hypothetical  necessity.  As  the  man  of  pru- 
dence must  act  according  to  his  apprehended  interests,  so  the 
man  of  principle  must  act  according  to  his  sense  of  duty. 
(Respecting  the  nature  of  necessity,  real  and  hypothetical, 
see  THE  PERCEPTIONALIST,  Chap.  XX.) 

Now  the  "  practical  necessity  "  of  which  men  speak,  mean- 
ing by  this  phrase  a  compulsory  inducement,  is  quite  different 
from  the  above  mentioned  necessities.  In  the  first  place  it 
is  not  an  hypothetical  but  a  real  relation;  it  is  the  position 
of  one  who  is  under  the  actual  pressure  of  strong  inducements. 
In  the  second  place  it  is  not  a  true  necessity,  because  the  an- 
tecedent or  ground  of  it  is  left  doubtful  and  unperfected.  It 
is  a  case  in  which  a  true  necessity  might  be  asserted  if  we 
knew  that  the  agent  would  be  governed  by  ordinary  prudence 
or  fear  of  consequences.  But  we  do  not  know  this.  When 
we  say  that  he  must  do  so  and  so  we  assert  only  that  he  is 
naturally  bound,  or  obligated,  or  placed  under  compulsory 
inducement,  to  do  so  and  so,  but  we  do  this  by  referring  to 
the  hypothetical  action  of  a  rational  being  and  by  using 
language  relating  to  that  hypothesis.  We  find  Mr.  A.  build- 
ing a  house  on  a  defective  plan;  we  tell  him  that  he  must 
change  his  plan.  This  means  only  that  a  better  plan,  which 


CHAP.  XVIII.]     A  UTHOR1TY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED).  195 

a  wise  man  could  not  but  accept,  imperatively  appeals  to 
Mr.  A. 

In  like  manner  the  moral  necessity  of  which  we  hear  some- 
times, and  which  is  discussed  by  ethical  writers,  is  not  a  true 
necessity,  but  is  only  an  aspect  under  which  moral  obligation 
may  be  viewed.  Mr.  B.  is  reluctant  to  keep  a  contract;  we 
tell  him  he  must  keep  it — that  he  is  absolutely  bound  to  keep 
it.  This  simply  signifies  that  a  duty,  which  a  virtuous  man 
could  by  no  means  neglect,  puts  forth  its  claim  on  Mr.  B. 

If  the  foregoing  statements  be  correct,  it  is  plain  that 
obligation  is  not  necessity  nor  necessity  obligation,  although, 
under  a  given  hypothesis,  obligation,  whether  non-moral  or 
moral,  is  the  ground  of  a  necessity.  And  that  being  so, 
while  necessity  may  be  used  to  state,  it  cannot  be  used  to 
explain,  obligation.  For  the  obligation  precedes  and  explains 
the  necessity. 

Non-moral  obligation  is  the  position  of  one  who  is  under 
compulsory  inducement;  moral  obligation  is  the  position  of 
one  who  is  under  moral  inducement.  Both  are  wholly 
peculiar  personal  relations. 

Moreover,  although  moral  obligation  is  properly  set  forth 
by  saying  that  it  is  our  duty  to  be  conformed  to  the  hypothet- 
ical action  of  the  man  of  principle,  this  asserts  obligation 
only  in  a  secondary  way.  Assuming  that  the  ideal  man  is 
necessarily  and  absolutely  governed  by  duty,  it  says  that  we 
should  follow  his  example.  Therefore  terms  relating  to 
necessity  seem  not  to  be  so  immediate  expressions  of  our 
relation  to  the  right  as  those  derived  from  indebtedness, 
such  as  "  oughtness  "  or  "  duty,"  or  even  as  those  originally 
denoting  the  "  proper,"  the  "  becoming,"  the  "  suitable,"  or 
the  "worthy." 

To  some  the  foregoing  explanation  of  that  language  in 
which  obligation,  whether  non-moral  or  moral,  is  spoken  of 
in  terms  of  necessity,  may  appear  needlessly  complex.  We 
would  gladly  consider  any  simpler  explanation  that  may  be 
suggested.  But,  on  the  basis  above  given,  it  is  clear  that 
moral  obligation  in  no  sense  arises  from  subjection  to  author- 
ity. Not  even  all  non-moral  obligation  has  this  origin,  but 
only  that  which  results  from  governmental  compulsion. 
Moral  obligation  is  founded  on  the  inherent  excellence  and 
superiority  of  the  right. 

3.  While  non-moral  and  moral  obligation  are  radically 
different,  it  is  important  to  remark  that  these  two  modes  of 


196  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

inducement  frequently  coalesce.  To  this  fact  we  ascribe  it 
that  some  fail  to  perceive  the  distinction  between  them.  But, 
as  already  remarked,  the  two  modes  of  motive  do  not  always 
coincide.  Eulers  and  even  laws  may  be  unjust;  and  this 
injustice  may  become  inveterate  and  last  for  generations. 
The  people  through  their  sense  of  legal  obligation  continue 
to  obey  till  some  insufferable  excess  of  tyranny  excites  vio- 
lence and  revolution.  In  addition  to  iniquitous  exactions 
civil  rulers  may  command  their  subjects  to  do  things  wrong 
and  wicked,  and  in  this  case,  especially,  non-moral  and  moral 
obligation  do  not  co-operate,  but  conflict,  with  one  another. 
At  the  same  time,  perhaps  in  the  majority  of  cases,  civil 
government,  social  customs  and  religious  doctrines,  call  for 
the  same  conduct  which  the  moral  sense  approves.  This  con- 
duct may  be  far  from  ideal  perfection,  yet  it  is  believed  to 
be  right  and  respected  as  such.  Under  these  circumstances 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  sentiment  of  duty  should  oc- 
casionally be  confounded  with  those  other  sentiments  which 
mingle  with  it  and  give  it  their  support.  This  confusion 
is  promoted  by  the  analogy  which  exists  between  legal  and 
moral  obligation  and  by  the  fact  that  the  language  of  the 
latter  is  largely  taken  from  that  of  the  former.  But  it 
arises  chiefly  because  the  two  modes  of  motive  are  so  generally 
coincident  in  operation.  This  will  be  better  understood  if 
we  consider  what  is  meant  by  the  word  "  authority,"  and  in 
what  ways  authority  is  related  to  the  right  and  obligatory. 

4.  This  word  is  used  in  two  distinguishable  senses,  one 
generic  and  primary,  the  other  secondary  and  specific.  Ac- 
cording to  the  primary  and  fundamental  sense  it  signifies 
the  power  of  one  person  to  place  another  under  coercive,  or 
legal,  obligation.  This  authority  includes  that  of  decrees, 
ordinances  and  statutes;  for  these  are  the  expression  of  the 
authority  of  persons.  Now  this  authority — this  power  to 
place  others  under  coercive  inducement — is  not  necessarily  a 
thing  right  and  obligatory.  It  is  simply  the  function  of 
issuing  commands  disobedience  to  which  renders  one  liable 
to  threatened  penalty.  The  leader  of  a  predatory  band  who 
levies  tribute  from  some  village  or  district  exercises  this 
kind  of  authority.  So  does  the  political  boss,  in  a  city  or  in 
a  state,  who  compels  office-holders  and  office-seekers  to  pay 
their  party  assessments.  In  such  cases  the  demand  is  met, 
not  because  it  is  rightful,  but  because  it  is  compulsory — 
because  compliance  is  essential  to  one's  interests.  But  in 


CHAP.  XVIII.]     A  UTHOR1TY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED).  197 

other  cases,  for  example,  in  the  payment  of  taxes  or  in  mili- 
tary service,  obedience  is  rendered  not  simply  because  of  the 
compulsory  authority,  but  in  recognition  of  the  rightfulness 
of  the  demand,  and,  it  may  be,  because  of  the  rightfulness  of 
the  authority.  This  brings  before  us  the  secondary  sense  of 
the  word. 

By  authority  we  often  mean  rightful  authority — the  right 
of  one  person  to  have  and  exercise  the  power  of  placing  an- 
other under  coercive  obligation.  Such  is  the  condition  of 
human  beings  that  they  need  to  be  compelled  and  constrained 
all  their  lives  to  do  that  which  is  right;  for  which  reason 
certain  modes  of  government  whose  prevalent  operation  is  to 
promote  the  right  and  to  suppress  the  wrong,  become  them- 
selves right  and  obligatory.  Hence  the  duty  of  obedience 
to  parents,  to  civil  rulers,  to  official  superiors  and  to  all 
properly  constituted  authorities.  Frequently,  in  ordinary 
speech,  our  thoughts  confine  themselves  to  this  rightful  au- 
thority, and  so  we  condemn  disobedience  to  authority,  and  we 
conceive  of  an  illegal  act  as  unlawful,  as  illegitimate,  as 
wrong — which  it  commonly  is. 

5.  In  certain  cases,  however,  the  commands  even  of  right- 
ful rulers  are  to  be  disobeyed  and  fought  against.  Mary, 
Queen  of  Scots,  reproached  John  Knox  because  he  rejected 
her  authority  in  religious  matters.  Referring  to  the  primi- 
tive Christians  she  said,  "  None  of  these  men  raised  the 
sword  against  their  princes."  Knox  answered,  "  God, 
Madam,  gave  them  not  the  power  and  the  means."  "  Think 
you,"  said  the  Queen,  "that  subjects,  having  the  power, 
may  resist  their  princes  ? "  The  reformer  replied,  "  If 
princes  exceed  their  bounds,  Madam,  they  may  be  resisted, 
even  by  power." 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  authority — that  is,  rightful 
authority — bears  three  relations  to  the  right.  First,  it  is 
founded  on  the  right — not  merely  on  the  possession  of  power ; 
secondly,  its  office  is  to  maintain  and  promote  the  right;  and 
thirdly,  it  confers  a  new  Tightness  on  things  rightfully  com- 
manded by  it.  The  first  of  these  relations  is  founded  on  the 
second,  since  the  only  reason  on  account  of  which  any  govern- 
ment can  justly  demand  obedience  is  that  it  is  to  be  the 
instrument  of  right  and  justice;  the  second  rests  on  the  fact 
that  government  is  needed  to  enforce  the  right  (for  any 
properly  administered  form  of  government  is  more  promotive 
of  the  right  than  anarchy  would  be) ;  the  third  is  a  corollary 


198  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

from  the  other  two,  because  it  must  be  a  duty  to  do  what 
is  rightly  commanded. 

The  statement  that  authority  confers  Tightness  and  obliga- 
toriness  on  its  commands  is  the  important  one  for  us  at 
present.  An  understanding  of  it  calls  for  a  definition  of  that 
province  within  which  authority  may  be  rightfully  exercised. 
First,  then,  we  say — positively — that  authority  may  not  only 
enforce  what  is  already  dutiful,  but,  in  some  cases,  may  make 
an  action  dutiful  which  was  not  obligatory  prior  to  the  com- 
mand. Part  of  the  office  of  rulers  is  to  determine  the 
methods  in  which  public  and  private  affairs  may  be  conducted 
without  disorder  and  for  the  best  interests  of  all.  Often  to 
this  end  it  is  not  so  necessary  that  any  particular  method 
should  be  adopted  as  that  some  one  method  should  be  pre- 
scribed. English  law  requires  that  vehicles  passing  each 
other  on  the  road  should  each  turn  to  the  left  hand;  Ameri- 
can law  that  they  should  turn  to  the  right.  Many  of  the 
requirements  of  the  common  law  are  simply  modes  of  doing 
to  which  immemorial  usage  has  given  a  preference.  Many 
imperative  rules  of  pleading  and  of  court  procedure  have  for 
their  object  only  the  orderly  conduct  of  business.  Regula- 
tions laid  down  by  the  proper  authority  must  be  obeyed. 
Moreover  it  is  the  function  of  government  to  devise  or  adopt 
measures  for  the  general  welfare ;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  citizens 
to  co-operate  in  such  measures.  Commonly,  too,  authority 
must  designate  by  whom  and  under  whose  direction  the  serv- 
ice of  the  public  is  to  be  accomplished;  just  as  a  general 
selects  the  troops  and  officers  for  some  military  enterprise. 
Thus,  in  many  cases,  duty  is  imposed  by  authority.  In  all 
cases,  however,  authority  does  not  originate  the  right  and 
obligatory  end,  but  only  the  manner  and  agency  of  its  pur- 
suit. Nor  can  authority  be  exercised  rightfully  except  so 
far  as  it  may  be  needed  for  a  right  end. 

6.  Therefore  we  say  in  the  second  place, — and  negatively— 
that  circumstances  may  arise  under  which  it  becomes  dutiful 
to  disobey  the  commands  even  of  properly  constituted  author- 
ity. The  right  of  revolution  exists  when  government  becomes 
tyranny.  When  rulers,  instead  of  striving  for  the  general 
good,  use  their  authority  to  enslave  and  rob  their  subjects, 
they  forfeit  all  allegiance  and  should  be  driven  from  power. 
Plainly,  however,  no  revolution  should  be  attempted  without 
a  fair  prospect  of  obtaining  the  ends  desired.  The  overthrow 
of  a  wicked  government,  or  even  active  resistance  to  it,  is  a 


CHAP.  XVIIL]     AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED}.  199 

duty  only  for  those  to  whom  God  has  given  "  the  power  and 
the  means." 

Sometimes,  when  there  is  no  prospect  of  effectual  resist- 
ance, one  may  refuse  obedience  to  an  unjust  law  in  order  to 
make  an  emphatic  protest  and  to  bring  the  matter  before 
the  bar  of  public  opinion.     But  if  the  demands  of  authorit^ 
be  not  only  unjust,  but  such  that  the  compliance  with  them  I 
would  involve  the  violation  of  conscience,  one  has  no  option/- 
but to  disobey.     If  it  were  possible  for  the  Divine  Being  to 
require  what  one  knew  to  be  wrong  and  wicked,  it  would  be 
one's  duty  to  refuse.     Such  a  supposition  is  absurd;   God 
cannot  be  tempted  of  evil,  neither  tempteth  he  any  man. 
If  we  can  know  beyond  a  doubt  what  he  would  have  us  do, 
we  may  be  sure  that  obedience  will  be  just  and  right.     Never- 
theless the  above  suppositional  judgment  correctly  sets  forth, 
our  duty  to  disregard  any  authority  whatever  that  commands/ 
wrongdoing. 

7.  If  these  things  be  so,  Tightness  is  not  founded  on  au- 
thority. On  the  contrary,  authority  is  legitimate  only  so/ 
far  as  it  has  the  realization  of  right  for  its  end;  and  it  is 
obligatory  only  while  it  is  exercised  within  certain  proper 
boundaries.  The  limits  are  determined  by  the  nature  of  the 
case  rationally  considered,  or  by  the  law,  understanding 
or  appointment,  under  which'  the  authority  exists.  When 
rulers  transgress  these  bounds,  obedience  is  no  longer  a 
duty;  and  when  they  command  iniquity,  it  is  our  duty 
to  disobey.  Clearly,  also,  although  authority  may  have 
a  rightfulness,  and  may  confer  rightfulness  upon  its  com- 
mands, this  character  is  not  originally  its  own,  but  is  de- 
rived from  the  right  which  authority  is  designed  to  serve. 
If  an  agent,  acting  upon  his  instructions,  contract  a  debt  for 
a  principal,  the  principal  is  bound.  Yet  the  origin  of  the 
obligation  is  not  in  the  act  of  the  agent,  but  in  his  appoint- 
ment by  the  principal.  So  authority  may  bind,  morally,  but 
the  origin  of  this  obligation  is  not  in  the  authority,  but  in 
that  obligatory  right  of  which  authority  is  the  minister  and 
instrument. 

Once  more;  the  nature  of  moral  obligation  may  be  more 
clearly  perceived  if  we  consider  it  apart  from  authority  and 
from  legal  obligation.  It  may  be  impossible  to  find  any 
instance  in  which  the  moral  agent  is  not  subject  to  some 
authority,  but  cases  are  at  least  conceivable  in  which  one 
may  act  dutifully  without  reference  to  authority  and  simply 


200  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

from  regard  for  the  right  as  obligatory.  Should  the  captain 
of  a  ship  at  sea  discover  another  vessel  about  to  founder  and 
carry  all  on  board  down  to  a  watery  grave,  his  sense  of  duty 
would  lead  him  to  succor  the  perishing,  whether  this  were 
included  in  his  sailing  instructions  or  not.  In  like  manner 
the  social  reformer  and  the  philanthropist  who  devote  them- 
selves to  the  service  of  mankind,  act  from  a  sense  of  duty 
rather  than  from  obedience  to  authority.  One  may  say  that 
in  such  cases  the  authority  of  conscience  and  duty  is  respected. 
That  is  true,  but  only  metaphorically.  The  "  authority  " 
mentioned  is  simply  the  force  of  moral  obligation,  and  is 
wholly  distinct  from  external  control. 

Were  one  to  attend  more  to  words  than  to  thoughts  an 
argument  of  some  force  might  be  made  for  the  derivation  of 
morality  from  authority.  All  terms  expressive  of  the  rela- 
tions of  duty  appear  to  have  been  originally  suggestive  of 
coercive  inducement,  and  to  have  been  applied  to  moral  as 
reinforced  by  non-moral  obligation.  The  nouns  duty,  obli- 
gation, imperative,  necessity,  requirement,  the  verbs  must, 
should,  ought,  bind,  constrain,  compel,  have  unmoral 
as  well  as  moral  meanings.  But  while  these  meanings 
often  combine  they  are  also  often  separated,  and  sometimes 
they  are  opposed  to  one  another.  The  closing  words  of 
Luther's  speech  before  Charles  the  Fifth  expressed  loyalty 
to  truth  and  principle  in  opposition  to  the  requirements  of  au- 
thority— "  Hier  stehe  ich ;  ich  kann  nicht  anders." 

The  question  has  been  asked,  "  Is  God  governed  by  a  sense 
of  duty  ?  "  We  believe  he  is,  though  of  course  he  is  not  in- 
fluenced by  external  authority.  In  planning  for  his  creatures 
he  chooses  the  best,  and  feels  that  he  cannot  do  otherwise.  He 
recognizes  the  supremacy  of  the  right  over  every  other  possible 
aim.  This  is  implied  in  our  conception  of  a  righteous  God. 

Moral  obligation,  therefore,  is  a  relation  between  the  ra- 
tional agent  and  the  right;  it  is  not  a  relation  between  the 
rational  agent  and  authority. 

8.  Recurring  now  to  Mr.  Spencer,  let  us  credit  him  with 
as  good  a  conception  of  moral  obligation  as  could  be  formed 
from  the  materials  to  which  he  felt  himself  restricted.  He 
is  not  chargeable  with  all  the  confusions  which  gather  them- 
selves about  the  word  "authority."  Doubtless  he  would 
allow  that  no  allegiance  is  due  to  an  unprincipled  usurper, 
and  that  even  a  rightful  ruler  should  be  disobeyed  if  he  com- 
mand what  is  wrong  and  wicked.  But,  contemplating  the 


CHAP.  XV1IL]     AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED).  201 

rightful  operation  of  rightful  authority,  he  teaches  that  moral 
obligation  is  the  result  of  habitual  subjection  to  this  specific 
exercise  of  power — that  it  is  the  position  of  one  who  realizes 
this  subjection.  This  doctrine  is  quite  intelligible.  But  the 
term  "  rightful "  used  in  our  statement  of  it,  refers  to  the 
utilitarian  conception  of  morality,  and  therefore  designates 
merely  that  which  contributes  to  human  welfare.  In  his  let- 
ter to  Mr.  Mill,  Spencer,  speaking  of  "  certain  fundamental 
moral  intuitions,"  says  that  "  these  moral  intuitions  are  the 
results  of  accumulateid  experiences  of  utility  gradually  organ- 
ized and  inherited."  More  explicitly  he  says,  "  I  believe  that 
the  experiences  of  utility,  organized  and  consolidated  through 
all  past  generations  of  the  human  race,  have  been  producing 
corresponding  nervous  modifications  which,  by  continued 
transmission  and  accumulation,  have  become  in  us  certain 
faculties  of  moral  intuition,  certain  emotions  responding  to 
right  and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis  in  the 
individual  experiences  of  utility." 

Some,  who  would  like  some  evidence  for  the  statements 
even  of  great  philosophers,  would  respectfully  inquire  how 
Mr.  Spencer  knows  what  has  occurred  throughout  all  past 
generations,  and  on  what  ground  he  asserts  the  transmuta- 
tion of  "  nervous  modifications "  into  "  faculties  of  moral 
intuition."  But,  passing  by  these  queries,  the  pressing  ques- 
tion with  us  is,  "  Does  Spencer's  theory  harmonize  with  the 
consciousness  of  those  rational  beings  who  are  now  alive  ?  " 
We  think  it  does  not,  and  that,  from  this  point  of  view,  it 
is  defective  in  two  respects.  First,  its  conception  of  the 
right  as  composed  of  "consolidated  experiences  of  utility," 
is  low  and  inadequate;  and,  secondly,  its  conception  of  moral 
obligation  fails  to  note  that  the  right  is  obligatory  of  itself, 
apart  from  authority,  and  indeed  that  the  obligatoriness  of 
authority,  so  far  as  it  is  moral,  arises  from  the  obligatori- 
ness of  the  right. 

Mr.  Spencer  uses  the  deductive  or  derivate  mode  of  philos- 
ophizing. Holding  that  spiritual  life  is  identical  with  nerv- 
ous energy  and  that  thought  and  feeling  are  the  refinement 
and  reproduction  of  nervous  activity,  he  derives  the  sentient 
from  the  insentient,  the  immaterial  from  the  material,  and 
the  moral  from  the  unmoral.  His  conclusions  are  so  re- 
pugnant to  the  analysis  of  consciousness  as  to  suggest  that 
the  hypotheses  with  which  they  are  connected  should  be  aban- 
doned. For  our  part,  we  know  of  no  good  reason  to  believe 


202  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

that  man  is  the  product  of  molecular  evolution  or  even  that 
he  was  changed  in  some  prehistoric  period  from  an  unmoral 
to  a  moral  being.  The  weight  of  evidence  and  of  argument 
is  against  these  suppositions.  But  if  an  irrational  savage 
brute  ever  was  developed  into  a  man,  it  must  have  been 
through  the  acquisition  of  a  new  faculty  and  not  through 
an  habitual  dread  of  punishment. 

9.  In  estimating  the  statements  of  Dr.  Hodge,  let  us  re- 
member that  his  aim  is  theological  rather  than  ethical,  and 
that  what  might  be  ultimate  for  a  teacher  of  religion  may 
fall  short  of  the  ultimate  for  a  philosopher.  Addressing 
those  who  believe  in  God  and  in  a  supernatural  revelation, 
Dr.  Hodge  declares  that  the  will  of  God  is  the  supreme 
rule,  and  the  law  of  God  an  absolute  standard,  of  human 
conduct.  This  position  cannot  be  disputed.  But  it  sets  forth 
an  absolute  rule  of  judgment  rather  than  a  fundamental 
principle  of  science.  That  "  the  will  of  God  is  the  ultimate 
ground  of  moral  obligation  "  is  a  final  statement  only  as  ter- 
minating quest  and  argument  respecting  any  matter  on  which 
God  has  given  a  command.  It  is  not  an  explanation  of  the 
nature  of  duty. 

This  is  evident  because,  as  Bishop  Butler  says,  "  God  can- 
not approve  of  anything  but  what  is  in  itself  right,  fit,  just. 
All  should  worship  and  endeavor  to  obey  Him  with  this 
consciousness  in  view."  In  other  words,  God's  authority 
should  be  obeyed  as  upholding  the  right,  as  defining  and  de- 
termining the  right,  and  as  being  therefore  itself  right  and 
obligatory,  but  not  as  creating  the  right.  Indeed,  those 
sacred  Scriptures,  revered  by  Dr.  Hodge  as  the  expression  of 
the  divine  will,  urge  men  to  pursue  virtue  according  to  their 
own  perceptions  of  what  is  right  and  dutiful,  and  not  merely 
as  being  what  God's  will  requires.  In  the  following  words 
an  inspired  man  expresses  the  general  teaching  of  the  proph- 
ets and  apostles :  "  Finally,  brethren,  whatsoever  things  are 
true,  whatsoever  things  are  honest,  whatsoever  things  are 
just,  whatsoever  things  are  pure,  whatsoever  things  are  lovely, 
whatsoever  things  are  of  good  report,  if  there  be  any  virtue, 
if  there  be  any  praise,  think  on  these  things."  Even  should 
we  adopt  that  extreme  view  which  regards  reason  as  God's 
voice  and  law  within  us  (and  not  merely  a  fallible  faculty 
whereby  we  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong)  this  would 
not  make  the  inward  instruction  the  origin  of  duty  but  only 
our  guide  to  the  knowledge  of  it. 


CHAP.  XVIII.J    AUTHORITY  ETHICS  (DISCUSSED).  203 

Dr.  Hodge  uses  stronger  language  than  merely  philosophi- 
cal aims  necessitate.  He  says  that  God's  will  is  "  the  only 
rule"  for  moral  decision,  and  that  "in  all  cases,  so  far  as 
we  are  concerned,  it  is  His  will  that  binds  us  and  constitutes 
the  difference  between  right  and  wrong."  This  language  can 
only  mean  that  the  divine  will  is  the  only  external  authority 
absolutely  determining  questions  of  duty  for  the  conscience. 
Dr.  Hodge  certainly  would  not  deny  that  men  are  bound  by 
their  own  convictions  of  right — that  every  man,  morally,  is 
a  law  unto  himself — and  that  the  common  knowledge  of  duty 
is  a  law  to  all.  He  simply  means  that  God's  will,  when 
known,  must  be  implicitly  obeyed,  and  that  this  is  the  only 
external  rule  which  is  of  absolute  moral  obligation.  More- 
over, Dr.  Hodge  rests  the  rightfulness  of  God's  will  on  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  expression  of  "infinite  wisdom  and  good- 
ness." This  implies  that  the  supremacy  of  the  Divine  author- 
ity arises  from  its  complete  identification  with  what  is  right 
and  good. 

Then,  too,  the  concluding  statement  of  Dr.  Hodge  that 
"  the  ultimate  foundation  of  moral  obligation  is  the  nature  of 
God  "  brings  up  the  question,  "  What  is  the  nature  of  God  ?  " 
What  is  his  "immutable  excellence" — his  "infinite  per- 
fection?" For  us — and  we  belive  for  Dr.  Hodge  himself — 
these  phrases  can  mean  only  the  perfect  wisdom,  goodness 
and  holiness  of  God  as  revealed  in  his  moral  law.  So  we 
return  to  the  ethical  problem,  which  is  to  determine  the  es- 
sence and  contents  of  right  moral  conduct. 

While  rejecting  the  doctrine  that  the  will  of  God  is  the 
first  origin  of  moral  distinctions,  we  do  not  question  the 
supreme  importance  of  the  divine  authority,  both  as  deter- 
mining duty  and  as  a  source  of  the  knowledge  of  duty.  We 
say  also  that  no  ethical  system  is  complete  without  a  reverent 
recognition  of  the  Supreme  Being.  Not  only  have  the  prin- 
ciples of  right  dwelt  eternally  in  the  divine  bosom,  but  our 
relations  to  God,  the  creator  and  preserver  of  all,  the  loving 
father  of  spirits,  the  righteous  ruler  of  the  universe,  enter 
as  necessary  elements  into  the  perfected  moral  life.  Morality 
may  exist  without  religion,  but  the  complete  development 
of  ethical  experience  includes  loving,  sympathetic  loyalty  to 
that  Spirit  in  whom  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being. 
This  truth  is  well  expressed  by  Bishop  Martensen  at  the 
beginning  of  his  "  Christian  Ethics  "  Morality  and  relig- 
ion/' he  says,  "are  not  all  one  and  the  same  thing,  but 


204  TFIE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XVIII. 

they  are  indissohnbly  associated;  and,  so  long  as  man  remains 
in  this  temporal  sphere,  so  long  must  he  live  his  life  under 
these  two  forms.  ...  A  godliness  from  which  the  ethical 
factor  is  in  every  respect  excluded  can  only  become  a 
mystic  absorption  in  God.  ...  A  morality,  on  the  other 
hand,  without  religion  is  a  false  self-dependence,  a  free-will 
lacking  foundation,  and  therefore,  also,  resting  on  an  inner 
self-contradiction/' 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

DUTY   ETHICS. 

1.  "  The  Ethical  problem  "  is  to  determine  the  supreme  law,  or  the 
universal  end,  of  duty.  The  language  of  Mackenzie  and  of  Sidg- 
wick  criticized.  Whewell  quoted. — 2.  The  Duty  school  includes 
all  who  without  analyzing  the  right  teach  that  it  is  inherently 
obligatory.  It  might  be  called  the  Dogmatic,  or  Intuitional, 
school. — 3.  Membership  in  this  school  depends  on  the  character 
of  one's  teachings,  not  on  his  terminology. — 4.  The  formula 
"  duty  for  duty's  sake  "  belongs  to  the  duty  school  only  "par 
eminence." — 5.  Plato,  the  Stoics,  Cicero,  and  the  schoolmen 
taught  duty  ethics. — 6.  Also  Des  Cartes,  Pere  Malebranche, 
Ralph  Cud  worth,  Samuel  Clark,  John  Locke,  Francis  Way  land, 
and  others. — 7.  The  views  of  Kant.  His  ethical  formula  or 
dictum. — 8.  This  was  not  intended  to  give  the  universal  end  of 
morality,  but  only  to  be  a  criterion  of  moral  judgment. — 9.  We 
reject  this  dictum  because  it  assumes  that  every  moral  rule  is 
binding  on  all  men,  whereas  many  rules  of  duty  apply  only  to 
limited  classes  of  men. — 10.  Because  most  moral  rules  have  ex- 
ceptions even  within  the  sphere  of  their  applicability. — 11. 
Because  a  call  of  duty  may  be  so  exceptional  in  character  as  not 
naturally  to  suggest  any  general  rule,  not  to  speak  of  a  universal 
rule.  12.  And  because  Kant's  criterion  might  consist  with  the 
adoption  of  an  immoral  rule. — 13.  The  Kantian  dictum  is  a  pre- 
mature and  incorrect  generalization.  It  differs  from  Adam 
Smith's  excellent  criterion  of  "  the  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator."— 14.  The  Duty  school  includes  (1)  a  priori  intuition- 
alists,  such  as  Plato,  Des  Cartes,  Cudworth  and  Kant,  (2)  a  pos- 
teriori intuitionalists  such  as  Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson,  Reid, 
Price  and  Stewart.  The  latter  are  less  assumptive  than  the 
former,  but  are  wanting  in  analysis. — 15.  Reid,  Whewell,  Haven 
and  many  others  assert  the  absolute  simplicity  of  moral  right- 
ness. — 16.  Adam  Smith  compared  with  Immanuel  Kant. 

1.  "  THE  ethical  problem  "  is  a  phrase  sometimes  used  at 
the  present  day.  For  instance,  it  is  the  title  of  the  first 
chapter  of  Seth's  "  Ethical  Principles,"  though  we  are  not 
told  expressly  in  what  sense  the  professor  employs  the  phrase. 
For  us  the  ethical  problem  is  to  define  the  right  and  obliga- 
tory, in  other  words,  to  determine  what  character  is  common 

205 


206  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

to  every  right  action  and  to  every  right  end.  Evidently  this 
must  be  some  generic  aim  of  rational  desire  and  effort.  That 
philosophers  are  striving  to  solve  this  problem  is  abundantly 
manifest  from  their  discussions,  though  it  cannot  always  be 
inferred  from  their  terminology.  For  example,  some  profess 
to  seek  a  "  standard  "  to  which  all  conduct  should  conform. 
Professor  Mackenzie,  in  successive  chapters,  speaks  of  the 
"  standard  as  law/'  "  the  standard  as  happiness/'  "  the 
standard  as  perfection ; "  and  then  he  concludes  by  saying, 
"  We  see,  in  fact,  that  the  end  must  consist  in  some  form  of 
self-realization,  .  .  .  that  the  end,  in  short,  ought  to  be  de- 
scribed as  perfection  rather  than  as  happiness." 

Properly  speaking,  a  standard  is  not  an  end  of  pursuit 
but  an  object  through  comparison  with  which  degrees  of 
quantity  or  of  quality  may  be  determined.  The  yard-stick 
in  the  tower  of  London  is  a  standard  of  length;  so  is  every 
yard-stick  made  like  it  and  employed  for  the  same  purpose. 
An  alloy,  ten  parts  of  gold  and  one  of  silver,  or  any  coin 
of  that  composition,  is  a  standard  of  the  purity  required 
in  an  American  ten-dollar  piece.  When  we  wish  to  meas- 
ure excellence  or  to  determine  whether  a  certain  degree 
of  excellence  has  been  reached,  either  a  perfect  object  or  one 
possessing  the  quality  in  question  in  a  high  degree,  is  gen- 
erally selected  as  a  standard.  In  short,  a  standard  is  a 
"measure  by  which  an  object  is  tested  as  having  or  not  having 
a  given  degree  of  quantity  or  quality;  it  is  not  the  type  to 
which  the  object  must  conform  if  it  possess  a  certain  char- 
acter. The  use  of  the  term  in  this  latter  sense  is  an  inno- 
vation. 

There  is  also  an  infelicity  in  calling  happiness  and  per- 
fection "  standards  "  of  right  conduct.  A  satisfaction  or  an 
excellence  realized  under  given  conditions  might  be  a  stand- 
ard of  happiness  or  of  excellence  experienced  under  conditions 
somewhat  similar ;  even  that  would  not  be  a  standard  of  moral 
life.  Possibly  the  pursuit  of  happiness  or  of  perfection,  if 
it  involved  some  definite  degree  of  virtue,  might  be  a  moral 
standard;  but  we  are  not  now  considering  degrees  of  virtue. 
Utilitarianism  makes  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  and  perfec- 
tionism the  pursuit  of  excellence,  necessary  to  any  virtue  at 
all.  The  use  of  the  word  "standard  "  to  signify  "  the  end 
at  which  we  are  to  aim"  can  scarcely  be  defended. 

The   word   "criterion"  has   also  been   employed   in   this 
signification.     But  it  has  too  wide  an  applicability.     A  cri- 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  20/7 

terion  is  not  necessarily  a  part  of  the  essence;  it  may  be 
anything  inseparably  connected  with  the  essence.     The  ting- 
ing of  the  litmus  paper  is  only  a  property  of  the  acid  or  the 
alkali ;  it  is  not  ordinarily  a  part  of  our  conception  of  either ~ 
one  of  these  agents. 

Not  much  objection  can  be  made  to  the  words  "law" 
and  "rule"  as  names  applicable  to  the  fundamental  ethical 
idea.  For  the  supreme  rule  must  set  forth  the  ultimate  end 
of  right  conduct.  As  Whewell  says,  "  With  regard  to  the 
supreme  rule  the  question  'why'  admits  of  no  further  an- 
swer." Every  moral  theory  can  be  characterized  by  the  law 
which  it  makes  fundamental — as,  Do  good,  Be  perfect,  Reg- 
ulate your  affections,  Obey  authority,  Realize  the  right. 
But  this  law  is  always  the  ultimate  law.  The  standard  of 
right  living  is  the  entire  moral  law,  to  every  part  of  which 
we  must  conform;  the  end  of  morality  is  the  supreme  rule 
only.  Strictly  speaking  even  this  law  prescribes  the  seeking 
of  the  end  of  duty ;  it  does  not  merely  state  the  end ;  so  that 
there  is  a  metonymy. 

A  peculiar  use  of  language  is  that  of  Prof.  Henry  Sidg- 
wick.  One  would  suppose  that  "methods  of  ethics"  meant 
modes  of  investigation.  He  really  uses  the  phrase  to  signify 
methods  of  judgment.  His  treatise  discusses  those  princi- 
ples which  different  systems  assume  as  the  bases  of  moral 
assertion.  It  says  little  concerning  processes  of  inquiry. 

Perhaps  the  best — certainly  the  most  literal — designation 
for  the  fundamental  thought  in  ethics  is  the  moral  end;  by 
which,  of  course,  we  mean  the  ultimate  and  universal  moral 
end.  But  even  this  phrase  may  mislead  unless  we  remember 
that  actions  are  often  conceived  of  as  including  ends  and 
as  being  ends  themselves.  We  accept  the  doctrine  that  an 
action  may  be  right  and  obligatory  per  se.  (Chap.  VI.) 

2.  Having  considered  four  general  schools  of  doctrine, 
we  pass  to  the  fifth,  which  contains  a  greater  variety  of 
authors  and  of  views  than  any  of  the  others.  This  school 
includes  all  those  who,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  teach  the 
obligation  of  the  right  without  giving  any  analysis  of  the 
right.  Some  of  these  writers  hold  the  right  to  be  simple 
and  incapable  of  analysis,  but  none  of  them  define  it.  All 
of  them — to  use  the  language  of  Mackenzie — teach  that  the 
"  standard  "  (in  other  words,  the  moral  end)  is  "  law."  In 
one  sense  we  might  say  that  every  theory  of  morals  is  a 
theory  of  law.  Both  Utilitarianism  and  Perfectionism  for- 


208  TMB  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP. 

mulate  supreme  laws;  the  one  requires  the  seeking  of  good, 
the  other  the  seeking  of  perfection;  and  they  mention  other 
laws  subordinate  to  these.  But  Mackenzie,  excluding  these 
systems,  limits  his  thought  to  those  which  present  moral 
rules  without  any  explanation  of  that  Tightness  which  makes 
them  moral.  For  in  such  systems  the  conception  of  law  is 
given  a  peculiar  prominence. 

At  first  one  might  suppose  that  theories  which  make  "  the 
standard  law  "  were  those  which  found  morality  on  external 
authority.  That  is  not  the  professor's  meaning.  He  refers 
to  a  law  which  binds  by  reason  of  its  own  nature ;  he  scarcely 
mentions  the  governmental  view  of  moral  obligation. 

For  ourselves,  were  we  to  use  the  word  "  law  "  in  designat- 
ing specific  theories,  not  only  Utilitarianism  and  Perfection- 
ism, but  also  Authority  and  Motivity  Ethics,  must  be  ex- 
cluded from  those  systems  which  make  "  law  "  the  end.  For 
in  each  of  these  four  theories  a  definition  of  the  morally  right 
very  sensibly  engrosses  the  attention. 

The  name  "  Duty  Ethics,"  however,  seems  better  to  express 
the  character  of  the  systems  now  to  be  considered  than  any 
other  designation;  although  it  is  to  be  confessed  that  duty, 
no  less  than  law,  has  a  place  in  every  theory  of  morals.  Here 
according  to  a  use  of  terms  already  explained  (Chap.  XVI.  4), 
"  duty "  is  tantamount  to  "  right,"  the  right  being  always 
dutiful  in  the  sense  of  being  obligatory.  Originally  these 
words  did  not  have  the  same  signification;  and  often  still,  as 
correlatives  of  one  another,  they  are  contrasted  in  meaning, 
"the  right"  being  that  which  is  obligatory,  "duty"  that 
which  is  obligated.  "Duty,"  too,  sometimes  signifies,  at- 
tributively, not  the  action  which  is  obligated  but  the  obliga- 
tion (or  obligatedness)  of  the  person  to  do  it;  as  when  we  say 
that  one  is  under  duty  to  do  this  or  that. 

But,  in  rational  conduct,  the  very  same  deed  may  in  one 
aspect  be  right  and  obligatory,  and  in  another  duty  and  obli- 
gated. Considered  in  relation  to  the  end  to  be  realized  and 
as  the  accomplishment  of  the  end,  an  action  is  right.  Con- 
sidered in  relation  to  the  moral  agent  and  as  his  accomplish- 
ing of  the  end,  it  is  due  to  the  right;  it  is  duty.  And  so  it 
happens  that  because  the  terms  "  right "  and  "  duty,"  in 
their  contrasted  meanings,  not  only  imply  one  another,  but 
are  constantly  applied  to  the  same  objects,  they  are  frequently 
used  interchangeably  and  as  equivalent  to  each  other.  Then 
the  right  signifies  the  dutiful  and  the  dutiful  the  right.  For 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  209 

example,  when  we  speak  of  the  claims  of  duty,  or  say  that 
duty  has  claims  upon  us,  we  are  speaking  of  the  right  as 
obligatory — not  of  duty  as  obligated.  Such  language  some- 
what justifies  those  who  say  that  "  ought "  means  to  "  obli- 
gate '  ;*  it  may  occasionally  do  so.  When  ethics  is  defined  as 
'•'the  Science  of  Duty,"  and  when,  as  now,  those  teachings 
which  hold  the  right,  considered  without  analysis,  to  be  the 
aim  of  virtue,  are  classed  as  "  Duty  Ethics,"  duty  signifies 
the  right  as  the  end  of  moral  purpose  and  desire.  For  moral 
Tightness  rather  than  moral  obligation  is  the  basal  idea  of 
ethical  science.  The  phrase  "  right  ethics "  might  be  em- 
ployed as  synonymous  with  "  duty  ethics,"  but  it  would  not  be 
so  easily  understood. 

3.  No  department  of  philosophy  contains  more  verbal  diffi- 
culties than  ethics.  In  this  study  one  must  look  through  the 
obscurities  of  language  to  the  thoughts  of  the  mind,  or  rather 
to  those  phenomena  which  are  the  true  subjects  of  our  con- 
sideration. In  the  present  characterization  of  schools,  if  we 
regard  agreement  in  sentiment  more  than  diversity  in  the 
expression  of  it,  some  philosophers  must  be  counted  as  teach- 
ers of  duty  ethics  who  do  not  maintain  this  style  of  doc- 
trine explicitly.  For  other  terms  have  been  used  to  express 
the  same  idea  as  the  words  "  right "  and  "  dutiful "  indicate 
more  properly — for  example,  the  words  "good"  and  "fair." 
The  good  deed  which  shines  so  far  "  in  a  naughty  world  "  is 

t  a  beneficent  or  benevolent  action  merely,  but  one  that  is 
.  ^rtuous   and   right.      "  Fair   dealing "   is   not  merely   that 
which  appears  well,  but  that  which  conscience  can  approve. 
In  like  manner  truth,  reason,  equity,  justice,  besides  their 
specific  meanings,  often  signify  a  general  conformity  to  the  . 
moral  law.    Among  the  Greeks  the  right  was  as  often  called   ! 
TO  xaAo'v,  Ta-yadov,  TO  Kpe-xov  (the  fair,  the  good,  the  befitting)  / 
as   TO  dzov,  TO  dtxawv,  TO  dpdov.      (the    due,    the    right,    the 
correct).     The  Eomans,   also,   called  right  things  in  gen- 
eral   honesta,    recta,    bona,    justa,    pulchra,    officiosa.     No 
matter  what  language  one  uses,  if  he  maintain  that  certain 
actions  and  aims  are  obligatory  because  of  a  peculiar  and 
inherent  excellence,  and  if  he  give  no  analysis  of  that  ex- 
cellence, he  may  be  quoted  as  supporting  duty  ethics.     Nor 
does  it  make  any  difference  whether  he  teach  this  doctrine 
of  the  right  simply,  or  whether  he  add  to  it  some  explanation 
regarding  the  way  in  which  duty  is  perceived  by  reason,  con- 
science, intuition,  the  moral  sense,  or  any  other  faculty. 
14 


210  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

4.  Some  characterize  duty  ethics  as  the  teaching  of  "  duty 
for  duty's  sake."    But  it  cannot  be  fairly  said  that  this  for- 
mula is  the  exclusive  property  of  any  one  school.     A  writer 
might  analytically  define  the  moral  end  and  still  consistently 
maintain  that  duty  should  be  pursued  for  its    own    sake. 
Those,   indeed,  who  reject   definitions  may   assert  that  the 
definers  do  not  advocate  duty  for  its  own  sake  but  something 
else  than  duty  for  the  sake  of  that  something  else.     But  in 
this   they   only   state  what  they   themselves   believe.     They 
could  not  reasonably — and  they  do  not — expect  that  others 
will  recognize  them  as  the  only  friends  of  duty. 

At  the  same  time  it  may  be  admitted  that  the  dogmatic  or 
intuitional  school — as  it  may  be  called — present  the  claims 
of  duty  in  an  emphatic  way.  Their  assertion  of  the  unde- 
fined right  has  that  force  which  all  the  utterances  of  the 
practical  reason  have,  and  which  at  first  is  lessened,  though 
it  may  afterwards  be  increased,  by  analytic  intelligence. 
Moreover,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  even  the  correct  articu- 
lations of  the  speculative  reason  cannot  take  the  place  of  that 
sense  of  duty  which  the  practical  reason  gives.  The  aim  of 
theoretic  morals  should  not  be  to  supplant  the  habitual 
ethical  judgment  but  to  render  this  more  informed  and  ac- 
curate. Those  therefore  who  regard  the  practical  reason  as 
our  only  source  of  understanding  respecting  the  right,  may 
be  said  to  teach  duty  ethics  in  a  special  sense. 

5.  In  ancient  times  this  form  of  doctrine  was  taught  prin- 
cipally by  the  Stoics,  though  Plato  and  his  followers  might 
also  be  said  to  favor  it.  Plato,  as  a  perfectionist,  sought  par- 
ticipation in  the  divine,  but,  along  with  this,  as  a  more  imme- 
diate aim,  he  sought  conformity  to  ideals  of  conduct  which 
constituted  for  him  a  moral  law.    Were  it  possible  to  regard 
these  ideals  as  specific  forms  of  "the  Idea/'  Plato  would  be 
simply  a  perfectionist,  after  his  own  mystical  fashion.    But 
he  advocates  wisdom,  courage,  temperance  and  justice  with- 
out defining  the  nature  common  to  them  all.     They  are  all 
virtues ;  each  of  them  in  a  specific  way  pursues    TO   av6x    dxa 
-r6.fa.6ov — that    is,    the    right.     Plato's    doctrine    is    that    of 
those  who  say  that  every  virtue  seeks  what  is  right  and  good. 
In  his  philosophy  one  finds  the  unity  of  lofty  sentiment  but 
not  the  unity  of  analytic  thought. 

The  Stoics  inculcated  duty  ethics  unequivocally  yet  with 
some  indirectness.  The  "Nature"  to  which  they  said  we 
must  conform  ourselves  was  chiefly  the  nature  within  us, 


CHAP.  XIX.J  DUTY  ETHICS.  211 

and  which  is  of  divine  origin.  Their  essential  rule  was  that 
we  must  live  according  to  reason;  and  thus,  without  defining 
duty,  they  told  how  duty  may  be  discovered  and  determined. 
This  instruction  is  reproduced  by  those  moderns  who  say  that 
man  should  live  according  to  "  right  reason."  The  right  is 
preeminently  the  "  reasonable  ";  .it  is  the  end  proposed  by 
the  most  absolute  exercise  of  practical  intelligence.  Conduct 
conformed  to  reason  the  Stoics  called  xaropOw^a — that  is,  the 
right,  the  correct,  the  recte  factum. 

Cicero,  though  by  no  means  a  Stoic,  was  yet  the  Stoic  phi- 
losopher of  the  Romans.  His  "De  Finibus"  does  not  treat 
of  the  right,  but  of  virtue  as  the  summum  bonum — the 
supreme  good — a  doctrine  of  which  Perfectionism  is  a  mis- 
interpretation. For,  though  moral  excellence  is  superior  to 
every  other  good  and  the  pure  fountain  of  blessedness,  it  is 
not  the  all-comprehensive  aim  of  duty.  Nor  does  Cicero's 
other  ethical  treatise,  the  "De  Officiis,"  define  any  such  aim. 
This  work  discusses  the  general  forms,  rather  than  the  generic 
nature,  of  duty.  Having  premised  that  officium  seeks  what 
is  right  and  what  is  useful,  the  honestum  and  the  utile  (the 
utile  as  a  rational  end  being  the  beneficial  or  expedient  and  a 
part  of  the  honestum  considered  in  a  broad  sense),  Cicero 
makes  the  fourfold  division  of  duty  common  among  the  an- 
cients. Thereupon  he  advocates  (1)  the  search  for  truth  and 
the  love  of  truth,  (2)  the  observance  of  justice  or  social  duty, 
including  beneficentia,  (3)  the  maintenance  of  moderation 
in  desires  and  deeds,  and  (4)  the  exercise  of  courage  and 
magnanimity  in  every  exigency  and  under  every  variation  of 
fortune.  The  closing  part  of  the  treatise  is  devoted  to  ques- 
tions arising  from  the  conflict  of  duties. 

The  Schoolmen  did  not  analyze  the  moral  end.  They  added 
little  to  the  ethics  of  the  ancients  except  to  render  it  more 
theological.  For  example,  St.  Thomas  of  Aquin,  in  his 
Summa  Theologica  (Quaestio  LV.),  defines  virtue  as  a  good 
quality  or  habit  by  which  one  lives  rightly  and  ill-uses  no  one, 
•and  which  is  operated  in  us  by  the  power  of  God — Virtus 
est  bona  qualitas  mentis  qua  recte  vivitur  et  nemo  male 
utitur,  et  quam  Deus  in  nobis  sine  nobis  operatur.  After 
that  he  discusses  different  modes  of  virtue  and  the  duties  cor- 
responding to  them.  In  his  Commentary  on  the  Nicomachean 
Ethics,  he  follows  Aristotle  closely,  but,  adhering  to  the  sub- 
jective point  of  view  and  mentioning  virtues  more  than  duties, 
he  gives  no  definition  of  the  right.  With  him  the  four  prin- 


212  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

cipal  or  "  cardinal "  virtues  are  the  same  as  those  discussed  by 
Plato  and  by  Cicero — wisdom,  justice,  temperance  and  cour- 
age. Those  who  view  morality  from  the  subjective  more  than 
from  the  objective  point  of  view,  seldom  attempt  an  analysis 
of  the  moral  end.  They  are  satisfied  with  an  analysis  of  vir- 
tue and  with  the  doctrine  that  virtue  is  the  summum  bonum. 

6.  The  modern  advocates  of  duty  ethics  agree  that  man  has 
a  power  of  immediately  distinguishing  between   right   and 
wrong,  but  they  give  different  names  to  this  faculty  and  ex- 
plain the  operation  of  it  in  different  ways.    Des  Cartes  (1596— 
1650)   started  the  modern  philosophical  movement  when  he 
discarded  scholastic  dogmatism  and    justified    fundamental 
convictions  by  a  great  inward  clearness  of  apprehension.    He 
held  that  certain  truths  shine  in  their  own  light,  which  is  the 
light  of  nature  (lumen  naturae)  and  so  introduced  the  doc- 
trine of  "  innate  ideas."    He  himself  dwelt  little  on  the  theory 
of   right   and   wrong,   but   his   disciple,    Pere   Malebranche 
(1638—1715)  founded  morality  on  necessary  truths  given  by 
the  universal  reason.    The  learned  Cudworth  combined  Car- 
tesian views  with  a  kind  of  Platonism.     Opposing  the  sensa- 
tionalism of  Hobbes,  he  contended  that  the  idea  of  a  "  natural 
immutable  and  eternal  justice  "  arises,  not  from  experience, 
but  from  "  the  innate  activity  of  the  mind  itself."  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke  (1675-1724)  taught 'that  reason  perceives  the  "  eternal 
and  necessary  differences  of  things./'  including  the  difference 
between  right  and  wrong.     He  held  that  Tightness  is  a  "  fit- 
ness" of  the  conduct  of  rational  beings  to  the  relations  in 
which  they  exist,  and  wrongness  an  unfitness.    But  this  doc- 
trine is  not  a  definition  of  right  and  wrong;  it  is  only  the 
statement  of  an  analogy.    Its  chief  significance  lies  in  the  im- 
plication that  the  moral  qualities  of  actions  are  perceived  by 
the  reason  just  as  fitness  and  unfitness  are.     Locke  (1632- 
1705),  a  senior  contemporary  of  Clarke,  believed  that  the 
science  of  ethics  might  be  developed,  like  that  of  mathematics, 
"  from  self-evident  propositions  concerning  God  and  rational 
beings."    Some  authors  of  our  own  day,  as  Dr.  Francis  Way- 
land,  teach,  somewhat  indefinitely,  that  right  and  wrong  arise 
from  the  relations  of  persons  to  each  other  and  to  things,  and 
that  the  moral  qualities  of  actions  are  an  undefinable  fitness 
and  unfitness. 

7.  Every  system  of  philosophy  is  more  or  less  affected  by 
the  view  entertained  by  its  author  concerning  the  action  of 
rational  intelligence.     The  moral  philosophy  of  Kant  was 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  213 

greatly  influenced  by  his  theory  of  mind.  His  "  Pure  Rea- 
son  "  was  a  faculty  furnishing  categories  (or  general  forms 
of  thought),  the  application  of  which  by  the  judgment  to  the 
products  of  the  sensibility  result  in  knowledge  or  cognition. 
Finding  this  faculty  inadequate  to  support  faith  in  God,  im- 
mortality and  duty,  Kant  devised  the  "  Practical  Reason,"  by 
the  assertions  of  which  man  is  impelled  to  belief  in  the  In- 
finite and  to  the  recognition  of  the  right.  The  Kantian  sys- 
tem, though  distressingly  obscure  for  those  who  would  find 
in  it  an  explanation  of  mental  phenomena,  is  essentially  sim- 
ple. It  is  the  dual  dogmatism  of  one  who  was  unable  to  make 
a  true  and  unifying  analysis  of  the  operations  of  the  intellect. 

In  ethics  Kant  does  not  give  categories,  as  he  does  in  meta- 
physics. He  contents  himself  with  a  formula  by  which  we 
may  be  guided  in  the  formation  or  adoption  of  moral  rules. 
He  says,  "Act  only  on  that  maxim  or  principle  which  ihou 
canst  at  the  same  time  will  to  become  a  universal  law"  This 
statement,  Kant  says,  is  not  a  new  law  of  duty  but  only  a 
formula  to  which  every  law  of  duty  must  conform.  It  is  to 
be  the  Rule  of  Rules.  "Who  would  think,"  he  asks,  "of 
introducing  a  new  principle  of  all  morality,  just  as  if  the 
whole  world  before  him  were  ignorant  of  what  duty  was? 
But  whoever  knows  of  what  importance  a  mathematical  for- 
mula is,  will  not  undervalue  my  formula."  (PREFACE  TO 
CRITIQUE  OF  THE  PRACTICAL  REASON.)  As,,  in  mathematics, 
a  formula  indicates  a  method  of  reaching  a  correct  result,  so 
this  formula  is  to  indicate  how  we  may  reach  rules  that  are 
right  and  obligatory.  Kant  illustrates  this  point  by  showing, 
to  his  own  satisfaction,  that  the  telling  of  truth,  the  keeping  of 
contracts  and  the  preservation  of  one's  own  life,  are  seen,  on 
the  application  of  his  formula,  to  be  universally  obligatory. 
But  his  argument  does  not  convince  one  of  the  value  of  his 
formula.  The  laws  mentioned  as  to  truth  telling  and  so  on 
are,  in  a  sense,  both  obligatory  and  universal,  but  these  things 
depend  on  the  nature  of  the  laws  themselves  as  applicable  to 
men  in  general;  they  are  not  deductions  frqm  the  principle 
that  every  law  of  duty  is  universal. 

8.  It  has  been  objected  to  the  Kantian  dictum  that  it  is 
empty  of  content — that  it  does  not  tell,  even  in  a  general  way, 
what  duty  is — that  it  cannot  be  more  than  a  direction 
whereby  reason  may  perfect  her  judgments.  This  certainly 
is  true  of  the  formula  considered  by  itself.  We  do  not  know 
whether  Kant  was  awaie  of  this  emptiness  or  not.  But  his 


214  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

writings  show  that  he  valued  his  formula  rather  as  a  rule  of 
ethical  judgment  than  as  a  statement  of  moral  truth.  His 
idea  is  that  Tightness  is  intuitively  perceptible  in  different 
modes  of  conduct,  but  that  we  may  form  mistaken  judgments 
of  duty  if  we  allow  our  minds  to  be  influenced  by  non-essen- 
tial considerations.  Innate  ideas  may  be  self-evident,  but  the 
apprehension  and  application  of  them  calls  for  care ;  else  they 
may  be  mingled  with  error.  That  such  is  Kant's  position  is 
evident  from  his  doctrine  of  "the  good  will"  (der  gute 
Wille).  He  says,  "  Nothing  can  possibly  be  conceived  in  the 
world,  or  even  out  of  it,  which  can  be  called  good  without 
qualification,  except  a  good  will."  But  the  will  thus  men- 
tioned is  not  a  benevolent  disposition — a  fixed  determination 
to  promote  the  welfare  and  happiness  of  beings.  The  "  good  " 
which  it  seeks  is  not  happiness,  but  the  right.  It  is  the  will 
determined  by  respect  for  duty.  "  The  preeminent  good," 
says  Kant,  "  which  we  call  moral,  can  consist  in  nothing  else 
than  the  conception  of  law  in  itself — which  certainly  is  only 
possible  in  a  rational  being — in  so  far  as  this  conception,  and 
not  the  expected  effect,  determines  the  will."  Kant  rejects 
and  opposes  Eudaemonism;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  in- 
tended by  means  of  his  formula  to  exclude  from  the  moral 
judgment  every  consideration  which  might  obscure  our  per- 
ception of  the  right — or  of  law,  as  he  called  it. 

9.  We  do  not  condemn  the  Kantian  principle  because  it 
is  supplementary  and  ministerial.  Yet,  even  in  this  light,  it 
is  of  doubtful  value;  several  objections  have  been  brought 
against  it.  First,  it  is  said  that  most  moral  rules  do  not  re- 
quire the  same  conduct  of  all  men,  and  that,  therefore,  it 
would  be  impossible  for  us  in  every  dutiful  action  to  employ 
a  maxim  which  we  may  will  all  men  to  follow.  A  few  duties 
— as  those  of  love,  of  beneficence,  of  veracity,  of  order  and 
peace,  of  promoting  knowledge  and  virtue,  of  respect  for  the 
worthy  and  good — arise  from  relations  universally  existing; 
and  therefore  apply  universally.  But  most  rules  apply  to 
men  in  special  relations;  and  some  rules  prescribe  duties 
which  some  men  are  never  called  to  perform.  The  duties  of 
the  soldier  differ  from  those  of  the  civilian.  Civilization  and 
barbarism  have  laws  peculiar  to  each,  and  unsuitable  for 
both.  Persons  of  the  wealthy  class  have  burdens  from 
which  the  poor  are  free.  The  aged  and  the  young,  the  strong 
and  the  weak,  the  intelligent  and  the  ignorant,  the  master 
and  the  servant,  the  husband  and  the  wife,  the  father  and 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETUICS.  215 

the  child,  have  each  his  peculiar  obligations.  To  say  that 
one's  mode  of  action  in  every  instance  of  duty  may  be  a  rule 
for  every  human  being  is  an  unfounded  exaggeration.  Yet 
such  a  doctrine  might  be  inferred  from  Kant's  language. 

Let  us  suppose,  however,  that  his  thought  is  different  from 
this — that  the  universality  of  which  he  speaks  means  that  a 
moral  law,  though  it  may  not  apply  to  all  men  at  all  times 
and  may  never  apply  to  some  men — is  yet  a  mode  of  conduct 
for  an  existing  class  who  fall  within  its  operations,  and  that,  as 
such,  it  is  absolutely  without  exception;  that  it  is  a  "  categor- 
ical imperative/'  not  merely  in  the  sense  of  being  inherently 
obligatory,  but  also  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot,  under  any 
circumstances,  be  superseded  or  set  aside  in  the  judgment  of 
the  moral  reason.  This  statement  would  probably  be  ac- 
cepted by  Kant  as  exactly  expressive  of  his  thought ;  but  it  is 
the  basis  of  a  second  objection  to  his  dictum.  It  is  said  that 
most  moral  laws  are  not  universal,  even  within  their  proper 
spheres,  but  have  exceptions;  and  that,  therefore,  we  cannot 
expect  to  act  only  on  maxims  which  we  may  will  to  be  with- 
out exceptions. 

10.  Most  laws  under  which  men  act  dutifully  are  not  of 
unrestricted  application.     Ordinarily  men  are  bound  not  to 
take  but  to  preserve  human  life;  not  to  appropriate  but  to 
protect  another's  property;  not  to  say  that  which  is  false  but 
only  that  which  is  true ;  not  to  disobey  but  to  fulfil  the  com- 
mands of  rightful  authority.     Yet,  in  extreme  cases,  these 
rules  give  way  to  a  more  fundamental  righteousness.     Mac- 
kenzie states  the  truth  forcibly  when  he  says:  "The  moral 
sense  of  the  best  men  seems  to  say  that  there  is  no  command- 
ment, however  sacred, — unless  it  be  the  commandment  of  love 
—that    does    not    under    certain    circumstances  release  its 
claims."     The  principle  that  man  should  always  obey  his 
conscience  seems  to  have  been  interpreted  by  Kant  to  mean, 
first,  that  conscience  never  makes  a  mistake,  and,  secondly, 
that  the  imperatives  of  conscience  are  absolutely  universal 
rules.    Neither  of  these  positions  can  be  maintained.    Jacobi 
is  justified  in  his  attack  on  the  "  rigor"  of  Kant. 

11.  A  third  objection  to  the  dictum  is  one  which  would  ap- 
ply to  any  precept  instructing  us  to  act  always  in  a  way  which 
is  or  might  be  a  general  rule;  that  is,  a  rule  applicable  to  a 
known  class  of  persons  or  of  cases  whether  it  be  a  rule  ad- 
mitting of  exception  or  not.    It  is  argued  that  extraordinary 
circumstances  call  for  duties  which  are  obligatory  only  under 


216  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

those  circumstances,  and  that  no  one  could  reasonably  wish 
the  duties  thus  incumbent  on  individuals,  or  in  individual 
cases,  to  be  universal.  This  statement  recognizes  the  fact 
that  the  Practical  Reason  often  forms  a  rule  for  some  class  of 
existing  persons  or  of  recurrent  cases,  and  then  regards  some 
other  persons  or  cases  as  exceptional,  and  as  calling  for  a 
treatment  different  from  that  which  the  rule  prescribes.  Or 
a  case  or  cases  may  be  considered  as  very  peculiar  and  not 
sufficiently  numerous  or  frequent  to  support  a  general  rule. 
Ordinarily  a  man  is  not  obligated  to  a  life  of  celibacy  or  of 
voluntary  indigence ;  though  some  persons  may  be.  Not  every 
one  should  visit  smallpox  hospitals,  or  enter  burning  build- 
ings, or  head  a  forlorn  hope ;  such  duties  fall  to  a  few.  Not 
every  man  should  seek  to  be  a  foreign  missionary,  or  a  polit- 
ical reformer,  or  a  philosopher,  or  an  orator,  or  a  congress- 
man, or  an  emperor,  or  the  president  of  a  republic.  Some  of 
these  cases  conflict  with  general  rules;  others  simply  lie 
without  them.  But  in  every  such  instance  one  is  not  ex- 
pected to  follow  a  rule  but  to  be  guided  by  the  requirements 
of  the  case.  It  is  to  be  allowed  that  the  conduct  found  suita- 
ble in  some  singular  conjuncture  may  be  generalized,  and  that 
a  new  rule  may  be  formed  in  this  way ;  but  such  a  rule  would 
not,  in  practical  language,  be  a  general,  much  less  a  universal, 
law.  We  would  naturally  think  of  it  as  having  restricted  ap- 
plicability— as  being  a  special  rule.  It  would  not  deserve  the 
name  universal;  nor  would  it  be  a  rule  which  one  should  wish 
to  be  universal. 

12.  A  fourth  objection  to  the  Kantian  formula  is  that  it 
provides  no  real  safeguard  against  the  adoption  of  an  immoral 
rule.  As  we  have  just  said,  every  mode  of  action  can  be  gen- 
eralized. After  that  it  would  be  practically  universalized  if 
it  were  accepted  by  the  agent  as  a  satisfactory  law  for  an  ex- 
isting class  of  similar  cases.  Now,  for  all  that  we  can  see, 
this  might  happen  without  securing  conformity  to  the  law  of 
right.  Kant  assumes  that  conscience  gives  rules  for  our 
obedience.  His  dictum  would  assist  us  in  the  understanding 
and  adoption  of  these  rules.  The  agent  is  to  ask  what  maxim 
he  himself  would  like  to  be  universal,  and  then  is  to  act  on 
that.  Recognizing  "moral  good,"  that  is,  the  right,  as  the 
aim  of  morality,  Kant  asserts  that  this  will  be  realized  under 
any  rule  which  the  agent  can  desire  to  be  observed  in  all  simi- 
lar cases.  He  thinks  that  if  this  direction  were  strictly  fol- 
lowed one  would  be  determined  to  the  right,  no  matter  what 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  217 

his  inclinations  might  be.  But  would  this  effect  necessarily 
follow  if  the  agent  were  a  selfish  being  and  careless  of  the 
right?  Might  not  the  hereditary  aristocrat  approve  of  the 
rule  of  caste  according  to  which  he  and  his  fellows  should 
have  the  honors  of  life  while  these  are  withheld  from  all 
others?  Might  not  the  sharp-witted  scoundrel  wish  the  law 
to  protect  him  and  his  like  in  their  evil  practices  and  ill- 
gotten  gains?  Would  not  the  powerful  bully  choose  the  law 
that  might  makes  the  right  and  that  all  mankind  should  be 
divided  into  masters  and  slaves  ?  In  every  such  case  the  agent 
might  desire  the  law  to  be  universal,  that  is,  to  be  rigorously 
carried  out;  but  that  would  not  prove  it  to  be  a  righteous  law. 

If  the  formula  were  that  one  should  follow  that  rule  which 
conscience  and  right  reason  would  approve  in  all  similar  cases, 
the  direction,  though  weak,  would  not  be  exactly  valueless ;  it 
would  favor  simplicity  and  disinterestedness  of  moral  judg- 
ment. But  the  only  requirement  is  that  the  agent  shall  follow 
a  rule  which  he  can  will  to  be  universal.  An  egoistic  hedonist 
could  meet  that  requirement  without  difficulty;  and  so  could 
the  adherent  of  any  evil  system ;  Kant's  fundamental  error  lies 
in  his  doctrine  that  the  "practical  reason  "  furnishes  an  un- 
reasoned rule  of  right.  According  to  him  "the  law"  has  no 
reference  either  to  motives  or  to  consequences.  It  is  an  abso- 
lute command — or  system  of  commands — which  admits  of  no 
explanation  beyond  its  own,  "  sic  jubeo"  This  law,  indeed,  is 
the  right,  but  with  Kant  it  relates  to  actions  rather  than  to 
ends.  Moreover,  not  perceiving  that  the  law  as  a  form  of  do- 
ing is  subsidiary  to  the  right  as  an  end,  and  is  obligatory 
only  because  it  embraces  the  right,  he  first  identifies  right 
with  law,  then  confuses  moral  law  with  law  in  general,  and 
after  that  asserts  that  any  rule  adopted  for  universal  use 
must  be  right.  He  assumes  that  the  mind  cannot  formulate 
clearly  any  practical  law  except  the  law  of  duty.  Nothing 
could  be  more  unsatisfactory  than  the  Kantian  mode  of  phi- 
losophizing. It  is  the  extreme  of  fanciful,  dialectic  dogma- 
tism, and  is  removed  as  far  as  possible  from  the  patient  analy- 
sis of  facts.  Those  professors  who  require  of  their  students 
long  courses  in  Kant  should  be  prosecuted  for  wasting  the 
precious  time  and  energies  of  the  young. 

The  dogmatism  of  Kant  arose  partly  from  a  lofty  earnest- 
ness. This  also  at  times  led  him  into  exaggerated  statements, 
such  as  the  doctrine,  already  mentioned,  that  moral  law  ad- 
mits of  no  exceptions.  We  account  in  this  way  for  his  appar- 


218  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

ent  contention  that  an  action  in  order  to  be  virtuous,  must 
proceed  from  the  "  good  will  "  exclusively,  that  is,  from  moral 
principle  without  any  mingling  of  natural  impulse.  Schiller 
ridicules  this  teaching  as  if  it  required  us  to  repress  every 
affection  and  to  find  duty  only  in  self-sacrifice.  Probably 
Kant  meant  merely  that  a  deed  is  virtuous  only  so  far  as  it 
proceeds  from  principle,  and  that  a  man  is  not  truly  good 
in  whom  natural  feeling  is  stronger  than  the  sense  of  duty. 
He  nowhere  denies  that  principle  may,  and  should,  be  ac- 
companied by  affection.  It  is  clear  also  that  virtue  becomes 
specially  manifest  in  cases  of  necessary  self-sacrifice. 

13.  While  Kant's  formula  yields  little  assistance,  some  aid 
might  be  given  the  moral  judgment  by  the  direction  to  act  in 
a  way  that  should  be  satisfactory — that  is,  acceptable  as  right 
— to  all  rational  beings  to  be  affected  by  it.    This  resembles 
the  Kantian  dictum  superficially,  but  is  essentially  different. 
It  means  simply  that  a  moral  rule  must  be  founded  on  a  com- 
prehensive consideration  of  the  results  included  in,  or  flowing 
from,  a  mode  of  action,  and  in  the  desire  that  every  one  of 
these  should  be  what  right  requires.    Without  defining  duty, 
it  would  help  in  the  perception  of  duty. 

This  law  of  judgment  might  be  used  with  any  ethical 
theory.  It  is  a  general,  practical  injunction  rather  than  a 
fundamental  principle.  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill,  after  saying,  "  The 
Utilitarian  criterion  is  not  the  happiness  of  the  agent  but 
that  of  all  interested  parties,"  continues,  "  Utilitarianism  re- 
quires that,  as  between  his  good  and  that  of  others,  the  agent 
should  be  as  strictly  impartial  as  a  benevolent  and  disinter- 
ested spectator  would  be."  Here  the  benevolent  spectator  is 
the  morally  "  wise  man  " — the  man  of  principle :  mere  sen- 
timental benevolence  does  not  always  judge  aright.  The 
same  practical  law  is  embodied  in  that  noble  command, 
"  Therefore,  all  things  whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should 
do  to  you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them."  This  precept  requires  that 
one  person  should  accord  that  treatment  to  another  person 
which  he  might*  reasonably — that  is,  rightly — claim  from  the 
other  in  case  their  relations  to  each  other  were  reversed.  In 
short,  divine  wisdom  directs  selfishness  to  become  unselfish 
and  to  transform  itself  into  the  law  of  love. 

14.  All  the  advocates  of  duty  ethics  pursue  radically  the 
same  style  of  thought ;  they  are  more  dogmatic  than  analytic. 
Yet,  with  reference  to  a  superficial  difference,  they  may  be 
divided   into   the   Eationalists   and   the   Intuitionalists,   or, 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  219 

should  we  take  the  word  "  intuition  "  to  signify  any  percep- 
tion held  to  be  immediate,  they  might  be  classified  as  "  A 
Priori  "  and  "  Common  Sense  "  Intuitionalists.  The  former, 
as  Des  Cartes,  Cudworth  and  Kant,  speak  of  reason  as  a  pri- 
mary source  of  ideas  and  truths — as  the  mother  of  principles 
which  are  to  be  received  as  her  gift.  The  latter  dwell  on  the 
irresistible  conviction  with  which  many  of  our  ordinary  per- 
ceptions are  attended,  and  they  ascribe  this  conviction  to  a 
power  of  immediate  cognition,  which  they  called  at  first 
"  common  sense,"  and  afterwards  "  intuition."  This  sec- 
ond class  of  writers  show  a  commendable  willingness  to  base 
philosophy  on  the  scrutiny  of  fact.  Among  them  we  reckon 
Lord  Shaftesbury  (1670-1713)  and  Prof.  Francis  Hutcheson 
(1694—1746),  disciples  of  Locke,  who  taught  that  we  per- 
ceive the  right  and  the  wrong  somewhat  as  the  beautiful  and 
the  homely  or  the  agreeable  and  the  disagreeable  are  seen ;  and 
who  called  the  faculty  of  doing  this  "  the  moral  sense." 
Their  doctrine  does  not  identify  cognition  with  feeling,  as 
sensationalism  does,  but  asserts  that  the  perception  of  the 
moral  qualities  of  actions  and  of  persons,  is  accompanied  and 
influenced  by  feeling.  Shaftesbury  unduly  exalts  the  func- 
tion of  feeling,  as  if  moral  cognition  might  be  reduced  to 
mere  sentiment  or  taste,  yet  he  makes  the  moral  faculty  a 
mode  of  the  "  understanding."  Hutcheson  taught  that  ethi- 
cal judgments  "  do  not  possess  moral  quality  as  right  and 
wrong,  but  intellectual  quality;  and  that  they  are  as  liable 
to  error  as  other  judgments." 

Following  these  authors,  the  "  Common  Sense "  school, 
Eeid  (1710-1795),  Price  (1723-1791),  and  Stewart  (1753- 
1828) — the  Intuitionalists  proper — not  only  adopt  the  right 
as  the  fundamental  element  in  morals,  but  insist  also  that  it  is 
absolutely  simple,  an  indefinable  peculiarity  common  to  vari- 
ous ends  and  modes  of  action.  Price  says,  "  The  ideas  of 
right  and  wrong  are  simple  ideas  and  must,  therefore,  be 
ascribed  to  some  power  of  immediate  perception."  Dr.  Reid 
assigns  two  offices  to  reason,  "the  first,  to  judge  of  things 
self-evident;  the  second,  to  draw  conclusions  that  are  not 
self-evident  from  those  that  are."  He  adds,  "The  first  of 
these  is  the  province — and  the  sole  province — of  common 
sense."  Truths  perceived  by  this  faculty  he  calls  "  first  prin- 
ciples, principles  of  common  sense,  common  notions,  self- 
evident  truths,"  and  among  them  are  "  first  principles  in  mor- 
als." For,  he  says,  there  is  "an  original  power  or  faculty 


220  ^#^  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

in  man,"  called  "  the  moral  sense,  the  moral  faculty, 
conscience";  and  "truths  immediately  testified  to  by  our 
moral  faculty  are  the  first  principles  of  all  moral  reasoning; 
from  which  all  our  knowledge  of  duty  must  be  deduced." 

Eeid  distinguishes  three  classes  of  "  first  principles  in  mor- 
als"; (1)  those  relating  to  " virtue  in  general";  (2)  those 
relating  to  "particular  branches  of  virtue";  and  (3)  those 
"  by  which,  when  there  seems  to  be  an  opposition  between  the 
actions  that  different  virtues  lead  to,  we  determine  to  which 
the  preference  is  due."  The  first  class  includes  such  princi- 
ples as  these : — "  Some  things  in  human  conduct  merit  ap- 
probation and  praise,  others  blame  and  punishment;  and  dif- 
ferent degrees  either  of  approbation  or  of  blame  are  due  to 
different  actions. — What  is  done  from  unavoidable  necessity 
may  be  agreeable  or  disagreeable,  useful  or  hurtful,  but  can- 
not be  the  object  either  of  blame  or  of  moral  approbation. — 
Men  may  be  culpable  in  omitting  what  they  ought  to  have 
done  as  well  as  in  doing  what  they  ought  not. — We  ought  to 
use  the  best  means  to  be  informed  of  our  duty"  The  sec- 
ond class  contains  such  laws  as  these : — "  W e  ought  to  prefer  a 
greater  good,  though  more  distant,  to  a  less;  and  a  less  evil  to 
a  greater. — As  far  as  the  intention  of  nature  appears  in  the 
constitution  of  man,  we  ought  to  comply  with  that  intention, 
and  act  agreeably  to  it. — No  man  is  born  for  himself  only. 
In  every  case  we  ought  to  act  that  part  towards  another 
which  we  would  judge  to  be  right  in  him  to  act  towards  us, 
if  we  were  in  his  circumstances,  and  he  in  ours.  To  every 
man  who  believes  the  existence,  the  perfection  and  the  provi- 
dence of  God,  the  veneration  and  the  submission  we  owe  to  him 
are  self-evident/'  The  third  class  is  composed  of  directions 
such  as  these : — "  Generosity  should  yield  to  gratitude,  and 
both  to  justice. — Beneficence  to  those  who  are  at  ease  should 
yield  to  compassion  to  the  miserable:  and  external  acts  of 
piety  to  works  of  mercy."  This  list  of  Reid's  sets  forth  self- 
evident  truths,  but  the  most  of  them  are  not  so  simple  as  to 
deserve  the  rank  of  "first  principles."  This  list  is  a  collec- 
tion of  maxims  formulated  by  the  good  sense  of  thoughtful 
men;  it  is  without  philosophical  verification,  simplification 
and  systematization.  No  one  has  taken  the  "  first  principles  " 
of  Reid  seriously,  or  as  anything  more  than  primary  state- 
ments on  which  ethical  investigation  may  be  based. 

15.  Many,  however,  agree  with  him  that  the  right  is  a 
quality  so  simple  that  it  admits  of  no  explanation  except  that 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  221 

it  is  the  right.  Prof.  Whewell  asserts  that  the  Tightness  of 
actions  is  a  supreme  rule,  and  an  absolutely  ultimate  end. 
It  is  ultimate,  not  merely  practically,  but  intellectually.  He 
says :  "  There  is  a  supreme  rule  of  human  action.  That 
which  is  conformable  to  the  supreme  rule  is  absolutely  right, 
and  is  called  right  simply,  without  relation  to  a  special  end. 
With  regard  to  the  supreme  rule  the  question,  ( Why  ? ' 
admits  of  no  further  answer.  Why  must  I  do  what  is 
right  ?  Because  it  is  right.  Why  should  I  do  what  I  ought  ? 
Because  I  ought.  The  supreme  rule  supplies  a  rule  for 
that  which  it  commands  by  being  the  supreme  rule."  He 
says  that  the  end  which  this  rule  has  in  view  is  the  "  ultimate 
or  supreme  good,  the  summum  bonum";  but  this  end,  with 
Whewell,  is  not  happiness ;  it  is  "  moral  good,"  or  the  right. 
More  explicitly  than  WThewell  President  Haven  says:  "  The\ 
term  right  expresses  a  simple  and  ultimate  idea ;  it  is,  there-  \ 
fore,  incapable  of  analysis  and  definition.  .  .  .  Eight  and  I 
wrong  are  distinctions  immutable  and  inherent  in  the  nature  / 
of  things."  Statements  like  these  might  be  quoted  from  other 
philosophers  and  from  theologians.  But  we  desire  simply  to 
illustrate  a  general  style  of  ethical  theory ;  and  this  has  been 
done  sufficiently. 

16.  Some  remarks,  however,  may  be  added  respecting 
Adam  Smith,  who  stands  related  to  the  Intuitionalist  form  of 
duty  ethics  very  much  as  Kant  does  to  the  Rationalist.  His 
thought  is  even  more  confused  than  that  of  Kant,  especially 
in  relation  to  the  moral  end;  yet  he  gives  better  help  than 
Kant  for  the  right  exercise  of  the  moral  judgment.  Smith 
assumes  that  "  passions,"  or  feelings,  are  the  primary  ob- 
jects of  approval  and  disapproval  and  that  actions  have  moral 
quality  only  as  proceeding  from  them.  His  doctrine  is  that 
when  one  person  declares  the  passion  of  another  person  to 
be  right,  he  means  merely  that  he  sympathizes  with  that  pas- 
sion, and  when  he  says  that  it  is  wrong  he  means  that  he  is 
displeased  with  it.  Thus  a  first  person  judges,  and  forms 
rules  of  judgment,  by  reason  of  the  harmony  or  the  disso- 
nance of  his  feelings  with  those  displayed  by  a  second  person, 
or  by  second  persons.  Afterwards  the  first  person  applies 
these  rules  to  his  own  passions;  and  so  conscience  arises. 
"  To  approve  of  the  passions  of  another  as  suitable  to  their 
objects,"  says  Smith,  "  is  the  same  thing  as  to  observe  that 
we  entirely  sympathize  with  them;  and  not  to  approve  of 
them  as  such  is  the  same  thing  as  to  observe  that  we  do  not 


222  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

entirely  sympathize  with  them."  With  respect  to  judgments 
concerning  one's  self,  he  says,  "When  I  endeavor  to  exam- 
ine my  own  conduct,  when  I  endeavor  to  pass  sentence  upon 
it  and  either  to  approve  or  condemn  it,  it  is  evident  that,  in 
all  such  cases,  I  divide  myself,  as  it  were,  into  two  persons; 
and  that  I,  the  examiner  and  judge,  represent  a  different 
character  from  that  other  I,  the  person  whose  conduct  is  ex- 
amined into  and  judged  of." 

Smith  does  not  distinguish  clearly  between  the  approbation 
or  disapprobation  of  actions  as  virtuous  or  vicious  and  the 
approval  or  disapproval  of  them  as  right  or  wrong.  But 
his  fundamental  error  lies  in  failing  to  perceive  that  our 
sympathy  with  the  passions  of  others  or  of  ourselves  is  not 
identical  with  the  judgment  that  the  passions  are  "  just  and 
proper  "  and  "  suitable  to  their  objects  " — in  other  words, 
morally  right;  and  that  our  displeasure  with  the  passions  of 
others  and  ourselves  is  not  the  same  with  the  judgment  that 
they  are  unjust,  improper,  unsuitable  and  wrong;  but  that, 
on  the  contrary,  our  sympathy  and  displeasure  spring  from 
the  judgment  and  accompany  it.  Smith's  theory  does  not  ex- 
plain the  moral  judgment,  but  takes  it  for  granted.  It  does 
not  show  on  what  the  judgment  is  founded  nor  even  the 
essential  conditions  of  its  formation.  •  It  only  brings  before 
us  the  truth  that,  in  order  to  a  correct  opinion  concerning 
ourselves,  we  should  judge  about  ourselves  just  as  we  should 
about  other  people.  Inculcating  this  principle,  Smith  is  a 
better  counselor  than  Kant. 

Moreover,  while  both  authors  vainly  attempt  to  explain  the 
moral  end  by  theorizing  respecting  the  manner  of  our  appre- 
hending it,  both  .appear  to  have  been  indistinctly  conscious 
that  they  were  merely  offering  directions  to  the  moral  judg- 
ment. The  initial  "  axiom  "  of  Kant  is,  "  There  is  an  abso- 
lute end  prescribed  by  reason  to  every  one,  which  can  be  ar- 
rived at  by  excluding  all  empirical  and  limited  ends."  And 
while  Smith  teaches  that  the  idea  of  right  originates  in  the 
sympathies  of  one  who  observes  first  the  conduct  of  others 
and  then  his  own,  this  observer  is  to  be  "  an  impartial  and 
well-informed  spectator."  In  short,  he  is  the  "  wise  man." 
We  are  not  to  conform  ourselves  to  what  others  think  about 
us,  but  to  what  they  ought  to  think.  "  We  suppose  ourselves," 
says  Smith,  "  the  spectators  of  our  own  behavior  and  en- 
deavor to  imagine  what  effect  it  would,  in  this  light,  pro- 
duce upon  us.  ...  If,  in  this  view,  it  pleases  us,  we  are  tol- 


CHAP.  XIX.]  DUTY  ETHICS.  223 

erably  satisfied:  we  can  be  more  indifferent  about  the  ap- 
plause and  in  some  measure  despise  the  censure  of  the  world 
— secure  that,  however  misunderstood  or  misrepresented,  we 
are  the  natural  and  proper  objects  of  approbation/'  The 
"  spectator  "  of  Smith  is  an  imaginary  yet  useful  friend  who 
counsels  men  to  honest  judgment,  even  though  the  whole 
world — yes,  and  their  selfish  selves,  also — were  to  differ  from 
them.  An  appeal,  says  Smith,  lies  from  the  opinions  of 
mankind  "to  a  much  higher  tribunal,  to  the  tribunal  of 
their  own  consciences,  to  that  of  the  supposed  impartial  and 
well-informed  spectator,  to  that  of  the  man  within  the  breast, 
the  great  judge  and  arbiter  of  their  conduct."  This  inward 
monitor  sympathizes,  but  he  judges  first.  Then  he  has  a 
conscientious  sympathy  with  the  right. 


CHAPTEE  XX. 

IMMUTABLE  MORALITY. 

1.  The  strength  of  duty  ethics  lies  in  its  appeal  to  common-sense. 
Its  weakness  is  to  forget  that  common  sense  is  only  the  begin- 
ning of  philosophy. — 2.  It  asserts  correctly  that  moral  Tightness 
is  the  aim  of  duty. — 3.  But  it  neither  gives  an  analytical  defini- 
tion of  the  morally  right  nor  shows  that  the  morally  right  is  so 
simple  as  to  be  incapable  of  such  a  definition. — 4.  The  doctrine 
of  immutable  and  eternal  morality,  though  sometimes  extrava- 
gantly stated,  calls  our  attention  to  three  permanent  necessities. 
— 5.  First,  rational  beings  always  have  existed,  and  always  must 
exist,  under  certain  fundamental  moral  laws. — 6.  Secondly, 
morality  has  an  unchangeable  support  in  the  nature  and  will  of 
God. — 7.  And  thirdly,  moral  life  must  appear  in  any  developed 
universe.  This  last  statement  might  be  dispensed  with,  but  has 
its  value.— 8.  The  doctrine  that  moral  distinctions  belong  to 
"  the  nature  of  things  "  has  been  advocated  imperfectly  by  Des 
Cartes,  Cudworth,  Clarke,  and  Kant. — 9.  The  true  foundation 
and  significance  of  this  doctrine.  Intuitional  and  experiential 
perception  distinguished.  Certain  moral  relations  have  a  kind  of 
ontological  necessity. 

1.  THE  strength  of  duty  ethics  lies  in  its  appeal  to  "  com- 
mon sense  " — that  is,  to  the  practical  reason  of  mankind  as 
exercised  about  matters  which  fall  within  the  immediate  ob- 
servation and  scrutiny  of  all.  Universal  convictions  which 
have  been  formed  in  this  way  are  of  the  utmost  authority. 
But  we  cannot  agree  with  Reid  that  all  the  assertions  of 
common  sense  are  "first  principles/'  or  absolutely  simple 
truths^  All  men  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong  and 
consider  these  things  not  as  mere  conformity  and  non-con- 
formity to  a  rule,  but  as  qualities  characterizing  ends  and 
actions.  But  men  generally  neither  think  nor  say  that  right 
and  wrong  are  absolutely  simple  things.  This  point  does 
not  fall  within  the  province  of  common  sense,  but  must  be 
settled  by  the  speculative  reason.  All  men  have  definite 
knowledge  of  air  and  water  and  of  the  more  prominent  sen- 
sible qualities  of  these  "  elements."  But  whether  air  or  water 
224 


CHAP.  XX.]  IMMUTABLE  MORALITY.  225 

is  a  simple  substance  or  not,  and,  if  not,  of  what  more  simple 
substances  it  is  composed,  are  questions  beyond  the  scope  of 
common  knowledge.  Questions  of  analysis  do  not  fall  under 
the  ordinary  scrutiny  and  investigation  of  men;  nor  are 
the  facilities  for  determining  such  questions  within  the 
reach  of  men  generally.  Common  sense  supports  duty  ethics 
only  in  the  assertion  that  explanations  which  do  not 
adequately  explain  the  moral  qualities  of  actions  should  be 
rejected,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to  leave  right  and  wrong 
unexplained  than  to  explain  them  erroneously  or  to  explain 
them  away. 

2.  Some  object  to  duty  ethics  that  it  makes  an  abstraction 
the  end  of  moral  purpose.    It  is  allowed  that  rightness  may  be 
a  quality  of  actions,  but  it  is  said  that  an  abstract  quality  can- 
not be  an  object  of  pursuit.    This  objection  would  have  some 
force  if  the  "  abstract  quality  "  were  something  which  can 
exist  apart  from  the  object  to  which  it  belongs.    But  there  is 
no    such   something.      The   abstraction   mentioned   pertains 
entirely  to  our  style  of  thought  and  speech — not  at  all  to  the 
thing  spoken  of.    To  say  that  one  is  influenced  by  the  right- 
ness  of  an  end  or  action  means  only  that  he  is  influenced 

\by  the  action  or  end  as  right.  This  language  is  similar  to 
\hat  used  when  we  say  that  men  are  attracted  by  the  lus- 
ciousness  of  fruit,  or  the  coolness  of  spring  water,  or  the  value 
of  gold,  or  the  beauty  and  brilliancy  of  a  gem.  Every  one 
understands  that  it  is  the  quality  as  existing  in  the  object,  or 
the  object  as  having  the  quality,  that  attracts. 

3.  The  one  radical  defect  of  duty1- ethics  is  that  it  leaves  the 
fundamental  problem  of  morality  unsolved.    It  neither  gives 
any  definition  of  the  moral  end  nor  does  it  show  by  thorough 
analytic  thought  that  a   definition  is  unnecessary  and  im- 
possible.    Whatever  aid  the  common  convictions  of  the  race 
may  give  to  philosophy,  they  cannot  be  accepted  as  ultimate 
doctrinal  declarations.    Duty  ethics  has  the  weakness  of  those 
systems  whose  chief  reliance  is  the  dogmatic  or  intuitional 
method.     No  one  has  the  right  to  assert  that  a  nature  is 
simple  till  after  analytic  scrutiny  of  the  various  instances  in 
which  that  nature  is  found.     An  examination  of  this  kind 
renders  a  conception  determinate,  and  then,  as  a  result,  we 
have  either  a  synthetic  definition,  if  the  nature  be  complex, 
or,  if  it  be  simple,  a  definition  giving  clear  knowledge  through 
the  use  of  distinguishing  relations. 

4.  The  main  position  of  duty  ethics,  which  is,  in  the  words 

'5 


226  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XX. 

of  Prof.  Sidgwick,  that  the  idea  of  right  "  is  to  be  taken  as 
ultimate  and  unanalyzable,"  need  not  now  be  further  con- 
sidered. But  another  doctrine  often  taught  in  connection 
with  it  deserves  attention.  It  is  asserted  that  our  perception 
of  the  fundamental  forms  of  right  and  wrong  resembles  our 
perception  of  mathematical  and  metaphysical  relations;  that 
it  is  a  necessary  cognition — or  rather  a  cognition  of  the  neces- 
sary; and  that  by  means  of  it  we  can  discover  laws  that  are 
immutable  and  eternal.  Subjectively  every  judgment  takes 
place  necessarily,  at  least  when  evidence  is  properly  consid- 
ered. But  some  perceptions  are  called  necessary  because  they 
assert  that  their  objects  exist  necessarily,  or  in  necessary  re- 
lations. When  judgments  of  this  latter  description  are  im- 
mediate, many  distinguish  them  by  the  name  intuitions. 
They  might  be  called  necessitudinal  judgments,  if  this  ad- 
jective were  used  in  a  wide  sense  and  so  as  to  cover  assertions 
of  possibility  as  well  as  those  of  necessity.  The  cognition  of 
possibility,  no  less  than  that  of  necessity,  is  dependent  on 
necessary  relations  (necessity  is  inferred  from  a  necessitat- 
ing antecedent,  possibility  from  a  necessary  condition)  ;  and 
these  two  modes  of  perception  with  their  combinations  pro- 
ducing contingency  and  probability,  are  naturally  contrasted 
with  mere  historical  cognition,  that  is,  with  the  simple  per- 
ception of  fact  aside  from  its  logical  relations. 

The  doctrine  of  an  abiding  and  changeless  morality — of 
principles  of  duty  which  always  have  been  and  always  shall 
be — has  commended  itself  to  thinking  men.  It  is  opposed  to 
the  opinion  that  there  are  no  fixed  moral  laws  the  knowledge 
of  which  enters  as  a  necessary  factor  into  all  rational  life, 
and  that  right  and  wrong  are  merely  the  creations  of  custom 
and  usage.  But  this  doctrine,  though  a  reasonable  one,  has 
suffered  from  an  advocacy  which  has  made  use  of  extravagant 
language  and  of  unfounded  theories.  Let  us  attempt  first 
a  statement  of  this  doctrine,  and,  after  that,  an  explanation 
of  its  philosophical  basis. 

5.  The  essential  point  in  it  is  that  a  few  rules  of  morality 
— >aa  those  supporting  love  and  beneficence,  order  and  justice, 
veracity  and  fidelity,  and  those  opposing  selfishness,  hatred, 
violence  and  deceit — inseparably  connect  themselves  with 
the  nature  of  sentient  rationality,  and  must  always  have  been 
binding  upon  agents  capable  of  understanding  them.  This 
proposition  does  not  imply  that  men  or  creatures  of  equal 
or  greater  intelligence  have  always  existed,  nor  that  man 


CHAP.  XX.]  IMMUTABLE  MORALITY.  227 

always  has  been  a  rational  and  moral  agent;  though,  in  our 
view,  this  latter  position  is  much  more  reasonable  than  the 
opposite  of  it.  It  is  only  asserted  that  all  rational  beings 
who  ever  have  existed  or  shall  ever  exist,  have  been  and  shall 
be  moral  agents.  As  a  corollary  of  the  necessary  connection 
of  the  moral  with  the  rational  it  follows  that  morality  is 
possible  wherever  rational  life  is  possible.  We  can  con- 
ceive of  a  period  when  no  rational  beings  existed ;  when  there 
was  only  empty  space  and  unoccupied  time,  or  when,  at 
least,  the  universe  contained  only  material  substances  and 
their  qualities.  Moral  law  would  have  no  place  under  such 
conditions.  Yet,  even  at  that  period,  on  the  supposition  that 
rational  beings  existed,  morality  would  be  not  only  possible 
but  necessary.  We  admit  that  this  last-mentioned  neces- 
sity is  only  hypothetical,  and  that  it  arises  not  from  the  "  na- 
ture of  things  "  in  general,  but  from  the  nature  of  the  beings 
supposed.  Yet  it  is  analogous  with  the  immutable  necessity 
of  geometrical  truth.  For  this  does  not  merely  mean  that 
the  content  of  any  existing  cube  can  be  found  by  taking  the 
length  of  one  of  its  edges  three  times  as  a  factor,  but  also 
that  this  would  be  true  respecting  any  cube  supposed  to  ex- 
ist where  there  is  now  only  empty  space. 

6.  Further,  if  we  grant  that  there  is  an  omnipresent  and 
self-existent  spirit,  the  wise  and  mighty  author  of  the  uni- 
verse, we  must  admit  that  moral  ideas  and  relations  have  been 
always  present  to  his  mind,  and  that  thus,  in  a  very  literal 
sense,  there  has  been  an  "  eternal  and  immutable  morality/'' 
Theists  also  hold  that  the  supreme  governor  of  the  universe 
lives  and  acts  in  accordance  with  right  principles ;  though  this 
is  an  additional  doctrine  to  that  just  stated,  and  rests  on 
somewhat  different  grounds.     The  immutability  of  the  es- 
sential principles  of  morality  is  seen  to  be  most  absolute  be- 
cause of  its  relations  to  the  power  of  God.     The  Almighty 
might  make  a  sphere  out  of  a  cube,  that  is,  out  of  the  matter 
composing  a  cube,  but  he  could  not  make  a  spherical  cube  nor 
give  to  the  cube,  while  remaining  such,  the  specific  properties 
of  a  sphere.    So,  if  the  rationality  of  a  spirit  were  destroyed, 
the  spirit  would  be  no  longer  subject  to  moral  law;  but,  so 
long  as  he  is  rational,  he  is  bound  to  the  right.     No  power 
can  change  the  radical  principles  of  morality. 

7.  Finally   it   is   contended    that    morality   pertains,   not 
merely  to  the  nature  of  intelligent  beings,  but  also  to  the 
"  nature  of  things/'  so  that  it  must  exist  if  things  exist  at 


228  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XX. 

all  and  must  have  a  place  in  any  system  of  being.  This  po- 
sition has  been  maintained  by  those  who  hold  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  is  given  to  us  in  the  same  way  as  that  of  Space 
and  Time ;  for  then,  evidently,  the  laws  of  righteousness  would 
have  dwelt  eternally  in  the  breast  of  the  divine  being.  But 
we  seem  able  to  conceive  of  the  non-existence  of  God  and  of 
a  space  and  a  time  uninhabited  by  aught,  unless  it  might  be 
chaos.  In  reasonings  of  this  metaphysical  kind  we  must 
proceed  on  certain  ascertained  principles  and  claim  no  more 
than  these  allow.  Right  and  wrong  could  not  be  said  to  per- 
tain to  a  chaotic  universe.  If,  however,  the  "nature  of 
things  "  be  taken  to  signify  not  the  lowest  conceivable  system 
of  being,  but  that  form  which  any  xooyzo?,  or  developed  uni- 
verse, must  assume;  that  form  which  reason  necessarily  an- 
ticipates and  expects;  an  argument  may  be  made  to  show  that 
morality  must  have  place  in  such  a  system. 

This  argument  starts  with  the  assumption  that  the  funda- 
mental forms  of  entity  and  their  mutual  relations  have  been 
learnt  from  the  analysis  of  individual  cognitions;  in  other 
words,  it  presupposes  a  knowledge  of  space ,  time,  quantity, 
substance  (that  is,  metaphysical  substance,  with  its  two  gen- 
era, spirit  and  matter),  power,  action  (including  passive 
operation),  change  and  relations.  This  list  may  be  shortened 
by  leaving  out  quantity  as  a  distinct  element  and  distributing 
it  among  the  rest,  since  all  entities  are  quanta,  or  some- 
things. Then  the  course  of  thought  proceeds  as  follows: — 
Space  and  Time  belong  to  the  "nature  of  things"  because 
(no  matter  what  some  philosophers  say)  nothing  can  exist  ex- 
cept in  space  and  in  time.  Substance  is  ontologically  neces- 
sary because,  were  there  no  substance,  there  would  be  nothing 
but  empty  space  and  unrecorded  time.  Power,  which  resides 
only  in  substance,  is  necessary,  because,  without  power,  any 
world  would  be  a  dead,  motionless  mass.  Again,  this  power 
must  operate  in  some  way  according  to  law,  else  the  changes 
produced  by  it  would  be  unintelligible  and  unusable,  and  we 
would  have  nothing  but  a  chaotic  confusion  and  mixture  of 
things.  Then,  if  the  universe  is  to  be  of  worth  or  value,  it 
must  contain  the  means  of  happiness  and  beings  capable  of 
enjoying  them.  Moreover,  since  the  realization  of  this  end 
cannot  come  by  chance,  there  must  be  all-controlling  power, 
skill,  wisdom  and  benevolence.  Once  more,  in  order  to  the 
experience  of  the  highest  form  of  happiness,  which  is  blessed- 
ness, there  must  be  rational  spirits  who  can  understand  the 


CHAP.  XX.J  IMMUTABLE  MORALITY.  229 

laws  of  well-being,  who  can  co-operate  in  works  of  goodness, 
and  who  are  capable  of  loving  and  worthy  of  being  loved. 
And  such  beings,  if  they  are  to  attain  the  end  of  their  exist- 
ence, must  live  according  to  the  law  of  reason,  that  is,  ac- 
cording to  the  law  of  right,  which  reason  prescribes. 

The  foregoing  argument  justifies  the  assertion  that,  in 
a  peculiar  sense,  moral  Tightness  pertains  to  the  "nature  of 
things,"  and  is  ontologically  necessary.  But  the  necessity 
thus  referred  to  is  not  causative;  it  does  not  produce  a  uni- 
verse nor  any  part  of  one.  It  is  that  logical  or  metaphysical 
necessity  which  governs  the  progressive  production  and  the 
constitution  of  any  system  of  being.  Moreover,  as  it  pertains 
not  merely  to  the  present  but  to  any  supposable  universe,  it 
is  preeminently  hypothetical.  While  it  is  a  law  of  existing 
things  and  in  that  light  is  actualistic,  it  does  not  imply  that 
things  do  or  must  actually  exist,  but  only  that,  if  they  exist 
at  all,  they  must  exist  in  a  certain  way,  and  that  a  complete 
cosmos  (which  is  what  reason  naturally  looks  for)  must  in- 
clude certain  forms  of  entity  in  their  appropriate  relations. 
To  some  this  unproductive  necessity  may  seem  unimportant; 
yet  it  is  that  expressed  by  mathematical  axioms;  and  it  is 
the  only  necessity  assumed  in  the  doctrine  that  the  first 
principles  of  morals  are  immutable. 

As  already  remarked,  this  doctrine  has  suffered  from  an 
imperfect  advocacy.  Some  have  taught  that  every  dictate  of 
conscience  is  infallible  and  equal  in  certainty  and  authority 
to  every  other.  This  is  a  manifest  absurdity.  Others  have 
committed  a  more  philosophical  error  in  basing  the  knowledge 
of  immutable  truth — that  is,  of  necessary  and  unalterable  re- 
lations— on  a  power  of  intelligence  which  immediately  ap- 
prehends this  truth  in  the  form  of  "  innate  ideas."  This  doc- 
trine was  advocated  by  Des  Cartes  and  was  applied  to  ethics 
by  Cudworth  in  his  treatise,  "  De  Aeternis  et  Immutabilibus 
Justi  et  Honesti  Notionibus."  Cudworth  does  not  claim  im- 
mutability for  the  specific  judgments  of  conscience,  but  only 
for  the  fundamental  conceptions  of  "  moral  good  and  evil, 
right  and  wrong  " — Bonum  et  malum  morale,  justum  et  injus- 
tum;  and  his  whole  argument  is  based  on  his  theory  of  ra- 
tional intelligence.  He  says  that  this  intelligence  does  not 
consider  things  without  the  mind  but  the  notions  of  the  mind 
itself;  he  adopts  the  Cartesian  criterion  of  intuitive  knowl- 
edge that  whatever  is  conceived  of  and  understood  clearly, 
must  be  absolutely  true;  and  he  explains  the  nature  and 


230  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XX. 

source  of  "  immutable  things  "  by  saying  there  is  an  eternal 
mind  from  which  all  created  intelligences  continually  receive 
ideas — "  Intelligentia  proprie  non  res  extra  mentem  versan- 
tes  considerat,  verum  mentis  ipsius  notions.  .  .  Quodcum- 
que  dare  concipitur  et  intelligitur,  id  absolute  verum  est.  L  L  L 
Est  eterna  quce  dam  mens  ex  qua  omnes  intelligentiae  creatae 
notiones  perpetuo  accipiunt"  (Read  the  last  two  chapters 
of  the"De  Aeternis.") 

Kant,  taking  up  this  theory  of  the  intellect,  destroyed  its 
vsimplicity  by  the  addition  of  his  arbitrary  and  confused 
"categories";  properly  enough,  too,  he  carried  it  out  to  a 
skepticism  of  which  his  predecessors  did  not  dream.  The 
doctrine  of  an  innate  and  necessary  knowledge  of  moral  good 
and  evil  was  also  adopted  by  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  who  says, 
"  That  eternal  rule  of  right  which  I  have  been  describing 
ought  as  indispensably  to  govern  men's  actions  as  it  cannot 
but  necessarily  determine  their  assent." 

All  such  philosophy,  though  well  meant,  is  worse  than  sim- 
ple dogmatism.  Truth  is  injured  when  false  theories  are  used 
in  its  support.  The  "  intelligence  "  which  apprehends  "  in- 
nate ideas,"  like  the  "  pure  reason  "  of  Kant,  is  a  mythical 
faculty — a  needless  theoretical  assumption;  Cudworth's  say- 
ing that  "knowledge  does  not  begin  with  individuals  but 
ends  with  them,"  is  the  reverse  of  truth ;  all  human  knowledge 
can  be  shown  to  originate  in  particular  perceptions,  and  all 
general  principles  can  be- explained  as  the  products  of  gener- 
alization. The  empiricist,  using — or  rather  misusing — these 
premises,  asserts,  as  Mill  and  Spencer  do,  that  our  only  rea- 
son for  believing  in  abstract  truth,  whether  metaphysical  or 
moral,  is  that  the  frequent  recurrence  of  some  idea  in  connec- 
tion with  an  antecedent  idea  has  resulted  in  a  habit  of  thought 
difficult  and  even  impossible  to  resist.  Then  he  adds  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  unchangeable  truth,  though  men  may 
be  deluded  into  believing  that  there  is.  Thus  doubt  and 
skepticism  are  introduced. 

9.  Those  who  are  content  with  the  dogmatic  assertion 
of  necessary  truth  and  who  find  no  difficulty  in  determining 
what  fundamental  truth  is,  may  care  little  to  know  how  truth 
is  first  obtained.  But  there  are  others  who  would  confirm 
their  faith  in  immutable  principles  by  an  understanding  of 
the  intellectual  operations  through  which  these  principles  are 
apprehended.  For  their  sake  we  shall  attempt  a  brief  state- 
ment of  the  philosophical  basis  of  necessary  truth.  This 


CHAP.  XX.]  IMMUTABLE  MORALITY.  231 

statement  can  scarcely  be  made  without  using  several  words 
in  an  arbitrary  and  technical  way.  For  example,  the  terms 
experience  and  intuition  must  be  employed  in  special  signi- 
fications. Experience  sometimes  signifies  all  of  man's  inward 
life  so  far  as  he  is  distinctly  conscious  of  it;  as  when  we  speak 
of  a  long  and  happy  experience.  Again,  this  word  may  indi- 
cate our  perception  of  present  objects  and  relations,  both  ex- 
ternal and  internal;  as  when  we  say  that  memory  is  a  record 
of  experience.  In  this  sense  experience  signifies  presenta- 
tional cognition  in  general.  At  other  times  this  term  denotes 
knowledge  gained  in  immediate  perception  considered  as  ac- 
companied by  inductive  judgment;  as  when  we  speak  of  the 
lessons  of  experience.  Let  us  now  use  the  word  for  the  per- 
ception of  mere  fact  as  contrasted  with  the  perception  of  the 
necessary  or  logical  relations  of  fact,  or  of  fact  as  having 
these  relations.  With  this  conception  in  mind  a  single  act  of 
this  mode  of  cognition  might  be  called  an  experiential  or  em- 
pirical judgment.  The  knowledge  obtained  through  such  ex- 
perience is  expressed  by  the  indicative  mood  of  verbs  in  its 
primary  use  as  the  simple  statement  of  observed  or  historical 
fact. 

The  term  intuition  occasionally  denotes  any  form  of  imme- 
diate cognition.  President  McCosh  says,  "  By  intuition  I 
mean  that  power  which  the  mind  has  of  perceiving  objects  and 
truths  at  once  and  without  a  process."  In  this  sense  all  the 
modes  of  experience  mentioned  above1,  except  one,  would  be 
forms  of  presentational  intuition.  Again,  intuition  may  sig- 
nify a  process  of  intellectual  apprehension  so  rapid  as  to  be 
apparently  immediate.  In  this  sense  the  "  intuition  of  rea- 
son "  is  opposed  to  the  "  discourse  of  reason."  At  present  let 
us  understand  by  intuition  the  immediate  perception  of  the 
necessary  or  (necessitudinal)  relations  of  things,  or  of  things 
as  necessarily  related.  To  see  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact  and 
measurement,  three  angles  are  equal  to  one  another  would  be 
an  experiential  judgment,  but  to  perceive  that  two  of  them 
being  each  equal  to  the  third  must  be  equal  to  each  other, 
would  be  an  intuition. 

It  is  a  peculiarity  of  such  judgments  that  they  take  place 
quite  as  well  in  the  absence  as  in  the  presence  of  their  objects; 
for  which  reason  they  may  be  divided  into  the  actualistic 
and  the  hypothetical.  With  reference  to  this  peculiarity  they 
have  been  called  the  "  intuitions  of  the  mind."  A  merely  sup- 
posed event,  as  an  explosion,  could  be  as  positively  rei'erred  to 


232  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XX. 

a  sufficient  imaginary  cause  as  a  real  explosion  would  be  re- 
ferred to  a  real  cause.  The  judgment  that  two  parallel  lines 
will  never  meet,  however  prolonged,  holds  good  whether  the 
lines  actually  exist  or  are  only  imagined  to  exist.  Moreover, 
such  judgments  appear  to  be  original  and  independent  of  all 
previous  judgments.  Of  course  merely  mental  or  supposi- 
tional intuition  does  not  produce  actualistic  but  only  hypo- 
thetical conviction;  yet  it  is  important  as  giving  us  a  knowl- 
edge of  "  the  nature  of  things." 

The  primary  form  of  intuition  is  the  perception  of  tfeces- 
sary  relations  between  objects  both  (or  all)  of  which  are  im- 
mediately present  or  given.  But  the  most  noted  use  of  intui- 
tion is  the  inference  of  one  object  from  another — of  a  con- 
sequent from  an  antecedent.  For  whenever  an  object  exists  in 
a  necessary  relation,  not  only  the  relation  but  also  the  cor- 
relate must  exist  also.  For  instance,  since  action  is  necessar- 
ily related  to  agent,  we  can  say  that,  if  an  action  take  place, 
there  must  be  .an  agent.  All  inference,  and  every  step  of 
reasoning,  can  be  accounted  for  in  this  way. 

The  convictional  force  of  every  intuition  lies  in  the  impli- 
cit or  explicit  recognition  of  an  absolutely  necessary  form  of 
existential  connection,  or  of  what  we  may  call  an  ontological 
necessity.  But  our  primary  intuitions  and  most  of  those  oc- 
curring in  daily  thought  contain  specific  matter  with  which 
the  ontological  element  is  clothed  and  on  which  the  convic- 
tional force  of  the  judgment  does  not  depend.  And  so,  though 
all  intuitions  are  truly  ontological,  there  are  some  which  pre- 
eminently deserve  that  name;  and  we  may  divide  intuitions 
into  the  ontological  and  the  cosmological,  if  we  limit  the  for- 
mer designation  to  those  judgments  which  use  only  that 
thought  on  which  the  necessity  of  sequence  depends.  Throw- 
ing salt  into  water  we  see  experientially,  as  a  mere  fact,  that 
it  is  dissolved,  and  also,  intuitionally,  that  this  takes  place 
necessarily  by  reason  of  a  power  in  the  water  to  act  in  that 
way.  This  intuition  is  not  that  of  a  cause  and  an  effect  sim- 
ply as  such,  but  of  a  particular  cause  producing  a  particular 
effect.  Nevertheless  it  contains  implicitly  the  simple,  or  pure, 
cognition  of  cause  and  effect.  In  like  manner,  that  a  thread 
of  silk  or  cotton  or  a  wire  of  platinum  or  of  gold  extends  far- 
ther when  stretched  to  straightness  than  when  bent  or  curved, 
embodies  the  mathematical  conviction  that  the  straight  line 
is  the  shortest  between  two  points.  In  short,  cosmological  em- 
braces ontological  intuition  much  as  a  variegated  landscape 


CHAP.  XX.J  IMMUTABLE  MORALITY.  233 

includes  figures,  positions,  directions  and  distances,  as  dis- 
tinguishable from  colors  and  shades.  Ontological  intuition 
takes  place  originally  in  this  concealed  way;  after  which  it 
acquires  separate  existence  by  abstraction;  and  is  yet  farther 
removed  from  fact  by  generalization;  by  which  axioms  and 
postulates  arise.  These  last  have  only  the  authority  of  the 
judgments  from  which  they  are  derived;  the  criterion  of  in- 
tuition is  not  the  clearness  with  which  first  principles  may  be 
conceived,  but  that  absolute  irresistible  conviction  which  at- 
tends the  cognition  of  individual  cases  of  necessity. 

The  law  according  to  which  universal  truth  is  obtained  from 
particular  perceptions  pertains  to  entity  in  general,  and  may 
be  called  the  homologic  law.  It  is  that  like  logical  antece- 
dents are  accompanied  by  like  consequents.  The  knowledge  of 
it  arises  in  the  same  way  as  that  of  any  other  axiom;  that  is, 
it  is  abstracted  from  particular  intuitions  respecting  similar 
cases  of  logical  sequence. 

The  foregoing  statement  regarding  the  perception  of  nec- 
essary truth  might  be  enlarged  by  showing  how  this  intuition 
discerns  possibility  and  contingency  as  well  as  necessity  and 
impossibility,  and  how  the  ontologically  contingent  is  that 
which  may  and  may  not  have  place  in  any  constitution  of 
things,  while  the  cosmologically  contingent  is  that  which  may 
and  may  not  have  place  in  the  existing  cosmos.  A  thing 
might  be  ontologically  contingent  which  is  cosmologically 
either  necessary  or  impossible ;  because  the  specific  laws  of  the 
universe  could  be  changed  by  the  power  that  made  them  and 
their  necessity  depends  on  that  power,  while  the  necessary- 
laws  of  being  are  not  alterable  by  any  power  whatever.  But 
these  matters,  and  indeed  this  whole  subject,  belong  to  meta- 
physics rather  than  to  ethics.  Those  interested  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  necessitudinal  thought  will  find  it  pretty  thoroughly 
discussed  in  the  PERCEPTIONALIST,  and  in  the  MODALIST. 
Our  aim  at  present  has  been  to  state,  rather  than  to  advocate, 
the  doctrinal  basis  on  which  right  and  wrong  are  said  to  be 
perceived  intuitively — to  be  the  self-evident  properties  of  cer- 
tain ends  and  actions — to  be  absolutely  necessary  relations — 
to  be  immutable  and  eternal — to  pertain  to  the  very  "  nature 
of  things."  The  essential  point  of  these  teachings  is  that  the 
distinction  of  right  and  wrong — or,  more  simply,  the  idea  of 
moral  Tightness — is  asserted,  hypothetically,  in  an  intuition 
of  ontological  necessity.  The  original  cognition  of  moral 
qualities  takes  place  in  connection  with  the  actual  conduct  of 


234  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XX. 

ourselves  and  others,  but,  perceiving  these  qualities  to  be  nec- 
essarily inherent  in  rational  conduct,  we  say  that  wherever 
and  whenever  rational  beings  exist,  their  conduct  must  have 
moral  character,  and  that  this  necessity  is  one  which  no  power 
can  alter  or  destroy :  in  this  sense  it  is  absolute  and  ontologi- 
cal.  It  belongs,  of  course,  to  the  existing  universe,  but  it  is 
not  merely,  cosmological.  For  no  power  whatever  could  make 
it  other  than  right  that  rational  beings  should  love  each  other 
and  care  for  each  other's  welfare,  should  observe  truth  and 
justice  in  their  dealings  with  one  another,  and  should  culti- 
vate virtue  and  hate  vice;  nor  could  the  opposite  of  these 
things  be  made  anything  else  than  wrong.  The  eternal  im- 
mutability of  moral  principle  means  that,  on  the  supposition 
of  rational  beings  existing  at  any  period  or  place  whatever, 
there  and  at  that  time  the  claims  of  morality  must  have  ex- 
isted too. 

But  little  more  than  the  foregoing  is  implied  when  right 
and  wrong  are  ascribed  to  the  necessary  "  nature"  or  "  con- 
stitution "  of  things.  This  doctrine  views  entity  collectively 
and  as  composed  of  related  elements;  and  it  asserts  that  no 
universe  could  be  complete  without  rational  beings  and  their 
morality.  The  conclusion  thus  presented  is  not  an  immediate 
intuition,  but  rather  a  deduction  from  intuitions.  Nor  is  it 
so  important  as  the  truth  that  right  and  wrong  are  necessarily 
connected  with  rationality. 

The  question  whether  there  is  any  immutable  basis  of  mor- 
ality is  merely  colllateral  to  the  inquiries,  "  What  are  the  prin- 
ciples of  morality,  what  is  their  essential  nature,  and  what  is 
the  ground  of  their  obligatoriness  and  value  ?  "  Moreover 
these  inquiries  should  be  pursued  by  a  direct  examination  of 
the  moral  judgments  of  men  rather  than  through  metaphysi- 
cal discussions.  But  the  doctrine  of  immutability  has  im- 
portance ;  it  is  opposed  to  the  error  that  right  and  wrong  are 
the  arbitrary  distinctions  of  custom  or  of  authority. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE  MORAL  LAW. 

1.  In  the  original  and  limited  use  of  tho  term  a  law  is  either  a 
general  command  or  the  mode  of  conduct  for  a  recurrent  case 
prescribed  by  such  a  command.  In  a  wider  sense  a  law  is  a 
mode  of  action  or  of  being  consequent  upon  some  antecedent ;  in 
other  words  a  general  mode  of  sequence.  2.  Under  this  broad 
acceptation  laws  are  either  causational,  logical,  or  practical.  A 
causational  law  has  a  productive  antecedent.  The  antecedent  of 
a  logical  law  involves  connection  of  existence,  but  exerts  no 
power.  A  practical  law  has  an  end  for  its  antecedent,  and,  for 
its  consequent,  the  means  which  one  must  employ  if  he  desire  to 
obtain  the  end. — 3.  Rules  prescribed  by  authority  are  practical 
laws  even  though  the  only  end  to  be  gained  is  the  avoidance  of 
threatened  penalty.  But  generally  they  have  other  ends  than 
this.  Most  practical  laws  are  not  dictated  by  authority  at  all  but 
only  by  wisdom  and  experience.  Primarily  the  moral  law 
attracts  and  obligates,  not  by  reason  of  any  command  or  penalty, 
but  by  reason  of  its  own  lightness.  Cicero  quoted. — 4.  The 
essence  of  the  moral  law  lies  in  its  generic  end,  its  Tightness. 
To  determine  what  rightness  is  we  must  group  moral  require- 
ments according  to  their  radical  similarities,  and,  after  that, 
obtain  their  common  quality  by  a  process  of  analysis  and  gener- 
alization. Existing  classifications  are  too  pragmatical  for  this 
purpose. — 5.  A  fourfold  classification  proposed.  Its  terminology. 
Moral  Goodness,  Moral  Esteem,  Regulative  Righteousness,  and 
Causative  Righteousness,  defined. — 6.  The  duty  of  Moral  Good- 
ness is  divisible  into  doing  good  and  loving  beings.  So  also 
Moral  Esteem  and  Regulative  Righteousness  have  both  practical 
and  affectional  requirements. — 7.  Often  the  same  term  designates 
both  a  virtue  (or  motive  moral  principle)  and  the  action  at  which 
it  aims.  It  may  contribute  to  clearness  to  apply  the  terms 
"  practive  "  and  "  commotive  "  to  the  virtues  and  "  practical." 
and  "  affectional  "  to  the  duties.  For  example,  Practive  and 
Commotive  Moral  Goodness  may  be  contrasted  with  Practical  and 
Affectional  Moral  Goodness.  Commonly,  however,  the  context 
shows  whether  tho  moral  principle  or  the  moral  action  is  in- 
tended.— 8.  Causative  Righteousness  may  be  subdivided  into  the 
Rudimentary,  or  Incipient  ;  the  Instructional,  or  Educative  ; 
and  the  Rectoral  or  Retributive. — 9.  Rectoral  Righteousness 
seeks  to  promote  virtue  and  to  suppress  vice  by  means  of  gov- 
ernmental power,  and  especially  by  the  use  of  rewards  and  pun- 

235 


236  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

ishments.  Punitive  Justice  is  the  most  prominent  development 
of  it.  The  animus  of  this  justice  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
anger,  which,  of  itself,  is  not  a  moral  but  a  natural  motivity. 

1.  THE  term  "law"  is  sometimes  used  objectively  to  sig- 
nify a  prescribed  or  established  mode  of  action  or  sequence, 
and  sometimes  subjectively  to  indicate  a  form  of  thought  or 
of  statement,  setting  forth  the  mode  of  action  or  sequence. — 
This  second  meaning  appears  when  law  is  said  to  be  written, 
proclaimed  or  stated.  It  is  wholly  subordinate  to  the  first, 
since  the  mental  or  verbal  formula  has  value  only  as  pre- 
senting a  mode  of  doing  or  being.  Apart  from  that  it  would 
not  be  a  law,  but  merely  a  thought.  This  subjective  sense 
is  so  closely  related  to  the  objective  that  many  make  no  dis- 
tinction between  the  two.  But  there  is  a  difference.  We  shall 
now  employ  the  word  in  its  objective  signification,  using  the 
subjective  chiefly  or  only  as  an  indirect  expression  of  the 
other. 

Etymologists  derive  the  word  "law"  from  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  verb  signifying  to  lay;  they  compare  it  with  the  Ger- 
man "  Gesetz,"  which  is  derived  from  the  verb  "  setzen,"  to 
place.  Originally,  therefore,  the  word  indicated  a  rule  laid 
down  by  authority  and  then  the  conduct  required  by  the 
rule.  It  still  retains  these  significations;  when  we  speak  of 
"  the  law  of  the  land,"  or  say  that  "  jurisprudence  is  the 
science  of  positive  or  municipal  law,"  we  have  in  mind  rules 
or  modes  of  doing  prescribed  and  enforced  by  civil  govern- 
ment. Because  of  certain  analogies,  however,  the  word,  es- 
pecially in  philosophic  and  scientific  writings,  has  come  to 
express  other  conceptions.  We  speak  of  the  laws  of  physics 
and  of  mechanics,  of  mathematics  and  metaphysics,  of  art 
and  of  duty.  In  these  cases  a  law  is  a  mode  of  operation  or 
of  being,  but  it  is  no  longer  a  mode  of  action  prescribed  by 
authority.  Nevertheless  one  definition  is  applicable  to  all 
forms  of  law  and  sets  forth  a  radical  nature  common  to  them 
all.  We  may  say,  "Law  is  a  general  mode  of  sequence  in 
which  some  consequent  is  conceived  of  as  accompanying  or 
following  some  antecedent." 

A  single  case  of  sequence  would  not  be  a  law,  neither  would 
any  number  of  individual  cases.  A  law  is  essentially  a  gen- 
eral object — a  "universal,"  if  we  may  use  the  old  scholastic 
term.  That  universals  do  not  exist  at  all,  while  yet,  because 
of  the  applicability  of  the  general  to  the  individual,  we  think 
and  speak  of  them  as  if  they  did  exist,  is  the  assertion  of 


CHAP.  XXI.]  TBE  MORAL  LA  W.  23? 

mental  science.  All  general  assertions  resemble  hypothetical 
assertions  in  that  they  are  made  regarding  non-existing  ob- 
jects and  yet  are  capable  of  expressing  truth  in  relation 
to  existing  objects.  (See  the  PERCEPTIONALIST,  Chap. 
XXVIII.)  Using  thought  and  language  in  this  way  we  say 
that  laws  in  general  are  divisible  into  three  comprehensive 
classes,  the  causational,  the  logical,  and  the  practical. 

2.  In  causational  law  adequate  power  to  produce  an  effect 
is  always  part  of  the  antecedent.  That  is  what  is  meant 
when  we  call  the  antecedent  a  cause.  Such  an  antecedent 
is  always  prior  in  time  to  its  consequent;  which  is  not  the 
case  with  other  antecedents.  Since  we  constantly  infer  from 
cause  to  effect,  even  while  we  have  no  wish  to  use  the  cause 
instrumentally  and  are  simply  inquiring  concerning  fact, 
causational  law  may  be  considered  a  species  of  the  logical. 
But  causational  sequence,  because  of  its  peculiar  and  aggres- 
sive operation,  is  contrasted  with  other  laws  that  can  be  used 
in  inference,  and  is  naturally  separated  from  them  in  classi- 
fication. It  might  be  said  that  a  law  of  cause  and  effect  is 
not  in  itself  a  law  of  inference,  and  that  its  logical  use  is  a 
consequence  of  its  metaphysical  nature.  Every  logical  law, 
however,  is  primarily  a  law  of  entity  or  being — a  metaphysi- 
cal law,  or  at  least  one  that  derives  its  strength  from  some 
ontological  principle.  The  peculiarity  of  causational  law  is 
that  it  proceeds  from  cause  to  effect.  Other  laws  enable  us 
to  say  that,  if  an  antecedent  be  granted,  the  consequent  must 
follow  certainly  or  probably  or  contingently,  but  these  laws 
do  not  set  forth  a  producing  necessity  and  do  not  admit  of  an 
instrumental  use.  They  are  distinguished  as  logical  because 
they  are  preeminently  logical — because  reason  has  no  use  for 
them  except  for  purposes  of  knowledge.  Such  are  the  prin- 
ciples of  geometry  and  of  mathematical  science,  and  those 
universal  laws  of  conviction  discussed  in  pure  logic.  That 
mode  of  sequence,  also,  according  to  which  an  adequate  cause 
may  be  inferred  from  an  effect,  may  be  ranked  as  logical. 

Practical  laws  are  those  which  set  forth  some  form  of  ac- 
tion or  conduct  as  needed  or  required  for  the  attainment  of 
some  end.  The  proposed  end  is  the  antecedent;  the  action 
necessary  for  its  attainment  is  the  consequent.  The  law  is, 
"  If  that  end  is  to  be  realized,  this  action  must  be  performed." 
Practical  laws  differ  from  the  causational  because  they  do  not 
proceed  from  cause  to  effect,  but  from  a  conceived  and  de- 
sirable result  to  the  means  of  bringing  it  about.  They  are 


238  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

founded  on  that  logical  law  whereby  an  appropriate  cause 
is  inferred  from  a  given  effect.  But  this  is  done  merely 
hypothetically,  and  not  with  any  aim  of  ascertaining  fact,  but 
for  the  purpose  of  influencing  the  will. 

In  logical  law  the  antecedent  justifies  the  inference  that  the 
consequent  exists  if  the  antecedent  does;  in  practical  law  the 
antecedent  does  not  support  such  a  conclusion;  for  it  is  not 
complete  either  as  a  causational  or  as  a  logical  antecedent. 
In  order  that  it  may  become  such  we  must  know  whether  or 
not  the  agent  is  determined  to  realize  the  end.  With  that 
information  we  can  infer  causationally  (and  logically)  that 
the  action  will,  or  will  not,  be  performed.  In  that  case  the 
practical  law  receives  an  addition  and  is  employed  in  a  new 
way ;  in  other  words,  it  becomes  causational  when  united  with 
will  and  desire  on  the  part  of  the  agent.  This  combination 
causes  action;  and,  through  action,  the  desired  result  is  real- 
ized. With  reference  to  this  fact  the  antecedent  of  a  practical 
law — the  end  or  aim  which  it  sets  forth — has  been  called  a 
"  final  cause,"  although  it  is  not  at  all  causative  of  itself. 
It  is  only  a  causal  condition  which  may  become  effectual  when 
adopted  and  sought  for  by  some  intelligent  and  voluntary 
agent. 

The  doctrine  that  every  law,  whether  causational,  logical 
or  practical,  is  a  mode  of  sequence,  is  imperfectly  stated  by 
those  who  say  that  every  law  is  a  mode  of  action  or  being. 
Thus  the  laws  of  physics,  chemistry,  botany  and  zoology, 
the  axioms  of  mathematics,  metaphysics  and  logic,  and  the 
rules  of  success  in  commerce,  social  intercourse,  art,  civil 
government,  and  industrial  occupations,  are  said  to  set  forth 
modes  of  action  or  of  being.  For  example,  in  physics  we 
learn  of  attractions  and  repulsions,  which  are  modes  of  ac- 
tion ;  in  mathematics  of  equalities  and  inequalities,  which  are 
modes  of  being;  in  commerce  of  honesty,  and  in  art  of  con- 
formity to  nature,  which  are  modes  both  of  being  and  of 
doing.  So  it  is  asserted  that  every  law  is  a  mode  of  opera- 
tion or  of  existence.  This  statement  only  partially  expresses 
the  truth.  A  mode  of  action  or  being  is  not  of  itself  a  law 
but  only  the  most  prominent  element  in  the  law.  There  is 
always  a  sequence  or  connection  whereby  the  mode  of  action 
or  being  is  attached  to  an  appropriate  antecedent,  The  es- 
sence of  causational  law  is  that  the  effect  should  follow  a 
productive  antecedent.  Every  mathematical  law  sets  forth 
a  consequence;  not  simply,  for  example,  the  fact  that  two 


CHAP.  XXI.]  THE  MORAL  LAW.  239 

lines  are  parallel,  but  that  they  must  be  parallel  because 
they  are  both  parallel  to  a  third;  and  so  with  every  onto- 
logical  principle.  Practical  laws,  likewise,  set  forth  not 
modes  of  doing  simply,  but  those  modes  of  doing  which 
must  (or  should)  be  adopted  in  order  to  gain  certain  ends. 
This  is  a  kind  of  sequence  in  which  the  "  final  cause "  is 
antecedent  and  the  needful  instrument  or  method  the  conse- 
quent. Every  law,  therefore,  is  a  general  mode  of  sequence. 

3.  As  already  seen  the  word  law  was  not  applied  at  first  to 
causational  or  logical  sequences,  nor  even  to  practical  methods 
or  procedures,  in  general,  but  only  to  rules  or  modes  of  ac- 
tion prescribed  by  authority.  In  these  last  the  end  promi- 
nently set  forth  is  freedom  from  penalty  and  the  good-will 
of  persons  in  power.  But,  in  all  likelihood,  the  original  con- 
ception of  law  contemplated  other  reasons  for  conduct  than 
the  influence  of  external  authority.  Even  in  the  simplest 
stages  of  society  both  rulers  and  ruled  were  not  beasts  ani- 
mated only  by  passion  and  fear,  but  rational  beings.  We 
are  of  the  opinion  that  the  earliest  laws  were  ordained  and 
were  respected  as  setting  forth  modes  of  conduct  necessary 
to  human  welfare  and  demanded  by  right  and  justice.  We 
believe  that  authority  itself  was  originally  obeyed  by  many, 
not  so  much  from  a  dread  of  punishment  as  from  a  sense  of 
loyalty  to  a  just  and  necessary  institution.  In  short,  primi- 
tive law  embodied  the  requirements  of  propriety  and  of 
duty  no  less  than  the  demands  of  power.  Afterwards,  when 
either  duty  or  interest  or  any  other  aim  required  some  form 
of  doing,  the  words  rule  and  law  came  to  be  applied  to  the 
mode  of  procedure  promotive  of  the  end,  whether  it  was  pre- 
scribed by  authority  or  not.  Hence  we  have  the  laws  of  art, 
which  are  those  rules  according  to  which  objects  of  taste  and 
beauty  may  be  produced ;  and  those  of  rhetoric,  which  are  the 
rules  in  compliance  with  which  spoken  or  written  discourse 
may  be  made  pleasing  and  persuasive  or  convincing.  And 
so  war,  commerce,  agriculture,  education,  navigation — every 
form  of  human  pursuit — has  its  laws,  or  principles  of  pro- 
cedure. 

In  like  manner  moral  law  in  general,  and  every  moral  law 
in  particular,  sets  forth  some  mode  of  action  for  the  real- 
ization of  the  right  or  for  the  prevention  of  the  wrong. 
Frequently  such  law  is  enforced  by  penalties  and  rewards, 
but  this  is  not  the  essential  part  of  it;  it  is  only  a  supple- 
mentary addition.  After  certain  conduct  is  seen  to  be  right 


240  TBS  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

and  obligatory  it  is  also  seen  that  men  may  be  induced  by 
governmental  measures  to  consider  and  to  adopt  this  con- 
duct. In  this  way  authority  becomes  a  moral  agency.  But 
the  mere  demand  of  threatening  power  is  without  moral 
quality.  Sometimes,  indeed,  using  language  figuratively,  we 
say  that  the  law,  not  as  laid  down  by  any  judge  or  ruler,  but 
simply  as  setting  forth  the  right,  has  authority.  This  means 
simply  that  the  morally  right  is  of  itself  morally  obligatory. 
Therefore  we  find  no  fault  with  Cicero's  language  in  defin- 
ing law,  that  is,  moral  law.  He  says  that  it  is  the  supreme 
rule  implanted  in  us  by  nature,  which  commands  those 
things  which  ought  to  be  done  and  prohibits  the  contrary. 
— Lex  est  ratio  summa  insita  in  natura,  quce  jubet  ea 
quce  facienda  sunt  proliibetque  contraria. 

4.  Such  being  the  case,  it  is  plain  that  the  nature  of  moral 
law  is  to  be  understood  from  those  ends  which  it  urges  upon 
our  adoption,  and  which  are  the  foundation  of  its  obliga- 
toriness.  A  practical  rule  ordained  by  external  authority 
has  an  additional  force  to  that  of  the  end  proposed  by  the 
rule  itself,  and,  in  case  this  end  does  not  appeal  in  any  way 
to  the  agent,  the  only  force  of  the  rule  is  that  of  the  outward 
compulsion.  But  those  practical  laws  which  arise  simply 
from  the  perceived  necessity  of  some  work  or  doing  for  the 
effectuation  of  an  end,  have  all  their  life  and  importance 
from  the  end  as  naturally  appealing  to  the  rational  spirit. 
This  evidently  is  the  case  with  moral  law.  Hence  every 
rule  of  duty  is  to  be  understood  through  a  study  of  its  end; 
and  the  moral  law  in  general  is  to  be  understood  through  a 
definition  of  the  right  as  the  generic  aim  of  morality. 

In  order  to  determine  this  conception  according  to  the 
analytic  method  all  forms  and  modes  of  duty  must  be  brought 
before  the  mind  in  some  comprehensive  classification.  Such 
an  arrangement  of  duties  should  include  all  things  moral 
and  exclude  all  that  are  non-moral,  but  its  chief  aim  must 
be  to  co-ordinate  duties  with  reference  to  the  most  comprehen- 
sive aims  of  morality.  The  ancient  four-fold  division  of  vir- 
tues will  not  answer  our  purpose  here,  chiefly  because  it  does 
not  follow  this  principle  of  classification.  "  Wisdom,  justice, 
fortitude  and  temperance,"  would  be  sufficiently  inclusive  and 
exclusive  only  if  we  should  understand  by  wisdom  that  moral 
prudence  which  seeks  to  know  the  right;  by  justice,  right- 
eousness in  general,  including  dutiful  beneficence  and  benev- 
olence ;  and  by  fortitude  and  temperance,  two  natural  disposi- 


CHAP.  XXL]  THE  MORAL  LAW. 

tions  which  must  be  exercised  according  to  principle  and  in 
support  of  principle.  Even  so  this  division  would  relate  more 
to  the  development  of  moral  life  as  experienced  by  the  an- 
cients than  to  the  fundamental  aims  of  duty. 

The  scholastic  classification  of  virtues  into  the  intellectual, 
the  moral  and  the  theological,  is  also  unadapted  to  our  pur- 
pose. According  to  St.  Thomas  the  "  virtutes  intellectuates  " 
(wisdom,  judgment  and  intuition)  are  virtues  merely  in  the 
sense  of  furnishing  a  power  of  well-doing,  and  not  in  the 
sense  of  causing  a  right  use  of  the  power.  That  is,  they  are 
virtues  only  according  to  that  ancient  acceptation  whereby 
the  word  virtue  may  be  applied  to  excellent  gifts  as  well 
as  to  right  dispositions. — Cum  habitus  intellectuales  specu- 
lativi  partem  appetitivam  non  perficiant  sed  solam  intellec- 
tivam,  hactenus  tantum  virtutes  did  possunt,  quod  bene  ope- 
randi  facultatem  faciant,  non  autem  quod  faciant  potentia  seu 
habitu  bene  uti.  But,  says  Aquinas,  the  "  virtutes  morales  " 
have  an  ethical  quality  of  themselves  because  they  pertain 
to  the  "  appetitive,"  or,  as  we  would  say,  to  the  motive,  part 
of  our  nature. — Qucevis  virtus  humana  est  vel  intellectualis, 
quce  ad  intellectum,  vel  moralis,  quce  ad  appetitum,  special. 
For  this  reason  they  are  the  "  principal "  or  "  cardinal " 
virtues;  that  is,  they  alone  are  virtues  in  that  strictly  ethical 
sense  which  the  term  has  at  the  present  day. — Morales 
virtutes,  cum  appetitus  rectitudinem  solce  contineant,  sola 
cardinales  seu  principales  dicuntur.  These  virtues  are  four 
in  number,  "  prudentia,  scilicet,  justitia,  temperantia  et 
fortitudo."  The  theological  virtues  are  of  the  same  general 
nature  as  the  moral ;  they  are  given  a  separate  place,  however, 
because  they  are  specially  developed  in  man's  spiritual  and 
eternal  life.  They  are  three  in  number — faith,  hope  and 
charity.  (SUMMA  MORALIS,  quaBestiones  LVIL,  LVIL, 
LXL,  LXII.) 

Modern  writers  seldom  attempt  any  arrangement  of  duties 
except  in  connection  with  applied  ethics.  Then  they  gener- 
ally make  a  division  based  on  the  personal  relations  of  the 
agent.  We  hear  of  duties  to  one's  self,  to  one's  neighbor,  to 
one's  family,  to  society,  to  the  state  and  to  God;  or  of  duties 
pertaining  to  man  as  a  physical,  a  psychical,  a  social,  a  politi- 
cal and  a  religious  being.  In  theoretical  morals  most  authors 
advocate  some  universal  principle  of  duty  without  giving 
any  generic  classification  of  duties.  To  this  rule  Professor 
Whewell  is  an  exception.  Rejecting  the  ancient  four-fold 
16 


242  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

division  as  of  little  value,  he  offers  a  new  list  of  cardinal 
virtues.  "  We  have/'  he  says,  "  five  ideas,  Benevolence,  Jus- 
tice, Truth,  Purity  and  Order,  which  may  be  considered  as 
the  elements  of  the  central  idea  of  morality,,  or  as  the  Car- 
dinal Points  of  the  Supreme  Kule  of  human  action."  (ELE- 
MENTS or  MORALITY,  Bk.  III.,  Ch.  II.) 

This  list  has  some  advantages  over  the  ancient  and 
mediaeval  enumerations.  It  gives  proper  prominence  to 
benevolence,  and  it  denies  a  cardinal  place  to  virtues  which 
are  chiefly  supplementary  to  others.  Every  one  of  the  five 
virtues  mentioned  seeks  a  right  and  obligatory  end  of  its 
own — a  principle  of  classification  which  theoretic  ethics  calls 
for.  Nevertheless  Whewell's  list  seems  lacking  in  complete- 
ness. It  would  be  difficult  to  say  under  what  heads  to  put 
prudence,  reverence,  esteem  for  the  good,  faith,  hope,  forti- 
tude, self-restraint,  and  other  virtues.  This  classification 
would  not  serve  for  a  comprehensive  survey  of  morality  with- 
out considerable  explanation  and  modification.  Instead  of 
attempting  that  we  shall  venture  upon  an  arrangement  of 
our. own,  not  far  removed  from  ordinary  thought — perhaps 
nothing  more  than  a  formulation  of  such  thought ;  and  shall 
endeavor  in  this  way  to  present  the  whole  moral  law  for  criti- 
cal examination. 

5.  All  duties,  we  believe,  may  be  divided  into  those  of 
MORAL  GOODNESS,  MORAL  ESTEEM,  REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUS- 
NESS, and  CAUSATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS. 

The  terms  used  in  this  statement  are  primarily  indicative 
not  of  duties  but  of  virtues;  while,  of  course,  we  are  aiming 
to  understand  duties.  Inasmuch  however,  as  the  classifica- 
tion of  duties  corresponds  with  that  of  the  virtuous  disposi- 
tions which  seek  to  perform  them,  it  is  possible  for  us  to  ex- 
press the  one  in  the  terms  of  the  other.  There  is  a  necessity  in 
our  modern  languages  to  use  words  in  this  way,  because  there 
is  a  scarcity  of  separate  designations  for  duties,  and  because, 
as  Whewell  remarks,  the  same  term — as  beneficence,  right- 
eousness, justice  or  purity — is  often  used  both  for  the  moral 
disposition  and  for  the  conduct  to  which  it  leads.  Only  let 
it  be  remembered  that  our  present  object  is  not  to  study 
virtue  but  duty. 

The  duties  of  Moral  Goodness  are  to  promote  the  welfare 
of  sentient  beings  and  to  love  them.  Those  of  Moral  Esteem 
are  to  treat  rational  beings  in  the  manner  which  their  moral 
character  renders  right  and  proper  and  to  feel  towards  them 


CHAP.  XXI.]  THE  MORAL  LAW.  243 

according  to  their  worthiness  or  unworthiness  of  our  affection. 
Those  of  Regulative  Righteousness  are  to  observe  the  differ- 
ent rules  of  right  doing,  and  to  exercise  rightly  our  natural 
dispositions.  Causative  Righteousness  aims  to  develop  and 
further  every  form  of  virtue  in  ourselves  and  in  others;  it  is 
a  reflex  exercise  of  principle;  and  is  called  causative  by  way 
of  preeminence.  For  while  all  virtue  is  an  efficient  cause, 
this  virtue  seeks  to  cause  virtue  itself  and  so  becomes  a  cause 
of  the  cause  of  doing  what  is  right  and  good. 

We  shall  understand  more  clearly  hereafter  how  Moral 
Esteem  is  a  modification  of  Moral  Goodness  and  how  Causa- 
tive Righteousness  has  a  radical  community  of  nature  with 
Regulative  Righteousness,  and  how,  therefore,  all  morality 
might  be  divided  into  Goodness  and  Righteousness.  Indeed, 
under  a  yet  higher  generalization,  Goodness  (that  is,  Moral 
Goodness)  and  Righteousness  (or  Justitia  Generalis)  might 
be  identified.  This  would  agree  with  Whewell's  use  of 
"  Moral  Goodness  "  as  the  all-comprehensive  designation  of 
virtue,  and  also  with  the  ancient  and  mediaeval  inclusion  of 
benevolence  (or  goodness  in  the  more  limited  sense)  under 
righteousness  in  general.  But  we  now  employ  terms,  as  men 
commonly  do,  to  express  certain  specific  and  contrasted  con- 
ceptions. According  to  these  Moral  Goodness  and  Moral 
Esteem  deal  directly  with  persons  and  with  the  treatment 
and  consideration  of  persons,  while  Regulative  and  Causative 
Righteousness  are  directly  concerned  with  methods  and 
measures.  The  distinction  thus  presented  is  not  very  funda- 
mental, because  all  duty  deals  with  conduct  and  with  conduct 
only  as  affecting  persons ;  still  it  is  a  natural  distinction,  and 
it  may  be  helpful  in  our  search  after  the  radical  nature  of 
the  moral  law. 

6.  In  an  early  discussion  of  the  present  treatise  (Chap. 
VI.)  it  was  seen  that  the  conception  of  an  action  in  morals  is 
very  broad  and  covers  the  intentional  exercise  of  affection 
or  desire  as  well  as  the  intentional  use  of  power  for  some  out- 
ward result.  For  example,  benevolence,  gratitude,  reverence, 
courage,  humility,  considered  as  consciously  cherished  feel- 
ings, are  dutiful  actions,  although  outside  of  morals — in 
psychology,  for  instance — they  might  pass  simply  as  modes 
of  feeling.  In  ethics  every  intentional  mode  of  life  comes 
under  the  head  of  conduct,  and  we  say  that  two  modes  of 
action  may  be  right  or  wrong,  the  practical  and  the  affec- 
tional.  Now  it  is  noticeable  that  both  these  forms  of  conduct 


244:  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

are  prominently  present  in  each  of  the  first  three  generic 
forms  of  duty  and  constitute  their  natural  subdivisions.  In 
Moral  Goodness  we  distinguish  at  once  the  duty  of  doing  good 
and  that  of  cherishing  love  or  benevolence.  In  Moral 
Esteem  the  duty  of  showing  special  favor  to  the  upright  is 
accompanied  by  that  of  cultivating  special  good-will  towards 
them:  corresponding  proprieties  also  justify  the  withholding 
of  favor,  whether  practical  or  affectional,  from  the  wicked. 
In  Regulative  Righteousness  we  both  observe  the  rules  of 
right  doing  because  of  their  Tightness  and  exercise  natural 
dispositions  (gratitude,  awe,  fear,  courage,  candor,  modesty) 
in  the  degree  and  manner  which  the  nature  of  the  case  re- 
quires. Causative  Righteousness,  also,  since  it  fosters  every 
kind  of  virtue,  may  be  said  to  aim  at  both  practical  and 
affectional  duty.  This  Righteousness,  however,  differs  from 
other  forms  of  virtue  in  that  its  immediate  aim  is  neither 
external  conduct  nor  the  regulation  of  natural  affection,  but 
the  conservation  and  advancement  of  moral  principle.  Its 
importance  arises  from  the  various  ways  in  which  it  contrib- 
utes to  this  end;  therefore,  also,  its  natural  logical  subdi- 
vision is  different  from  that  of  the  other  departments  of 
morality. 

Moral  Goodness  and  Regulative  Righteousness  are  the  more 
fundamental  forms  of  virtue,  because  each  of  these  is  presup- 
posed in  Moral  Esteem  and  in  Causative  Righteousness. 
Moreover,  Moral  Goodness,  because  of  the  simplicity  of  its 
aims,  claims  our  attention  in  advance  of  Regulative  Right- 
eousness. We  shall  therefore  begin  the  analysis  of  the  moral 
law  with  the  study  of  Moral  Goodness,  and,  next  after  that, 
we  shall  discuss  Regulative  Righteousness.  Again,  dividing 
each  of  these  according  to  its  immediate  aims,  we  shall  con- 
sider Practical  Moral  Goodness,  and  Affectional  Moral  Good- 
ness; and  also  Practical  Regulative  Righteousness,  and  Affec- 
tional Regulative  Righteousness. 

7.  These  designations  here  indicate  different  forms  of 
virtue  or  moral  principle.  They  are,  however,  affected  with 
an  ambiguity  inasmuch  as  they  may  be  used  to  signify  not  the 
virtues  but  the  modes  of  conduct  at  which  the  virtues  aim. 
Ordinarily  the  context  will  show  which  signification  is  in- 
tended. But  were  a  terminology  desired  for  the  formulation 
of  a  distinction,  which  should  always  be  borne  in  mind, 
that  virtuous  principle  which  aims  at  doing  good  or  at  doing 
right  might  be  distinguished  as  practire  virtue,  while  that 


CHAP.  XXI.]  THE  MORAL  LAW.  245 

which  aims  at  the  right  exercise  of  benevolence  or  any  other 
natural  disposition  might  be  distinguished  as  commotive 
virtue.  Then  the  terms  practical  and  affectional  might  be 
reserved  for  the  modes  of  conduct  at  which  the  virtues  aim. 
With  this  terminology  we  might  speak  of  Tractive  and  Com- 
motive Moral  Goodness  as  forms  of  moral  principle,  and  of 
Practical  and  Affectional  Moral  Goodness  as  modes  of  right 
conduct.  In  like  manner  we  might  speak  of  Tractive  and 
Commotive  Righteousness  and  of  Practical  and  Affectional 
Righteousness. 

The  word  "  commotive  "  is  adopted  because,  as  will  appear 
more  fully  hereafter,  moral  principle  strives  to  make  the  ex- 
ercise of  our  natural  feelings  consentaneous  and  co-operative 
with  the  practical  requirements  of  the  moral  law. 

Here,  also,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  natural  feelings,  even 
while  exercised  as  duties  under  the  control  of  commotive 
virtue,  are  themselves  called  virtues — a  use  of  language  prob- 
ably due  to  the  fact  that  commotive  virtue  mingles  with  the 
sentiments  which  it  superintends  and  regulates.  But  neither 
this  nor  the  ambiguity  affecting  the  terms  Moral  Goodness 
and  Regulative  Righteousness,  need  trouble  those  who  do  not 
take  words  for  thoughts,  and  who  study  the  very  phenomena, 
or  facts,  which  are  the  subjects  of  investigation. 

8.  This  preliminary  survey  of  the  moral  law  may  be  con- 
cluded by  mentioning  the  specific  modes  of  causative  right- 
eousness. These  may  be  enumerated  as  three:  the  Rudi- 
mentary, or  Incipient ;  the  Instructional,  or  Educative ;  and 
the  Rectoral,  or  Retributive.  They  are  easily  distinguishable 
from  each  other,  yet  may,  and  often  do,  unite  in  operation. 
The  rudimentary  or  incipient  form  of  causative  righteousness 
may  be  seen  in  those  efforts  which  one  makes  incidentally,  and 
without  the  deliberate  use  of  methods  or  agencies,  for  the 
stimulation  of  virtue  in  himself  and  others.  A  man  may  not 
only  be  conscious  of  a  right  will  and  of  good  intentions,  but 
may  also  be  desirous  to  continue  and  to  progress  in  virtue. 
With  this  end  in  view  while  faithfully  performing  duty,  he 
may  designedly  turn  his  thoughts  away  from  inducements 
to  evil  and  direct  them  to  reasons  showing  the  importance, 
the  excellence  and  the  attractiveness  of  right  conduct.  When 
cases  of  this  kind  occur  there  is  a  reflex  exercise  of  principle 
more  immediate  than  that  of  causative  virtue  in  general. 
The  agent  uses  a  self-determining  power  in  connection  with 
the  specific  pursuit  of  duty,  and  this  self-regulation  aims 


246  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXI 

principally  at  the  same  ends  which  are  being  dutifully  sought 
at  the  time.  Thus  while  all  causative  virtue  is  in  a  sense 
reflexive,  this  incipient  form  of  it  is  particularly  so.  In  like 
manner  if  a  man  were  associated  with  another  upon  whom 
some  duty  immediately  devolved — especially  if  it  were  a  duty 
common  to  them  both,  he  might  counsel  and  influence  that 
other  as  a  soldier  might  encourage  a  comrade  in  battle.  And 
this,  too,  would  be  a  rudimentary  exercise  of  causative  right- 
eousness. 

The  more  developed  modes  of  this  disposition  arise  when 
general  conceptions  of  virtue  as  moral  good  and  of  vice  as 
moral  evil  are  entertained.  Then  it  is  seen  that  every  proper 
effort  should  be  made  to  promote  the  one  and  to  repress  the 
other.  These  ends  are  of  such  supreme  importance  that  they 
excel  all  other  ends  in  life;  they  seem  to  be  the  supreme  ends 
in  the  Universe.  Without  them  many  points  in  the  provi- 
dential treatment  of  mankind  are  quite  inexplicable. 

The  most  obvious  mode  of  developed  causative  righteousness 
is  that  which  seeks  to  inform  the  mind  respecting  the  prin- 
ciples of  duty  and  to  train  the  spirit  to  habits  of  correct  con- 
duct. On  this  account  it  has  been  characterized  as  instruc- 
tional and  educative.  Every  one  should  seek  moral  enlight- 
enment and  should  cultivate  in  himself  all  virtuous  disposi- 
tions. Therefore  the  good  man  delights  in  the  law  of  the 
Lord  and  meditates  on  its  precepts  day  and  night.  He 
separates  himself  from  the  counsels  of  the  wicked,  and  joins 
himself  to  the  society  of  the  righteous.  He  reads  good  books 
and  sacred  writings,  waits  upon  the  ministry  of  consecrated 
men,  and  fills  his  mind  with  lofty  ideals  and  examples. 
Through  prayer  and  in  the  public  and  private  worship  of  the 
Almighty  he  ihopes  for  spiritual  progress. 

He  labors  also  for  the  improvement  of  others,  whether  old 
or  young.  Hence  the  kind  admonitions  of  parents  and  em- 
ployers; hence  Sabbath-schools  and  churches,  Christian  en- 
deavor societies,  missionary  organizations,  and  every  agency 
for  the  suppression  of  vice  and  for  the  moral  elevation  of  the 
people.  One  of  the  chief  aims  in  any  system  of  public  edu- 
cation should  be  the  dissemination  of  right  principles  and  the 
creation  of  noble  character. 

9.  Another  development  of  causative  righteousness,  and 
perhaps  the  most  philosophically  important,  is  that  which 
supports  the  moral  law  by  the  employment  of  rewards,  and 
punishments.  We  have  called  it  rectoral  because  it  devolves 


CHAP.  XXI.]  THE  MORAL  LAW. 

especially  upon  official  judges  and  rulers,  but  it  should  affect 
the  conduct  of  all  wise  persons  who  find  themselves  entrusted 
with  the  control  of  others.  The  duties  of  this  virtue  differ 
from  those  of  moral  esteem  in  that  the  latter  do  not  aim  at 
the  promotion  of  morality,  but  are  simply  the  becoming 
treatment  of  men  according  to  their  moral  character.  Evi- 
dently, however,  the  same  act  may  be  inspired  by  both  these 
principles  of  duty.  The  end  of  Rectoral  Righteousness  is 
to  uphold  and  honor  the  law  through  a  certain  bestowal  of 
good  and  infliction  of  evil.  It  is  called  retributive  because 
retribution  in  the  wide  sense  includes  both  the  rewarding 
of  well-doers  and  the  punishment  of  transgressors.  The  in- 
fliction of  penalties  is  so  prominent  in  human  experience  that 
it  almost  monopolizes  the  phrase  "  retributive  justice." 
This,  however,  applies  to  the  righteousness  which  rewards  as 
well  as  to  that  which  punishes.  Strictly  speaking,  Punitive 
Justice  is  a  species  of  Retributive  Justice. 

When  one  person  is  conscious  of  receiving  harm  or  pain 
from  another,  anger  or  resentment  arises,  including  a  desire 
to  repel  the  assailant  by  inflicting  suffering  on  him,  and 
causing  a  satisfaction  in  his  suffering.  This  anger  is  not 
a  moral  but  a  natural  motivity ;  it  may  be  cherished  in  a  way 
that  is  irrational,  immoral  and  wrong.  Only  when  it  unites 
its  animus  with  the  spirit  of  punitive  justice,  it  becomes 
righteous  indignation.  But,  even  in  that  case,  Punitive  Jus- 
tice is  to  be  distinguished  from  resentment  in  that  it  is  a 
rational  motivity  and  seeks  a  rational  end.  It  strives  to 
maintain  the  law  and  advance  the  cause  of  righteousness 
through  the  infliction  of  threatened  evil  upon-  the  sinner. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

MORAL  GOODNESS. 

1.  The  duties  of  beneficence  and  benevolence  illustrated  and  defined. 
They  include  care  and  affection  for  oneself.  Confucius,  Meng- 
tseu,  and  Moses,  quoted. — 2.  Tractive  moral  goodness,  or  prin- 
cipled beneficence,  distinguished  (1)  from  commotive  moral 
goodness  and  (2)  from  morally  exercised  benevolence  or  sympa- 
thy. It  is  sometimes  unaccompanied  with  affection.  It  aims  at 
good  as  a  right  end. — 3.  This  good  is  not  *'  moral  good,"  or  virtue 
(which  is  the  aim  of  Causative  Righteousness)  but  simply  what- 
ever promotes  happiness  or  prevents  nfisery. — 4.  And  it  is  not 
private  (or  privatively  related)  good,  but  all  the  good  of  which 
the  case  admits,  or  any  part  of  that  total.— 5.  We  call  this 
Absolute  Good,  using  the  word  "  absolute,"  not  in  any  peculiar 
philosophic  sense,  but  to  indicate  the  unrestricted  complete- 
ness of  the  good — all  the  relations  of  one's  action  having  been 
considered. — 6.  Men  seek  absolute  good  in  a  great  variety  of 
ways  ;  and  are  often  more  sensible  of  its  value  than  of  its  abso- 
luteness.—7.  Right  loving  is  equally  important  with  right  doing, 
but  it  is  a  duty  of  secondary  development.  The  immediate  aim 
of  Commotive  Goodness  is  "to  cherish  natural  affection  consen- 
taneously with  the  aim  and  operation  of  Practive  Goodness. — 8. 
But  Commotive,  no  less  than  Practive  Goodness,  finds  its  ulti- 
mate law  in  absolute  good  as  an  end.  Because  right  affection  (1) 
is  a  necessary  concomitant  of  right  doing,  (2)  adds  to  the  motive 
force  of  beneficent  principle,  and  (3)  is  itself  a  noble  source  of 
happiness. — 9.  The  study  of  other  forms  of  duty  will  throw  light 
on  the  laws  of  Moral  Goodness. 

1.  BENEFICENCE  and  benevolence,  which  are  the  duties  of 
Moral  Goodness,  appeal  to  all  men,  though  they  are  disre- 
garded by  many.  The  sentiment  of  the  Roman  writer, 
"Homo  sum;  humanum  nihil  a  me  alienum  puto"  is  ap- 
proved by  every  thinking  heart.  A  yet  wider  virtuous  sym- 
pathy was  expressed  by  the  Christian  poet,  who  wrote,  "  I 
would  not  number  on  my  list  of  friends  the  man  who  need- 
lessly sets  foot  upon  a  worm."  Confucius  taught  that  "  the 
chief  of  all  the  virtues  is  humanity/'  that  "  one  should  love 
all  mankind  with  all  the  strength  and  compass  of  one's  affec- 
248 


CHAP.  XXIJ.J  MORAL  GOODNESS.  249 

tion,"  and  that  "  the  superior  man  is  he  who  feels  the  same 
kindness  towards  all."  His  disciple,  Meng-tseu,  declared, 
"  The  doctrine  of  our  Master  consists  solely  in  having  up- 
rightness of  heart  and  loving  our  neighbor  as  ourselves." 
"  To  act  towards  men  as  we  wish  that  they  should  act  toward 
us,  this  is  the  doctrine  of  humanity."  In  the  Hebrew  Scrip- 
tures we  read,  "  Trust  in  the  Lord  and  do  good ;  so  shalt  thou 
dwell  in  the  land,  and  verily  thou  shalt  be  fed":  and  in  the 
New  Testament  it  is  written,  "  To  do  good  and  to  communi- 
cate forget  not;  for  with  such  sacrifices  God  is  well  pleased." 
We  are  also  given  this  "  commandment,"  that  "  he  who  loveth 
God  love  his  brother  also;  for  he  that  loveth  not  his  brother 
whom  he  hath  seen,  how  can  he  love  God,  whom  he  hath  not 
seen  ?  "  Supreme  moral  excellence  is  set  forth  in  the  asser- 
tion, "  God  is  love '" ;  and  the  ethical  importance  of  right 
affection  is  inculcated  in  the  words,  "  Thou  shalt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart  and  with  all  thy  soul  and 
with  all  thy  mind ;  this  is  the  first  and  great  commandment. 
And  the  second  is  like  unto  it,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neigh- 
bor as  thyself.  On  these  two  commandments  hang  all  the 
Law  and  the  Prophets." 

These  last  statements,  quoted  by  our  Saviour  from  Moses, 
are  noticeable  on  account  of  their  comprehensiveness.  We 
are  to  love  God  supremely  because  he  is  the  great  spirit,  and 
because  of  his  infinite  worthiness  and  goodness.  And  we 
are  to  love  our  fellow-man,  not  to  the  exclusion  of  ourselves, 
but  as  we  love  ourselves.  This  agrees  with  the  doctrine  that 
we  should  love  all  beings  capable  of  being  loved  and  do  good 
to  all  beings  capable  of  receiving  good.  Beneficence  and 
benevolence  often  signify  forms  of  good-will  towards  others. 
We  must  now*  use  these  terms  in  a  wide  sense  so  as  to 
include  affection  for  one's  self  and  a  rational  regard  for  one's 
own  welfare.  The  scope  of  these  virtues  is  unlimited. 

2.  The  conceptions  of  Scripture  and  those  of  common  life, 
being  products  of  the  practical  rather  than  of  the  speculative 
intellect,  cannot  be  expected  to  yield  complete  answers  to  phil- 
osophic questions.  They  enable  us  to  distinguish  the  duties 
of  Moral  Goodness  into  loving  beings  and  doing  good,  but 
they  do  not  enable  us  to  determine  how  these  duties  are 
related  to  one  another.  At  first  it  might  be  supposed  that 
the  whole  virtue  of  Moral  Goodness  lay  in  loving  and  that 
the  whole  duty  of  Moral  Goodness  lay  in  doing  good.  This 
would  be  a  defective  statement.  Right  affection  is  a  duty 


250  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXII. 

which  may  be  required  of  us;  and  the  doing  of  good,  if  it 
be  not  merely  an  intentional  but  also  a  desiderative  or  disposi- 
tional  action  (Chap.  VI. ),  may  be  an  exercise  of  the  virtue 
of  beneficence.  There  is  need  here  of  the  distinction  which 
recognizes  Practive  and  Commotive  Goodness,  as  two  forms 
of  virtuous  principle,  and  Practical  and  Affectional  Goodness, 
as  the  two  modes  of  conduct  aimed  at  by  the  two  forms  of 
principle  respectively.  We  do  not  know  that  Commotive 
Moral  Goodness  has  heretofore  been  given  a  name  by  any 
writers,  but  some  have  designated  Practive  Moral  Goodness 
by  the  phrase  "  Eational  Love."  This  virtue  commingles 
with  commotive  goodness  and  with  dutiful  affection  and  is 
assisted  in  the  production  of  good  deeds  by  the  co-operation 
of  these  motivities.  It  is,  nevertheless,  distinguishable  from 
love  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word.  It  is  simply  the  dis- 
position to  do  good  because  that  doing  is  right  and  dutiful. 

Some  might  say  that  in  Practive  Moral  Goodness  we  aim 
only  at  what  is  right  as  such  and  not  at  good.  That  would 
be  an  inexact  assertion.  Consciousness  testifies  that  we  aim 
at  good  as  being  good  and  as  being  right.  Hence  while 
one  might  question  whether  Practive  Moral  Goodness  aims  at 
good  for  its  own  sake,  it  certainly  does  aim  at  it  as  such; 
and  the  wonder  is  that  when  one  aims  thus  at  good  he  does 
not  also  always  desire  it  with  affection  and  tenderness.  The 
question  arises,  Why  is  not  right  love  or  benevolence  (which 
is  the  immediate  aim  of  Commotive  Goodness)  an  invariable 
concomitant  of  the  exercise  of  Practive  Goodness?  For 
Practive  Goodness — Principled  Beneficence — especially  if  it 
be  put  forth  on  a  grand  scale  and  with  distant  results  in  view 
(as  in  movements  for  political  reform  and  the  administration 
of  public  charities)  does  not  necessarily  involve  what  we  ordi- 
narily mean  by  love  or  affection. 

This  possible  separation  of  affection  from  that  virtue  which 
seeks  the  good  of  beings  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  differ- 
ence 'between  those  motivities  which  spring  from  our  abstract 
thinkings  and  those  which  originate  from  our  more  immedi- 
ate and  direct  cognitions.  (Chap.  IX.)  The  former,  though 
spiritual  tendencies  as  truly  as  the  latter,  are  not  commonly 
spoken  of  as  such  but  as  active  "  principles  " ;  for  example, 
we  speak  of  the  principle  of  self-interest  or  of  duty;  while  the 
latter,  even  while  they  may  be  accompanied,  guided  and  regu- 
lated by  rational  thougiht,  retain  their  peculiar  character  as 
affections,  inclination's,  sympathies  and  so  forth.  They  are 


CHAP.  XXII.]  MORAL  GOODNESS.  251 

more  restricted  and  more  definitely  personal  in  their  regards 
than  the  rational  principles  of  action;  and  they  are  more 
emotional  and  impulsive. 

Practive  Moral  Goodness,  as  a  motivity  independent  of 
affection  and  as  the  simplest  form  of  moral  activity,  naturally 
claims  our  attention  before  Commotive  Moral  Goodness.  It 
consists  in  the  ex  animo  observance  of  the  law  of  doing  good 
to  beings,  and  should  be  studied  with  reference  to  the  end 
at  which  it  aims  and  to  that  exercise  of  reason  whereby  the 
end  is  apprehended.  In  saying  "we  ought  to  do  good  to 
beings/'  plainly  the  emphatic  word  is  "good."  The  labor, 
or  the  doing  (which  is  labor  intentionally  employed  so  as 
to  effect  a  desired  end)  would  be  a  thing  indifferent  were  it 
not  a  laboring  for,  or  a  doing  of,  good.  The  whole  moral 
force  of  the  law  lies  in  the  end  which  it  sets  before  us;  and 
which,  by  reason  of  its  very  nature,  is  right  and  obligatory. 
Therefore,  to  understand  the  law  of  Practive  Goodness,  we 
must  understand  the  nature  of  that  good  which  it  seeks  to 
realize. 

3.  First,  then,  let  us  note  that  the  good  now  spoken  of  is 
not  moral  good  or  virtuous  excellence.       The  function  of 
seeking  moral   excellence   for  ourselves   and  others  belongs 
specifically   to   Causative   Righteousness   and   not   to   Moral 
Goodness.     The  end  at  which  this  goodness  aims  is  simply 
the  pleasure,  comfort  and  happiness  of  sentient  beings  and 
their  deliverance  from  suffering  and  sorrow.     For  men  give 
the  name  "  good  "  to  anything  which  invariably  or  essentially 
is  productive  of  happiness  or  preventive  of  misery,  and  which, 
therefore,  may  be  said  causally  or  conditionally  to  contain 
happiness.     (Chap.    II.)     "Good"   is   the   same   idea  gen- 
eralized.    How   far  moral   and  natural   good  have   a   com- 
munity of  nature  will  be  considered  hereafter.     We  are  now 
thinking  only  of  natural  good. 

4.  In  the  next  place,  it  is  evident  that  Practive  Moral 
Principle,  while  striving  for  this  good,  does  not  seek  any 
private,  or  personal,  or  particular  end,  or  interest,  as  such. 
For  if,  in  any  case,  we  should  aim  at  private  good,  or  some 
special  interest  or  interests,  to  the  neglect  of  other  interests 
involved,  we  might  find  ourselves  doing  more  harm  than 
good,  or,  at  the  least,  we  might  be  guilty  of  leaving  good 
undone.     Either  of  these  results  would  be  contrary  to  right 
principle.     Practive  Moral  Goodness  seeks  that  good  which, 
all  things  considered,  will  be  not  merely  a  good  but  also 


252  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXII. 

all  the  good  of  which  the  case  admits:  and  this  good  can  be 
considered  either  as  a  whole  or  in  any  part  or  parts  of  it  as 
related  to  the  whole.  To  express  this,  the  generic  aim  of 
dutiful  goodness,  we  can  think  of  no  better  name  than  the 
phrase,  "  absolute  good  "  or  "  the  absolutely  good,"  applying 
these  words  very  widely  to  the  means  and  conditions  of 
happiness,  but  otherwise  in  their  ordinary  signification. 
Absolute  Good,  or  The  Absolutely  Good,  is  the  total  good 
possible  to  be  realized  in  any  case — that  is,  in  any  conjunc- 
tion of  agencies  and  circumstances  affecting  interests ;  or  any 
element  of  that  total  considered  as  a  part  of  it.  This  latter 
is  the  form  of  the  notion  which  presents  itself  most  fre- 
quently. We  perceive  that  the  prosecution  of  some  particular 
interest  or  the  attainment  of  some  particular  good  is  both 
good  in  the  ordinary  sense  and  also  falls  in  with  the  total 
of  good  possible  in  the  case;  and  so  we  seek  it  dutifully  as 
unexceptionably  and  absolutely  good.  We  do  this  not  with 
any  mathematical  exactitude  of  thought;  for  that  seldom 
enters  into  the  sphere  of  moral  life;  but  with  a  probable  and 
practical  judgment. 

5.  The  word  "  absolute  "  as  employed  above  has  a  different 
meaning  from  that  given  to  it  by  some  philosophers  who  say 
that  the  absolute  is  the  "  unconditioned  and  the  infinite," 
and  that  it  is  "  unrelated  "  and  "  inconceivable  " — incompre- 
hensible and  unintelligible.  The  illogical  pretensions  agnos- 
ticism connected  with  this  futile  conception  has  brought  the 
word  "absolute"  into  disrepute.  We  would  have  preferred 
some  other  term  in  the  present  discussion  if  a  suitable  one 
could  have  been  found. 

Again,  the  good  now  contemplated  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  that  "  absolute  good  "  which  Janet  makes  the  end  aimed 
at  in  moral  life.  At  least,  if  it  be  the  same  thing,  it  is  not 
conceived  of  and  defined  in  the  same  way.  Janet's  "  Le 
Bien  Absolu"  is  an  ideal  metaphysical  perfection  immedi- 
ately discernible  by  reason,  and  which,  without  any  reference 
to  happiness,  is  the  guiding  star  of  conduct.  Though  happi- 
ness results  from  devotion  to  this  high  aim,  the  end  sought  is 
not  happiness  but  perfection.  The  professor  advocates  this 
doctrine  eloquently  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  first  book  of 
his  treatise.  His  thought  is  argumentative  and  eclectic  with- 
out being  analytic;  and  gives  no  clear  conception  either  of 
the  moral  end  in  general  or  of  any  specific  moral  end. 

The  good  of  which  we  now  speak  is  absolute,  not  because 


CHAP.  XXII.]  MORAL  GOODNESS.  253 

the  conception  of  it  is  a  simple  inexplicable  and  unchangeable 
gift  of  the  reason;  nor  yet  because  it  is  without  conditions 
or  limitations.  The  idea  of  it  is  constructed  from  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  causes  of  happiness  and  of  suffering.  Like  all 
good  of  which  we  can  have  any  conception  this  good  is  condi- 
tioned and  limited.  But  it  is  without  any  save  necessary 
limitations.  The  variety  of  its  specific  forms  corresponds 
with  the  numberless  capacities  of  pain  or  pleasure  belonging 
to  sentient  beings;  its  sources  are  the  multiplied  means  of 
happiness  which  can  be  rationally  employed ;  it  is  distributed 
impartially  among  all  persons  whom  it  can  affect  according 
to  their  just  claims;  the  time  for  its  realization  is  that  dic- 
tated by  wisdom  and  which  is  neither  to  be  unduly  hastened 
nor  unduly  delayed;  its  duration  may  be  that  of  the  passing 
hour,  or  of  a  lifetime,  or  of  ages  to  come;  the  degree,  the 
kind,  the  relative  proportion,  of  its  components,  are  deter- 
mined only  by  the  law  of  its  own  fullness.  In  every  respect 
it  is  as  absolute  as  good  can  be. 

6.  In  ancient  times  when  a  weaver  had  completed  a  piece 
of  cloth  by  filling  up  all  the  length  of  his  warp,  he  loosened 
his  work  from  the  loom  and  spoke  of  it  as  absolutum,  or 
finished.  His  product  had  then  been  fully  wrought,  and 
could  not  be  further  improved  by  him.  In  like  manner, 
should  a  moral  agent  accomplish  all  the  good  of  which  the 
case  admits,  the  result  of  his  effort  would  be  absolute  or  com- 
plete; and  he  should  aim  at  this  result.  In  the  application 
of  this  principle  any  action  is  deemed  good  which  either 
produces  enjoyment  unattended  with  evil,  or  which  brings 
about  a  considerable  enjoyment  or  avoids  some  great  misery 
at  the  expense  of  relatively  inconsiderable  suffering  or  loss. 
But  although  this  absoluteness  always  characterizes  the  end 
of  moral  goodness,  men  do  not  make  it  a  prominent  object 
of  thought  unless  some  question  arise  as  to  whether  the  good 
be  absolute  or  not.  They  think  first  and  chiefly  of  the 
good  and  feel  dutifully  bound  to  that  course  which  promises 
the  greatest  good  as  an  ultimate  result.  With  this  end  in 
view  they  perform  a  wonderful  variety  of  actions,  some  of 
slight  and  ephemeral,  others  of  profound  and  lasting,  conse- 
quence. Duty  forbids  the  muzzling  of  the  ox  that  treadeth 
out  the  corn  and  gives  the  cup  of  water  to  the  fainting  way- 
farer. It  feeds  the  hungry  and  clothes  the  naked.  It  pro- 
vides a  Christmas  dinner  for  the  street  Arabs  and  a  mid- 
summer excursion  for  the  children  of  the  poor.  It  erects 


254  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXII. 

fountains  by  the  roadside,  and  seats  where  the  weary  rest.  It 
builds  schools  and  churches,  homes  for  the  aged  and  indigent, 
refuges  for  the  lost,  asylums  for  the  orphan,  hospitals  for  the 
sick  and  the  insane.  Duty  calls  upon  every  man  to  find  in 
every  other  man  a  brother,  and  points  to  the  example  of  Him 
who  went  about  continually  doing  good. 

The  variety  of  the  ends  sought  by  moral  goodness  may  be 
illustrated  by  the  provisions  which  every  parent,  to  the  extent 
of  his  ability,  should  make  for  his  child.  Suitable  pleas- 
ures and  recreations  should  be  furnished;  bodily  health 
and  comfort  should  be  cared  for;  fit  companionship  should 
be  selected ;  parental  love  and  sympathy  should  be  shown ;  a 
good  education  should  be  secured,  especially  a  right  moral 
and  religious  training;  and  every  preparation  should  be  made 
for  the  future  prosperity  and  happiness  of  one's  offspring. 
The  ends  aimed  at  have  a  wide  range  from  the  passing  pleas- 
ure of  the  hour  to  the  blessedness  of  eternity;  but  they  are 
all  desired  by  moral  goodness;  moreover  they  are  all  sought 
in  harmony  with  each  other.  What  is  called  "  the  conflict 
of  duties  "  seldom  troubles  him  whose  heart  is  bent  on  benefi- 
cence. In  ordinary  cases  the  good  man  has  little  difficulty 
in  determining  what  course  to  follow.  The  proper  action  is 
either  manifestly  and  purely  beneficial,  or  it  clearly  promises 
a  deliverance  from  evil  and  a  great  surplus  of  gain  for 
comparatively  little  loss.  For  the  most  part  men  neglect 
the  requirements  of  moral  goodness  not  because  of  inability 
to  perceive  them  but  from  the  lack  of  a  disposition  to  per- 
form them.  But  what  if  difficulty  is  sometimes  experienced 
in  determining  whether  some  particular  course  will,  abso- 
lutely considered,  be  productive  of  good  ?  This  is  consistent 
with  the  fact  that  a  considerable  part  of  virtue  is  what  we 
have  explained  moral  goodness  to  be.  And  is  it  not  intui- 
tionally  evident  that,  in  every  case,  we  should  seek  all  the 
good  of  which  the  case  admits  ?  Occasional  perplexity  in  the 
application  of  this  principle  cannot  invalidate  the  principle 
itself.  Moreover,  as  already  said,  perplexity  seldom  arises. 
Even  in  complicated  cases  the  practical  reason  easily  solves 
questions  of  personal  duty,  while  generally  the  speculative 
reason,  following  some  proper  method,  also  reaches  a  satis- 
factory understanding. 

7.  Thus  we  find  the  end  and  law  of  Tractive  Moral  Good- 
ness in  that  good  which  is  perceived  by  the  absolute  and  im- 
partial exercise  of  reason;  in  other  words,  in  absolute  good. 


CHAP.  XXII.]  MORAL  GOODNESS.  255 

Doubtless  the  law  of  Commotive  Moral  Goodness  is  in  some 
way  connected  with  this,  the  duty  of  loving  being  closely 
associated  with  the  duty  of  doing  good.  Those  who,  with 
President  Edwards  and  President  Hopkins,  make  no  distinc- 
tion between  the  virtues  of  beneficence  and  benevolence  and 
regard  the  one  of  these  as  only  a  different  aspect  of  the 
other,  will  be  content  with  one  law  of  moral  goodness. 
Defining  virtuous  love  as  the  rational  and  conscientious 
desire  of  doing  good,  they  identify  it  with  practive  moral 
goodness.  They  recognize  the  fact  of  natural  affection,  but 
do  not  find  for  this  a  place  in  moral  life  distinct  from  that 
of  rational  beneficence.  In  this  they  differ  from  the  com- 
mon thought  of  men  which  distinguishes  the  virtuous  disposi- 
tion to  do  good  from  the  virtuous  exercise  of  affection,  and 
which  regards  the  latter  as  no  less  important  than  the  former. 

Right  loving  is  of  equal  importance  with  right  doing  and 
in  some  respects  of  greater  importance;  nevertheless  it  must 
be  recognized  by  philosophy  as  a  duty  of  secondary  develop- 
ment. Love — that  is,  benevolence,  or  kind  feeling — is  of 
itself  merely  a  natural  affection.  It  originates  in  that  sym- 
pathy by  which  one  sentient  being  desires  that  another  or 
others  should  escape  from  distress  and  should  participate  in 
comforts  and  pleasures.  This  feeling  is  called  "  love  "  when 
it  is  exercised  earnestly  and  continuously.  It  takes  such 
forms  as  family  affection,  friendly  regard,  and  charitable 
kindness.  Moreover,  in  the  generalizations  of  ethics  we  must 
enlarge  the  conception  of  benevolence  so  as  to  include  love 
for  one's  self  and  to  unite  under  one  thought  the  egoistic  and 
the  altruistic  developments  of  affection.  This  benevolent 
motive  feeling  always  aims  at  some  form  of  good,  yet  with 
a  limited  range  of  reference.  Hence  the  good  sought  for 
may  not  only  be  of  a  private  or  particular  description,  but  it 
may  even  conflict  with  the  total  of  good  possible  in  the  case, 
and  may,  therefore,  from  the  absolute  point  of  view,  be  an 
evil  and  not  a  good.  When  that  occur?,  as  it  often  does, 
through  human  weakness  or  narrowness,  love  is  not  virtuous 
but  is  opposed  to  virtue.  Evidently,  therefore,  affection  is 
virtuous  and  right  only  when  exercised  in  a  manner  consen- 
taneous with  the  aim  of  Practive  Moral  Goodness. 

8.  Hence,  too,  it  is  plain  that  Commotive  Moral  Goodness, 
though  less  directly  than  Practive  Moral  Goodness,  yet  as 
really  and  as  truly,  finds  its  law  in  the  idea  of  absolute  good. 
For  affection,  as  consentaneous  with  principle,  is  dutiful  and 


256  2M  MOHAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXII. 

virtuous  for  the  following  reasons.  First  of  all,  the  dis- 
position to  do  good  in  a  right  way  is  accompanied  with  right 
loving  by  a  kind  of  natural  necessity.  We  do  not  mean  that 
benevolent  affection  always  attends  the  exercise  of  principled 
beneficence,  but  only  that  it  frequently  does  so,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  and  through  the  spontaneous  operation  of  human 
nature.  Whenever  the  needs  and  capacities  of  those  whom 
we  seek  to  benefit  are  brought  distinctly  before  us,  it  is  im- 
possible for  us  to  exercise  principle  without  a  concomitant 
experience  of  affection;  for  the  same  objects  appeal  to  both 
motivities;  nor  would  it  be  possible  to  repress  the  affection 
without  at  the  same  time  weakening  the  more  rational  dis- 
position. In  this  way  right  loving  is  involved  in  the  dutiful 
doing  of  good. 

Next,  it  is  evident  that  when  love  acts  in  harmony  with 
practive  goodness  a  great  addition  is  made  to  the  motive  force 
of  moral  conduct.  The -man  whose  affectional  side  is  weak 
and  who  acts  chiefly  from  principle,  may  accomplish  much, 
but  he  is  surpassed  in  efficiency  by  the  man  of  deep  and  noble 
feeling.  His  character  lacks  vital  vigor;  his  conduct, 
spirit  and  force;  and  his  influence  over  his  fellow-men  is 
weak.  Without  sympathy  for  others  it  is  impossible  to  win 
either  their  assent  or  their  co-operation  in  matters  of  prin- 
ciple. 

Finally,  right  loving  is  in  itself  an  absolute  good.  There 
is  no  purer  source  of  enjoyment  than  to  love  and  to  be  loved. 
Next  to  moral  principle  wisely  exercised  affection  is  the  most 
permanent  and  widely  operative  means  of  happiness  with 
which  rational  creatures  are  endowed;  even  as  this  same 
natural  affection,  if  wrongly  directed,  may  occasion  great 
misery.  The  friendly  fellowship  of  the  virtuous  is  a  prin- 
cipal source  of  earthly  happiness;  the  perfect  commun- 
ion of  the  glorified  is  a  chief  element  of  the  blessedness  of 
heaven. 

9.  Thus  both  modes  of  Moral  Goodness  find  their  law  in 
the  idea  of  absolute  good.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served that  no  form  of  virtue  works  independently  of  others, 
and  that  the  law  of  moral  goodness  cannot  be  fully  under- 
stood except  in  connection  with  those  of  Regulative  Right- 
eousness, Causative  Righteousness  and  Moral  Esteem.  The 
different  modes  of  duty  interpenetrate  each  other,  so  that 
while  seeking  good  and  loving  beings  we  must  also  obey  the 
rules  of  righteousness,  promote  every  form  of  virtue,  and 


CHAP.  XXII.]  MORAL  GOODNESS.  257 

conduct  ourselves  towards  beings  as  their  merit  or  demerit 
may  require.  These  aims  of  duty  never  displace  the  law  of 
moral  goodness,  but  they  modify  its  operations. 

Moreover,  it  is  clear  that  all  the  laws  of  duty  must  be  con- 
sidered before  any  statement  can  be  made  of  the  universal 
principle  of  morality. 
17 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS. 

1.  The  word  "  righteousness  "  has  both  a  subjective  and  an  objec- 
tive signification. — 2.  And  also  both  a  general,  or  comprehensive, 
and  a  restricted,  or  specific,  meaning.  Its  general  use  covers  all 
virtue  and  right  conduct  whatever  ;  just  as  a  wide  conception  of 
moral  goodness  sometimes  does. — 3.  The  Latin  "  justitia  "  is 
identical  in  sense  and  use  with  the  English  "  righteousness." 
Justinian,  Cicero,  the  Schoolmen,  and  Mackenzie,  quoted. — 4. 
In  modern  thought  righteousness  and  justice  are  the  same,  except 
only  that  righteousness  is  sometimes  conceived  of  (1)  as  more 
strenuous  than  justice,  and  (2)  as  less  directly  concerned  with 
the  "  rights  "  or  "  jura  "  of  individuals.— 5.  The  terms  "  jus  " 
and  "  right  "  are  exactly  equivalent  to  each  other  ;  and  they 
have  two  distinct  significations. — 6.  Righteousness  in  the  re- 
stricted sense  is  that  form  of  virtue  and  duty  which  we  have 
called  Regulative  Righteousness.  The  ends  and  rules  of  (this) 
righteousness  are  specifically  different  from  those  of  love  and 
goodness. — 7.  The  Mosaic  decalogue,  reviewed. — 8.  The  require- 
ments of  righteousness  under  modern  civilization.— 9.  In  which 
our  duties  towards  God  are  included.  Thomas  Aquinas  quoted 
respecting  the  ethics  of  natural  dispositions. — 10.  Righteousness 
differs  from  goodness  in  that  it  does  not  embrace  love, 
or  affection. — 11.  Also  because  it  makes  rules  more  prominent 
than  ends.  (Kant's  doctrine  that  Moral  law  admits  of  no  ex- 
ception, criticized.) — 12.  Also  in  having  defensive  and  conserv- 
ative rather  than  progressive  aims. — 13.  But  this  righteousness, 
or  justice,  agrees  with  moral  goodness  in  that  it  mingles  affec- 
tional  with  practical  duty,  and  makes  the  former  of  these  con- 
formable to  the  latter.  Every  natural  disposition  is  bound  to 
work  harmoniously  with  practive  virtue. — 14.  Aristotle's  doc- 
trine of  the  fj-eaoTw,  stated  and  discussed. — 15.  Finally,  Right- 
eousness agrees  with  Goodness  in  having  absolute  good  for  its 
generic  end  ;  for  every  rule  of  justice  cares  in  some  way  for  the 
absolute  welfare  of  beings. — 16.  This  is  true  whether  we  regard 
practical  or  affectional  duty.  Bishop  Butler  quoted. 

1.  THE  word  "  righteousness "  has  both  a  subjective  and 

an  objective  signification.     It  may  denote  either  an  habitual 

disposition  of  the  spirit  or  that  course  of  conduct  at  which 

this  disposition  aims;  and  by  which  it  is  manifested.    These 

258 


CHAP.  XXIII.]      REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  259 

significations  imply  each  other,  and  may  blend  into  one. 
When  we  are  told  that  "righteousness  exalteth  a  nation 
while  sin  is  a  reproach  to  any  people,"  both  that  virtue  which 
seeks  to  observe  the  rules  of  right  living  and  that  course  of 
action  which  the  virtue  produces  are  set  forth ;  and  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  say  which  of  the  two  elements  is  the  more  promi- 
nent in  our  conception.  Evidently,  however,  while  we  are 
analyzing  the  moral  law,  the  word  righteousness  will  be 
employed  chiefly  in  its  objective  signification. 

2.  This  word,  also,  is  given  different  meanings  in  connec- 
tion with  the  extent  of  its  application.     In  its  unlimited 
scope  righteousness  includes,  objectively,  every  mode  of  the 
discharge  of  duty,  and,  subjectively,  every  form  of  the  dis- 
position which  loves  and  seeks  the  right.     Every  befitting 
moral  action,  whether  practical  or  affectional  (Chap.  VI.), 
and  every  exercise  of  virtue,  whether  practive  or  commotive, 
is  embraced  under  righteousness.     Under  this  general  signi- 
fication that  moral  goodness  which  we  have  already  discussed, 
would   be   a   development   of   righteousness;   and   so   would 
moral  esteem  and  causative  righteousness.     The  idea  is  all- 
inclusive;  it  sets  forth  virtue  in  general  as  a  conformity  to 
the  moral  law  and  a  pursuit  of  the  right. 

This  same  universality  of  application  -appears  sometimes 
in  the  conception  of  moral  goodness.  The  good  man  is 
thought  of  not  only  as  dutifully  beneficent  but  also  as  de- 
sirous to  do  right  in  every  way;  as  being  identical  with  the 
righteous  man.  When  the  ideas  of  goodness  and  of  right- 
eousness are  thus  used  broadly,  the  only  difference  between 
them  is  that  the  one  emphasizes  the  good  as  an  end  while 
the  other  emphasizes  the  right,  there  being,  at  the  same  time, 
an  implication  that  these  ends  are,  in  some  way,  identical. 
For  the  good  is  not  sought  simply  as  being  good  but  also  as 
being  right;  and  the  right,  also,  is  sought  not  as  something 
separable  from  the  good  but  as  being,  in  its  own  nature,  both 
right  and  good.  The  ground  for  this  community  between 
these  conceptions  will  become  apparent  hereafter. 

3.  The  Latin  word  corresponding  to  the  English  "right- 
eousness" is  "  justitia"  or  justice.     This  term,  also,  is  em- 
ployed both  subjectively  and  objectively,  and  with  both  an 
unrestricted   and   a   restricted   application.      The   subjective 
use  is  to  be  seen  in  the  well-known  definition  of  Justinian, 
*'"  Justitia  est  constans  et  perpetua  voluntas  jus  suum  cuique 
fribuendi  " ;  which  may  be  rendered,  "  Justice  is  the  firm  and 


260  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

abiding  disposition  to  give  to  every  one  what  belongs  to  him 
of  right."  The  objective  use,  however,  is  more  frequent  than 
the  subjective,  and  is  the  ordinary  meaning  of  it  in  modern 
times.  When  we  speak  of  "  loving  justice,"  or  of  "  promot- 
ing justice  between  man  and  man,"  the  justice  referred  to 
is  the  observance  of  right  and  the  fulfilment  of  obligations. 
Cicero's  definition,  "  quod  dat  suum  cuique"  is  so  general 
as  to  cover  both  the  disposition  and  the  conduct. 

The  unrestricted  application  of  the  term  "  justice  "  is  that 
employed  by  the  schoolmen  when  they  speak  of  "  justitia 
iota,"  or  "justitia  generalis,"  and  by  moralists  who  oppose 
this  general  righteousness  to  "  civil  or  legal "  justice,  to 
"  distributive  and  commutative  "  justice,  and  to  "  remuner- 
ative and  punitive"  justice — all  these  being  limited  or  spe- 
cific forms  of  duty.  Sometimes,  too,  justice  is  divided  simply 
into  the  distributive  and  the  punitive;  in  which  case  dis- 
tributive justice  is  made  to  include  all  righteousness  but  that 
of  inflicting  punishment — the  distributive  being  the  giving 
to  each  person  what  rightfully  belongs  to  him,  excepting 
penalties  only.  In  this  broad  sense  distributive  justice,  no  less 
than  justice  in  general,  includes  moral  goodness  as  a  specific 
form.  Prof.  Mackenzie  had  this  conception  of  justice  in  his 
mind  when  he  wrote  (Book  III.,  Ch.  4) :  <(  We  commonly 
say  that  generosity  is  expected  as  well  as  justice,  and,  in 
Christian  communities,  love  also  is  required.  In  a  sense, 
however,  we  may  say  that  all  this  ought  to  be  included  in  our 
idea  of  justice.  For  it  is  a  part  of  what  is  due  from  one 
individual  to  another  that  the  latter  should  be  treated  .  .  . 
as  a  person.  .  .  .  The  thoroughly  just  man  .  .  .  will  be  glad 
when  the  external  relations  of  mere  contract  can  be  trans- 
muted into  the  relations  of  friendship  or  Christian  love."  In 
their  unrestricted  use  the  terms  "  justice,"  "  righteousness  " 
and  "moral  goodness"  are  all  designations  of  the  same 
thing.  The  just  man,  the  righteous  man  and  the  good  man 
are  one  and  the  same  person.  Under  this  general  concep- 
tion we  read  that  the  path  of  the  just  is  as  a  shining 
light;  that  the  memory  of  the  just  is  blessed;  and  that 
the  Lord  sendeth  rain  on  the  fields  of  the  just  and  of 
the  unjust. 

4.  Possibly,  however,  a  shade  of  difference  should  some- 
times be  recognized  in  the  use  of  the  terms  "justice"  and 
"  righteousness,"  even  in  their  broad  significations.  As 
beneficence  is  prominent  in  our  conception  of  the  good  man, 


CHAP.  XXIII. J    REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  261 

so  the  righteous  man  is  thought  of  as  more  energetically, 
though  not  more  truly  devoted  to  right  doing  than  the  just 
man.  This  discrimination  is  not  always  made,  and,  when 
made,  sets  forth  a  variation  too  slight  to  be  a  difference  of 
nature.  But  another  distinction — and  one  of  greater  im- 
portance— may  be  stated  in  connection  with  the  words  of 
Justinian  and  of  Cicero.  Their  "  suum  cuique  "  (to  each  his 
own)  teaches  that  justice  does  not  simply  aim  at  "  the  right " 
— in  other  words,  at  right  ends  and  modes  of  conduct — but 
also  assigns  different  "rights"  to  different  persons.  These 
rights  are  interests  (that  is,  specific  means  or  conditions 
of  prosperity,  such  as  life,  liberty,  wages,  property,  knowl- 
edge of  fact,  reputation,  respect,  affection  and  care,  fulfil- 
ment of  contracts,  payment  of  debts,  prescribed  obedience  or 
service)  considered  so  far  as  they  rightfully  belong  to  this 
or  that  individual  or  body  of  individuals.  On  the  other 
hand,  righteousness,  as  opposed  to  justice,  seeks  to  do  what- 
ever is  right  and  obligatory  whether  the  persons  for  whom  it 
is  to  be  done  and  their  shares  in  the  good  to  be  accomplished 
be  definitely  distinguished  or  not.  For  although  interests — 
and  therefore  rightful  interests — always  pertain  to  persons, 
they  may  be  thought  of  simply  as  good,  or  as  forms  of  good, 
to  be  maintained  or  realized,  and  without  emphasizing  the 
distribution  of  the  good  among  persons.  Righteousness  and 
justice  are  often  contrasted  in  this  way.  Under  this  con- 
trast, justice  is  a  more  concrete  mode  of  principle  than  right- 
eousness, and  may  be  defined  as  righteousness  dealing  with 
distributed  or  personalized  interests. 

5.  The  distinction  thus  made  between  two  forms  of  virtue 
which  are  essentially  identical,  may  become  clearer  if  we 
dwell  for  a  moment  on  the  exact  coincidence  in  the  expression 
of  ethical  thought  between  the  Latin  noun  "jus"  and  the 
English  noun  "  right,"  and  if  we  consider  two  ideas  which 
each  of  these  terms  with  equal  freedom  is  used  to  convey. 
"Jus"  seems  cognate  with  the  verb  " jubeo"  to  command, 
as  if  the  Romans  designated  the  right  from  the  fact  that 
it  was  enforced  by  authority.  The  Greeks  named  the  right 
dixy,  which  lexicographers  treat  as  an  original  root,  but 
which  may  be  etymologically  akin  to  the  Latin  "  dico"  to 
say.  This  suggests  that  the  right  was  distinguished  as  that 
which  some  competent  judge  found  and  declared  to  be  obli- 
gatory. The  English  "  right,"  without  referring  either  to 
command  or  to  judgment,  sets  forth  duty  as  what  is  con- 


262  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

formed  to  a  rule,  and  which  therefore  has  the  excellence  of  the 
rule.  This  mode  of  conception  appears,  also,  to  have  origi- 
nated the  German  "  Recht  "  and  the  French  "  droit." 

Whatever  be  their  etymology,  the  nouns  "  jus "  and 
"  right "  agree  in  having  two  principal  significations.  First, 
they  indicate  "  The  Right "  or  "  that  which  is  right  "  simply 
as  right  and  obligatory  upon  us.  In  this  sense  the  word 
"  right "  is  often  used  in  the  general,  as  when  we  say,  "  For 
Right  is  Right  since  God  is  God."  The  same  thought  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  word  justice  used  objectively;  as  in  the  sen- 
tence, "Let  justice  triumph  though  the  heavens  fall."  The 
phrases,  "  Sit  jus,"  "  Fiat  jus,"  mean  simply,  Let  the  right, 
or  that  which  is  right,  be  done. 

The  second  signification  of  jus  and  right  is  quite  differ- 
ent from  the  first,  though  closely  related  to  it,  and  derived 
from  it.  It  is  that  of  an  interest  rightfully  belonging  to  one 
or  more  definitely  conceived  of  persons,  and  which,  therefore, 
may  be  claimed  for  him  or  them.  By  an  "  interest "  here  we 
do  not  mean  the  share  which  one  may  have  in  some  enter- 
prise or  business,  but  any  particular  privilege  or  advantage 
which  one  may  possess,  and  which  he  can  use  for  his  own  good 
or  that  of  others.  An  interest  is  a  means  of  welfare  belong- 
ing to  some  one.  In  this  sense  we  hear  of  a  person  caring  for 
his  own  interests  or  for  the  interests  of  the  public.  When  we 
speak  of  a  right  or  of  rights — of  a  jus  or  of  jura — we  have 
in  mind  some  personal  interest  or  interests.  Thus,  as  already 
stated,  life,  liberty,  wages,  stipulated  services,  the  peaceful 
possession  of  property,  are  the  rights  of  those  to  whom  these 
things  rightfully  belong.  The  just  claim  to  any  one  of  these 
things,  also,  is  called  a  right. 

Now  when  righteousness  and  justice  are  contrasted  with 
one  another,  the  difference  between  them  is  that  justice  always 
considers  those  personalized  interests  which  we  call  rights  or 
jura  while  righteousness  is  not  confined  to  these  conceptions 
but  may  and  often  does  aim  simply  at  what  is  right  without 
giving  weight  to  the  claims  of  individuals  as  such.  It  is  in- 
fluenced only  by  that  absolute  and  general  interest  which  is 
the  good  of  all.  For  example,  one  may  tell  the  truth,  or  deal 
honestly,  or  observe  law  and  order,  or  relieve  the  destitute, 
or  cultivate  purity,  or  support  schemes  of  beneficence,  simply 
as  things  right  and  obligatory  and  in  obedience  to  the  claims 
of  duty  rather  than  in  compliance  with  the  claims  of  persons. 
Such  is  the  distinction  between  our  conceptions  of  righteous- 


CHAP.  XXIII.]     REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  263 

ness  and  of  justice;  though  each  conception  is  often  employed 
as  identical  with  the  other. 


6.  So  far  we  have  been  studying  that  unrestricted  use  of 
these  ideas  according  to  which  they  may  be  applied  to  every 
form  of  virtue  and  duty.     Let  us  now  turn  to  that  limited 
scope  of  thought  according  to  which  righteousness — or  jus- 
tice— is  contrasted  with  other  forms  of  morality,  and  espe- 
cially with  moral  goodness.     This  righteousness^  which  we 
have  distinguished  as  regulative,  may  be  described  as  a  form 
of  moral  principle  which  does  not  involve  the  exercise  of  love, 
and  which,  without  aiming  at  the  advancement  of  happiness, 
seeks  a  variety  of  ends,  and  obeys  a  variety  of  laws,  as  right 
and  obligatory.     That  a  considerable  development  of  virtue 
answers  to  this  description  will  be  evident  if  we  contemplate, 
first,  the  Mosaic  decalogue  as  the  code  of  morality  which  has 
exerted  the  greatest  influence  in  the  world,  and,  after  that, 
the  principal  laws  of  righteousness  as  these  are  now  formu- 
lated in  the   consciences  of  civilized  people.     Without   at- 
tempting to  obtain  from  either  of  these  studies  an  exhaust- 
ive statement  of  the  laws  of  duty  we  shall  hope  that  the  two 
together  may  yield  a  correct  conception  of  the  general  charac- 
ter of  those  laws.     The  Mosaic  code  begins  with  duties  to- 
wards God  and  is  presented  as  a  series  of  divine  commands. 
It  represents  that  morality  which  allies  itself  with  religious 
sentiment,   and  which  may   be   styled  theocentric.     On  the 
other  hand  the  morality  of  our  day  thinks  first  of  man's 
duties  towards  his  fellow-man,  and,  after  that,  of  the  divine 
claims ;  it  may,  therefore,  be  styled  anthropocentric.     This 
difference,  however,  pertains  more  to  the  order  of  thought  and 
statement  than  to  the  principles  involved. 

7.  The  first  command  of  the  decalogue  prohibits  the  adora- 
tion and  service  of  any  but  Jehovah,  the  self-existent  and 
ever-living   God.     It  was   directed  against  that  polytheism 
which  had  originated  in  the  devotional  personifications  of  the 
powers  of  nature.     The   second  command  forbids  idolatry, 
or  the  worship  of  God  through  the  use  of  sensible  emblems. 
This  practice  had  been  found  to  encourage  superstitions  and 
a  degrading  formalism.    The  third  warns  against  the  irrever- 
ent use  of  God's  name,  and,  by  implication,  requires  respect 
for  all  the  institutions  of  religion.     The  fourth  calls  for  the 
remembrance  of  the  seventh  day  of  the  week  as  a  day  of  re- 


264  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

ligious  rest,  the  principle  being  that  one  set  day  out  of  the 
seven  should  be  kept  holy  unto  the  Lord.  The  fifth  command- 
ment is  the  first  respecting  duties  to  our  fellow-men.  It  en- 
joins honor  for  one's  father  and  one's  mother,  including  in 
this  all  due  service  and  obedience.  Parents  here  typify  those 
generally  who  are  one's  rightful  superiors.  The  sixth  com- 
mandment prohibits  murder,  the  unlawful  taking  of  human 
life.  The  seventh  forbids  sexual  intercourse  except  as  pro- 
vided for  in  marriage.  The  eighth  prohibits  the  taking  of 
another's  property  without  some  justifying  reason ;  the  ninth, 
the  telling  of  falsehood  to  another's  injury ;  the  tenth,  the  in- 
ordinate desire  for  any  of  the  goods  or  possessions  of  another. 

This  brief  code  of  laws  does  not  cover  all  the  duties  of 
life,  yet  it  was  fitted  to  bring  all  before  the  thoughtful 
Israelite.  Directing  attention  to  the  leading  ethical  relations 
of  man,  it  was  cherished  by  the  conscientious  Hebrew  as  a 
fountain  of  unfailing  wisdom.  He  obtained  from  it  support 
for  positive  as  well  as  for  negative  virtue,  and  direction  for 
the  inner  as  well  as  for  the  outer  life.  For,  in  prohibiting 
covetousness  and  in  requiring  respect  for  parents,  affectional 
duty  is  explicitly  required;  while  every  command  implicitly 
calls  for  sentiments  corresponding  with  the  line  of  action  it 
enjoins.  Hence  our  Saviour,  interpreting  the  law  this  way, 
declares  that  he  who  hateth  his  brother  is  a  murderer,  and 
that  he  who  looketh  upon  a  woman  to  lust  after  her  hath 
committed  adultery  with  her  already  in  his  heart.  Eightly 
accepted  the  commandment  of  the  Lord  is  "  exceeding  broad." 

8.  The  moral  rules  of  the  present  time  do  not  differ  radi- 
cally from  those  of  Moses.  Setting  aside  beneficence  and 
benevolence  as  laws  of  moral  goodness,  the  requirements  of 
righteouness  are  such  as  the  following.  We  feel  bound 
not  only  to  do  no  murder  but  also  to  protect  ourselves 
and  others  against  bodily  harm,  and,  so  far  as  may  be,  to 
provide  against  disease  and  wretchedness.  We  acknowledge 
a  stricter  marriage  relation  than  that  enforced  by  Moses, 
making  marriage  the  union  of  one  man  with  one  woman. 
The  right  of  property  is  to  be  respected  whether  as  regards  a 
man's  own  honest  acquisitions,  the  product  of  industry  and 
thrift,  or  as  regards  what  one  may  have  received  by  gift  or 
inheritance.  This  right,  however,  like  every  personal  privi- 
lege, is  subject  to  such  conditions  and  limitations  as  respect 
for  public  and  private  good  may  necessitate.  Under  similar 
restrictions  we  guard  every  man's  freedom,  that  is,  his  right 


CHAP.  XXIII.]     REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  265 

to  spend  his  life  and  employ  his  means  according  to  his  own 
choice  and  judgment ;  and  we  condemn  every  form  of  slavery 
and  oppression.  We  recognize  the  obligation  of  contracts  as 
voluntary  arrangements  limiting  the  rights  of  property  and 
of  freedom;  because  without  such  understandings  and  the 
observance  of  them  the  co-operation  of  men  would  be  impos- 
sible. For  a  like  reason  truth  is  to  be  maintained  between 
man  and  man.  We  are  not  bound  always  to  give  asked-for 
information,  but,  unless  the  right  to  correct  information 
has  been  forfeited  or  destroyed,  which  happens  only  in  rare 
and  extreme  cases,  one  should  tell  the  truth,  if  he  says  any- 
thing at  all.  In  all  social  and  public  relations  peace  and 
order  are  to  be  preserved  and  upheld;  for  violence,  or  the 
threat  of  violence,  and  disobedience  to  the  just  regulations 
of  authority,  interfere  ruinously  with  the  progress  of  life. 
Then,  also,  various  relations  between  persons  give  rise  to 
specific  duties.  Not  only  are  magistrates,  parents,  teachers 
and  other  natural  or  official  superiors  to  be  obeyed,  but 
children  and  other  dependents  are  to  be  supported;  the 
weak  are  to  be  protected ;  the  vicious  restrained ;  the  ignorant 
instructed;  the  destitute  relieved;  the  struggling  assisted; 
while  courtesy  and  consideration  are  to  be  shown  to  all.  Fi- 
nally, the  character  and  reputation  of  others  and  of  one's  self 
must  be  defended  from  harm;  because  no  greater  wrong  can 
be  done  than  to  corrupt  and  debauch  either  old  or  young ;  and 
an  injury  to  one's  reputation  is  harder  to  be  borne  than  the 
theft  of  valuable  property. 

Who  steals  my  purse  steals  trash  :  .  .  . 
But  he  that  filches  from  me  my  good  name 
Robs  me  of  that  which  not  enriches  him, 
And  makes  me  poor  indeed." 

OTHELLO,  III. ,  in. 

Such  are  the  practical  demands  of  righteousness  from  the 
human  or  earthly  point  of  view.  In  addition  to  these  many 
affectional  requirements  may  be  mentioned ;  for  duty  demands 
that  our  whole  nature  should  act  in  harmony  and  in  co-opera- 
tion with  practive  principle.  All  men  feel  obligated  to  cul- 
tivate properly  such  sentiments  as  courage,  caution,  com- 
passion, self-restraint,  self-respect  and  respect  for  others, 
prudence,  modesty,  independence,  loyalty,  candor,  cheerful- 
ness, willingness,  promptitude,  and,  in  general,  every  nat- 
ural disposition  which  may  contribute  to  upright  living.  So 
far  as  mundane  life  is  concerned,  this  inward  regulation  of 


266  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

self  does  not  occupy  so  large  a  place  in  men's  thoughts  as 
practical  duties  do ;  yet  it  is  distinctly  pursued  as  dutiful. 

9.  On  the  other  hand,  when  our  relations  to  the  divine 
being  are  seriously  considered,  a  Sectional  duties  receive  the 
greater  prominence.  After  love  towards  God  the  chief  re- 
quirements of  religion  are  those  of  reverence,  faith,  submis- 
sion, and  devotion.  Eeverence  for  God  is  that  supreme  re- 
spect, mingled  with  awe,  which  is  naturally  felt  towards  the 
infinitely  mighty  and  holy  ruler  of  the  universe.  It  is  not 
servile  dread  of  punishment  but  rather  a  sense  of  the  un- 
speakable solemnity  of  the  divine  government.  It  is  that 
fear  of  the  Lord  which  the  Scriptures  declare  to  be  the  be- 
ginning of  wisdom,  and  which  is  so  consistent  with  trust  and 
affection  as  to  be  ascribed  by  the  author  of  the  Hebrews  to 
our  Saviour.  (HEB.  5:7.)  Faith  is  confidence  in  God  as  a 
gracious  being  who  never  forgets  his  promises,  and  who  will 
bless  all  that  fear  him  and  keep  his  commandments.  Sub- 
mission is  the  unreserved  acquiescence  of  the  human  in  the 
divine  will  and  a  hearty  acceptance  of  God's  dealings  with  us 
as  just  and  good.  It  is  a  natural  concomitant  of  faith. 
Devotion  is  the  spirit  of  worship ;  it  is  the  adoration  and  serv- 
ice of  God  as  the  object  of  our  deepest  reverence,  confidence 
and  affection. 

Along  with  these  inward  duties  we  owe  God  such  outward 
duties  as  obedience  to  his  commands,  observance  of  his  ordi- 
nances, prayer  for  his  help  and  guidance,  and  labor  for  the 
promotion  of  his  kingdom.  But  these  practical  duties  are 
felt  to  be  without  spiritual  value  except  as  proceeding  from 
the  affectional.  The  reason  for  this  may  be  that  practical 
services  may  contribute  to  the  welfare  of  human  beings, 
whether  they  be  accompanied  with  affection  or  not,  whereas 
God  is  independent  of  our  doings  and  can  be  pleased  only  by 
the  worship  of  pure  and  noble  hearts. 

The  doctrine  that  natural  dispositions  become  dutiful  and 
virtuous  only  through  their  co-operation  with  moral  principle 
has  long  been  taught  by  philosophers ;  in  proof  of  which  the 
following  may  be  quoted  from  St.  Thomas :  "  There  is  no 
virtue/'  he  says,  "in  resentment  and  desire,  so  far  as  they 
are  sensitive  motive  tendencies.  But,  when  they  are  subor- 
dinated to  reason,  there  is  necessarily  some  virtue  in  each. 
And  this  virtue  is  a  certain  habitual  conformity  of  them  to 
reason  itself." — In  irascibli  et  concupiscibili,  ut  sunt  potes- 
tates  appetitus  sensitivi,  nulla  virtus  est.  8edf  ut  subordi- 


CHAP.  XXIII.]     REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  267 

nantur  rationi,  necesse  est  in  utraque  aliquam  virtutem  esse. 
Quce  qucedam  est  illarum  ad  rationem  ipsam  habitualis  con- 
formitas.  (SUMMA  THEOL.,  Ques.  56,  Art.  4.) 

10.  When  we  review  the  different  modes  of  right  living, 
we  find  that  none  of  them  can  be  rationally  separated  from 
the  principles  of  moral  goodness,  as  if  the  two  had  nothing 
in  common;  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  great  majority  of 
them   are   distinguishable   from   love   and   beneficence,    and 
form  a  body  of  conduct  which  men  contrast  with  goodness 
and  call  righteousness  or  justice.    Let  us  examine  this  con- 
trast. 

First,  it  is  evident  that  this  righteousness  does  not  include 
love  or  affection  as  goodness  does.  Those  who  place  all  mor- 
ality in  benevolence  encounter  difficulty  when  they  would  dis- 
cover love  in  the  conscientious  doing  of  what  is  just  and 
right.  Doubtless  every  duty  should  be  accompanied  with 
good-will  towards  all  affected  by  it,  but,  in  many  cases,  not 
even  microscopic  vision  could  discern  love  in  the  dutiful  per- 
formance of  obligations.  What  affection  is  there  in  discharg- 
ing one's  debt  to  some  wealthy  corporation,  in  paying  taxes 
and  rendering  obedience  to  the  civil  authorities,  in  abstention 
from  murder  and  adultery,  in  telling  the  truth  on  the  wit- 
ness-stand, in  refraining  from  abusive  slander,  in  the  preven- 
tion of  crime  and  the  defense  of  the  right  ?  Those  who  have 
no  theory  to  support  see  plainly  that  men  do  many  things  on 
principle  and  without  thought  that  they  are  putting  forth  af- 
i'ection  in  so  doing.  Then,  too,  different  natural  dispositions, 
which  are  virtuously  exercised,  are  easily  distinguished  from 
benevolence  or  good-will.  There  is  no  benevolence  in  courage, 
self -restraint,  modesty,  respect,  reverence,  candor,  independ- 
ence, faith,  humility,  submission.  Yet  it  is  our  duty  to  ex- 
ercise each  of  these  whenever  the  proper  occasion  for  it  may 
arise. 

Some  argue  that  all  duty  is  a  putting  forth  of  benevolence, 
because  all  duty  aims  at  good  in  some  form  or  another.  But 
this  reasoning  is  not  conclusive  even  though  the  premise 
stated  may  be  true.  For  men  often  seek  good  merely  as  a  mat- 
ter of  principle,  without  the  exercise  of  affection.  (Chap.  IX.) 
Besides,  benevolence  is  never  content  with  the  mere  conser- 
vation of  interests,  while  this  is  the  end  of  justice. 

11.  In  the  next  place,  righteousness  gives  more  prominence 
to  rules,  and  less  prominence  to  ends,  than  goodness  does. 
We  cannot  say  that  righteousness  does  not  pursue  ends,  or 


268  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII, 

that  moral  goodness  does  not  use  rules;  but  righteousness 
finds  its  end  in  the  very  conformity  to  rule,  each  rule  of  it- 
self being  accepted  as  right  and  obligatory,  while  moral  good- 
ness, though  following  the  law  of  absoluteness  of  good,  seeks 
good  as  an  end  with  little  consciousness  of  obedience  to  a 
law.  Goodness  apprehends  definitely  its  ultimate  aims,  while 
righteousness  is  devoted  to  various  modes  of  duty  without 
complete  and  explicit  understanding  of  the  reasons  for  them. 
Murder,  theft,  lying,  and  disorderly  conduct  are  avoided  as 
evil,  honesty,  fidelity,  obedience  and  loyalty  are  chosen  as 
good,  with  simply  a  general  reference  to  the  ways  in  which 
these  things  operate  for  good  or  evil.  A  rule  of  righteousness, 
too,  seldom  stands  purely  on  its  own  merits  but  is  observed 
as  a  teaching  of  past  experience,  as  supported  by  the  judgment 
of  the  wise,  as  approved  by  the  moral  sense  of  the  community 
and  as  enforced  by  authority.  Hence,  sometimes,  the  ulti- 
mate purpose  of  the  rule  is  not  accurately  apprehended ;  even 
while  the  rule  is  right,  and  is  accepted  as  right  by  the  prac- 
tical reason. 

Another  difference  between  righteousness  and  goodness, 
closely  allied  to  that  just  mentioned,  yet  distinguishable  from 
it,  is  that  the  former  lays  stress  on  law  as  the  embodiment  of 
right  and  duty,  while  the  latter  does  not  do  so.  Law  of  itself 
is  merely  a  prescribed  or  established  mode  of  conduct  and  is 
not  necessarily  right  and  obligatory.  It  may  even  require 
what  is  wrong  and  immoral,  as  has  often  happened  under  bad 
governments  or  in  barbarous  and  heathenish  countries.  But 
a  great  presumption  exists  in  favor  of  the  righteousness  of 
any  law  which  has  been  enacted  by  duly  constituted  authority, 
or  which  is  a  solemn  custom  of  the  community,  or  which  has 
been  long  and  habitually  acknowledged  by  the  practical  rea- 
son. Law  thus  formulated  and  supported  appeals  strongly 
to  the  conscience.  It  is  accepted  as  the  exponent  and  repre- 
sentative of  the  right;  we  feel  that  it  must  be  obeyed  unless 
we  can  show,  in  some  extreme  and  exceptional  case,  that 
wrong  and  evil  would  result  from  obedience.  Thus  moral 
reason  makes  conformity  to  law  an  end  of  duty. 

Indeed,  since  all  duty  can  be  expressed  in  rules,  many,  like 
Kant  and  the  Intuitionalists,  make  conformity  to  law  the  es- 
sence— the  vital  principle — of  virtuous  living.  In  this  they 
commit  the  error  of  treating  what  is  secondary  as  if  it  were 
primary.  For  morality  consists  in  seeking  right  ends  whether 
they  present  themselves  in  rules  or  not. 


CHAP.  XXIII.]    REG  ULA  T1VE  &1GHTEO  USNESS. 

Kant  also  taught  that  moral  law  admits  of  no  exception. 
This  merely  reproduces  a  popular  mistake  deduced  fallaciously 
from  the  doctrine  of  the  supremacy  of  conscience.  It  is  true 
that  the  essential  and  universal  principle  of  morality  admits 
of  no  exception.  It  cannot  be  superseded  by  any  other  prin- 
ciple. Nor  can  any  law  or  duty  be  subordinate  to  a  law  that 
is  not  a  law  of  duty.  At  the  same  time  that  body  of  rules 
which  men  conscientiously  obey,  and  which  we  call  the  moral 
law,  admits  of  many  exceptions.  Any  rule  of  duty  is  no 
longer  binding  when  it  conflicts  with  some  more  fundamental 
principle  of  morality.  But,  as  already  said,  exceptions  to  the 
laws  of  righteousness  are  rare.  When  they  occur,  unless  the 
reasons  for  them  be  very  clear,  they  give  trouble  to  the  con- 
scientious mind.  Even  then  an  accepted  rule  is  departed  from 
with  great  reluctance.  The  good  man  does  not  willingly  kill 
the  assassin  even  in  self-defense;  and  he  is  loth  to  seize  even 
that  property  which  may  be  needed  to  save  the  perishing  from 
death. 

12.  A  final  distinction  between  righteousness  and  goodness 
— and  the  most  important  of  all — may  be  thus  stated :  the  for- 
mer  is  a  conservative  while  the  latter  is  a  progressive  kind  of 
virtue.  While  moral  goodness  seeks  the  removal  of  suffer- 
ing and  misery  and  the  greatest  possible  increase  of  happi- 
ness, regulative  righteousness,  or  justice,  is  content  with  the 
prevention  of  evil  and  the  conservation  of  good.  One  evi- 
dence of  this  is  that  the  requirements  of  righteousness  are 
often  expressed  in  the  form  of  prohibitions.  "Thou  shalt 
not"  appears  in  each  of  the  ten  commandments  except  the 
fifth.  This  enjoins  honor  to  father  and  mother,  and  is  sup- 
ported by  a  promise  of  long  life  and  prosperity.  The  fourth 
commandment  begins  positively,  "  Eemember  the  Sabbath 
day  to  keep  it  holy/'  but  is  mainly  devoted  to  the  prohibition, 
"  In  it  thou  shalt  do  no  work." 

It  would,  however,  be  incorrect  to  say  that  righteousness 
is  occupied  only  with  prohibitions,  or  that  the  decalogue  was 
intended  to  inculcate  a  merely  negative  morality.  Every 
injunction  of  the  Mosaic  code  suggests  positive  duty  to  be 
performed  when  the  evil  conduct  is  to  be  avoided.  The  pro- 
hibitory form  originated  probably  in  the  conviction  that, 
while  the  utterances  of  authority  accomplish  much  for  the 
prevention  of  wrong-doing,  the  fruitful  efforts  of  beneficence 
can  be  looked  for  only  through  instruction  and  training, 
through  the  influence  of  good  example  and  of  loving  sym- 


THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

pathy,  and  through  an  expectation  of  the  rewards  of  virtue. 
It  is  significant  that  the  only  command  free  from  prohibition 
and  calling  for  activity  in  well-doing  is  the  one  attended  with 
the  promise.  But,  when  we  read  the  Scriptures  and  be- 
come acquainted  with  the  spirit  of  the  ancient  dispensation, 
we  see  clearly  that  every  command  is  connected  with  a  positive 
principle  of  duty. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  noted  that  even  the  positive 
requirements  of  righteousness  are  protective  rather  than  pro- 
gressive. Eighteousness  as  a  specific  form  of  virtue — justice, 
as  it  is  commonly  called — exists,  of  course,  independently  of 
any  code  of  morals.  It  arises  because  the  present  nature  of 
man  and  the  uses  of  earthly  life  compel  a  distinction  between 
those  duties  which  constantly  press  upon  the  conscience,  in- 
asmuch as  evil  and  misery  manifestly  ensue  from  disregard- 
ing them,  and  those  the  observance  of  which  looks  to  a  clear 
increase  of  good  or  happiness.  Righteousness,  therefore,  may 
be  defined  as  defensive  and  conservative  morality.  While  the 
requirements  of  it  favor  different  forms  of  good,  they  fall 
short  of  the  progressive  aims  of  beneficence.  Justice  protects 
the  lives  of  men  and  even  provides  necessary  subsistence  and 
some  opportunity  for  self-advancement.  But  it  aims  at  pros- 
perity only  so  far  as  this  may  be  safeguarded  and  promoted 
by  these  preliminary  measures.  Justice  does  not  attempt  to 
provide  happy  homes  and  affectionate  families,  but  it  endeav- 
ors to  prevent  the  wretchedness  and  ruin  of  dissolute  conduct. 
It  does  not  engage  to  increase  the  wealth  of  the  individual 
or  the  community,  but  it  recognizes  honestly  obtained  own- 
ership and  enforces  rightful  claims  to  property.  It  defends 
against  slavery  and  oppression  and  even  delivers  from  them, 
yet  it  does  not  actively  assist  one  who  may  be  striving  to  im- 
prove his  place  in  life.  It  compels  men  to  tell  the  truth,  but 
does  not  undertake  to  make  them  well-informed,,  It  main- 
tains peace  and  order,  but  commits  public  progress  to  the  wis- 
dom and  virtue  of  the  citizens.  It  requires  various  specific 
duties  according  to  the  relations  in  which  persons  stand  to 
one  another,  but  only  so  far  as  the  neglect  of  these  duties 
involves  evil  and  disaster.  Moreover,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
those  natural  dispositions  which  men  feel  bound  to  exercise  in 
connection  with  the  works  of  righteousness,  and  which  may  be 
called  affectional  righteousness,  do  not  include  benevolence 
or  beneficence,  but  only  certain  " minor  virtues"  which  co- 
operate with  conservative  conscientiousness. 


CHAP.  XXIII.]     REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS. 

While  these  things  are  so,  it  is  to  be  acknowledged  that 
developed  moral  character  is  not  content  with  mere  righteous- 
ness, but  adds  to  it  a  more  progressive  form  of  virtue.  The 
good  man,  too,  accompanies  even  the  duties  of  justice  with 
the  spirit  of  love  and  kindness.  It  may  even  be  conjectured 
that,  in  some  higher  sphere  of  life  than  the  present,  the  con- 
trast between  righteousness  and  goodness  will  lose  its  impor- 
tance and  fade  from  sight.  Such  considerations,  however,  do 
not  justify  a  disregard  of  the  distinction  which  men  naturally 
make  between  these  modes  of  morality. 

Righteousness  and  goodness  differ  from  one  another.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  they  are  both 
modes  of  virtue,  and  have  a  common  nature.  Let  us  conclude 
this  discussion  by  considering  some  characteristics  in  which 
they  agree.  First  of  all,  in  each  of  them  affectional  mingles 
with  practical  duty.  This  is  more  thoroughly  the  case  in 
goodness  than  in  righteousness.  While  dutiful  benevolence 
not  only  mingles  but  coalesces  with  the  virtue  of  beneficence, 
the  practical  doings  of  justice  are  of  so  distinct  an  operation 
that  we  commonly  conceive  of  them  independently  of  the  nat- 
ural dispositions  with  which  they  may  be  accompanied.  We 
do,  however,  often  think  of  these  dispositions,  and  find  it  to 
be  our  duty  to  exercise  them  in  a  particular  way. 

This  introduces  a  second  point  of  agreement.  The  rule  of 
duty  for  our  natural  motive  tendencies  is  that  they  must  work 
harmoniously  with  that  conscientious  disposition  which  aims 
directly  at  right  doing.  The  law  of  commotive  regulative 
righteousness  is  precisely  analogous  to  that  of  commotive 
moral  goodness.  A  natural  motivity  and  the  conduct  to 
which  it  leads  have  no  moral  excellence  of  their  own.  They 
become  virtuous  and  dutiful  only  as  consciously  co-ordinated 
with  the  pursuit  of  what  is  right.  Indeed,  a  disposition 
otherwise  innocent,  when  cherished  in  opposition  to  princi- 
ple, is  vicious  and  wrong. 

"  For  even  love,  by  difference  nice, 
Is  now  a  virtue,  now  a  vice." 

14.  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  fisffor^ — that  virtue  is 
the  pursuit  of  a  middle  course  between  extremes — could 
scarcely  have  been  intended  as  an  essential  or  general  defini- 
tion. His  ro  piffov  evidently  relates  to  that  phase  of  virtue 
which  seeks  to  regulate  our  natural  dispositions  and  the  con- 
duct to  which  these  lead.  In  other  words,  it  pertains  to  com- 


MORAL  LAW  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

motive  regulative  righteousness.  Possibly  all  right  conduct 
is  producible  by  this  commotive  virtue;  inasmuch  as  there  is 
no  good  action  to  which  some  natural  disposition  might  not 
prompt.  That,  however,  would  account  for  right  doing  by  a 
secondary  mode  or  phase  of  virtue.  The  regulation  of  mo- 
tivities  not  in  themselves  moral  can  become  moral  only 
through  its  conformity  with  some  more  primary  principle  of 
duty.  Therefore,  though  all  right  conduct  were  producible 
by  commotive  virtue,  this  would  not  explain  the  essential 
nature  of  morality  but  would  render  that  explanation  more 
requisite  than  ever.  We  must  not  abandon  that  primary  vir- 
tue which  directly  seeks  the  right  because  we  have  found  it 
to  be  reinforced  and  supported  by  a  secondary  virtue. 

Moreover,  it  is  not  satisfactory  to  say  that  this  secondary 
and  commotive  righteousness  aims  at  a  middle  course.  It 
seeks  the  conformity  of  the  natural  with  the  moral  and  a 
union  of  the  two.  In  this  work,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  often 
falls  upon  a  middle  between  extremes.  But  it  does  not  aim  at 
that  middle  always  or  for  its  own  sake.  When  an  archer  is 
practising  for  his  amusement,  he  commonly,  though  not  in- 
variably, aims  at  the  center  of  a  target  or  other  object,  not 
because  it  is  the  center  but  because  the  mark  is  there  which 
he  desires  to  hit.  But  when  he  shoots  to  kill  he  aims,  not  at 
the  center,  but  at  the  vulnerable  or  vital  part  whether  it  be  in 
the  center  or  not.  So,  if  one  desires  only  his  own  pleasure  or 
happiness,  he  may  find  it  a  good  rule  to  be  active  and  alive 
while  avoiding  the  extremes  of  exertion  or  of  passion.  But 
if  his  heart  be  set  on  the  realization  of  the  right,  he  will  not 
be  controlled  by  such  a  rule.  Frequently  he  may  find  himself 
in  a  middle  course,  but  sometimes,  in  a  crisis,  righteousness 
may  demand  great  self-sacrifice  or  the  unreserved  expenditure 
of  energies.  There  are  cases  of  duty  which  call  for  the  utmost 
possible  courage,  application,  perseverance,  self-reliance, 
faith,  submission,  devotion.  Moreover,  there  are  other  cases 
in  which  a  natural  disposition  and  the  conduct  resulting  from 
it  may  be  censurable  without  going  to  any  extreme  at  all. 
One  may  put  forth  just  the  daring  needful  for  victory  while 
he  is  fighting  for  a  bad  cause.  The  gratitude  of  an  unprin- 
cipled man  may  not  be  excessive,  yet  it  may  cause  him  to 
promise  his  benefactor  what  he  has  no  right  to  promise. 
One  may  show  admirable  determination  and  magnanimity  in 
the  service  of  a  destructive  ambition.  Industry  and  energy 
may  be  devoted  to  the  prosecution  of  an  evil  business.  In 


CHAP.  XXIIL]     REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  273 

these  cases  one's  spirit  and  conduct  are  wrong,  not  because 
they  are  defective  or  excessive  in  energy,  but  simply  be- 
cause they  are  wrongly  directed.  The  only  satisfactory  rule 
for  one's  natural  life  is  that  it  be  made  conformable  and 
consentaneous  with  the  aims  of  practive  virtue. 

15.  A  third  quality  common  to  goodness  and  righteousness 
— and  the  most  essential  characteristic  of  both — is  that  each, 
in  its  own  way,  strives  after  absolute  good.  Righteousness 
labors  for  the  protection  and  conservation  of  this  good ;  good- 
ness, for  its  increase  and  advancement.  While  moral  princi- 
ple says,  positively,  "  Have  regard  for  interests  absolutely 
considered;  do  good  and  remove  evil,"  it  says  also  negatively, 
"  Do  not  permit  harm  or  loss  to  interests  absolutely  consid- 
ered ";  and  this  is  ever  the  animus  of  righteousness.  We  have 
seen  how  absolute  good  is  the  end  of  moral  goodness.  (Ch. 
XXII.)  That  it  is  the  end  of  righteousness,  also,  will  be- 
come apparent  if  we  examine  the  practical  workings  of  this 
virtue,  especially  when,  in  the  name  of  justice,  it  accords  to 
every  one  "  his  rights."  For  although  a  right  is  an  interest, 
or  form  of  good,  to  which  a  person  or  a  body  of  persons  is 
entitled,  it  is  noteworthy  that  no  right  belongs  to  any  one 
except  so  far  as  it  may  form  part  of  the  total  of  good  of 
which  the  case  admits. 

The  authority  of  parents,  magistrates,  ship  captains,  mili- 
tary commanders  and  the  dignitaries  of  church  and  state 
pertains  to  them  personally,  yet  more  for  the  good  of  others 
than  for  their  own.  The  institution  of  property  exists  not 
solely  for  the  benefit  of  owners,  but  quite  as  much  in  order 
that  the  resources  of  life  may  be  husbanded,  and  for  the  en- 
couragement of  thrift  and  industry.  Even  one's  life  and 
liberty  are  not  absolutely  private  privileges;  for  no  man  liveth 
to  himself  alone,  and,  morally,  we  are  free,  not  for  selfishness 
and  wrong,  but  for  the  seeking  and  doing  of  good.  The  honor 
of  woman  is  to  be  guarded,  not  merely  that  she  herself  may 
be  saved  from  ruin,  but  also  that  family  life  may  prosper,  and 
that  society  may  not  be  honeycombed  with  rottenness.  Truth 
must  be  told  and  contracts  kept,  not  for  the  sake  of  those 
alone  who  are  immediately  interested,  but  also  that  they,  in 
turn,  may  fulfil  their  engagements,  and  may  inform  others. 
In  this  way  men  are  united  in  mutual  helpfulness, 
also,  the  claims  of  the  destitute  to  be  relieved,  of  the  ignorant 
to  be  instructed,  of  the  good  and  wise  to  be  respected,  of  the 
capable  and  faithful  to  be  honorably  employed,  are  promotive 
18 


274:  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

of  general  as  well  as  of  individual  good.  In  short  the  lawful 
interests  of  every  one  are  for  the  benefit  of  all.  Even  the 
rights  of  God  himself  are  correlated  with  the  welfare  of  his 
creatures.  He  sits  upon  his  throne  that  righteousness  and 
goodness  may  prevail  throughout  the  Universe.  And,  when 
it  is  said  that  God  does  all  things  for  his  own  glory,  as  his 
supreme  end,  this  does  not  mean  that  he  does  them  for  his  own 
selfish  gratification.  The  glory  of  God  is  that  wide-spread 
appreciation  of  his  perfections,  whereby  rational  beings  not 
only  render  him  his  most  worthy  praise,  but  also  themselves 
become  partakers  of  the  divine  nobility  and  blessedness. 
Plainly  personal  rights  are  parts  of  absolute  good,  and  are 
justified  by  the  moral  reason  as  having  that  character. 

This  truth  is  yet  more  evident  from  the  fact  that  when  any 
right  becomes  obstructive  to  total  and  absolute  good,  it  ceases 
to  be  a  right,  and  may  be  neglected  or  overruled.  Ordinarily 
one  is  entitled  to  life,  liberty,  property,  to  truthful  state- 
ments, to  the  keeping  of  agreements,  to  considerate  and  cour- 
teous treatment,  and  to  the  unimpeded  use  of  the  means  of 
happiness.  But  any  of  these  claims  may  be  superseded  by 
that  of  absolute  good;  this  is  ever  the  supreme  right.  Men 
are  sometimes  said  to  have  certain  inalienable  rights.  These 
are  inalienable  only  in  the  sense  that  they  cannot  be  abrogated 
by  the  arbitrary  exercise  even  of  the  most  exalted  authority. 
They  do  not  exist  so  absolutely  that  they  may  not,  in  excep- 
tional cases,  disappear  under  the  operation  of  that  principle 
in  which  all  rights  are  rooted.  They  are,  indeed,  fundamen- 
tal and  stable  interests.  Belonging  to  individuals  not  merely 
as  such  but  as  members  of  a  universal  family,  they  are  parts 
of  that  general  and  absolute  good  which  righteousness  pro- 
tects and  maintains.  Yet  they  are  not  so  fixed  that  they  can- 
not, under  any  circumstances,  be  displaced.  Life,  for  in- 
stance, is  the  natural  right  of  every  human  being.  But,  in 
certain  cases,  life  must  be  risked  and  even  sacrificed,  for  the 
prevention  of  great  evil  and  the  accomplishment  of  great 
good.  Sometimes  it  is  expedient  that  one  man — or  even  that 
many  men — should  die  for  the  people,  so  that  the  whole  na- 
tion perish  not.  This  supercession  of  personal  right  by  "  the 
right"  in  general  is  especially  noticeable  when  the  sacrifice 
is  demanded  by  the  "  moral  good  "  of  the  individual  or  of  the 
community.  The  suppression  of  vice  and  the  maintenance  of 
virtue  are  very  dominant  ends  of  duty.  But  this  particular 


CHAP.  XXIII.J     REGULATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  275 

involution  of  law  will  be  considered  hereafter  in  connection 
with  causative  righteousness. 

16.  Turning  from  the  practical  to  the  affectional  duties 
of  regulative  righteousness,  we  find  that  the  latter  also  aim 
at  absolute  good,  though  not  so  directly  as  the  former.  Kev- 
erence,  gratitude,  fortitude,  courage,  pity  or  compassion,  self- 
restraint,  modesty,  candor,  the  love  of  knowledge  and  of 
truth,  habits  of  independence,  sobriety  and  industry,  are  vir- 
tuous only  so  far  as  they  are  consciously  harmonized  with  the 
practical  efforts  of  righteousness.  Thus  exercised  they  are 
absolutely  good,  just  as  rightly  regulated  benevolence  is. 

The  excellence  of  these  dispositions  is  to  be  seen  partly  in 
the  assistance  which  they  give  to  virtuous  doing.  In  crea- 
tures constituted  as  we  are,  these  secondary  "virtues"  not 
only  accompany  practive  principle  by  a  kind  of  necessity,  but 
they  are  almost  essential  to  its  success.  This  may  be  illustrated 
by  some  remarks  of  Bishop  Butler  concerning  the  moral  uses 
of  compassion.  "  Since  in  many  cases,"  he  says,  "  it  is  very 
much  in  our  power  to  alleviate  the  miseries  of  each  other — 
and  benevolence,  though  natural  to  man,  yet  is  in  a  very  low 
degree  kept  down  by  interest  and  competition — and  men  are, 
for  the  most  part,  so  engaged  in  the  business  and  pleasures 
of  the  world  as  to  overlook  and  turn  away  from  objects  of 
misery,  which  are  plainly  considered  as  interruptions  to  them 
in  their  way,  as  intruders  upon  their  business,  their  gaiety 
and  mirth;  compassion  is  an  advocate  within  us  in  their  be- 
half, to  gain  the  unhappy  admittance  and  access,  to  make 
their  case  attended  to.  ...  And  if  men  would  only  resolve  to 
allow  thus  much  to  it  (let  it  bring  before  their  view,  the  view 
of  their  mind,  the  miseries  of  their  fellow-creatures;  let  it 
gain  for  them  that  their  case  be  considered),  I  am  persuaded 
it  would  not  fail  of  gaining  more ;  and  that  very  few  real  ob- 
jects of  charity  would  pass  unrelieved."  ( Sermon  VI. ) . 

Every  natural  disposition  may,  after  this  fashion,  lend  its 
aid  to  dutiful  activity ;  and  should  be  encouraged  and  guided 
to  do  so.  When  life  is  conducted  under  this  rule,  man  be- 
comes a  noble  creature  and  an  effectual  worker  of  good. 

Moreover,  aside  from  its  workings  in  conduct,  a  character 
composed  of  rightly  ordered  dispositions  is  of  itself  a  source 
of  happiness.  It  gives  pleasure  to  its  possessor,  and  is  a  de- 
light to  every  virtuous  being  with  whom  he  may  be  associated. 
So  long  as  one  is  governed  by  selfishness  or  passion  he  ex- 
periences unrest  and  dissatisfaction.  The  motivities  of  his 


276  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIII. 

nature  contend  against  one  another;  as  the  Scriptures  say, 
there  is  war  in  our  members.  The  rule  of  principle  intro- 
duces peace  and  harmony.  Then  one  has  the  comfort  of 
knowing  that  all  the  energies  of  his  life  are  devoted  to  the 
high  service  of  duty  instead  of  being  spent  for  unworthy  aims. 
He  enters  also  on  the  blessed  fellowship  of  the  good,  feel- 
ing himself  to  be  the  object  of  their  friendship  and  favor, 
and  making  them  the  objects  of  his  affections.  Thus,  in  vari- 
ous ways,  rightly  regulated  dispositions  are  sources  of  un- 
mixed good,  and  the  beginnings  of  an  endless  felicity. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

MORAL  ESTEEM  AND  CAUSATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS. 

1.  Esteem,  in  its  primary  meaning,  is  a  judgment  recognizing  per- 
sonal excellence  and  accompanied  by  an  appropriate  feeling. 
The  excellence  is  often,  though  not  always,  moral. — 2.  Moral 
esteem  is  that  form  of  virtue  which  regulates  our  consideration 
and  treatment  of  persons  according  to  their  moral  character. — 
3.  This  virtue  modifies  the  operations  but  does  not  interfere  with 
the  aims  of  Moral  Goodness. — 4.  Moral  Esteem,  though  less  di- 
rectly than  Moral  Goodness,  finds  the  ground  of  its  Tightness  and 
obligatoriness  in  the  absolute  good  of  beings. — 5.  Causative 
Righteousness  and  its  aims  explained. — 6.  The  Reflex  exercise  of 
Moral  Principle  ;  or  Incipient  Causative  Virtue.  This  is  con- 
ditioned on  a  faculty  of  intentional  self -regulation. — 7.  This  self- 
regulation  is  implied  also  in  cornmotive  virtue,  but  not  in  prac- 
tive,  or  primary,  virtue. — 8.  Developed,  or  Methodical  Causative 
Righteousness,  defined.  It  seeks  virtue,  or  moral  good,  as  an 
end,  more  definitely  than  Incipient  Causative  Righteousness 
does.  Its  principal  forms  are  the  Instructoral  and  the  Rectoral. 
— 9.  The  ends  of  Causative  Righteousness  being  first,  virtue,  and 
then  the  ends  which  virtue  seeks,  are  all  of  necessity  things 
absolutely  good.— 10.  That  absolute  good  is  the  ultimate  and 
obligatory  end  of  Causative  Righteousness  seems  evident.  Yet 
two  objections  to  this  doctrine  should  be  considered. 

1.  THE  words  "  esteem  "  and  "  estimation  "  are  sometimes 
used  synonymously.     But,  generally,  the  first    expresses    a 
judgment  respecting  persons,  and  the  latter  a  judgment  re- 
pecting  things.     Esteem  is  a  recognition  of  personal  excel- 
lence accompanied  with  a  feeling  of  respect  and  good-will. 
The  excellence  perceived  is  not  necessarily  moral,  but  may  be 
any  form  of  efficiency  or  of  desirable  endowment.     (Chap. 
III.)    A  man  may  be  esteemed  as  a  philosopher  or  as  a  states- 
man, as  an  orator  or  as  a  poet,  as  an  artist  or  as  a  workman, 
without  being  esteemed  for  virtue  and  goodness.    Commonly, 
however,  it  is  understood  that,  when  we  esteem  any  one,  we 
respect  him  for  his  moral  excellence — that  he  is  the  object  of 
moral  esteem. 

2.  According  to  the  terminology  of  the  present  treatise 

277 


278  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIV. 

moral  esteem  is  a  department  of  duty  which  resembles  moral 
goodness  in  being  both  practical  and  affectional  and  in  being 
concerned  with  loving  beings  and  with  doing  good.  But  it 
differs  from  goodness  in  that  its  treatment  of  persons  is  de- 
termined by  a  regard  for  their  moral  character,  and  not 
simply  in  view  of  their  capacities  and  needs  as  sentient  be- 
ings. We  all  acknowledge  that  a  virtuous  person  has  a  special 
right  to  our  good- will  and  our  assistance;  while  vice  lessens 
one's  claim  to  love  and  consideration,  and  may  even  destroy 
it  altogether.  Christians  love  God  and  desire  his  pleasure 
and  blessedness,  not  simply  becaue  he  is  the  greatest,  but 
yet  more  because  he  is  the  best,  of  beings.  They  also  accept 
the  precept  to  do  good  to  all  men,  but  especially  to  those  who 
are  of  the  household  of  faith ;  and  they  feel  in  duty  bound  not 
merely  to  value  the  servants  of  God  because  of  the  work  they 
do,  but  to  esteem  them  very  highly  in  love  for  their  work's 
sake,  that  is,  for  their  devotion  to  their  work.  Other  things 
being  equal,  we  give  the  preference  to  a  good  man,  and  this, 
too,  simply  because  of  his  goodness.  We  also  feel  justified  in 
withdrawing  our  regard  from  the  unworthy.  It  is  conceiv- 
able that  beings  wholly  and  hopelessly  set  on  evil  may  lose 
all  right  to  consideration.  One  is  not  bound  to  love  devils. 
Thus  the  law  of  moral  esteem  modifies  the  operation  of  the 
law  of  moral  goodness. 

3.  At  the  same  time  the  former  of  these  laws  never  really 
conflicts  with  the  latter.  It  requires  neither  the  neglect  of 
any  absolute  interest  nor  the  withdrawal  of  love  from  any 
being  fit  and  possible  to  be  loved. 

Examining  the  practical  working  of  the  law  of  esteem,  we 
find  that  it  does  not  propose  the  injury  of  one  class  for  the 
benefit  of  another,  but  only  such  special  favor  for  the  good  as 
may  consist  with  the  best  welfare  of  beings  in  general.  A 
special  favor  is  not  necessarily  a  robbing  of  the  common 
store,  but  often  falls  in  with  our  utmost  endeavor  for  the 
general  prosperity.  Moral  esteem  does  not  demand  for  the 
righteous  any  privileges  which  may  be  injurious  to  others. 
Moreover,  no  law,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  requires  the  ill-treat- 
ment of  the  wicked  simply  because  they  are  wicked.  On  the 
contrary,  we  are  bound  to  strive  for  the  good  of  the  wicked 
as  long  as  they  are  capable  of  good,  and  in  all  cases  in  which 
a  benefit  done  them  may  not  be  productive  of  evil  greater 
than  itself,  and  may,  therefore,  be  consistent  with  absolute- 
ness of  good.  We  cannot  believe  that  the  infliction  of  puni- 


CHAP.  XXIV.]  MORAL  ESTEEM.  279 

tive  evil  is  an  exception  to  this  rule;  but  this  point  will  be 
considered  hereafter.  At  present  we  say  that  duty  sometimes 
requires  the  denial  of  favors  to  the  wicked — favors  such  as 
moral  goodness  could  cheerfully  and  safely  grant  to  those 
who  had  not  transgressed — but  even  this  only  as  a  reproof 
and  check  of  wickedness.  The  practical  operation  of  moral 
esteem,  as  distinguished  from  that  severer  righteousness 
which  we  call  punitive  justice,  would  not  go  further  than  we 
have  now  stated:  and  this  certainly  is  not  inconsistent  with 
the  aims  of  moral  goodness. 

In  like  manner  the  affectional  operation  of  the  law  of  moral 
esteem  consists  with  that  of  moral  goodness.  The  latter  re- 
quires us  to  exercise  love  for  beings  in  a  manner  consen- 
taneous with  the  aims  of  practive  goodness.  We  cannot  love 
beings  too  much  in  this  way.  But  an  increase  of  love  for  the 
morally  good  does  not  interfere  with  the  putting  forth  of 
dutiful  benevolence.  Special  love  to  the  good — for  example, 
love  to  God — brings  us  into  more  perfect  sympathy  with  them 
and  enlarges  the  heart  for  the  virtuous  love  of  mankind. 
Moreover,  we  need  scarcely  say  that  the  hatred  of  beings  has 
no  place  within  the  domain  of  duty.  Moral  esteem  leaves 
untouched  the  law  of  goodness  that  we  should  love  all  beings 
so  far  as  we  can — and  so  far  as  we  can  consistently — while 
aiming  at  absolute  good. 

But  this  duty  of  esteem  brings  to  view  three  grounds  of 
limitation  to  the  exercise  of  virtuous  benevolence ;  which  may 
operate  singly  or  together.  In  the  first  place,  love  for  the 
wicked,  if  not  specially  restrained,  might  lead  us  to  favor 
them  unduly  more  frequently  than  love  for  any  other  class 
would  lead  us  to  favor  them  unduly.  It  is,  therefore,  pecu- 
liarly obligatory  not  to  love  the  immoral  in  a  way  discordant 
with  that  practive  virtue  which  seeks  the  general  and  absolute 
good  of  beings.  Secondly,  it  is  evident  that  we  should  sub- 
ordinate our  love  for  wicked  persons  to  the  claims  of  puni- 
tive justice.  A  love  which  would  prevent  or  neglect  the  pun- 
ishment of  the  guilty  when  they  ought  to  be  punished  would 
be  an  improper  love.  How  far  the  ultimate  principle  of  this 
limitation  may  be  identified  with  that  of  the  first  limitation 
will  appear  subsequently.  In  the  third  place,  we  are  not 
under  obligation  to  love  the  wicked  when,  by  reason  of  their 
hopeless  and  determined  depravity,  they  have  ceased  to  be  the 
possible  objects  of  our  affection.  In  this  last  case  a  natural 
law  determines  the  limit  of  duty  in  some  such  way  as  fol- 


280  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIV. 

lows.  Two  spirits,  placed  in  company  and  made  to  under- 
stand each  other's  experience,  would  naturally  have  benevo- 
lent affection  for  each  other, — the  simple  sympathy  of  sentient 
souls.  Various  causes  might  then  tend  to  strengthen  or 
to  weaken  this  affection.  In  particular,  moral  goodness  in 
each  being  would  strengthen  his  natural  affection  and  would 
make  him  more  attractive  to  the  affection  of  the  other.  In 
this  way  the  goodness  of  both  beings  would  become  a  bond 
of  mutual  attachment,  capable,  we  believe,  of  being  stronger 
than  any  other.  But,  if  one  of  the  beings  were  morally  bad, 
that  is,  in  any  degree  opposed  to  what  is  right,  the  other, 
though  morally  good,  would  of  necessity  love  him  less,  in 
proportion  to  his  wickedness,  than  he  would  were  it  possible 
for  him  to  regard  that  other  being  without  any  reference  to 
moral  character.  Nevertheless  his  goodness,  if  perfect,  would 
lead  him  to  love  that  other  so  long  as  he  was  an  object  pos- 
sible to  be  loved,  as  also  it  would  lead  him  to  labor  for  the 
good  of  the  wicked  person  so  long  as  there  might  be  any 
hope  of  doing  him  good.  But  in  case  that  immoral  spirit 
became  so  purely  and  thoroughly  evil  that  love  for  him  should 
be  no  longer  possible,  or  in  case  through  his  wickedness  he 
became  so  hopelessly  lost  as  to  be  no  longer  susceptible  of 
good,  an  end  of  duty  would  be  reached.  We  need  not  now 
discuss  whether  these  cases  always  accompany  each  other, 
but  it  is  plain  that,  in  either  case  or  in  their  conjuncture, 
considerations  connected  with  moral  character  would  be  de- 
terminative of  duty  and  would  justify  a  discontinuance  of 
practical  or  affectional  regard.  But  clearly  no  one  of  the 
limitations  mentioned,  neither  that  directly  from  respect  for 
absolute  good,  nor  that  from  punitive  justice,  nor  that  from 
a  sort  of  necessity  of  nature,  is  inconsistent  with  the  law  of 
moral  goodness. 

4.  In  thus  showing  that  the  duties  of  moral  esteem  and 
consideration  do  not  conflict  with  the  essential  principle  of 
goodness,  we  have  prepared  ourselves  to  show  how  they  origi- 
nate from  that  principle.  That  the  duties  in  question  arise 
from  their  relation  to  absolute  good,  may  be  argued  as  fol- 
lows: First  of  all,  so  far  as  practical  consideration  of  persons 
because  of  their  moral  excellence  is  a  doing  of  good  to  a  class 
without  injury  to  others,  it  is  a  direct  application  of  the 
primary  law  of  morals ;  it  is  a  seeking  of  absolute  good.  We 
all  know  that  favor  and  assistance  can  be  given  to  the  morally 
good  in  many  cases  in  which  it  cannot  be  wisely  or  safely 


CHAP.  XXIV.]    CAUSATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  281 

given  to  others.  Take,  for  example,  circumstances  in  which 
confidence  in  character  or  the  honoring  of  right  principles 
is  needed,  or  may  he  a  determining  consideration.  In  the 
next  place,  it  is  clear  that  special  regard  for  the  good  may  be 
justified  on  higher  ground  than  mere  non-interference  with 
the  general  welfare,  or  with  the  rights  of  others.  Favor 
shown  them  as  being  good  is  succor  and  assistance  given  to 
the  cause  of  virtue.  Of  this  ground  of  duty  we  shall  speak 
more  fully  under  the  head  of  causative  righteousness.  Then, 
as  to  our  affectional  esteem,  we  have  seen  that,  owing  to 
spiritual  affinity,  the  good  must  needs  love  the  good.  Special 
affection  for  the  good  is  as  inseparably  bound  with  simple 
moral  goodness  as  general  benevolence  is.  Just  in  proportion 
as  we  have  rational  desire  for  the  right,  or  the  absolutely 
good  as  being  right,  we  also  have  personal  love  for  those  in 
whom  this  principle  is  prevalent  and  powerful.  The  former 
motive  tendency  generates  the  latter,  and  imparts  to  it  a 
moral  character.  Finally,  love  for  the  good  is  itself  an  abso- 
lute good,  and  should  therefore  be  cultivated  as  being  in 
itself  a  right  end.  This  pure  and  high  affection  is  a  prin- 
cipal source  of  that  blessedness  which  is  diffused  through- 
out the  society  of  Heaven. 

5.  Causative  Righteousness  is  that  species  of  virtue  which 
aims  at  the  maintenance  and  promotion  of  virtue  in  every 
form.  It  also  seeks  the  suppression  of  vice,  that  is,  of  every 
form  and  degree  of  disposition  in  rational  beings  which  con- 
flicts with  virtue.  It  is  conditioned  on  the  fact  that  a  ra- 
tional and  moral  being  is  able  to  regard  himself  and  others 
as  rational  and  moral,  and  is  able  to  exert  influence  on  him- 
self and  on  others,  either  favorably  or  adversely,  to  the  exer- 
cise of  virtue.  When  he  uses  power  or  influence  favorably 
to  virtue,  and  does  so  because  he  feels  it  to  be  right  and  dutiful 
to  do  so,  then  the  animus  of  his  conduct  is  what  we  have 
termed  causative  virtue. 

Clearly  this  animus  may  exist  where  one  may  not  himself 
be  able  to  do  anything  toward  that  particular  promotion  of 
virtue  which  he  desires.  A  poor  bed-ridden  man  might 
earnestly  desire  that  the  gospel  should  be  preached  to  the 
heathen,  without  being  able  to  do  anything  towards  the  real- 
ization of  his  desire.  True,  he  could  use  the  influence  of 
prayer.  But,  without  thinking  of  this  indirect  efficiency, 
and  regarding  him  as  wholly  impotent,  we  would  yet  con- 
sider his  earnest  desire  a  virtue.  In  other  words^  causative 


282  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIV. 

righteousness  is  so  called,  not  because  it  always  causes  virtue, 
though  it  frequently  does,  but  because  it  desires  the  causation 
of  virtue,  and  because,  whenever  it  has  the  power  to  promote 
virtue,  it  uses  this  power  to  that  end. 

There  is  no  species  or  form  of  virtue  which  causative  right- 
eousness does  not  desire  to  perfect  and  promote.  Moral  good- 
ness and  regulative  righteousness,  in  their  various  develop- 
ments, and  that  moral  esteem  which  assumes  the  presence  or 
the  absence  of  these  virtues,  and  even  causative  virtue  itself, 
are  all  objects  of  the  care  of  causative  virtue.  This  last 
thought  does  not  imply  that  any  one  act  of  causative  virtue 
can  aim  at  itself,  but  only  that  one  exercise  of  causative 
virtue  may  aim  at  another.  For  example,  Christians  may 
encourage  and  sustain  each  other  in  evangelical  labors.  But 
in  all  cases,  what  is  immediately  aimed  at  is  virtue,  that  is, 
the  effective  exercise  of  moral  principle,  or  of  the  disposition 
to  regard  and  seek  what  is  right. 

As  we  may  have  recurring  occasion  to  speak  of  virtue  as 
aimed  at  by  causative  righteousness,  we  may  sometimes,  when 
viewing  it  in  that  relation,  call  it  object-virtue. 

6.  An  understanding  of  causative,  like  that  of  practive 
and  of  commotive,  virtue — and  indeed  of  every  motivity  of 
spirit — must  be  sought  from  an  investigation  of  the  ends 
which  it  keeps  in  view.  Before  proceeding  with  this  inves- 
tigation, however,  we  may  notice  what  might  be  called  In- 
cipient Causative  Righteousness,  or  the  Reflex  Exercise  of 
Moral  Principle;  the  latter  expression  being  perhaps  less 
adequate  than  the  former.  This  mode  of  causative  virtue  is 
more  subtle  than  any  other.  The  exercise  of  it  mingles  in 
our  bosoms  with  the  virtue  which  it  promotes.  Special  study 
is  needed  in  order  to  understand  its  operation. 

The  exercise  of  such  virtue  is  conditioned  on  the  possession 
of  a  faculty  of  self-regulation  by  which  man  may  guide  and 
control  his  own  virtue  as  well  as-  his  other  motivities.  Be- 
yond doubt,  we  have  such  a  faculty.  For,  first  of  all,  the 
soul  has  a  power  of  reflection  whereby  it  takes  cognizance  of 
its  own  states,  tendencies  and  acts,  and  of  their  true  nature 
and  relations.  This  power  is  a  part  of  reason :  it  differs  from 
mere  consciousness,  which  even  brutes  may  have,  in  that  it 
is  attentive  and  discriminating.  By  it  reason  can  take  cog- 
nizance of  all  those  operations  in  which  she  herself  partici- 
pates, and  especially  of  man's  moral  thinkings  and  move- 
ments. That  is,  one  mode  of  reason  observes  and  judges  of 


CHAP.  XXIV.]     CAUSATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  283 

all  the  operations  of  man's  rational  life.  In  the  next  place, 
man  can  exercise  desire  or  motive  feeling  concerning  his 
own  understood  experiences  and  motivities,  as  well  as  con- 
cerning other  objects  of  thought.  Accordingly  men,  in  fact, 
often  exhibit  the  desire  to  be  virtuous;  they  wish  to  be  will- 
ing to  do  what  is  right.  Sometimes  they  desire  virtue  only 
as  personally  advantageous  to  themselves;  in  which  case  their 
desire  is  not  of  the  nature  of  virtue.  But  sometimes,  also, 
they  desire  virtue  because  it  is,  in  effect,  an  accomplishing 
of  right  ends,  and  also  for  its  own  sake,  as  we  say,  that  is, 
a?  being  in  itself  something  absolutely  good  and  right  to  be 
desired :  and,  if  they  desire  virtue  for  either  of  these  reasons, 
their  desire  is  itself  of  the  nature  of  virtue.  Thus  a  Chris- 
tian virtuously  desires  that  he  himself,  and  others,  may  grow 
in  grace.  Finally,  the  soul,  as  reflectively  intelligent^  has  a 
faculty  of  intentionally  directing  and  developing  its  own 
motivities,  and,  in  particular,  its  own  moral  dispositions. 
This  faculty  depends  on  the  power  which  one  has  of  fixing 
and  guiding  the  motive  regards  of  his  own  mind.  Thus  a 
man,  in  the  intervals  of  the  actual  performance  of  some  prac- 
tical or  affectional  duty — perhaps  even  while  engaged  in  it 
— may  encourage  or  dissuade  himself  concerning  its  per- 
formance. Now,  should  he,  in  the  exercise  of  this  self- 
regulation,  purposely  strive  to  be  virtuous,  this  would  be  a 
rudimental  form  of  causative  righteousness.  He  would  thus 
be  doubly  virtuous,  first  as  simply  seeking  what  is  right  for 
its  own  sake,  and  then  again  as  desiring  and  striving  to  do 
so.  In  the  first  instance  his  purpose  would  be  simply  to  do 
what  is  right ;  in  the  second  his  purpose  would  be  to  have  and 
exercise  the  disposition  of  virtue. 

The  principal  aim  and  animus  of  this  incipient  and  inter- 
nally directed  causative  righteousness  are  precisely  the  same 
with  those  of  the  object-virtue  which  it  promotes.  There- 
fore we  may  say  that  the  chief  element  of  it  is  a  reflex  ex- 
ercise of  moral  principle.  For  a  man  may  consciously  desire 
and  strive  to  be  honest  that  he  may  do  honest  things,  which 
is  also  the  .aim  of  honesty;  and  he  may  desire  and  strive  to 
be  truthful  in  order  that  he  may  speak  the  truth  as  he  ought 
to  speak  it,  which  is  the  aim  of  veracity.  In  such  cases  the 
causative  virtue  is  a  reflex  exercise  of  the  virtue  caused.  It 
is  the  moral  disposition  of  some  species  of  virtue  seeking  to  es- 
tablish and  perfect  itself  so  as  better  to  accomplish  its  proper 
aim.  At  the  same  time  it  seems  true  that  even  incipient 


THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIV. 

causative  righteousness  often — perhaps  generally — agrees 
with  the  more  deliberate  form  of  causative  virtue  in  regarding 
virtue  as  an  end  in  itself,  and  not  merely  as  leading  to  the 
special  ends  aimed  at  by  the  form  of  object-virtue  promoted. 

7.  There    is    a    resemblance    between    incipient    causative 
righteousness  and  commotive  virtue.    Both  aim  at  the  regu- 
lation and  guidance  of  motive  feelings  or  tendencies,  and 
this,  too,  within  the  personality  of  the  one  moral  agent. 
But  they  differ  in  respect  to  the  motivities  with  which  they 
deal  and  as  to  their  aims,  or  laws.     The  one  would  make 
natural    disposition   consentaneous   with   moral;    the   other 
would  give  to  moral  disposition  its  own  right  developments. 
Each,    also,  works    in    its    own    way.      To    stimulate    and 
strengthen  the  dull  or  weak  conscience,  to  inform  and  cor- 
rect the  unstable  or  eccentric  conscience,  and,  as  there  may 
be  need,  to  modify  and  conform  to  truth  those  dispositional 
habits  into  which  even  the  moral  reason  falls — these  are  the 
methods  of  virtuous  reflection. 

The  reflex  exercise  of  principle  is  of  some  importance  in 
connection  with  the  theory  of  virtue  in  general.  Many  who 
have  found  two  forms  of  virtue,  the  promoted  and  the  pro- 
moting, constantly  connected  in  our  experience,  have  spoken 
as  if  all  virtue  were  essentially  reflective  or  self-regulative. 
But  primary  or  practive  virtue  consists  simply  in  the  seeking 
of  absolute  good — that  is,  the  absolute  of  natural  good — as 
being  right,  and  not  in  the  regulation  of  moral  principle  by 
itself.  The  reflex  exercise  of  principle  is  not  an  essential  or 
necessary  part  of  beneficence,  honesty,  or  veracity.  These 
involve  only  the  objective  exercise  of  reason  and  rational 
tendency.  In  like  manner  affectional  or  secondary  virtue, 
such  as  reverence,  courage  and  love,  does  not  involve  the 
intentional  regulation  of  the  moral  principle  which  it  in- 
cludes. It  consists  in  the  promoted  and  sustained  consen- 
taneity of  natural  affection  with  primary  virtue. 

8.  The  more  pronounced  and  methodical  forms  of  causa- 
tive virtue  are  those  in  the  exercise  of  which  one  uses  out- 
ward means  for  his  own  moral  improvement  and  rectitude  of 
life  (as,  for  example,  the  ordinances  of  religion  or  the  so- 
ciety of  the  good),  and  those,  also,  in  which  he  endeavors,  in 
any  way,  to  maintain  and  promote  righteousness  and  good- 
ness among  men. 

The  virtue  thus  developed  contains  the  same  elements 
which  we  have  found  in  its  incipiency ;  but  they  are  combined 


CHAP.  XXIV. J     CAUSATIVE  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  285 

in  a  different  proportion.  In  incipient  or  subjective  causa- 
tive virtue,  though  the  immediate  effort  is  to  promote  some 
form  of  righteousness,  this  righteousness  is  regarded  chiefly 
as  an  effectual  means  for  the  realization  of  the  end  which  it 
seeks,  and  which  is  prominently  before  the  mind.  We  see 
that  what  it  is  right  and  obligatory  to  do,  it  is  also  right  and 
obligatory  to  cause  to  be  done.  We  do  not  think  so  much  of 
the  righteousness  itself  as  a  right  end.  But  in  developed 
causative  virtue,  though  one  may  have  the  right  things  to 
be  accomplished  by  the  object-virtue  more  or  less  in  view,  we. 
generally  aim  chiefly  at  the  object-virtue,  or  at  object- 
virtue  in  general,  as  good  in  itself  and  right  to  be  sought, 
without  any  separate  notion  of  the  results  to  proceed  from 
it.  The  end  thus  conceived  of  and  sought  after  is  quite  dif- 
ferent from  the  ends  aimed  at  by  object- virtue.  Virtue  it- 
self is  regarded  as  a  great,  comprehensive  and  excelling  end, 
and  is  distinguished  under  this  aspect  as  moral  good. 

Methodical  causative  virtue  may  be  divided  into  two  species 
according  to  the  mode  of  its  operation.  One  of  these  may  be 
styled  instructoral  righteousness,  because  it  seeks  for  one's  self 
and  for  others  the  improvement  of  character  and  life  through 
an  effective  knowledge  of  duty,  and  therefore  employs  every 
direct  means  of  moral  instruction  and  edification.  The  other 
may  be  styled  rectoral  righteousness,  not  because  it  is  ex- 
clusively a  virtue  of  rulers,  but  because  rulers  are  specially 
bound  to  exercise  this  virtue.  It  aims  to  suppress  moral  evil 
and  to  promote  moral  good  through  the  employment  of  power 
and  especially  through  the  bestowal  of  rewards  and  the  in- 
fliction of  punishments.  Its  principal  forms,  therefore,  are 
those  of  remunerative  and  punitive  righteousness.  The  latter 
of  these,  which  is  commonly  called  punitive  justice,  is  a 
very  striking  development  of  morality,  because  of  the  sever- 
ity of  its  methods  and  their  excitement  of  our  fears.  For 
mankind  are  more  influenced  morally  by  the  fear  of  pun- 
ishment than  by  the  hope  of  reward. 

9.  It  seems  clear  that,  in  every  form  of  causative  righteous- 
ness, whether  the  incipient,  the  instructoral  or  _  the  rectoral, 
two  aims  are  consciously  pursued,  first,  the  realization  of  the 
end  of  object-virtue  through  that  virtue  as  an  instrument, 
and,  second,  the  promotion  of  object-virtue  itself.  We  have 
now  to  add  that,  in  each  of  these  seekings,  causative  virtue 
aims  at  absolute  good.  This  need  not  be  argued  in  relation 
to  the  first  aim.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  ends  of  ob- 


286  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIV. 

ject-virtue — of  moral  goodness,  regulative  righteousness  and 
moral  esteem — are  things  absolutely  good.  That  being  the 
case,  object-virtue  itself  as  favoring  these  ends  must  be  abso- 
lutely good.  And  this  virtue  is  admirably  excellent  also  in 
other  directions.  It  gives  satisfaction  to  its  possessor;  it 
secures  for  him  the  favor  of  the  good ;  it  conforms  his  life  to 
the  conditions  of  an  enduring  prosperity  and  places  it  under 
the  protection  of  Heaven;  it  unites  the  virtuous  in  harmony 
and  love ;  it  is  the  foundation  of  an  everlasting  blessedness. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  adherence  to  duty  may  be  accom- 
panied with  immediate  trouble  and  suffering.  The  righteous 
man  is  rather  to  expect  trials;  sometimes  he  is  called  to  be 
faithful  even  unto  death.  Nevertheless,  from  the  absolute 
point  of  view,  virtue  must  be  declared  a  good.  For  no  sacri- 
fices are  expected  of  any  one  except  such  as  may  contribute 
to  the  highest  welfare  of  all.  Therefore,  if  duty  called  for 
one's  complete  self-destruction,  the  virtue  of  acceding  to 
this  demand  would  be  an  absolute  good,  though  it  would  be 
a  private  evil.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  no  such  sacrifice 
is  ever  demanded,  and  that  the  permanent  blessedness  of 
every  righteous  man  is  included  in  the  absolute  good  of  the 
universe.  With  faith  in  this  truth  the  moral  hero  despises 
the  tribulations  which  attend  his  course  of  well-doing.  In 
the  midst  of  the  severest  sufferings  he  declares  that  these  light 
afflictions  which  are  but  for  a  moment  shall  work  out  for  him 
a  far  more  exceeding  and  eternal  weight  of  glory. 

10.  Since,  then,  causative  righteousness,  as  well  as  every 
other  form  of  virtue,  aims  at  absolute  good  as  its  obligatory- 
end,  may  we  not  conclude  that  the  realization  of  this  good  is 
the  generic  end  of  the  moral  law  ?  But  in  ordinary  language 
the  end  of  the  law  is  said  to  be  the  accomplishment  or  realiza- 
tion of  the  right,  or  of  that  which  is  right.  All  this  being 
so,  the  right  seems  to  be  nothing  else  than  absolute  good 
considered  as  an  endf  or  as  the  obligatory  end.  Our  analysis 
of  the  laws  of  duty  points  to  this  conclusion. 

Two  objections,  however,  to  the  foregoing  definition  of  the 
right,  claim  consideration,  because  these  objections,  like  the 
definition  itself,  are  founded  on  a  scrutiny  of  moral  thought. 
First  it  may  be  said  that  moral  good — or  virtue  as  an  object 
of  desire — is  so  peculiar  in  its  nature  and  so  different  from 
all  other  good  which  duty  seeks,  that  it  cannot  be  classified 
with  the  right  ends  of  object-virtue  under  the  head  of  abso- 
lute good.  In  other  words,  its  character  as  moral  good  is 


CHAP.  XXIV.]     CA  USA  TIVE  R1GHTEO USNESS. 

asserted  not  to  consist  in  its  conduciveness  to  the  welfare  and 
happiness  of  beings,  but  to  be,  perhaps,  a  simple  and  unde- 
finable  quality.  In  this  way  it  is  maintained  that  causative 
righteousness,  at  least,  aims  at  something  else  than  absolute 
good. 

The  other  objection  claims  that  the  more  prominent  form 
of  rectoral  righteousness,  namely,  punitive  justice,  has  an 
aim  different  from,  or  additional  to,  the  repression  of  vice 
and  the  promotion  of  virtue ;  that  its  object  is  to  inflict  pun- 
ishment on  the  transgressor;  and  that  this  end  is  philosoph- 
ically ultimate  and  not  to  be  explained  as  a  requirement  of 
absolute  good. 

The  arguments  thus  presented,  together  with  two  impor- 
tant topics,  may  be  advantageously  considered,  if  one  short 
chapter  be  devoted  to  the  subject  of  moral  good,  and  after 
that,  another  to  the  subject  of  punitive  justice. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

VIRTUE  THE  "  SUMMUM  BONUM/' 

1.  Formerly  the  word  "  virtue  "  designated  any  efficient  quality  of 
character.  Effective  moral  principle  was  virtue  merely  by  pre- 
eminence. We  now  use  the  term  only  in  its  ethical  application. 
— 2.  The  doctrine  that  virtue  is  the  "  summum  bonum  "  means 
chiefly  that  virtue  is  the  greatest  absolute  good,  though  virtue  is 
also  the  greatest  private  good. — 3.  Virtue  is  an  absolute  good 
because  it  seeks  and  accomplishes  things  absolutely  good. — 4. 
Also  because  of  its  concomitants.  (1)  It  is  the  foundation  of 
esteem  and  affection.  (2)  It  places  one  in  right  relation  to  the 
laws  of  God  and  the  conditions  of  happiness.  (3)  It  is  an  im- 
mediate source  of  contentment  and  satisfaction. — 5.  Also  because 
it  prevents  vice  and  the  dreadful  evil  which  vice  entails. — 6.  Our 
conception  of  virtue  as  the  summum  bonum  and  as  opposed  to 
vice,  the  summum  malum,  is  greatly  enlarged  when  we  consider 
the  consequences  which  may  flow  from  virtue,  or  from  the  want 
of  it,  in  a  future  life. — 7.  Moral  good  may  be  an  end  to  the 
practical  reason  and  may  be  sought  "for  its  own  sake,"  while 
yet  the  speculative  reason  may  enumerate  the  elements  which 
are  included  in  the  good. — 8.  That  virtue  is  dutifully  sought  only 
as  an  absolute  good  is  evident  (1)  because  this  is  the  only  char- 
acteristic which  virtue  has  in  common  with  other  obligatory  ends, 
and  (2)  because  this  is  the  only  quality  in  virtue  with  which 
reason  can  connect  moral  obligation. — 9.  The  failure  of  some  to 
see  the  analogy  between  virtue  as  a  right  end  and  all  other 
absolute  good  as  an  end  arises  from  three  causes.  (1)  Virtue  is 
differentiated  from  the  other  forms  of  good  by  reason  of  its  pecul- 
iar character  and  exceeding  value.  (2)  Virtue  is  an  absolute 
good  in  a  variety  of  ways.  The  mention  of  one  or  two  of  these  is 
properly  rejected  as  an  insufficient  account  of  the  Tightness  of 
virtue  as  an  end.  (3)  Virtue  has  striking  characteristics  in 
addition  to  its  absoluteness  of  good  ;  and  these  may  affect  the 
mind  sentimentally,  while  only  absoluteness  of  good  is  the  ground 
of  duty. — 10.  Absolute  good  is  the  end  of  all  duty. 

1.  THE  word  "  virtue  "  had  formerly  a  wider  signification 
than  it  ordinarily  has  now.  It  was  applied  by  the  Romans  to 
every  quality  that  belongs  to  an  efficient  and  vigorous  char- 
acter, or  to  such  a  character  as  composed  of  such  qualities. 
But  virtus,  or  virtutes,  the  vir  was  distinguished  from  the 
288 


CHAP.  XXV.]     VIRTUE  THE  ei  SUMMITM  nONUM.* 

mere  homo.  A  vir  was  a  man  considered  as  endowed  with 
vires,  or  powers.  Strength  of  mind,  practical  wisdom,  reso- 
lution, courage,  perseverance,  energy,  entirely  apart  from  any 
thought  of  morality,  were  called  virtues.  Along  with  this 
general  signification  the  word  was  also  used  in  the  sense 
commonly  given  to  it  at  the  present  day;  and  so  designated 
moral  principle,  the  habitual  disposition  to  do  right,  or  any 
specific  development  of  such  principle.  Influenced  by  the 
broad  conception  of  virtue,  the  ancients  frequently  failed  to 
emphasize  the  distinction  between  the  moral  and  the  non- 
moral  elements  of  character;  to  remedy  which  defect  the 
Schoolmen  divided  virtues  into  the  intellectual  and  the  moral. 
They  described  the  latter  as  dispositions  which  aim  at  the 
realization  of  the  right,  that  is,  as  virtues  in  the  modern  sense 
of  the  word,  and  they  said  that  intellectual  virtues  are  merely 
various  mental  abilities  which  may  be  employed  in  the  serv- 
ice either  of  the  right  or  of  the  wrong. 

The  Schoolmen,  also,  following  the  ancients,  discussed 
morality  more  under  the  head  of  virtues  than  under  the 
head  of  duties.  For  example,  they  taught  that  mundane 
life  should  be  regulated  by  four  principal  or  "  cardi- 
nal "  virtues,  namely,  prudence,  temperance,  fortitude  and 
justice.  In  thug  speaking  of  virtues  they  did  not  exclude, 
but  rather  included,  the  duties  which  these  dispositions  seek 
to  perform;  and  so  their  classification  of  virtues  became 
the  basis  for  their  study  of  the  moral  law.  But  in  this 
classification,  no  hint  is  given  of  the  distinction  between 
that  secondary  virtue,  which  is  merely  the  right  exercise 
of  natural  disposition  blended  with  regulative  principle,  and 
that  primary  virtue  which  directly  seeks  right  doing; 
and  consentaneity  with  which  is  the  essence  of  secondary 
virtue.  Of  the  four  "cardinal"  virtues,  justice,  alone, 
has  the  primary  character;  prudence,  courage  and  fortitude 
become  moral  in  the  secondary  way.  This  failure  to  note  an 
important  difference,  and  the  acceptance  of  a  superficial  list 
as  if  it  represented  an  ultimate  analysis,  introduced  much* 
difficulty  into  the  study  of  ethics.  Even  yet  some  are  con- 
fused in  their  understanding  of  the  moral  law,  because  they 
direct  their  attention  more  to  virtues  than  to  duties,  and  be- 
cause they  do  not  discriminate  between  primary  (or  practive) 
and  secondary  (or  commotive)  virtue. 

In  the  following  discussion  the  term  "  virtue  "  is  to  be  used 
in  its  widest  moral  application.  It  is  to  stand  for  effective 

19 


290  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP  XXV. 

moral  principle  and  for  the  whole  character  and  activity  of 
man  so  far  as  these  are  governed  and  qualified  by  such 
principle.  We  are  to  conceive  of  virtue  as  the  old  Pythag- 
oreans did  when  they  called  it  the  ££«?  TOO  dtovro? — the 
habit  or  disposition  of  duty — considering  along  with  this  all 
the  ways  in  which  this  disposition  shows  its  efficacy.  We 
have  to  contemplate  virtue  with  the  Stoics  as  the  life  of  that 
"  wise  man  "  in  whom  moral  principle  reaches  its  full  devel- 
opment and  operation.  And  we  are  to  study  this  life  as  the 
supreme  good — the  summum  bonum — of  rational  beings.  For 
when,  nowadays,  men  dutifully  promote  virtue  as  moral 
good,  and  as  the  highest  good  which  can  be  sought,  they  are 
simply  carrying  into  practice  the  old  doctrine  of  the  sum- 
mum  ~bonum. 

2.  This  doctrine,  though  frequently  mentioned  by  moral- 
ists, is  not  discussed  by  many,  nor  even  carefully  stated.     A 
satisfactory  understanding  of  it  requires  that  the  summum 
bonum  should  be  regarded  in  a  double  aspect.    For  virtue  can 
be  considered  either  as  the  greatest  absolute  good,  that  is,  the 
chief  source  of  prosperity  to  beings  in  general;  or  it  may  be 
contemplated  as  the  greatest  private  good,  that  is,  the  chief 
source  of  happiness  to  its  possessor.     These  two  views  are 
closely  related,  and  may  be  said  to  involve  one  another. 
But  they  should  be  distinguished  because  the  obligation  to 
promote  virtue  springs  from  the  fact  that  virtue  is  an  abso- 
lute good,  while  the  fact  that  virtue  is  a  private  good  ap- 
peals only  to  self-interest  or  to  benevolence.     Considering 
the  summum  bonum  from  an  ethical  point  of  view  we  main- 
tain, first,  that  virtue  is  the  most  important  form  of  abso- 
lute good,  and,  secondly,  that  it  is  a  right  and  obligatory 
end  as  having  this  excellence. 

3.  The  claims  of  virtue  as  a  moral  end  have  been  already 
briefly  stated    (Chap.   XXIV.) ;  they   must  now  be  given 
more  at  length.    In  the  first  place,  virtue  is  absolutely  good 
as  permanently   aiming   at   and   continually   accomplishing 
things  absolutely  good.    This  holds  true  whether  we  consider 
the  practical  or  the  affectional  workings  of  principle.     With 
respect  to  practical  duty  we  have  seen  that  absolute  good  is 
the  end  of  the  labors  both  of  moral  goodness  and  of  regula- 
tive righteousness.    Good  is  the  prominent  aim  of  the  efforts 
of  goodness;  absoluteness  of  good  and  the  Tightness  of  the 
end  are  more  regarded  in  a  course  of  righteousness;  never- 
theless both  good  and  the  absoluteness  of  it  enter  into  every 


CHAP.  XXV.]     VIRTUE  THE  "  SUMMUM  BONUM."  291 

law  of  practive  virtue.  Sometimes  goodness  is  directly  con- 
cerned about  the  absoluteness  of  the  good.  For  example, 
philanthropists,  seeking  to  improve  the  condition  of  im- 
prisoned or  discharged  convicts,  strive  to  do  this  by  some 
method  which  may  be  truly  and  absolutely  good.  They  are 
quite  as  much  exercised  about  the  right  mode  or  form  of 
good,  or  the  right  way  of  doing  good,  as  about  good  or  the 
doing  of  it.  Sometimes,  on  the  other  hand,  the  attention  of 
justice  or  righteousness  is  called  more  to  the  good  to  be 
done  than  to  the  absoluteness  of  it;  as  when  the  oppressed 
widow  sought  redress  from  the  unjust  judge.  But  in  every 
case,  practive  virtue  seeks  absolute  good;  and  is  itself  abso- 
lutely good  on  that  account.  In  like  manner,  commotive  or 
affectional  virtue  promotes  that  absolute  good  which  is  found 
in  right  developments  of  natural  disposition  by  reason  of 
their  implication  with  primary  virtue,  their  practical  opera- 
tion and  their  intrinsic  excellence.  Thus  object-virtue  in 
general  is  an  absolute  good,  because  it  is  the  fruitful  source 
of  all  those  multiplied  forms  of  absolute  good  which  that 
virtue  labors  for.  For  whatever  is  permanently,  and  by 
reason  of  its  own  nature,  productive  of  peace,  comfort  and 
happiness,  men  call  a  good;  and  they  seek  virtue  under  this 
notion  as  an  end,  and,  under  the  additional  notion  of  ab- 
soluteness, as  a  right  end. 

4.  In  the  second  place,  virtue  is  an  absolute  good  because 
of  certain  natural  consequents,  which,  as  distinguished  from 
the  ends  at  which  it  aims,  may  be  called  its  concomitants. 
Three  of  these  are  noticeable.  First,  virtue  renders  the  pos- 
sessor of  it  a  proper  object  of  esteem  and  affection.  Moral 
excellence  is  not  only  admirable  in  itself,  but  it  is  the  only 
ground  of  rational  and  enduring  love.  Goodness  when  fully 
developed  creates  a  preeminent  personal  attractiveness  which 
might  be  distinguished  as  moral  loveliness.  This  is  not  that 
loveableness,  or  amiability,  which  attends  an  easy  temper 
and  pleasant  manners,  and  which  is  often  found  in  persons 
whom  we  cannot  esteem  highly.  It  is  a  quality  which  unites 
the  good  together  in  a  noble  friendship,  and  which  is  the 
basis  of  their  expectation  of  the  blessed  fellowship  of  Heaven. 
A  perfect  exemplification  of  this  loveliness  appears  in  the 
character  of  Jesus  Christ. 

The  second  of  those  concomitants  which  unite  to  make 
virtue  an  inexhaustible  source  of  happiness,  is  that  well- 
ordered  condition,  both  of  inward  capacity  and  of  outward 


292  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

relations,  which  follows  upon  conformity  to  the  laws  of  rec- 
titude. Such  is  the  constitution  of  the  Universe  and  such 
the  mind  of  the  Creator,  that  virtuous  beings,  while  seeking 
absolute  good  rather  than  good  as  privately  related,  are  yet 
in  the  way  of  receiving  greater  good  personally  than  they 
could  hope  for  in  any  other  course  of  life.  It  is  entirely 
consistent  with  this  statement  that  the  good  man  is  often  the 
subject  of  sore  trials  and  afflictions.  Sorrowful  experiences 
are  not  the  natural  effects  of  virtue,  but  of  the  sin  and  evil 
to  which  virtue  is  opposed;  and  their  ultimate  result  is  to 
increase  the  capacity  of  the  upright  for  virtue  and  happiness. 
The  good  man  is  assured  that,  although  no  chastening  for 
the  present  seemeth  to  be  joyous  but  grievous,  nevertheless 
afterward  it  yieldeth  the  peaceable  fruit  of  righteousness 
unto  them  which  are  exercised  thereby.  There  is  also  a  ra- 
tional conviction  among  men  that  the  ruler  of  the  universe 
will  provide  for  the  welfare  of  the  good  and  will  subject 
impenitent  transgressors  to  the  just  recompense  of  their 
iniquity.  All  nations  believe  and  say  that  it  will  be  well 
with  the  righteous  and  that  evil  shall  overtake  the  wicked. 
This  judgment  arises  partly  because,  under  the  best  ordering 
of  human  affairs,  the  personal  prosperity  of  good  men  is 
found  not  to  conflict  with  the  general  well-being,  but  to  form 
a  part  of  it.  Therefore,  to  provide  for  the  welfare  of  the 
good  is  a  moral  obligation.  It  is  assumed  that  the  perma- 
nent state  of  virtuous  beings  will  be  settled  in  accordance 
with  this  principle. 

The  remaining  concomitant  to  be  mentioned,  in  the  light 
of  which  virtue  is  an  unqualified  good,  is  that  satisfaction 
which  the  virtuous  have  both  in  the  possession  and  exercise 
of  their  own  virtue  and  in  the  beholding  of  the  virtue  of 
others.  A  virtuous  being  has  a  deep  and  peaceful  happiness 
in  realizing  the  harmony  between  himself  and  that  law  of 
absoluteness  of  good  which  he  regards  as  right  and  obli- 
gatory; and  he  has  similar  pleasure  in  seeing  others  obedient 
to  that  law.  He  also  rejoices  in  his  agreement  with  all  powers 
and  agencies  of  good  and  with  the  mind  and  government  of 
God.  Vice,  on  the  other  hand,  excites  unrest  and  dissatis- 
faction in  the  sinful  spirit. 

The  happiness  which  thus  accompanies  virtue,  by  reason 
of  its  moral  loveliness,  its  attendant  personal  prosperity,  and 
its  inward  satisfactions,  when  thought  of  as  fully  realized,  is 
often  called  blessedness.  This  holy  felicity  is  the  endless 


CHAP.  XXV.]     VIRTUE  THE  u  SUMMUM  BONUM."  293 

portion  of  the  inhabitants  of  Heaven.  It  differs  vastly  in 
nature  and  in  degree  from  all  happiness  not  conditioned 
upon  virtue. 

5.  In  the  third  place — and  finally — virtue  is  a  great  and 
absolute  good  as  being  preventive  of  vice  and  of  the  ruin  and 
misery  which  vice  entails.  Rational  agents  are  not  granted 
the  choice  between  a  life  of  virtue  and  no  life  at  all.  They 
must  either  be  obedient  to  the  rule  of  righteousness  or  dis- 
obedient to  it.  They  must  act  either  unselfishly,  uprightly 
and  for  the  general  good,  or  selfishly  and  in  disregard  of  the 
laws  of  God  and  of  the  claims  of  their  fellow-men.  More- 
over, although,  for  a  time  and  influenced  by  environments, 
one's  disposition  may  waver  between  good  and  evil,  character 
ever  tends  to  become  more  determinate — more  governed  by 
a  fixed  principle.  Such,  too,  is  the  power  of  habit  that, 
when  either  good  or  evil  gains  the  ascendancy  in  one's  af- 
fections, he  is  likely,  not  only  to  be  borne  along  in  his  chosen 
course,  but  also  to  become  more  and  more  bent  on  ways  of 
good  or  ways  of  evil.  Hence  the  necessity  of  right  decisions 
when  questions  of  duty  come  before  us.  One's  destiny  for 
an  endless  future  may  at  last  be  settled  through  an  alliance 
formed  by  his  will  with  the  right  or  with  the  wrong.  This 
thought  influenced  him  who  wrote: 

There  is  a  time,  we  know  not  when 

A  point,  we  know  not  where, 
That  marks  the  destiny  of  men 

To  glory  or  despair. 

This  was  the  thought  of  Moses,  the  man  of  God,  in  bring- 
ing to  a  close  his  solemn  farewell  address  to  the  children 
of  Israel :  "  See,"  said  he,  "  I  have  set  before  thee,  this  day, 
life  and  good,  and  death  and  evil."  While  virtue  is  the 
supreme  source  of  blessings  to  rational  beings,  vice  is  the 
supreme  evil  and  the  source  of  unspeakable  and  incurable 
misery.  And,  as  vice  can  be  prevented  only  through  the 
maintenance  of  virtue,  the  importance  of  virtue  is  dupli- 
cated; and  our  obligation  to  promote  it  becomes  very  great 
indeed. 

It  is  an  interesting  question  whether,  in  dutifully  promot- 
ing virtue,  we  conceive  of  it  more  as  generative  of  prosperity 
and  preventive  of  evil,  or  as  an  agency  intentionally  seeking 
what  is  right.  Probably  men  realize  the  obligation  more  on 
the  ground  that  virtue  is  instrumental  to  the  realization  of 


294  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

the  right.  At  the  same  time  virtue  is  often  recognized  as 
a  dutiful  end  because  it  is  a  generative  source  of  good  and 
happiness.  One  may,  indeed,  labor  for  the  virtue  of  an  in- 
dividual or  of  a  community  under  the  influence  of  some 
merely  natural  affection  (which  may  have  been  enlarged 
and  liberalized,  though  not  subdued,  by  reason) ;  and,  in  this 
case,  his  conduct  would  not  be  virtuous.  A  bad  man  might 
desire  his  son  to  be  a  good  man,  or  a  wicked  ruler  that  his 
people  should  be  virtuous.  Nay;  men  sometimes,  from  a 
selfish  principle,  desire  to  be  virtuous  themselves.  Neverthe- 
less it  is  evident  that  we  may  and  do  virtuously  desire  the 
spiritual  good  and  blessedness  of  ourselves  and  of  others;  as, 
for  example,  when  Christians  labor  and  pray  for  the  sal- 
vation of  sinners.  This  is  a  right  end,  because  it  is  a  thing 
absolutely  good. 

6.  The  convictions  which  men  have  of  the  greatness  of 
moral  good  and  the  dreadfulness  of  moral  evil  arise  from  a 
perception  of  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and  of  vice  to  produce 
happiness  and  misery.    They  are  more  than  mere  records  of 
the  course  and  conclusion  of  things  in  this  world,  however 
impressive  these  records  may  sometimes  be.     They  include 
an  inference  from  things  that  are  seen  to  things  that  are 
not  seen.    They  assume  that  the  natural  effects  of  virtue  and 
of  vice  will  at  last  be  completely  realized.     Such  are  the 
present  limitations  and  checks  of  man's  condition  that  virtue 
has  not  free  scope  for  the  accomplishment  of  all  the  good 
which  it  desires  and  labors  for;  nor  yet  have  pride,  enmity, 
selfishness  and  passion  the  power  to  do  all  the  evil  to  which 
they  directly  tend.     But  the  more  serious  portion  of  man- 
kind are  deeply  convinced  that  in  the  total  of  existence,  vir- 
tue shall  find  herself  grandly  efficacious  for  good,  and  that 
vice  shall  be  terribly  productive  of  evil.     Even  with  respect 
to  our  best  present  interests  thoughtful  men  hold  virtue  to 
be  a  great  and  absolute  good  and  vice  a  great  and  absolute 
evil.     But  their  estimate  of  the  inner  and  essential  impor- 
tance of  these  things  contemplates  a  wider  field  of  experience 
than  that  included  within  the  bounds  of  earthly  life.     They 
regard  virtue  as  something  likely  to  be  productive  hereafter 
and  indefinitely  of  untold  good,  and  vice  as  the  natural  cause 
of  untold  evil. 

7.  Having  considered  virtue  as  a  great  and  absolute  good, 
let  us  now  see  how  it  becomes  an  obligatory  end,  because  it 
is  an  absolute  good,  and  for  this  cause  alone.    All  will  agree 


CHAP.  XXV.]      VIRTUE  THE  "  SUMM UM  BONUM."  295 

not  only  that  virtue  should  be  cultivated  because  it  is  a  good, 
but  also  that  duty  requires  this  of  us  not  exclusively  for  our 
own  profit  or  for  their  benefit  in  whom  we  may  be  interested, 
but  because  virtue  is  the  supreme  part  of  the  total  of  good 
possible  for  ourselves  and  for  others.  It  may,  however,  be 
questioned  whether  this  is  the  only  ground  on  account  of 
which  virtue  is  an  obligatory  end.  Some  also  may  say  that 
men  recognize  the  claims  of  moral  good  intuitionally  and 
without  thought  of  any  consequences  flowing  from  it. 

In  questions  of  this  kind  it  is  important  to  remember  that 
the  practical  reason  differs  in  its  mode  of  action  from  the 
speculative,  and  that  the  latter  must  take  account  of  this 
difference  when  attempting  to  explain  the  operations  of  the 
former.  Practical  reason  frequently  unites,  in  its  conception 
of  an  end,  both  the  means  to  be  used  and  the  result  to  be 
accomplished.  In  this  way  an  instrument  or  agency  may  be 
desired,  not  in  order  to  its  consequence  or  consequences,  but 
as  being  united  with  it  or  them  under  the  same  conception. 
Often,  too,  when  an  object  is  variously  productive  of  gratifi- 
cations, these  are  thought  of  indefinitely  or  by  a  kind  of  ref- 
erence, and  can  be  distinctly  perceived  and  mentioned  only 
after  some  reflection.  After  this  fashion  wealth,  station, 
power  and  knowledge,  are  commonly  desired.  There  is,  there- 
fore, a  sense  in  which  one  might  be  said  to  seek  virtue  simply 
as  moral  good  and  without  further  thought  of  its  results. 
As  moral  good,  it  is  inclusive  of  its  results.  But  when  the 
speculative  reason  interprets  this  action  of  the  practical  rea- 
son, it  does  so  by  enumerating  the  ways  in  which  virtue  is 
efficacious  of  good;  just  as  we  have  attempted  to  do  in  the 
present  treatise.  We  acknowledge  that  the  intuitive  reason 
seeks  moral  good  as  an  end ;  but  we  hold  that  this  end  admits 
of  the  explanation  which  has  been  given.  We  trust,  also, 
that  others  will  find  this  explanation  satisfactory  if,  without 
undue  prepossession,  they  will  pursue  that  method  of  patient 
analytic  thinking  without  which  progress  in  philosophy  is 
not  to  be  hoped  for. 

..  8.  A  careful  consideration  of  the  ethical  judgments  of  men 
will  be  found  to  support  our  doctrine  in  various  ways.  For 
example,  it  will  become  apparent  on  examination  that  abso- 
luteness of  good  is  the  only  characteristic  which  virtue  has 
in  common  with  other  ends  of  moral  pursuit.  This  is  an 
important  point,  because  all  the  requirements  of  morality 
are  right  and  obligatory,  and  must  agree  in  some  quality  on 


296  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

which  their  lightness  depends  or  in  which  it  consists.  We 
have  seen  that  all  the  duties  of  object-virtue  aim  at  the  preser- 
vation or  advancement  of  absolute  good,  and  are  obligatory 
on  this  account.  Is  not  this  the  case  also  with  the  duty  of 
promoting  virtue?  That  it  should  be  so  is  consistent  with 
the  fact  that  we  labor  for  virtue  as  moral  good  and  with 
little  thought  of  its  absoluteness.  We  seek  good  dutifully  in 
three  ways,  first  as  the  aim  of  moral  goodness  and  moral 
esteem,  then  as  the  aim  of  regulative  righteousness,  and, 
finally,  as  the  aim  of  causative  righteousness:  and  each  of 
these  modes  of  virtue  recognises  absolute  good  as  an  obliga- 
tory end.  But  this  absoluteness,  or  rightness,  though  always 
present,  is  a  prominent  element  of  thought  only  in  regulative 
righteousness.  In  short,  causative  virtue  seeks  moral  good 
as  absolute  just  as  moral  goodness  seeks  the  absolute  of 
natural  good.  But  to  desire  either  moral  or  natural  good 
as  merely  privately  related,  is  not  an  act  of  moral  principle 
but  only  of  prudence  or  of  wisdom. 

Further;  it  seems  true  that  absoluteness  of  good  is  the  only 
quality  in  virtue  with  which  reason  connects  moral  obli- 
gation. If  virtue  were  in  no  way  conducive  to  the  welfare 
and  happiness  of  beings — if  it  were  neither  good  in  itself 
nor  in  any  way  productive  of  good — who  would  feel  bound  to 
labor  for  the  promotion  of  virtue?  Moral  excellence  might 
excite  our  interest  or  admiration,  as  genius  and  beauty  do; 
or  we  might  respect  it  as  we  do  any  influential  agency  in 
human  affairs;  but  we  would  not  feel  under  obligation  to 
serve  it.  Moreover,  as  already  shown,  it  is  not  as  privately 
related  good  that  virtue  appeals  to  duty,  but  as  the  supreme 
absolute  good. 

9.  The  reluctance  of  some  to  accept  any  conception  of 
moral  good  which  correlates  it  as  an  end  with  other  ends  of 
duty,  is  traceable  chiefly  to  three  causes;  all  of  which  are 
explainable  in  accordance  with  the  theory  that  absolute  good 
is  the  universal  aim  of  morality.  In  the  first  place,  virtue, 
as  we  have  seen,  has  an  exceedingly  marked  character  of  its 
own  by  which  it  is  contrasted,  not  only  with  all  other  good, 
but  even  with  all  other  forms  of  absolute  good.  It  is  the 
absolute  good,  not  of  the  outward  actions  or  natural  affec- 
tions, but  of  the  inmost  and  highest  nature  of  rational  beings. 
It  is  an  absolute  good  because  those  who  possess  it  habitually 
do  every  right  action,  whether  practical  or  affectional,  and 
because  their  course  of  life  leads  towards  an  eternal  and  holy 


CHAP.  XXV.]      VIRTUE  THE  "  SUMMUM  BONUM."  297 

blessedness  in  which  they  and  all  the  virtuous  shall  par- 
ticipate. Considering  the  nature  and  developments  of  this 
good,  we  ascribe  to  it  a  comprehensiveness,  a  greatness  and  a 
spirituality,  which  elevate  it  above  all  other  good.  Hence 
it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  excellent  men,  desiring  to 
maintain  for  themselves  and  others  an  exalted  appreciation 
of  virtue  as  an  end,  sometimes  seem  to  deny  that  virtue  is  a 
good  at  all.  At  least  their  language  suggests  that,  in  think- 
ing of  virtue  as  an  end,  they  think — or  suppose  they  think — 
of  it,  not  as  a  good  but  as  an  end  higher — more  morally 
attractive  and  obligatory — than  any  good  or  than  all  good. 
For  our  part  we  think  it  sufficient  to  say  that  virtue  is  a 
far  higher  end  than  any  other  good;  that  it  is  the  highest 
conceivable  form  of  absolute  good  which  can  be  developed 
from  the  nature  of  rational  beings ;  nor  can  we  find  any  rea- 
son to  believe  that  good  men  dutifully  labor  for  virtue  except 
under  this  notion  of  it. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  virtue  is  abso- 
lutely good  in  various  modes  and  directions  and  that  it  is 
a  right  and  obligatory  end  in  each  and  in  all  of  these  modes 
and  directions.  This  fact  makes  it  possible  to  form  a  partial 
and  incomplete  explanation  of  moral  good  as  an  end  of  duty. 
Virtue  is  a  right  end  as  seeking,  maintaining  and  accomplish- 
ing all  things  absolutely  good — as  fostering  all  absolutely 
good  affections — as  being  morally  lovely — as  conforming  ra- 
tional beings  to  the  conditions  of  prosperous  existence — as 
giving  a  satisfaction  sui  generis  to  all  holy  beings.  In  all 
these  ways  virtue  is  permanently  and  by  reason  of  its  very 
nature  absolutely  good.  It  is  not  merely  a  benefit  to  its  pos- 
sessor, but  it  is  generally  diffusive  of  good.  Evidently  our 
conception  of  this  end  is  exceedingly  comprehensive,  and  may 
be  regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  generalizations  of  reason. 

Hence  fault  might  justly  be  found  should  we  teach  that  our 
conception  of  virtue  as  a  right  end  includes  only  one  or  two 
modes  of  good,  or  that  it  sets  forth  good  as  only  privately 
related.  On  the  one  hand,  for  example,  it  would  not  be 
enough  to  say  that  virtue  is  a  dutiful  end  because  it  is  the 
bond  of  the  harmonious  fellowship  of  rational  beings,  though 
this  is  true ;  nor  yet  that  virtue  should  be  cultivated  because 
it  is  a  general  source  of  blessedness  to  rational  beings,  though 
that  is  true.  These  statements  would  not  give  the  whole  truth 
of  which  the  practical  reaon  is  conscious;  and  they  might 
properly  be  objected  to  by  persons  who  could  not  make  any 


298  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

more  satisfactory  statement.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would 
be  insufficient  to  say  that  we  are  bound  to  seek  the  moral 
good  of  an  individual,  or  of  some  set  of  individuals,  because 
it  is  his  or  their  moral  good.  This  would  be  true  because 
in  this  case  the  private  good,  being  moral,  would  also  be 
absolute.  That  is,  it  would  be  a  part  of  the  absolute  total, 
and  would  really  be  considered  as  such.  But  the  assertion 
might  be  taken  to  mean  that  the  ground  of  duty  is  simply  the 
welfare  of  the  person  or  persons  morally  improved,  others 
being  disregarded;  which  would  not  be  true. 

An  illustration  of  these  remarks  may  be  found  in  the 
duty  of  promoting  piety,  or  that  form  of  virtuous  life  which 
proceeds  from  dutiful  regard  for  God  as  the  wisest  and  best 
of  persons.  It  would  be  weak  and  inadequate  to  say  that 
we  should  labor  for  piety  because  of  the  right  and  good  things 
which  it  strives  for  among  men,  and  equally  so  to  say  that 
piety  is  a  moral  end  because  of  the  good  and  blessedness  which 
it  brings  to  its  possessor  and  to  the  society  of  the  godly. 
These  things  are  absolutely  good,  and  therefore  also  are  aims 
of  virtue.  Nevertheless  in  promoting  piety  we  should  be 
yet  more  influenced  by  moral  esteem  for  the  divine  being  and 
by  the  desire  for  his  satisfaction.  For  the  good  Lord  takes 
pleasure  in  the  right  conduct  of  his  servants — in  their  deeds 
of  beneficence  and  in  their  lives  of  love;  the  holy  Ruler  of 
all  is  gratified  by  the  virtue  and  righteousness  of  his 
creatures;  our  Heavenly  Father  delights  in  the  unfeigned 
affection  of  his  children;  and  the  God  of  love  rejoices  in  the 
prosperity  and  blessedness  of  those  that  fear  his  name.  In 
short,  we  should  labor  for  piety  as  the  highest  development 
of  good,  and  the  chief  good  in  every  way  in  the  eyes  of  both 
God  and  man. 

Finally,  we  should  notice  that  virtue  has  various  character- 
istics in  addition  to  those  which  constitute  it  an  absolute 
good,  and  that  one  may  be  sentimentally  impressed  by  these 
characteristics  of  virtue  at  the  same  time  that  he  is  dutifully 
affected  only  by  its  absolute  excellence.  Hence  a  good  man 
might  find  it  difficult  to  seize  and  to  present  exactly  those 
aspects  of  virtue  in  which  he  regarded  it  as  a  right  end,  these 
being  necessarily  involved  with  others.  Moral  disposition 
and  conduct  may  be  considered  as  conducive  to  or  destructive 
of  the  good  of  some  individual  or  community,  that  good 
being  thought  of  only  as  privately  related;  in  such  a  case 
virtue  is  regarded  not  as  a  right  thing  but  as  a  good  thing. 


CHAP.  XXV.]     VIRTUE  THE  "  8UMMUM  BONUM."  299 

Or  virtue  and  vice  may  be  conceived  of  simply  as  dispositions 
with  which  we  may  or  may  not  sympathize.  Or  virtue  may 
be  looked  upon  as  something  amiable,  and  vice  as  something 
hateful.  Or  we  may  view  moral  conduct  as  giving  satisfac- 
tion or  the  reverse  to  the  agent  or  to  others — as  being 
solemnly  enforced  by  authority  and  legal  sanctions — or  as 
about  to  bring  the  moral  agent  rewards  and  punishments. 
These  and  other  particulars  excite  within  us  various  senti- 
ments and  a  general  complex  sentiment;  yet,  except  so  far 
as  they  indirectly  commend  virtue  as  absolutely  good,  they 
do  not  affect  our  sense  of  duty.  They  should  be  distin- 
guished from  those  aspects  of  virtue  on  account  of  which  it 
is  a  right  and  obligatory  end. 

10.  In  discovering  a  generic  agreement  between  absolute 
natural  good  and  moral  good  as  absolute,  we  have  found  that 
unity  in  the  matter  of  the  moral  law  which  is  demanded  both 
by  philosophy  and  by  the  ordinary  reason  of  mankind.  At 
the  same  time,  by  insisting  on  the  marked  specific  character 
of  moral  good  and  on  that  excellence,  spirituality  and  great- 
ness which  distinguished  it  from  all  other  good — even  from 
such  other  good  as  it  is  obligatory  on  us  to  seek — we  have 
endeavored,  while  explaining,  not  to  weaken  our  conception 
of  virtue  as  the  superlative  end  of  duty. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

PUNITIVE  JUSTICE. 

1.  That  Rectoral  Righteousness  aims  fundamentally  at  the  promo- 
tion of  absolute  good,  is  disputed  only  as  relates  to  Punitive  Jus- 
tice. The  views  of  Dr.  A.  A.  Hodge. — 2.  The  ill-desert  (or  guilt) 
of  persons  and  the  ill-desert  of  sin,  defined  and  explained. — 3. 
The  infliction  of  penalty,  though  ultimate  as  an  end  to  the  prac- 
tical reason,  can  be  analyzed  and  accounted  for  by  the  specula- 
tive reason.  Its  aim  is  the  maintenance  of  virtue  as  an  absolute 
good  and  the  suppression  of  vice  as  an  absolute  evil. — 4.  This  is 
the  only  ground  on  which  we  deliberately  justify  punishment. 
The  animus  of  punitive  justice  is  to  be  distinguished  from  anger, 
or  resentment,  and  even  from  righteous  indignation.  Spite  and 
malice  are  irrational  perversions  of  resentment. — 5.  The  Chris- 
tian doctrine  of  the  Atonement  as  related  to  Punitive  Justice. 
Inexplicable  on  the  supposition  that  the  end  of  punishment  is 
simply  the  infliction  of  evil  on  the  transgressor.  Intelligible  on 
the  theory  that  punishment  is  designed  to  uphold  the  cause  of 
righteousness. — 6.  The  just  subjection  of  the  human  race  to  evil 
because  of  the  apostasy  of  their  first  parent  was  an  act  of  rectoral 
righteousness  which  cannot  be  literally  identified  with  the 
exercise  of  punitive  justice.  But  the  two  modes  of  righteous- 
ness are  so  analogous  that  the  same  use  of  language  properly  ex- 
presses both.  They  have  a  generic  community  of  nature. 

1.  THE  essential  or  proper  aim  of  that  mode  of  causative 
righteousness  which  has  been  termed  rectoral  righteousness 
seems  evident.  If  the  animus  of  this  form  of  principle  be 
the  love  of  virtue  and  the  hatred  of  vice,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  it  aims  at  absolute  good,  and  that  of  the  highest  kind. 
No  one  will  object  to  this  doctrine  so  far  as  the  duty  of 
bestowing  rewards  is  concerned.  All  will  agree  that,  in 
addition  to  the  law  of  moral  esteem,  which  has  been  explained 
in  preceding  discussions,  the  only  other  law  conferring  special 
favor  on  the  righteous  is  that  of  causative  virtue. 

Some,  however,  teach  that  the  duty  of  inflicting  punish- 
ment on  the  wicked  is  founded  on  a  principle  different 
from,  and  additional  to,  that  of  causative  righteousness. 
300 


CHAP.  XXVI.]  PUNITIVE  JUSTICE.  301 

They  say  that  punitive  justice  looks  on  the  inherent  ill- 
desert  of  sin,  and  claim  that  this  ground  of  punishment  is  an 
ultimate  and  irresolvable  intuition.  They  allow  that  sin 
should  be  punished  in  order  to  maintain  the  law  and  thereby  to 
suppress  vice  and  promote  virtue;  but  they  assert  that  the 
essence  of  punitive  justice  is  to  punish  sin  just  because  it 
ought  to  be  punished ;  and  that  this  is  a  simple  and  ultimate 
principle.  Dr.  Archibald  Alexander  Hodge,  the  distin- 
guished son  of  a  yet  more  distinguished  father,  in  his  book 
on  "The  Atonement'1  (page  55),  says,  "  As  the  essential  and 
irresolvable  characteristic  of  virtue  is  oughtness  and  of  sin 
its  opposite  oughtnotness,  so  it  is  an  intrinsic  and  immutable 
attribute  of  sin  that  it  ought  to  be  punished.  This  obliga- 
tion to  punishment  is  an  ultimate  fact  of  moral  consciousness ; 
it  cannot  be  resolved  into  any  other  principle  whatever;  it 
is  intrinsic  in  sin  without  reference  to  any  other  principle." 
We  question  whether  Dr.  Hodge  would  have  expressed  him- 
self so  confidently  in  this  passage — 'and  throughout  his  book — 
regarding  the  philosophy  of  right  and  wrong,  if  he  had 
realized  the  need  of  an  analytical  study  of  ethics.  He  would 
have  seen  that  the  essential  characteristic  of  that  dutiful  con- 
duct which  he  calls  "virtue/1  is  not  oughtness  (or  obligatori- 
ness)  but  Tightness;  and  that  the  former  of  these  character- 
istics is  consequent  upon  the  latter.  In  every  case  of  duty  a 
thing  ought  to  be  done  because  it  is  right;  and  this  Tightness 
can  be  distinguished  from  its  necessary  concomitant.  He 
would  have  seen,  also,  that  an  end,  or  an  object  of  thought, 
which  is  ultimate  to  the  "  moral  consciousness  " — that  is,  to 
the  practical  moral  reason — may  not  be  ultimate  to  the  specu- 
lative intellect.  He  might,  indeed,  find  moral  obligation  to 
be  a  simple  peculiar  relation  between  a  rational  agent  and  the 
right,  but  he  would  scarcely  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  no  reason 
or  explanation  can  be  given  for  the  existence  of  this  relation 
in  particular  cases  of  duty.  Accepting  "  oughtness  "  as  abso- 
lutely ultimate  and  elemental,  may  we  not  still  inquire,  Why 
ought  we  to  punish  the  trangressor?  Dr.  Hodge  thinks  that 
philosophical  investigation  is  not  needed  on  such  points.  He 
says,  "  Nothing  can  be  gained  here  by  refinements  of  the 
speculative  intellect.  The  Scriptures,  the  moral  sense,  and 
the  common  judgments  of  mankind,  are  our  only  courts  of 
appeal."  According  to  our  view  the  sacred  Scriptures  and 
the  daily  judgments  of  men  yield  the  most  important  concrete 
presentations  of  moral  truth  which  can  be  found.  All  ex- 


302  Tfl-E  MOKAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVI. 

planations  of  philosophy  should  be  subordinated  to  these; 
as  theory  must  ever  be  subordinate  to  fact.  But  it  does 
not  appear  wise  to  dissuade  reason  from  examining  the  con- 
ceptions of  Scripture  and  of  conscience,  and  from  seeking 
an  understanding  of  them  free  from  confusion  and  inconsist- 
ency, and  satisfying  to  honest  inquiry.  This  investigation 
will  be  made  in  spite  of  any  one's  objections;  and  is  it  not 
better  that  it  should  be  made  by  those  who  accept  the  state- 
ments of  Scripture  and  of  common  sense;  and  that  it  should 
not  be  left  to  those  for  whom  no  philosophy  is  sufficiently 
profound  which  is  not  opposed  both  to  the  teachings  of  the 
Bible  and  to  the  ordinary  convictions  of  mankind  ? 

2.  The  expression  "ill-desert,"  in  morals,  has  a  two-fold 
application.  First,  it  is  applied  to  persons  considered  as 
evil-doers  and  as  related  to  punitive  law.  It  then  signifies 
the  obligation  (or  obligatedness)  of  a  person  to  punishment 
by  reason  of  his  sin  or  ill-service;  for  in  morals,  we  are  the 
servants,  or  subjects,  of  the  law  of  right.  When  we  say  that 
a  person  deserves  ill,  we  mean  that  he  has  transgressed  or  dis- 
obeyed the  law,  and  is  therefore  affected  by  the  claims  of 
punitive  justice.  Ill-desert  has  precisely  the  same  meaning 
as  demerit.  It  is  the  peculiar  relation  in  which  the  sinner 
stands  to  punishment  as  something  right  and  obligatory. 
It  is  just  obligation  to  penalty  because  of  one's  disregard  of 
the  moral  law.  And  the  evident  reason  of  it  is  that  the  vio- 
lated law  and  the  injured  cause  of  virtue  must  be  vindicated 
and  maintained.  It  does  not  arise  from  any  private  rela- 
tions of  the  guilty  person,  else  it  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  justice,  but  from  his  relations  to  the  moral  law.  Such 
a  desert  is  a  simple  thing,  yet  not  an  absolutely  ultimate 
principle.  It  is  a  development  of  the  duty  of  promoting 
virtue  and  the  right;  in  other  words,  -an  application  of  the 
principle  of  causative  righteousness. 

Secondly,  the  expressions  ill-desert  and  demerit  are  applied, 
not  to  the  transgressor  as  brought  under  penal  condemnation, 
but  to  his  sin  as  productive  of  that  relation.  This  ill-desert 
of  sin  is  that  quality  in  personal  moral  conduct  by  reason  of 
which  this  may  become  the  just  ground  of  the  ill-desert  of 
the  evil-doer.  It  is  the  heinousness  of  sin.  It  is  the  char- 
acter of  sin  as  being  absolutely  and  extremely  evil,  in  that  it 
is  opposed  to  right  doing  and  to  moral  good;  and  as  thus 
necessitating  the  duty  of  punishment.  For  justice  ever  labors 
to  suppress  and  prevent,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  to  destroy  sin, 


CHAP.  XXVI.]  PUNITIVE  JUSTICE.  303 

by  mean  of  threatenings  and  punishments,  simply  because  it 
is  sin,  and,  as  such,  absolutely  evil  and  hateful.  But  clearly, 
in  connection  with  this  ill-desert  of  sin,  penalty  or  punish- 
ment is  not  a  thing  right  and  obligatory  simply  as  suffering 
inflicted  on  the  sinner  and  without  reference  to  its  operation 
in  support  of  right  and  virtue.  On  the  contrary,  penalty  as 
related  to  sin,  no  less  than  penalty  as  related  to  the  sinner, 
is  simply  a  suitable  and  necessary  means  of  suppressing 
wickedness  and  of  maintaining  righteousness — that  is,  of  pro- 
moting the  indispensable  agency  and  the  highest  form  of 
absolute  good.  The  teaching,  therefore,  that  all  duty  aims 
at  absolute  good  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  the  in- 
herent ill-desert  of  sin.  Indeed  it  enables  us  better  to  under- 
stand that  idea.  It  explains  ill-desert  as  arising  from  the 
fact  that  sin  is  wholly  and  intensely  evil,  and  that  this  evil, 
as  the  opposite  of  moral  good,  should  be  suppressed  and 
destroyed. 

The  idea  of  punitive  justice  thus  given  is  intermediate 
between  that  of  Dr.  Hodge,  which  has  been  already  stated, 
and  that  of  President  Porter,  who  conceives  of  it  as  "  a  form 
or  manifestation  of  moral  benevolence,  which  is  called  justice 
because  impersonal  equity  is  one  of  its  chief  characteristics," 
etc.  (EL.  MOR.  SCIENCE,  section  289.)  Each  of  these  doc- 
tors seems  to  apprehend  one  side  of  the  truth  too  strongly. 

3.  The  doctrine  that  punitive  justice  is  essentially  a  mode 
of  causative  righteousness  cannot  be  set  aside  by  analytical 
argument.  Nevertheless  difficulty  may  be  found  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  all  our  experience  in  accordance  with  it.  In  the 
more  rapid  and  impulsive  discharge  of  punitive  duty  we  some- 
times appear  to  aim  simply  at  the  suffering  of  the  sinner, 
without  thinking  of  any  end  beyond  that.  There  is  a  sense 
too,  in  which  not  merely  indignation,  or  righteous  anger, 
but  also  the  calm  and  deliberate  exercise  of  the  punitive  dis- 
position, may  be  said  to  aim  at  the  infliction  of  penalty  with- 
out regard  to  any  end  beyond  this  infliction.  The  following 
considerations  may  relieve  the  subject  of  obscurity.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  evident  that,  while  punitive  justice  seeks  only 
the  maintenance  of  the  cause  of  right  and  virtue,  other  duti- 
ful ends  may  be  pursued  in  connection  with  this.  Such,  for 
example,  are  the  reformation  of  the  offender,  when  this  is 
possible;  the  peace  of  the  community;  the  protection  of  the 
innocent;  and  the  preservation  of  civil  order.  These  are 
right  and  obligatory  ends;  and  each  of  them  is  frequently 


304  THB  MO&AL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVI. 

promoted  by  punitive  action?.  But  these  ends  may  be  sought 
by  means  which  are  not  penal;  and  they  are  not  the  objects 
of  the  punitive  disposition.  The  essential  aim  of  penal 
infliction  is  to  enforce  respect  for  law  through  the  punishment 
of  the  disobedient,  and  so  to  promote  righteousness  as  the 
supreme  good  and  to  suppress  vice  as  an  absolute  and  ex- 
treme evil. 

In  the  next  place,  let  it  be  noted  that  our  minds  do  not 
commonly,  in  their  practical  workings,  regard  the  punish- 
ment of  the  sinner  and  the  maintenance  of  righteousness  as 
two  distinct  things.  They  rather  regard  punishment  as  being 
one  thing,  namely,  the  infliction  of  suffering  or  loss  on  the 
evil-doer,  so  as  to  maintain  virtue  and  the  moral  law.  This 
is  a  case  in  which  two  notions  are  combined  so  as  to  form 
one  notion.  There  is  first  the  idea  of  the  infliction  of  suffer- 
ing on  the  sinner,  and  secondly,  the  idea  of  the  maintenance 
of  virtue  and  right.  The  mind  can  distinctly  conceive  of 
each  of  these  things,  and  can  also  think  distinctly  of  their 
connecting  relation.  But,  in  the  common  notion  of  punish- 
ment, both  of  these  ideas,  together  with  that  of  their  related- 
ness,  are  contracted  together  and  form  but  one  idea.  Pun- 
ishment, therefore,  though  properly  analyzed  and  defined  by 
the  speculative  reason  as  "  suffering  inflicted  on  the  evil- 
doer, so  as  to  maintain  virtue  and  the  right,"  constitutes  but 
one  object  of  thought  to  the  practical  reason,  and  is  inflicted 
as  containing  its  own  end,  and  not  for  any  end  beyond  itself. 
(Chap.  V.) 

Moreover,  in  compounded  motive  notions  of  this  kind,  one 
element  is  frequently  more  sensibly  apprehended  than  others; 
because  various  causes  lead  the  mind  to  put  the  stress  of  its 
attention  more  on  one  element  than  on  others.  In  such  a 
case  we  might  say  that  the  one  element  is  thought  of  and  the 
others  only  referred  to;  meaning  by  this  last  an  indefinite 
kind  of  thought.  In  the  present  instance  the  idea  of  suffer- 
ing inflicted  on  the  evil-doer  is  often  more  prominent  than 
the  idea  of  the  maintenance  of  virtue  and  the  suppression  of 
vice;  this  is  especially  the  case  in  the  more  rapid  and  im- 
pulsive exercises  of  the  punitive  disposition.  Hence,  in  an 
attempted  analysis,  the  infliction  of  suffering  on  the  trans- 
gressor may  be  taken  to  be  the  only  element.  But  both  ideas 
are  always  present;  both  are  essential  parts  of  the  notion 
of  punishment  when  this  is  conceived  of  as  an  ultimate 
moral  end. 


CHAP.  XXVI.]  PUNITIVE  JUSTICE.  305 

An  illustration  of  the  mode  of  thought  referred  to  above 
may  be  drawn  from  the  ordinary  conception  of  good;  for 
this,  like  the  notion  of  punishment,  is  not  absolutely  simple 
and  irresolvable.  As  already  taught  (Chap.  II.),  a  good  is 
an  object  which,  either  immediately  or  mediately,  is  a  cause 
or  effective  condition  of  some  form  of  relief,  peace,  comfort, 
satisfaction  or  blessedness.  Therefore  the  conception  of  any- 
thing as  a  good  involves  three  ideas;  first,  that  of  an  object 
viewed  by  itself  or  as  to  its  natural  essence;  secondly,  that 
of  satisfaction  in  some  of  its  forms,  whether  general  or  par- 
ticular, moral  or  natural;  and  thirdly,  that  of  the  relation 
of  the  object  to  the  satisfaction,  whether  as  a  mediate  or  an 
immediate,  an  active  or  a  passive,  cause  of  the  satisfaction. 
Of  these  three  ideas  the  notion  of  satisfaction,  or  gratifica- 
tion (including  relief  from  any  distress),  is  the  most  impor- 
tant ;  yet  it  is  commonly  less  definitely  apprehended  than  that 
of  the  conditioning  object.  In  most  kinds  of  good — property, 
for  example — the  included  satisfactions  are  so  various  that 
they  can  be  conceived  of  only  in  the  general.  Hence,  and 
because  of  the  immediate  presence  of  the  object,  the  notion 
of  satisfaction  seems  to  hide  itself  within  that  of  the  object. 
Yet  it  is  always  there,  and,  like  the  flavoring  ingredient  which 
constitutes  the  pleasing  quality  of  a  fruit,  gives  to  the  object 
its  importance  and  attractiveness.  Such  is  the  common  no- 
tion of  a  good,  when  men  think  and  speak  of  it  as  an  end. 
A  similar  account  might  be  given  of  the  conception  of  evil 
as  the  opposite  of  good. 

4.  That  we  have  correctly  analyzed  the  idea  of  punish- 
ment as  a  moral  end  will  become  increasingly  evident  on  re- 
flection. For  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  punishment  as  a 
duty  is  a  part  of  what  is  right  and  not  of  what  is  wrong,  and 
that  we  are  at  present  directly  concerned  only  with  the  aims 
of  virtuous  indignation  and  of  justice,  not  with  those  either 
of  purely  natural  anger,  or  of  wicked  anger  and  hatred. 
Now,  though  even  the  moral  faculty  sometimes  acts  rapidly 
and  impulsively,  in  righteous  indignation,  it  is  clear  that 
we  never  act  virtuously  without  some  moral  thought.  Such 
cases  must  be  accounted  for  by  saying  that  the  practical  rea- 
son, having  formed  for  herself  such  a  notion  as  punishment 
— or  as  good — follows  it  by  a  sort  of  habit  and  often  applies 
it  instantly,  recognizing  its  intrinsic  value  and  obligatory 
character,  yet  not  analyzing  it  so  as  to  note  distinctly  those 
elements  of  it  which  give  it  value  and  authority  as  a  rule. 
20 


306  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVI. 

But  when  we  act  slowly  and  when  we  deliberately  reflect  upon 
our  conduct,  then  the  essential  reason  of  the  rule  appears; 
and  by  this  only  we  justify  the  rule.  This  is  a  principle 
of  general  application  in  morals.  As  to  the  present  case, 
what  good  man  would  consider  himself  justified  in  inflicting 
punishment  on  his  children  or  on  other  persons  subject  to  his 
authority,  if  he  could  not  on  deliberation  conclude  that  he 
thereby  was  honoring  and  maintaining  the  moral  law  and 
serving  the  cause  of  virtue? 

It  is  important  that  we  should  distinguish  anger,  includ- 
ing therein  even  righteous  indignation,  from  the  proper  and 
essential  animus,  or  motive  disposition,  of  punitive  justice. 
Anger,  like  benevolence,  is,  in  itself,  merely  a  natural  exercise 
of  motivity.  It  becomes  moral  only  as  consentaneous  with 
justice.  Like  benevolence  too,  it  may  be  divided  into  the 
purely  natural  or  instinctive,  the  rationalized,  and  the  moral. 
Every  form  of  it,  however,  is  conditioned  on  a  nearer,  fuller 
and  more  vivid  view  of  its  object  than  is  possible,  for  such 
beings  as  we  are,  in  the  use  of  our  moral  faculty.  Instinctive 
anger,  by  which  we  mean  that  resentment  which  does  not 
involve  any  exercise  of  the  rational  faculty  and  which  even 
brutes  exhibit,  is  the  simplest  form  of  anger.  It  is  not  re- 
lated to  evil  as  viewed  absolutely,  nor  to  any  general  evil,  nor 
to  any  instance  of  evil  which  can  be  apprehended  only  through 
the  processes  of  the  reason.  It  arises  in  view  of  some  par- 
ticular injury  as  immediately  perceived.  And,  indeed,  anger, 
even  after  it  is  more  or  less  rationalized,  is  still  conditioned 
on  a  full  and  vivid  cognition  of  its  object,  that  is,  of  a 
person  as  -doing  harm.  When,  in  some  particular  case,  a 
person  is  suddenly  perceived  to  be  causing  harm,  then  we  are 
perturbed  and  impulsively  desire  to  repel  and  subdue  that 
person  as  harmful.  For  instance,  a  man  may  become  angry 
on  perceiving  that  he  has  lost  money  through  the  incompe- 
tence of  another  or  that  he  has  failed  of  a  bargain  because  an- 
other has  stepped  in  before  him.  Such  anger  is  nothing  more 
than  instinctive  resentment  acting  with  some  admixture  of 
rational  thought. 

A  higher  sort  of  anger  arises  when  we  see  some  particular 
person  doing  some  specific  evil  which  we  know  that  he  should 
avoid  as  absolute  and  wrong;  and  so  also  committing  sin, 
which  is  moral  evil  within  himself.  The  anger  thus  excited 
naturally  allies  itself  with  the  animus  of  punitive  justice. 
The  two  for  the  time  may  coalesce  while  we  impulsively 


CHAP.  XXVI.]  PUNITIVE  JUSTICE.  307 

attack  the  evil-doer  and  strive  to  inflict  on  him  an  adequate 
penalty.  This  kind  of  resentment,  which  becomes  moral 
when  it  co-operates  with  justice,  is  called  indignation.  It  is 
distinguishable  from  the  animus  of  justice  because  it  is  more 
impulsive  than  the  latter,  and  because  it  regards  sin  rather 
as  a  doing  of  evil  than  as  being  also  itself  moral  evil.  Its 
view  is  not  so  wide  and  far-reaching  as  that  of  justice;  for 
the  aims  of  the  latter  are  more  comprehensive  than  those  of 
any  sudden  impulsion  or  passion. 

Anger,  so  far  as  consentaneous  with  the  true,  animus  of 
punitive  justice — which  animus  is  hatred  for  sin  as  evil — 
is  not  wrong  but  right.  Eighteous  indignation  is  an  assist- 
ance given  by  our  natural  constitution  to  our  moral  faculty, 
so  as  to  intensify  our  attention  and  our  feelings  and  to  stir 
up  our  activity.  Nevertheless  anger  of  any  kind  is  not  con- 
sentaneous, nor  even  consistent,  with  duty,  if  it  be  indulged 
to  excess  and  become  a  wild  passion,  or  if  it  be  cherished  after 
the  provocation  for  it  has  grown  old  or  has  passed  away.  It 
then  becomes  a  disturbing  element  in  moral  life.  As  a  rule, 
we  should  not  allow  the  sun  to  go  down  upon  our  wrath. 
With  respect  to  its  lawful  duration  resentment  is  strikingly 
contrasted  with  benevolence — a  fact  significant  of  the  truth 
that  good  is  ever  the  main  and  essential  aim  of  duty,  while 
evil,  whether  punitive  or  remedial,  is  inflicted  only  as  sub- 
sidiary to  good.  The  animus  of  justice,  however,  remains 
after  the  subsidence  of  righteous  indignation;  and  it  gives 
life,  endurance  and  power  to  one's  determination  to  punish 
the  guilty. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  study  particularly  that  perturba- 
tion and  impulsiveness  which  characterize  both  natural  and 
moral  anger;  and  also  to  discuss  that  wicked  hatred  of  per- 
sons, commonly  called  malice,  which  exhibits  a  chronic  de- 
generation of  the  animus  of  anger  after  its  perturbation  and 
impulsiveness  have  disappeared.  But  the  former  of.  these 
topics  belongs  rather  to  psychology  than  to  ethics,  and  the 
latter  to  an  analysis  of  sin  rather  than  to  the  theory  of  duty. 
At  present  we  aim  at  this  last  only.  We  think  that  it  has 
been  sufficiently  shown  that  punitive  justice  inflicts  penalty 
on  the  evil-doer,  because  penalty  is  right  and  obligatory  as 
repressive  of  moral  evil  and  as  promotive  of  moral  good. 


5,  The  doctrine  thus  stated  has  some  bearings  on  two  im- 


308  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVI. 

portant  teachings  of  the  sacred  Scripturea,  namely,  that  all 
mankind  are  in  a  state  of  condemnation  by  reason  of  the  sin 
of  their  first  parent  and  that  the  death  of  Christ  was  an 
expiatory  sacrifice  for  the  sins  of  his  people.  These  teach- 
ings are  commonly  known  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Fall  and  the 
doctrine  of  the  Atonement.  According  to  the  first  of  them 
the  ruin  of  the  descendants  of  Adam  was  decided  upon  before 
any  of  them  had  come  into  existence  and  was  the  just  penalty 
of  Adam's  sin,  the  eating  of  that  forbidden  fruit — 

"  Whose  mortal  taste 
Brought  death  into  the  world  and  all  our  woe." 

Because  of  this  transgression  no  human  being  since  the 
first  man  and  the  first  woman,  has  been  created  in  maturity 
and  perfection  and  surrounded  with  the  conditions  of  an  un- 
broken happiness.  All  men  have  been  born  in  weakness  and 
immaturity,  sinful  and  suffering  creatures,  and  must  pass 
their  lives  in  a  world  of  sin  and  sorrow  and  of  exposure  to 
endless  evil.  According  to  the  second  doctrine  the  sufferings 
of  Christ — especially  his  voluntary  death  on  the  cross — are 
a  full  satisfaction  to  justice  for  the  transgressions  of  those 
who  truly  repent,  and  forsake  their  sin  for  the  service  of  God. 
Therefore  believers  are  treated  by  the  divine  government  as 
though  they  had  never  incurred  ill-desert. 

It  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  our  discussions  to  show 
that  the  foregoing  doctrines  are  taught  in  the  sacred  writings. 
We  find  them  there;  and  we  would  consider  them  in  connec- 
tion with  the  philosophy  of  punitive  justice.  Taking  the 
more  important  doctrine  first,  it  is  evident  that,  if  the  suffer- 
ings of  a  Redeemer  are  a  satisfaction  for  the  sins  of  penitent 
and  converted  souls,  they  can  be  so  only  through  an  exception 
to  the  ordinary  rule  of  justice.  On  any  theory  the  primary 
design  of  punishment  must  include  the  suffering  of  the  guilty, 
not  that  of  the  innocent.  If  penal  suffering  is  ever  to  be 
assigned  to  the  innocent,  this  can  only  be  when  the  suffering 
of  the  innocent  may  serve  as  a  substitute  for  the  suffering  of 
the  guilty.  It  is  impossible  to  see  how  any  arbitrary  inflic- 
tion of  pain  on  the  innocent  could  properly  be  used  aa  an 
expression  of  hatred  for  sin  and  in  maintenance  of  the  cause 
of  virtue  and  duty.  Arbitrarily  directed  suffering  would 
be  itself  wrong,  and  a  discouragement  to  virtue.  The  first 
law  of  punitive  justice  must  be,  "  The  soul  that  sinneth,  it 
shall  die."  If  there  be  any  atonement  or  expiation  through 


CHAP.  XXVI.J  PUNITIVE  JUSTICE.  399 

the  sufferings  of  an  innocent  victim,,  it  must  be  an  excep- 
tion to  this  rule  and  a  substitute  for  it. 

In  the  next  place,  if  the  infliction  of  penalty  because  of 
transgression  be  founded  on  a  simple  and  absolute  intuition, 
then  there  is  no  possibility  that  the  ends  of  justice  can  be 
satisfied  in  any  other  way  than  that.  An  ultimate  prin- 
ciple does  not  admit  of  exceptions;  it  has  the  nature 
of  a  mathematical  action.  Moreover,  the  law  that  the 
sinner  himself  must  suffer,  though  not  absolutely  ulti- 
mate, has  more  right  to  claim  that  character  than  any 
other  rule  of  punitive  justice  which  can  be  stated.  The  doc- 
trine that  sin  has  demerit  and  should  be  punished  is  little 
more  than  a  secondary  way  of  saying  that  the  sinner  has 
demerit  and  should  be  punished.  Taken  otherwise,  and  as 
a  separate  statement  asserting  the  ill-desert  of  siu  without 
personally  locating  the  liability  to  punishment,  it  is  not  so 
evident  to  reason  as  the  common  dogma;  and  is  certainly 
no  more  ultimate.  In  fact  neither  of  these  statements  is  a 
simple  intuition. 

Finally,  if  the  aim  of  punitive  justice  be  the  vindication 
of  the  broken  law  and  the  maintenance  of  the  cause  of 
righteousness  through  penalty  exacted  from  the  transgressor, 
it  may  be  that,  under  exceptional  circumstances,  this  same 
end  can  be  obtained  through  the  intercession  and  suffering 
of  anoth&r  than  the  transgressor.  An  attribute  of  mercy 
affects  human  government  whereby  sometimes  pardon  is 
granted  an  offender,  or  the  sentence  against  him  is  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  remitted.  This  happens  when  the 
culprit  is  a  person  of  good  character  and  has  been  misled 
by  sudden  strong  temptation;  when  he  is  heartily  penitent; 
when  his  punishment  would  work  extreme  hardship  for  the 
innocent;  when  intercession  is  made  for  him  by  those  who 
have  rightful  claims  to  consideration;  and  when  it  is  clear 
that  lenient  measures  will  not  weaken  but  strengthen  the 
cause  of  virtue  and  morality.  The  punishment  even  of  the 
guilty  does  not  seem  to  be  obligatory  when  it  is  no  longer 
needed  for  the  vindication  of  the  law;  and  so  would  be  a 
gratuitous  infliction  of  evil.  Under  such  circumstances  con- 
scientious parents  do  not  exercise  their  right  to  chastise  their 
children ;  and  for  sufficient  reasons  civil  rulers  grant  amnesty 
or  pardon  to  those  who  have  transgressed  the  laws. 

According  to  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  however, 
though  some  of  the  foregoing  considerations  apply,  the  for- 


310  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVI. 

giveness  of  sin  against  God  cannot  rightly  take  place  without 
a  satisfaction  of  punitive  law  through  the  sufferings  either  of 
the  sinner  or  of  a  redeemer.  From  the  earliest  times  the  in- 
stitution of  expiatory  burnt  offerings  taught  men  that  "  with- 
out shedding  of  blood  there  is  no  remission  of  sins,"  and  we 
learn  from  the  New  Testament  that  Christ  "  hath  loved  us 
and  hath  given  himself  for  us,  an  offering  and  a  sacrifice  to 
God,  for  a  sweet-smelling  savor."  The  sufferings  of  our 
Lord  were  an  "  atonement,"  or  "  propitiation  "  *  and  the  ex- 
planation of  this  is  that,  by  means  of  those  sufferings,  the 
law  of  God  and  the  cause  of  righteousness  were  more  glori- 
ously vindicated  and  honored  than  they  could  have  been  by 
the  destruction  of  the  sinners  who  were  saved.  From  the 
nature  of  the  case  the  intercession  of  Christ  could  be 
efficacious  only  for  those  whom  he  properly  represented— 
for  those  who  have  at  least  begun  to  participate  in  his 
life  and  to  exhibit  his  character.  The  divine  favor  cannot 
be  expected  for  impenitent  and  wilful  transgressors.  But 
forgiveness  is  offered  to  all  on  the  condition  of  faith  and  re- 
pentance. This  isubstitutionary  justice  finds  some  analogy 
in  human  proceedings.  Sometimes — not  always — justice  is 
satisfied  if  a  fine,  incurred  by  one  person,  be  paid  by  another. 
Occasionally  a  substitute  has  been  accepted  to  bear  the  whole 
or  part  of  the  penalty,  and  this,  especially,  when  the  interces- 
sory expiation  has  been  rendered  by  him  whose  duty  it  is 
to  enforce  the  law.  In  that  case  the  purpose  of  the  ruler 
or  the  judge  to  maintain  the  cause  of  righteousness  cannot 
be  questioned.  The  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  however,  re- 
ceives stronger  support  from  its  own  inherent  reasonableness 
than  from  any  human  analogies. 

The  question  whether  the  death  of  Christ  was  the  payment 
of  a  penalty  or  only  of  a  substitute  for  a  penalty,  is  mainly 
one  of  words.  If  penalty  signify,  as  it  commonly  doea,  the 
suffering  to  which  the  guilty  have  become  obligated,  Christ 
did  not  endure  the  penalty  but  only  a  substitute  for  it.  But 
if,  as  Professor  Foster  of  the  Cumberland  Presbyterian 
Church  says,  "  Any  suffering  which  has  the  purpose  and  effect 
of  penalty  is,  to  that  extent  and  for  that  very  reason,  penalty 
itself"  (SYSTEMATIC  THEOL.,  p.  610),  then  we  may  say  that 
Christ  paid  the  penalty  of  our  transgressions. 

6.  The  condemnation  of  the  human  race  because  of  the 
apostasy  of  their  first  parent  seems  less  closely  related  to  the 
principles  of  punitive  justice  than  the  atonement  which 


CHAP.  XXVI.]  PUNITIVE  JUSTICE.  311 

Christ  made  for  believers.  So  far  as  Adam  was  concerned 
personally,  the  effects  of  his  fall  were  truly  punitive.  But 
this  cannot  be  maintained  in  regard  to  his  descendants.  They 
are  born  into  an  estate  of  sin  and  misery  without  any  trans- 
gression of  their  own.  This  may  in  some  manner  be  the 
just  and  legal  consequence  of  Adam's  sin,  but,  if  so,,  it  can- 
not be  on  the  ground  of  punitive  justice.  To  punish,  for  the 
fault  of  their  progenitor,  countless  myriads  who  had  not 
sinned  after  the  similitude  of  his  transgression — who,  indeed, 
had  not  incurred  guilt  of  any  kind — would  have  no  tendency 
to  vindicate  the  broken  law  or  to  uphold  the  cause  of  virtue. 
On  the  contrary  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  the 
innocent.  How,  then,  were  mankind  condemned  for  the  sin 
of  Adam?  Must  it  not  have  been  because,  in  the  first  man, 
human  nature,  created  in  maturity  and  perfection,  had  a 
fair  trial,  perhaps  the  most  favorable  possible,  and  was  found 
wanting?  Adam,  as  the  best  type  of  unf alien  humanity, 
represented  every  man,  and  therefore  all  men.  The  story  of 
the  Fall,  whether  purely  historical  or  not,  seems  to  be  the 
record  of  an  occurrence  which  justified  and  required  a  course 
of  dealing  such  as,  we  may  presume,  had  never  before  been 
followed  with  rational  creatures.  Man,  now  born  a  helpless 
and  dependent  being,  is  trained  from  the  cradle  in  lessons  of 
humility  and  submission,  of  trust  and  hope,  of  temperance 
and  fortitude,  of  industry  and  obedience,  and  is  daily  called 
to  that  life  of  faith  in  God  in  which  alone  his  highest  good  can 
be  realized.  These  facts  suggest  the  legal  ground  of  God's 
severe  dealings  with  the  human  family.  They  are  explain- 
able, not  on  the  principles  of  punitive  justice,  properly  so 
called,  but  on  those  of  a  cognate  rectoral  righteousness  which 
aims,  in  its  own  way,  at  the  suppression  of  moral  evil  and 
the  promotion  of  moral  good.  This  development  of  rectoral 
duty  differs  from  those  of  retributive  justice  in  that  it  re- 
lates not  to  rewards  and  penalties,  but  to  the  wisest  and  best 
disposition  of  man's  earthly  life.  Yet  it  so  resembles  puni- 
tive justice  in  its  methods,  that  the  two  modes  of  righteous- 
ness naturally  go  under  the  same  name  and  call  for  the  use 
of  the  same  terms.  There  is  an  analogy  between  them.  In 
each  there  is  a  trial,  or  probation;  in  each  there  is  sin  or 
transgression ;  in  each  condemnation  or  account  of  the  trans- 
gression; in  each,  a  condition  of  sin  and  misery  resulting 
from  the  condemnation.  That  the  Bible  and  the  creeds  of 
the  church  should  use  the  terms  of  punitive  justice  in  speak- 


312  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVI, 

ing  of  the  fall  of  our  race  is  not  to  be  wondered  at.  Human 
language  has  no  other  terms  so  well  fitted  to  express  the  truth. 
At  the  same  time  reason  has  the  right  to  interpret  this  lan- 
guage according  to  the  nature  of  the  case. 

This  cursory  review  of  two  noted  doctrines  may  seem  out  of 
place  to  some  who  would  exclude  theistic  thought  from  ethics ; 
and  it  may  be  considered  by  others  deficient  and  unsatis- 
factory. It  will,  at  least,  illustrate  the  conviction  that  theo- 
logical doctrine  is  a  proper  subject  of  philosophical  investi- 
gation. We  cannot  conceive  how  satisfying  views  of  truth 
can  be  obtained  in  any  other  way. 


CHAPTEE  XXVII. 

ABSOLUTE   GOOD  AND  THE  TIIGHT. 

1.  The  right  is  absolute  good  considered  as  an  end.  It  might  be 
defined  as  that  which  is  morally  attractive  because  of  its  abso- 
luteness of  good,  but  this  definition  would  not  give  proper  prom- 
inence to  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  right. — 2.  We 
identify  the  right  with  absolute  good  (1)  because  men  take  the 
right  to  be  good  simply  in  being  the  right  ;  (2)  because  no  one 
can  improve  upon  a  right  end,  unless  it  be  by  making  it  more 
perfectly  right  ;  it  is  absolutely  good  ;  and  (3)  because  the 
attractiveness  of  the  right  for  us  as  moral  beings  seems  to  be 
that  of  absolute  good. — 3.  The  relations  of  the  right  are  identical 
with  those  of  absolute  good  as  an  end.  It  is  inherently  superior, 
and  therefore,  also,  preferable  (in  the  absolute  view  of  reason) 
to  any  good  which  can  come  into  competition  with  it. — 4. 
Further,  it  is  regally  supreme  among  the  ends  or  aims  of  life  ; 
and  therefore  also  obligatory  upon  our  personal  choice  and  pur- 
suit. In  short  every  predicate  of  the  right  is  a  predicate  of 
absolute  good.  Moral  obligation  defined. — 5.  The  theory  which 
makes  absolute  good  the  end  of  duty  may  be  named  Totalism. 
Its  leading  conception  is  a  high  generalization.  In  order  to 
grasp  this  idea  the  breadth  of  its  applicability  must  be  kept  in 
mind. — 6.  Utilitarianism  is  the  gospel  of  common  humanity.  It 
advocates  the  welfare  of  mankind.  But  it  neglects  our  inner 
and  higher  nature,  and  subordinates  virtue  to  utility.  Its  affilia- 
tions are  materialistic.  Blackie  quoted. — 7.  Perfectionism  seeks 
spiritual  excellence  and  the  development  of  character  ;  which 
are  dutiful  ends.  But  its  conceptions  are  undefined  and  its  aims 
too  exclusively  subjective.  It  is  allied  to  mysticism  in  philosophy. 
—8.  Motivity  ethics  teaches  the  weakness  of  that  virtue  which 
does  not  incorporate  with  itself  all  the  natural  tendencies  of  the 
soul,  and  which  endeavors  to  act  from  principle  alone.  But  it 
fails  to  see  that  self-regulation  is  a  secondary  mode  of  duty  which 
presupposes  a  primary  and  objective  perception  of  things  obli- 
gatory. Aristotle's  "  medietas  "  explained. — 9.  The  truth  in 
Authority  Ethics  is  that  obedience  to  rightful  rule  is  an  impor- 
tant form  of  duty.  Some  theories  throw  this  into  the  shade. 
But  the  hypothesis  that  authority  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  duty 
is  entirely  untenable. — 10.  Duty  ethics  gives  just  prominence  to 
moral  law  and  moral  obligation.  In  so  doing  it  appeals  to  com- 
mon sense,  and  is  better  than  any  system  which  conflicts  with 
common  sense.  But  it  is  devoid  of  philosophical  analysis,  and 

313 


314  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

gives  no  answer  to  legitimate  inquiry.  Kant  and  A.  A.  Hodge, 
quoted. — 11.  Theoretic  ethics  calls  for  a  comprehensive  mental 
grasp. 

1.  THE  identification  of  absolute  good  as  an  end  with 
the  morally  right  is  the  conclusion  in  which  our  discussions 
culminate.     If  absolute  good  be  the  essential  end  sought  for 
in  every  form  of  moral  goodness,  moral  esteem,  regulative 
righteousness  and  causative  righteousness,  we  seem  compelled 
to  acknowledge  that  the  right  and  absolute  good  as  an  end 
are  one  and  the  same  thing. 

Possibly  one  might  avoid  this  conclusion  by  emphasizing 
the  distinction  between  absoluteness  of  good  and  its  peculiar 
attractiveness,  or  what  we  may  call  its  final-causality.  It 
might  be  said  that  the  Tightness  of  an  end  or  action  ties  in 
this  latter,  and  not  in  that  excellence  from  which  the  attrac- 
tiveness arises.  Then  the  right  would  be  defined  as  the 
morally  attractive,  rather  than  as  absolute  good  considered 
as  having  its  own  peculiar  attractiveness.  We  shall  admit 
for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  right  may  'be  conceived  of 
in  this  way,  and  that  this  conception  may  be  distinguished 
from  that  of  absolute  good  as  an  end.  Indeed  should  one 
define  the  right  as  the  morally  attractive  while  deriving  this 
attractiveness  from  the  fact  that  the  right  is  absolutely  good, 
we  would  say  that  he  had  apprehended  the  truth,  and  that  he 
had  only  failed  to  apprehend  our  ordinary  conception  of  the 
right.  For  men  regard  the  right  as  attractive  by  reason  of 
its  very  nature;  which  cannot  mean  that  it  is  attractive  be- 
cause it  is  attractive,  but  that  it  is  attractive  because  it  is 
absolutely  good.  In  other  words,  men  conceive  of  the  morally 
right  both  as  absolutely  good  and  as  attractive  on  that 
account.  This  is  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  right 
is  absolute  good  as  an  end. 

2.  This  result,  reached  by  a  process  of  comparison,  analysis 
and  generalization,  is  confirmed  'by  a  direct  examination  of 
the  nature  of  moral  Tightness.    For  one  cannot  but  admit  two 
things  to  be  identical  if  the  essential  elements  and  necessary 
predicates  of  the  one  are  also  the  essential  elements  and  nec- 
essary predicates  of  the  other. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  noticeable  that  men  consider  that 
which  is  right  to  be  good  simply  as  being  right.  How  often 
do  they  say  of  some  action  or  end  or  course  of  conduct  that  it 
is  right  and  good,  evidently  deducing  good  from  right  and 
emphasizing  the  right  as  being  a  peculiar  form  of  good ! 


CHAP.  XXVII.]     ABSOLUTE  GOOD  AND  TBE  RIGHT.       315 

In  the  next  place,  it  is  a  natural  dictate  of  the  understand- 
ing that  any  end,  or  designed  result,  which  is  morally  right, 
could  not  be  bettered;  and  that  this  is  a  part  of  its  Tightness. 
A  different  result  might  advance  some  private  or  particular 
interest  more,  yet  on  the  whole,  what  is  morally  right  could 
not  be  bettered — it  is  absolutely  good. 

It  is  also  a  part  of  the  common  idea  of  Tightness,  that  the 
morally  right  appeals  to  the  moral  reason.  What  is  right,  in 
being  right,  recommends  itself  in  a  peculiar  way  to  man,  or 
has  a  peculiar  kind  of  attractiveness  for  man,  as  having  a 
rational  nature.  Hence  their  praises  who  have  identified  the 
right  with  the  good,  the  true,  the  fair  and  the  beautiful. 
Hence,  too,  the  love  of  right  and  the  hatred  of  wrong  in  those 
beings  in  whom  the  moral  reason  has  power.  But  evidently 
this  attractiveness  is  just  that  which  the  absolutely  good  ex- 
ercises upon  reason  as  motive — that  is,  upon  man  as  being 
able  through  reason  to  discern  what  is  absolutely  good,  and 
as  capable  of  being  affected  through  this  perception. 

3.  The  foregoing  are  all  the  elements  absolutely  essential 
to  our  notion  of  moral  Tightness.  We  have  indicated  rather 
than  explained  them  because  they  have  previously  been  dwelt 
upon  at  length.  The  consideration  of  them  identifies  the  ab- 
solutely good  as  an  end  with  the  morally  right.  But  there 
are  several  relations  in  each  of  which  the  right  has  a  certain 
necessary  characteristic — a  certain  property,  as  logicians 
would  say;  and  such  properties  are  so  intimately  united  in 
our  ordinary  thinking  with  the  essence  of  the  right  that  we 
often  enlarge  our  notion  of  the  right  so  as  to  take  in  one  or 
more  of  them.  For  men's  minds  need  not,  and  do  not,  dis- 
tinguish carefully  between  the  essential  and  that  which  is  in- 
evitably connected  with  the  essential.  Let  us  study  these 
necessary  characteristics  in  their  relation  to  our  definition  of 
Tightness.  In  this  way  the  definition  may  be  further  tested. 

First  of  all,  the  practical  reason  recognizes  an  inherent 
superiority  of  the  right  over  any  or  all  good  which  can  in  any 
way  compete  or  conflict  with  it.  It  is  more  valuable  than 
anything  which  can  take  its  place.  Men  feel  that,  on  the 
whole,  nothing  would  be  lost  even  though  many  precious  in- 
terests were  ruined  in  the  maintenance  of  what  is  right. 
Plainly  this  is  a  necessary  quality  of  the  right  as  absolute 
good.  For  such  good,  when  compared  with  any  other  form 
of  good  possible  in  the  case,  is  of  necessity  more  valuable, 
or  a  superior  good.  Moreover,  in  most  cases  where  good  as 


316  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

particular  or  private  is  contrasted  with  the  right,  we  per- 
ceive that  to  neglect  the  right  for  the  good  would  be  to  sacri- 
fice a  very  great  absolute  good  for  a  comparatively  small  per- 
sonal or  private  interest.  And  the  contrast  between  the 
right  and  the  not  right  is  yet  more  marked  when,  as 
constantly  happens,  what  is  useless  or  injurious  is  opposed 
to  what  is  right.  This  inherent  superiority  often  gives  a  pe- 
culiar phase  to  what  is  right  and  at  times  seems  included  in 
our  conception  of  moral  Tightness. 

Another  property  of  the  right — which  indeed  immediately 
follows  from  its  superiority — is  its  superlative  attractiveness 
as  an  end,  its  preferableness  to  any  possible  competitive  end, 
in  the  view  and  sense  of  the  moral  reason.  This  preferable- 
ness  belongs  to  the  right  as  having  superlative  excellence ;  it 
is  the  superlative  attractiveness  of  this  excellence.  Because 
of  this  preferableness  men  ascribe  a  supreme  dignity  and  of- 
fice of  guidance  to  the  moral  reason  as  discerning  and  tend- 
ing towards  the  right.  Hence,  too,  we  recognize  the  supreme 
worth  of  the  moral  law,  which  is  that  product  of  the  moral 
reason  in  and  by  which  she  indicates  and  sets  forth  the  right 
for  our  pursuit  and  realization.  Here  again — in  this  prefer- 
ableness— do  we  not  have  a  necessary  predicate  of  absolute 
good,  as  being  inherently  superior — and,  in  most  cases,  vastly 
superior — to  any  good,  or  other  end,  which  may  enter  into 
competition  with  it  ?  For  the  "  wise  man  "  ever  loves  and 
chooses  the  right  as  being  better  than  aught  else. 

4.  Further,  the  right,  as  related  to  competitive  ends,  has 
not  merely  a  superlative  preferableness  but  also  a  regal  su- 
premacy. It  not  merely  solicits  but  demands  the  highest 
place  among  the  aims  of  life.  A  ministerial  supremacy,  also, 
among  our  motivities,  is  claimed  by  conscience,  or  the  moral 
reason,  as  the  representative  of  duty.  The  right,  in  its  appeal 
to  the  soul,  may  meet  with  no  decided  opposition.  When 
there  are  no  strong  competitive  ends  a  spirit  attuned  to  vir- 
tue chooses  the  right  simply  for  its  own  sake  and  as  the 
noblest  of  ends,  without  consciously  deciding  against  other 
aims.  In  such  a  case  no  conflict  occurs  between  the  right 
and  other  motive  ideas,  and  one  might  say  that  the  right  is 
chosen  just  because  it  is  the  right,  or  because  of  its  absolute 
superlative  excellence.  But  when  the  right  is  opposed  to 
other  motive  thoughts  or  objects  and  this  opposition  is  sen- 
sibly felt,  then  the  moral  reason  claims  for  the  right  a  su- 
premacy over  all  other  ends.  If  in  such  a  case  one  should 


CHAP.  XXVII.]     ABSOLUTE  GOOD  AND  THE  RIGHT.        317 

choose  the  right,  he  would  use  peculiar  emphasis  in  saying 
that  he  chose  it  because  it  was  the  right,  or  because  it  ought 
to  be  chosen.  Thus  an  honorable  man  of  business  in  surren- 
dering all  of  a  large  property  to  satisfy  creditors  does  so  be- 
cause this  is  a  thing  right  and  dutiful  or  a  thing  that  ought 
to  be  done.  In  this  he  recognizes  that  inherent  supremacy 
which  the  right  has  over  every  competitive  end  in  the  view 
of  the  moral  reason.  But  what  is  this  supremacy  but  the  just 
claim  of  absolute  good,  on  the  ground  of  its  superiority  to 
all  other  motive  objects? 

This  supremacy  often  does  not  belong,  as  a  realized  fact, 
to  the  right.  Man,  in  the  exercise  of  the  total  of  his  motive 
regards,  frequently  finds  other  ends  more  attractive  than  the 
pursuit  of  absolute  good.  But  lordship  always  belongs 
to  the  right  in  reason  and  in  law — that  is,  in  the  judgment 
of  the  moral  reason  and  in  the  law  which  is  the  product  and 
conception  of  that  reason.  In  other  words,  it  is  always 
claimed  by  reason  in  behalf  of  the  absolutely  good. 

Finally,  the  right  is  recognized  as  having  obligatoriness, 
and  is  often  conceived  of  as  the  obligatory.  This  charac- 
teristic is  closely  allied  to  the  last;  indeed,  the  two  are  to 
be  distinguished  from  each  other  only  as  different  aspects 
of  the  same  thing.  For  we  speak  of  the  right  as  supreme 
among  ends,  but  as  obligatory  upon  persons.  This  obligatori- 
ness  is  an  immediate  consequence  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
right  over  ends.  For  that  which  is  supreme  over  all  competi- 
tive ends,  must  be  supreme  also  over  all  of  one's  motive  life, 
and  so  also  over  the  person  as  living  and  choosing.  Hence 
we  say  that  persons  are  bound  to  the  observance  of  the  right, 
or  are  subjected  to  the  right — this  obligation  or  subjection 
existing,  of  course,  in  law  and  in  the  conception  of  the  moral 
reason.  Hence,  too,  we  are  bound  to  obey  conscience  as  the 
exponent  of  the  right. 

An  operative  sense  of  the  right  as  thus  obligatory,  or  su- 
preme over  oneself,  renders  one  willing  to  perform  any  labor 
or  make  any  sacrifice  in  its  service.  And  when  we  thus  rec- 
ognize the  right  as  obligatory,  then  we  speak  of  duty  as  that 
which  we  owe  to  the  right,  and  say  that  in  doing  duty  we  do 
that  which  we  owe  or  ought  to  do.  For  generally  some  price 
must  be  paid  for  the  realization  of  right ;  some  sacrifice,  how- 
ever willingly,  must  be  laid  on  the  altar  of  principle. 

This  sense  of  the  obligatory  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
desire  to  have  an  easy  conscience  and  from  the  fear  of  pun- 


318  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

ishment  or  hope  of  reward.  Should  one  do  what  is  right 
merely  to  escape  punishment,  to  gain  a  reward,  or  to  be  free 
from  troubling  emotions,  he  could  not  properly  be  said  to  do 
right  because  he  ought  to  do  it,  though  such  motives  are  not 
wrong  per  se.  The  right  becomes  the  obligatory  as  claim- 
ing royalty  or  supremacy  over  that  personal  life  in  which 
man  aims  at  various  ends.  When  men  obey  the  obligatory, 
they  act  simply  from  an  operative  sense  of  that  supremacy 
which  the  right  claims.  Now  evidently  this  obligatoriness, 
this  supremacy  over  personal  life — like  that  absolute  pref- 
erableness  and  that  legal  supremacy  over  all  competing  ends, 
to  both  of  which  it  is  closely  allied — is  a  necessary  character- 
istic of  absolute  good  as  the  end  prescribed  by  the  moral 
reason. 

The  foregoing  analysis  makes  it  clear  that  every  attribute 
or  property  of  moral  Tightness  may  be  accounted  for  by  iden- 
tifying that  rightness  with  absoluteness  of  good  in  an  end. 
With  this  identification  every  aspect  of  rightness  is  luminous 
and  intelligible,  while,  if  we  reject  and  deny  it,  there  is  left 
indeed  a  grand  name,  but  its  authority,  like  that  of  a  sover- 
eign whose  power  has  been  taken  away,  may  be  boldly  ques- 
tioned. 

Thus,  too,  our  expectation  has  been  realized  that  an  under- 
standing of  moral  rightness  would  include  an  understanding 
of  moral  obligatoriness;  and  we  are  also  put  in  a  position  to 
define  that  moral  obligation  which  pertains  to  persons.  This 
is  the  correlative  of  moral  obligatoiiness.  It  is  the  legal  re- 
lationship in  which  a  person,  as  endowed  with  rationality, 
stands  to  the  right  as  supreme  in  law  over  one's  life  and  self. 
It  is  his  being  subject  or  bound,  in  law,  to  absolute  good  as 
an  end. 


5.  The  general  theory  of  morals  advocated  in  the  present 
treatise  asserts  that  the  fundamental  aim  of  duty  is  the  total 
good  of  which  the  case  admits  or  any  part  which  may  help  to 
constitute  that  total.  For  this  reason  this  theory  might  be 
designated  TOTALISM.  Some  such  term  might  distinguish  it 
from  the  other  theories  which  are  current,  that  is,  from  Utili- 
tarianism and  Perfectionism,  and  from  Motivity  Ethics, 
Authority  Ethics  and  Duty  Ethics.. 

Comparing  Totalism  with  these  systems  its  fundamental 
doctrine  seems  specially  abstruse.  This  was  to  be  expected 


CHAP.  XXVII.]    ABSOLUTE  GOOD  AND  THE  RIGHT. 

if  this  doctrine  springs,  as  we  think  it  does,  from  a  more  ex- 
haustive analysis  of  moral  life  than  has  been  made  heretofore. 
A  doctrine  which  unites  the  contrasting  phases  of  truth  pre- 
sented by  various  theories,  and  which  is  intended  to  explain 
every  possible  development  of  duty,  may  be  simple  and  clear, 
but  it  is  necessarily  abstruse.  For  this  reason  it  may  not  be 
accurately  apprehended  if  dwelt  upon  too  much  in  its  own 
abstractness.  It  should  be  held  as  related  to  the  theories  for 
which  it  provides  harmonization  and  to  the  specific  forms  of 
duty  which  it  brings  under  a  universal  law. 

The  moral  life  may  be  compared  to  a  lofty  mountain  which 
presents  different  appearances  to  the  beholder  according  to  the 
direction  from  which  it  is  surveyed.  Some  of  its  sides  are 
steep  and  encumbered  with  rocks ;  others  bear  a  forest  growth ; 
others  are  upland  pastures;  others,  which  enjoy  a  warm  ex- 
posure, are  terraced  into  orchards  and  vineyards.  From  some 
points  this  mountain  may  appear  exceedingly  high;  from 
others,  only  of  a  moderate  elevation.  Should  one  in  a  neigh- 
boring valley  perceive  it  towering  above  all  surrounding 
peaks,  its  snowy  top  might  seem  to  pierce  the  sky.  Should  he 
look  at  it  from  a  point  many  miles  distant  upon  a  widespread 
plain,  he  would  not  appreciate  its  magnitude  and  its  altitude. 
Or  should  he  gaze  upward  from  some  too  near  locality 
where  a  projecting  shoulder  of  the  mountain  shut  off  a  view 
of  the  regions  beyond,  he  might  mistake  the  lower  elevation 
for  the  summit.  In  a  similar  way,  if  one's  thought  be  con- 
centrated upon  some  one  phase  of  a  great  subject  or  be  lim- 
ited to  a  peculiar  point  of  view,  he  may  form  conceptions 
that  are  partial  and  incorrect.  It  is  also  confessedly  diffi- 
cult to  find  a  position  from  which  to  see  the  whole  truth  at 
one  time;  and,  even  should  this  be  accomplished  by  an  all- 
comprehensive  survey  of  facts  and  a  painstaking  generaliza- 
tion, the  result  may  be  unsatisfactory  unless  correlated  with 
specific  aspects  of  the  subject  as  seen  from  less  elevated  points 
of  observation.  The  sight  of  the  mountain  from  a  balloon 
soaring  above  it  or  a  photograph  of  it  taken  from  an  aerial 
height,  would  give  a  truer  view  of  the  mountain  as  a  whole 
than  could  be  obtained  from  any  terrestrial  position,  yet  the 
view  gained  from  above  would  be  lacking  in  significance, 
were  it  not  interpreted  by  the  help  of  observations  taken  in 
less  exalted  places.  It  becomes  more  determinate  and  intel- 
ligible when  considered  in  connection  with  the  partial  views. 
Therefore  we  may  expect  the  totalistic  conclusion  concerning 


320  THE  MORAL  LAW.         [CHAP.  xxvn. 

the  right  to  be  confirmed  and  illuminated  by  a  comparison 
with  competitive  doctrines. 

6.  This  theory  agrees  with  -utilitarianism  in  asserting  that 
the  right  is  a  species  of  good  and  that  practical  moral  good- 
ness is  the  fundamental  virtue.    The  idea  of  good  is  the  source 
from  which  every  form  of  utilitarianism  has  drawn  its  vital- 
ity.   The  hedonistic,  the  euda3monistic,  and  the  humanitarian 
developments  of  doctrine,  each  in  its  own  way,  make  "  good  " 
the  aim  of  morality.    The  defect  of  these  systems  is  that  they 
offer  no  adequate  distinction  between  that  good  which  may 
be  sought  by  a  wise  self-interest,  or  even  by  public-spirited 
benevolence,  and  that  which  principle  seeks  as  absolute  and 
right.     The  most  noted  utilitarian  definition  of  the  end  of 
duty  is  that  it  is  the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number. 
Such  is,  at  times,  the  aim;  at  other  times  we  are  not  bound 
to  care  for  the  greatest  number,  but  only  to  ~seek  the  greatest 
good,  or  good  simply.    Utilitarianism  gives  no  sufficient  ac- 
count of  this  good  which  is  the  aim  of  duty.    The  old  egoism 
dignified  the  pursuit  of  self-interest  with  the  name  of  virtue ; 
humanitarian  ethics  bestows  this  title  on  the  disinterested 
pursuit  of  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  all,  and  has  used 
this  principle  to  explain  moral  goodness  and  regulative  right- 
eousness.   But  it  is  not  a  distinctively  moral  principle.    More- 
over the  application  of  it  has  been  so  limited  to  objective 
duty  that  utilitarianism  has  fairly  earned  the  designation, 
given  it  by   Professor  Blackie,   of   ethical   "  externalism." 
(FOUR  PHASES  OF  MORALS,  p.  333.)     This  system  does  not 
recognize  as  it  should,  the  inherent  importance  of  affectional 
duty — of  right  loving  and  right  feeling;  and  it  neglects  the 
developments  of  principle  in  moral   esteem  and  causative 
righteousness.     It  makes  happiness  rather  than  virtue  the 
summum  bonum.    While  utilitarianism  in  its  best  presenta- 
tions has  great  claims  on  our  consideration,  it  must  be  re- 
garded as  belonging  to  an  incomplete  stage  in  the  progress  of 
ethical  science. 

7.  Perfectionism  emphasizes  that   side   of  morals  which 
utilitarianism   slights.      It   recommends   the   cultivation   of 
virtue  as  the  end  of  life,  and  bases  all  duty,  including  that 
of  beneficence,  upon  that  principle.     But  it  gives  no  satis- 
factory conception  of  the  excellence  which  it  enjoins.    We  are 
told  that  perfection  is  a  thing  simple  and  ultimate;  or  we 
are  offered  some  strange  definition  of  it.     It  is  spoken  of  as 
the  realization  of  the  true  self — as  the  development  of  the 


CHAP.  XXVII.]     ABSOLUTE  GOOD  A^t)  THE  RIGHT.         321 

divine  in  man — as  the  attainment  of  the  highest  efficiency — 
as  the  fullest  and  freest  exercise  of  activity — as  the 
harmony  of  our  spiritual  powers — as  a  combination  of 
the  harmony  with  the  activity  of  our  powers.  But  we  are 
not  told  that  the  perfection  to  be  realized  is  virtue  as  the 
supreme  good.  The  perfectionist  is  precluded  from  this  defi- 
nition. He  is  seeking  to  determine  the  essential  or  primary 
aim  of  virtue,  and  it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  virtue  pri- 
marily aims  at  its  own  existence.  One  might  as  well  say 
that  the  primary  use  of  money  is  to  procure  more  money; 
or  that  government  is  instituted  solely  in  the  interest  of  the 
rulers.  Even  the  supporter  of  absolute  despotism  would  say 
that  government  exists  for  the  benefit  of  mankind.  The 
principal  objection,  however,  to  the  perfection  of  the  perfec- 
tionist is,  not  that  it  is  unintelligible,  though  it  is  sufficiently 
obscure,  but  that*t  is  an  incompetent  explanation  of  morality. 
This  defect  is  so  sensibly  felt  that  most  perfectionists — for 
example,  Professors  Janet,  Mackenzie  and  Bowne — fall  back 
on  utilitarianism  as  a  supplementary  theory. 

The  strength  of  perfectionism  lies  in  two  statements,  first, 
that  virtue  is  the  greatest  aim  of  duty ;  and  second,  that 
virtue,  when  cherished,  performs  every  duty  and  accomplishes 
every  right  end.  Nevertheless  the  promotion  of  virtue  is  not 
the  primary  and  fundamental  principle  of  duty.  That  is 
to  be  found  in  the  service  of  absolute  good.  Virtue  is  not  the 
only,  but  the  highest,  form  of  that  good. 

8.  The  merit  of  motivity  ethics  is  that  it  brings  before  us 
the  connection  between  moral  life  and  motive  life  in  general. 
The  natural  and  the  moral  modes  of  activity  are  so  closely 
related  that  they  may  unite  in  one;  as  they  do  in  every 
holy  being.  Duty  requires  that  our  entire  experience  should) 
be  controlled  and  qualified  by  principle.  This  fact  renders 
possible  a  system  of  ethics  the  fundamental  idea  of  which  is 
the  regulation  of  our  motivities.  Just  as  the  cultivation  of 
virtue,  under  the  law  of  causative  righteousness,  may  lead 
to  the  performance  of  every  other  duty,  so  the  right  ex- 
ercise of  natural  affection  may  produce  conformity  to  the 
whole  moral  law.  This  might  take  place  under  the  control 
of  an  enlightened  sentiment  of  honor,  and  yet  more  under 
that  of  a  wise  benevolence.  We  are  told  that  "  love  is  the  ful- 
filling of  the  law";  we  know,  too,  that  the  truly  honorable 
man  will  neglect  none  of  his  obligations,  but  will  strive  ear- 
nestly to  discharge  them  all.  It  is  easy  to  understand  how 

21 


322  TBE  MOEAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

Dr.  Mark  Hopkins  places  all  duty  in  right  loving,  and  how 
Dr.  James  Martineau  believes  that  it  resides  in  the  right 
government  of  our  desires.  Then,  also,  Aristotle's  doctrine 
of  the  "  medietas,"  or  {j-effprys, — that  virtue  lies  in  the  choice 
of  a  mean  between  extremes, — is  the  imperfect  statement  of 
a  law  regulating  the  pursuit  of  objects  under  the  promptings 
of  our  natural  inclinations.  The  doctrine  of  Aristotle  re- 
minds one  of  a  certain  political  party  who  call  themselves 
the  "Middle  of  the  Eoad  "  Populists,  and  who  thus  declare 
their  re-solution  not  to  deviate,  because  of  any  inducements, 
however  tempting,  from  their  own  distinctive  principles  and 
policy.  With  them,  evidently  the  "  middle  "  is  the  "  correct " 
course,  and  is  determined  not  so  much  by  the  avoidance  of 
extremes  as  by  adherence  to  settled  views.  So,  also,  because 
the  decision  of  a  dispute  frequently  lies  between  contending 
claims,  and  should  always  be  for  the  right,  and  not  for  the 
private  .advantage  of  either  party,  justice  is  sometimes 
thought  of  as  pursuing  a  middle  course;  though  this  is  not 
the  essential  aim  of  justice.  Among  the  Greeks  e'c  plaov 
dLfj.<poTtpoi<s  dtxdZew  signified,  not  to  choose  between  extremes, 
but  to  judge  fairly  or  impartially.  Aristotle's  ALTO'S- 
teaches  that  conduct  as  proceeding  from  natural  tendencies 
should  be  regulated  by  principle,  and  has  little  further  signifi- 
cance. He  himself  found  a  governing  end  in  eudasmonism. 
Modern  motivity  ethics  proposes  various  rules,  but,  in  the 
last  resort,  adopts  the  pursuit  of  "  good  "  as  the  determining 
law.  Even  Martineau  says,  "  the  rule  is  reducible  to  that  of 
rational  benevolence." 

Thus  it  is  taught  that  our  inward  life  must  be  controlled 
by  a  reference  to  good.  But  it  is  not  explained  how  the  good 
referred  to  is  absolute  good,  and  is  identical  with  the  right 
—how  the  practical  pursuit  of  it  is  the  primary  form  of 
virtue — and  how  this  originates  a  law  for  our  motivities, 
not  as  a  faculty  primarily  concerned  about  our  motivities, 
but  as  having  first  an  objective  operation  of  its  own. 

9.  Authority  ethics,  whether  theistic  or  anthropic,  throws 
little  light  on  the  radical  nature  of  moral  law.  But  it  directs 
attention  to  a  form  which  the  law  often  takes,  and  also  to  a 
dutiful  obedience  which  may  result  in  the  performance  of 
every  other  requirement  of  morality.  For  when  one  is  in- 
structed in  duty  by  some  earthly  superior  or  by  some  divine 
revelation,  the  inherent  claims  of  right  conduct  are  reinforced 
by  the  obligation  of  obedience;  and  so  the  law  is  supported 


CHAP.  XXVII.]     ABSOLUTE  GOOD  AND  THE  EIGHT.        323 

by  a  double  influence.  We  may  especially  say  that  the  man 
who  does  all  the  will  of  God  performs  all  his  duty ;  for  God's 
will  and  law  are  the  perfect  standard  of  righteousness  and  of 
goodness.  In  a  less  absolute  way  the  expectations  and  de- 
mands of  those  in  authority  over  us — of  parents,  instructors, 
judges,  rulers,  and  of  society  at  large — present  a  code  to 
which  we  feel  bound  to  conform.  Here,  as  in  obedience  to 
God,  a  sense  of  dutiful  subjection  unites  with  the  simple 
sense  of  duty.  These  considerations  explain  how  some  are 
led  to  base  ethical  theory  on  the  principle  of  obedience. 

Moreover,  our  obligation  to  obey  the  divine  being  calls  to 
mind  his  peculiar  right  to  the  service  of  his  rational  creatures. 
Loyalty  to  him  rests  not  merely  on  the  justice  and  wisdom  of 
his  rule,  but  yet  more  on  his  personal  character  and  his 
holy  benignant  disposition.  He  is  the  perfect  object  of 
esteem  and  affection.  Our  obedience  to  his  law  should  ex- 
press our  love  and  devotion  to  himself.  And  when  we  re- 
member that  all  the  resources  of  the  divine  government  are 
employed  for  the  destruction  of  evil  and  the  advancement 
of  virtue,  and  that  we  are  called  to  co-operate  with  God  for 
the  accomplishment  of  spiritual  good,  it  is  evident  that  the 
life  of  duty  has  a  broad  theistic  side.  This  aspect  of  morals 
should  not  be  treated  with  neglect. 

No  one  can  deny  the  importance  of  those  views  which  au- 
thority ethics  brings  under  consideration.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  these  views  do  not  depend  on  the  doc- 
trine that  moral  law  is  based  on  the  requirements  of  author- 
ity; nor,  indeed,  is  this  doctrine  now  held  without  qualifi- 
cation by  any  reputable  writer.  Anthropic  moralists  do  not 
say  that  the  rules  of  righteousness  arise  from  accidental 
custom  or  arbitrary  enactment,  but  that  they  are  modes  of 
doing  which  experience  has  shown  to  be  necessary  to  man's 
welfare.  And  those  who  teach  that  moral  law  is  the  expres- 
sion of  the  divine  will,  are  careful  to  add  that  this  will  is  the 
expression  of  the  divine  nature,  that  is,  of  the  unchanging 
disposition  of  the  Almighty.  But  what  is  this  disposition 
except  God's  love  for  what  is  right  and  his  desire  that  abso- 
lute good  should  prevail  throughout  his  universe  ? 

10.  Duty  ethics  is  the  least  philosophical  of  moral  theories. 
It  asserts  that  all,  or  most,  of  the  laws  of  duty  are  discerned 
by  a  simple  intuition  of  the  mind,  and  are  not  explainable 
by  any  fundamental  principle.  One  can  say  only  that  each 
law  prescribes  a  duty.  The  dictum  of  Kant,  "  Act  on  that 


324;  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

maxim  which  thou  canst  will  to  become  a  universal  law," 
is  not  an  explanatory  principle,  but  only  a  test — a  very  im- 
perfect test— of  duty.  His  other  saying,  "  There  is  nothing 
good,"  that  is,  morally  good,  "  but  the  good  will,"  might  be 
taken  as  a  utilitarian  definition  of  virtue,  if  his  "  good  will " 
were  the  disposition  to  promote  happiness.  But  he  means 
only  the  will  to  do  right:  and,  like  all  other  writers  of  the 
intuitional  school,  he  leaves  the  right  undefined. 

Duty  ethics  is  an  unsatisfactory  system,  the  product  of 
dogmatic,  not  of  analytic,  thought;  yet  it  brings  to  view 
very  important  truths.  In  this  form  of  doctrine  the  delib- 
erate moral  sense,  or  practical  moral  reason,  of  mankind,  as- 
serts the  superiority  of  its  own  conclusions  over  all  theories 
of  the  speculative  reason  which  may  conflict  with  those  con- 
clusions. In  order  to  complete  results  both  these  modes  of 
intellect  must  work  in  harmony.  The  habitual  decision  of 
an  honest  and  well-informed  intelligence  is  almost  certainly 
correct.  The  universal  agreement  of  such  judgments  is 
called  by  philosophers  "  the  common  sense  "  of  men.  Any 
theory  which  conflicts  with  this  stands  in  need  of  revision 
and  amendment.  We  do  not  say  that  "  the  intuitions  of 
reason"  are  always  incapable  of  explanation.  They  are  by 
no  means  confined  to  intuitions  of  ultimate  truth.  But  they 
are  most  reliable.  Therefore,  also,  the  ordinary  rules  of 
morality  are  to  be  followed  except  when  the  reasons  for  a 
departure  from  them  are  so  convincing,  and  so  founded  on 
principle,  that  "  the  exception  proves  the  rule." 

We  have  to  thank  duty  ethics  also  for  maintaining  that 
the  right,  by  reason  of  its  very  nature,  is  the  obligatory. 
The  older  utilitarians  deny  this  truth  altogether;  and  some 
advocates  of  authority  ethics  confound  moral  with  legal  obli- 
gation. The  "  duty  school  "  make  "  oughtness  "  their  fun- 
damental conception.  They  advocate  "  duty  for  duty's  sake." 
"  The  essence  of  all  that  is  moral,"  says  Dr.  A.  A.  Hodge, 
"  is  that  it  ought  to  be."  We  prefer  to  say  that  the  essential 
aim  of  morality  is  the  right,  and  that  obligatoriness  is  a 
necessary  property  of  the  right.  Possibly  the  adherents  of 
duty  ethics  would  accept  this  statement  and  allow  that 
"  Tightness "  and  "  oughtness  "  are  distinguishable.  But, 
whether  they  would  or  not,  we  must  <agree  with  them  that 
moral  obligation  is  a  most  fundamental  conception. 

Finally,  we  commend  this  school  because  of  the  prominence 
which  it  .gives  to  law  as  the  product  of  right  reason.  Some 


.  XXVII.]     ABSOLUTE  GOOD  AND  THE  EIGHT.        325 

moralists  exalt  ends  to  the  disparagement  of  those  tried 
methods  of  the  practical  judgment  whereby  good  is  to  be  safe- 
guarded and  promoted.  This  neglect  of  established  law,  espe- 
cially by  writers  whose  explanation  of  the  aims  of  morality  is 
inadequate,  is  a  dangerous  mistake.  Ancient  Epicureans  and 
modern  humanitarians  have  erred  in  this  way.  No  such  fault 
can  be  charged  upon  the  duty  school.  On  the  contrary,  they 
seem  sometimes  to  undervalue  the  claims  of  goodness  and  of 
moral  esteem  while  hearkening  to  those  of  regulative  and 
of  causative  righteousness.  This  is  not  a  necessary  character- 
istic of  duty  ethics.  It  is  rather  a  tendency  connected  with 
its  downright  advocacy  of  law  and  right.  It  can,  and  should, 
be,  guarded  against.  When  that  is  done,  duty  ethics  may 
claim  a  preference  over  any  theory  whose  analysis  of  the 
moral  law  is  defective  and  misleading.  Dogmatic  adherence 
to  truth  is  better  than  a  reasoned  adoption  of  error. 

11.  In  view  of  the  variety  and  the  importance  of  the  truths 
made  prominent  by  the  different  ethical  systems,  it  is  evident 
that  the  science  of  morals  calls  for  a  comprehensive  grasp  of 
mind.  Clearly,  also,  the  unifying  principle  of  the  moral 
law  should  be  understood,  not  as  an  independent  abstraction, 
but  as  the  central  element  of  a  system.  Moreover,  while 
absolute  good  is  the  end  of  duty,  our  choice  and  our  appreci- 
ation of  this  end  are  constantly  modified  by  varying  percep- 
tions of  its  characteristics.  We  consider,  at  different  times, 
its  excellence  and  attractiveness;  its  absoluteness;  its  right- 
ful leadership  of  our  affections;  its  direct  claim  on  our  serv- 
ice; its  manifestations  in  the  form  of  law;  the  enforce- 
ment of  its  pursuit  through  power  and  penalty;  the  rewards 
which  must  fall  to  its  faithful  followers;  and  its  highest 
form  as  moral  good,  or  virtue — itself  a  great  reward,  the 
antidote  of  all  evil  and  the  supreme  source  of  blessedness. 
Because  of  these  different  aspects  the  right  is  contemplated 
with  a  variety  of  sentiments  and  with  a  mingling  of  these 
together.  All  this  arises  naturally  in  view  of  the  diverse 
developments  and  relations  of  absolute  good  as  an  end. 
Hence,  to  appreciate  the  essential  aim  of  virtue,  absolute 
good  must  be  viewed  in  its  fullest  and  most  complete  real- 
ization. Our  thought  should  comprehend  every  aspect  of 
the  moral  life  and  every  department  of  the  moral  law. 


328  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

choice;  for  which  reason  the  ethical  doctrine  of  free  agency 
is  often  called  the  doctrine  of  free-will,  or  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will. 

2.  But,  while  the  terms  "  free  will "  and  "  freedom  of  the 
will "  are  needed  in  ethics  to  qualify  "  free  agency/7  it  is  to 
be  noticed  that  these  expressions  themselves  are  used  am- 
biguously.    Some  mean  by  them  that  man  is  free  as  having 
the  power  of  choice,  no  matter  whether  this  power  itself  be 
free  or  not;  while  others  say  that  moral  freedom  consists 
both  in  having  the  power  of  choice  and  in  the  freedom  of 
that  power.     The   former   theorists   identify   freedom   with 
the  possession  of  a  will,  but  assert  that  the  will  is  controlled 
by  external  factors  and  therefore  is  not  free.    As  not  riches 
but  the  owner  of  them  is  rich,  and  not  wisdom  but  he  who 
has  it  is  wise,  so  not  the  will  but  he  who  possesses  a  will  is 
free.    The  latter  reject  this  view,  and  say  that  a  certain  free- 
dom of  action — or  exemption  from  control — must  belong  to 
the  will  in  order  that  he  who  is  endowed  with  this  faculty 
may  be  free.     In  the  one  case  we  are  told  that  man  is  free 
because  he  has  and  exercises  a  will,  while  yet  the  will  is 
absolutely  determined  by  the  "greatest  apparent  good"  or 
"  the   strongest  combination  of  inducements "   or  by  "  the 
most  powerful  motives/'  and  so  is  governed  by  factors  out- 
side of  itself.    In  the  other  case  we  are  told  that  man  is  free, 
first  because  he  has  a  will,  and,  secondly,  because  that  will 
is  really — that  is,  efficiently — determined,  not  by  anything 
outside  of  itself,  but  wholly  by  the  operation  of  its  own 
nature. 

This  latter  statement  seems  to  be  the  more  reasonable, 
and  to  express  better  what  all  men  feel  to  be  the  fact.  Yet 
we  may  admit  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  expres- 
sions "  free  will "  and  "  freedom  of  the  will "  can  be  em- 
ployed to  signify  the  freedom  of  man  as  willing,  whether 
the  will  itself  be  free  or  not.  Acknowledging  that  the  words 
may  be  used  in  this  sense,  we  shall  argue  that  philosophical 
truth  requires  the  other  meaning,  namely,  that  man  is  free 
not  only  as  willing  but  also  because  the  will  itself  is  free. 
According  to  this  doctrine  the  will,  and  therefore  also  the  soul 
in  willing,  acts  wholly  from  within,  is  self-determined,  and, 
in  this  way,  free.  In  other  words  man  in  the  act  of  choice 
is  not  determined  by  any  factors  except  those  which  are  to 
be  found  in  the  act  of  choice  itself. 

3.  In  thus  defining  free  agency  or  free  will,  we  have  stated 


CHAP.  XXVIII.J     FREE  AGENCY,  OR  FREE  WILL.  329 

that  doctrine  which  we  would  use  these  terms  to  express.  The 
liberty  which  this  doctrine  claims  for  the  .faculty  of  choice 
might  be  called  the  essential  freedom  of  the  will,  because  it 
necessarily  attends  the  act  of  volition.  This  thought  also 
might  be  more  simply  indicated  by  calling  it  volitional  free- 
dom. As  it  is  implied  in  every  moral  act,  it  is  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  "  moral "  freedom ;  but  this  last  designation  has 
the  disadvantage  of  being  ambiguous.  Ethical  writers  men- 
tion various  modes  of  freedom'  in  connection  with  the  life  of 
duty;  hence  we  hear  from  them  of  several  varieties  of  moral 
freedom.  Of  these  volitional  freedom,  alone,  is  inseparable 
from  the  nature  and  operation  of  the  faculty  of  choice.  This 
liberty  is  the  subject  of  present  inquiry;  in  order  to  an  un- 
derstanding of  it,  we  must  distinguish  it  from  other  modes  of 
freedom,  especially  from  those  which  are  closely  related 
to  it. 

Freedom,  in  this  primary  and  proper  sense  of  the  word, 
can  belong  only  to  voluntary  beings.  It  is  the  condition  of 
such  beings  when  their  life  and  conduct  are  not  subject  to  the 
control  of  any  power  external  to  themselves.  One  is  free 
so  far  as  he  is  exempt  from  the  government  of  others,  and 
so  can  act  as  he  chooses.  In  a  secondary  sense  one's  powers 
are  said  to  be  free  when  they  are  not  controlled  by  other 
powers;  and  it  seems  impossible  that  one  should  be  free  with 
respect  to  any  of  his  powers  unless  that  power  also  should 
be  free.  One  is  not  free  in  respect  to  his  hands  if  his  hands 
be  tied.  So  one  is  not  free  in  respect  to  his  will  if  his 
will  be  enslaved.  But  an  ability  to  act  determinately  with 
one's  powers  is  not  inconsistent  with  freedom;  it  is  rather 
demanded  by  freedom.  At  least  conduct  entirely  separated 
from  the  guidance  of  intelligent  motivity  would  be  the  action 
of  a  lunatic  or  a  madman  rather  than  of  a  free  moral  agent. 
So  much  for  the  general  conception  of  freedom  in  its  original 
and  proper  use. 

The  freedom  of  a  physical  agent  is  not  a  literal  freedom. 
We  sometimes  speak  of  material  things  acting  freely,  but 
they  have  only  an  imperfect  and  figurative  liberty.  We  say 
that  the  wind  blows  freely  over  the  prairie  and  that  the  river 
flows  freely  toward  the  sea;  this  means  only  that  the  air  and 
the  water  move  without  restraint,  there  being  no  obstacle  to 
their  progress.  We  know  well  that  in  each  case  the  motion 
is  determined  by  external  attractions  and  repulsions  which 
the  moving  bodies  could  not  at  all  resist.  In  particular  they 


328  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

choice;  for  which,  reason  the  ethical  doctrine  of  free  agency 
is  often  called  the  doctrine  of  free-will,  or  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will. 

2.  But,  while  the  terms  "  free  will "  and  "  freedom  of  the 
will "  are  needed  in  ethics  to  qualify  "  free  agency,"  it  is  to 
be  noticed  that  these  expressions  themselves  are  used  am- 
biguously.    Some  mean  by  them  that  man  is  free  as  having 
the  power  of  choice,  no  matter  whether  this  power  itself  be 
free  or  not;  while  others  say  that  moral  freedom  consists 
both  in  having  the  power  of  choice  and  in  the  freedom  of 
that  power.     The   former   theorists   identify   freedom   with 
the  possession  of  a  will,  but  assert  that  the  will  is  controlled 
by  external  factors  and  therefore  is  not  free.    As  not  riches 
but  the  owner  of  them  is  rich,  and  not  wisdom  but  he  who 
has  it  is  wise,  so  not  the  will  but  he  who  possesses  a  will  is 
free.    The  latter  reject  this  view,  and  say  that  a  certain  free- 
dom of  action — or  exemption  from  control — must  belong  to 
the  will  in  order  that  he  who  is  endowed  with  this  faculty 
may  be  free.     In  the  one  case  we  are  told  that  man  is  free 
because  he  has  and  exercises  a  will,  while  yet  the  will  is 
absolutely  determined  by  the  "  greatest  apparent  good "  or 
"  the   strongest   combination   of   inducements "   or  by   "  the 
most  powerful  motives,"  and  so  is  governed  by  factors  out- 
side of  itself.    In  the  other  case  we  are  told  that  man  is  free, 
first  because  he  has  a  will,  and,  secondly,  because  that  will 
is  really — that  is,  efficiently — determined,  not  by  anything 
outside  of  itself,  but  wholly  by  the  operation  of  its  own 
nature. 

This  latter  statement  seems  to  be  the  more  reasonable, 
and  to  express  better  what  all  men  feel  to  be  the  fact.  Yet 
we  may  admit  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  expres- 
sions "  free  will "  and  "  freedom  of  the  will "  can  be  em- 
ployed to  signify  the  freedom  of  man  as  willing,  whether 
the  will  itself  be  free  or  not.  Acknowledging  that  the  words 
may  be  used  in  this  sense,  we  shall  argue  thait  philosophical 
truth  requires  the  other  meaning,  namely,  that  man  is  free 
not  only  as  willing  but  also  because  the  will  itself  is  free. 
According  to  this  doctrine  the  will,  and  therefore  also  the  soul 
in  willing,  acts  wholly  from  within,  is  self-determined,  and, 
in  this  way,  free.  In  other  words  man  in  the  act  of  choice 
is  not  determined  by  any  factors  except  those  which  are  to 
be  found  in  the  act  of  choice  itself. 

3,  In  thus  defining  free  agency  or  free  will,  we  have  stated 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FREE  AGENCY,  OR  FREE  WILL.  329 

that  doctrine  which  we  would  use  these  terms  to  express.  The 
liberty  which  this  doctrine  claims  for  the  .faculty  of  choice 
might  be  called  the  essential  freedom  of  the  will,  because  it 
necessarily  attends  the  act  of  volition.  This  thought  also 
might  be  more  simply  indicated  by  calling  it  volitional  free- 
dom. As  it  is  implied  in  every  moral  act,  it  is  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  "  moral "  freedom ;  but  this  last  designation  has 
the  disadvantage  of  being  ambiguous.  Ethical  writers  men- 
tion various  modes  of  freedom'  in  connection  with  the  life  of 
duty;  hence  we  hear  from  them  of  several  varieties  of  moral 
freedom.  Of  these  volitional  freedom,  alone,  is  inseparable 
from  the  nature  and  operation  of  the  faculty  of  choice.  This 
liberty  is  the  subject  of  present  inquiry;  in  order  to  an  un- 
derstanding of  it,  we  must  distinguish  it  from  other  modes  of 
freedom,  especially  from  those  which  are  closely  related 
to  it. 

Freedom,  in  this  primary  and  proper  sense  of  the  word, 
can  belong  only  to  voluntary  beings.  It  is  the  condition  of 
such  beings  when  their  life  and  conduct  are  not  subject  to  the 
control  of  any  power  external  to  themselves.  One  is  free 
so  far  as  he  is  exempt  from  the  government  of  others,  and 
so  can  act  as  he  chooses.  In  a  secondary  sense  one's  powers 
are  said  to  be  free  when  they  are  not  controlled  by  other 
powers;  and  it  seems  impossible  that  one  should  be  free  with 
respect  to  any  of  his  powers  unless  that  power  also  should 
be  free.  One  is  not  free  in  respect  to  his  hands  if  his  hands 
be  tied.  So  one  is  not  free  in  respect  to  his  will  if  his 
will  be  enslaved.  But  an  ability  to  act  determinately  with 
one's  powers  is  not  inconsistent  with  freedom;  it  is  rather 
demanded  by  freedom.  At  least  conduct  entirely  separated 
from  the  guidance  of  intelligent  motivity  would  be  the  action 
of  a  lunatic  or  a  madman  rather  than  of  a  free  moral  agent. 
So  much  for  the  general  conception  of  freedom  in  its  original 
and  proper  use. 

The  freedom  of  a  physical  agent  is  not  a  literal  freedom. 
We  sometimes  speak  of  material  things  acting  freely,  but 
they  have  only  an  imperfect  and  figurative  liberty.  We  say 
that  the  wind  blows  freely  over  the  prairie  and  that  the  river 
flows  freely  toward  the  sea;  this  means  only  that  the  air  and 
the  water  'move  without  restraint,  there  being  no  obstacle  to 
their  progress.  We  know  well  that  in  each  case  the  motion 
is  determined  by  external  attractions  and  repulsions  which 
the  moving  bodies  could  not  at  all  resist.  In  particular  they 


330  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

are  controlled  by  the  force  of  gravitation,  which  acts  from 
without  quite  as  much  as  from  within. 

But  even  were  it  possible  to  conceive  of  some  self -efficiency 
whereby  a  body  devoid  of  thought  and  soul  could  act  spon- 
taneously in  the  absence  of  stimulus  or  impulse  from  with- 
out— a  star,  for  example,  freed  from  external  guidance  and 
able  to  journey  hither  and  thither  in  space — we  would  ascribe 
freedom  to  such  a  body  only  in  a  secondary  way,  very  much 
as  we  apply  the  term  "  agent "  to  material  factors  in  a  secon- 
dary way ;  as  when  we  speak  of  chemical  agents  and  re-agents. 
Just  as  a  genuine  agent,  or  doer,  is  always  a  thinking  person, 
so  freedom,  in  the  full  and  proper  sense,  belongs  only  to  be- 
ings possessed  of  intelligence  and  will. 

Again:  as  already  said,  the  freedom  of  outward  conduct, 
though  often  included  in  free  agency,  is  not  included  in 
that  radical  free  agency  which  pertains  to  the  conduct  of 
the  will,  and  which  is  identical  with  the  freedom  of 
the  will.  External  actions  are  free  when  they  proceed 
from  volition,  or  are  voluntary.  This  freedom  arises  in  part 
because  the  actions  are  not  restrained  or  prevented  by  physical 
force ;  for  if  there  were  an  effectual  hindrance  the  will  could 
not  cause  the  actions.  But  the  freedom  of  conduct  depends 
essentially  on  the  fact  that  the  conduct  is  voluntary.  Civil 
and  religious  liberty  are  modes  of  this  outer  freedom.  They 
exist  when  people  are  not  restrained  by  authority  from  the 
proper  pursuit  of  their  temporal  and  their  spiritual  interests. 
Whatever  is  done  voluntarily,  shares  in  the  honor  of  that 
freedom  which  belongs  to  the  action  of  the  will  itself. 

4.  In  the  next  place,  volitional  freedom — the  essential  free- 
dom .of  the  will — is  to  be  distinguished  from  that  liberty 
which  consists  in  exemption  from  any  compulsory  inducement 
to  choose.  We  often  say  that  a  person  is  not  free  who  does 
not  have  this  last  mentioned  liberty.  A  galley  slave  chained 
to  his  oar  is  not  free  to  refuse  to  work.  He  is  compelled 
to  choose  labor  in  preference  to  severe  punishment.  He  has 
not  the  privilege  of  choosing  a  course  of  action  according  to 
his  unconstrained  desires  and  preferences.  In  like  manner 
men  daily  speak  of  their  liberty  of  choice  as  being  limited, 
or  even  destroyed,  by  various  practical  "necessities."  Cer- 
tain lines  of  conduct  are  possible,  and  would  also  be  immedi- 
ately pleasurable.  But  they  would  lead  to  ruin  or  disgrace. 
So  men  restrain  themselves  and  say  that  they  are  "  not  at 
liberty  "  to  act  in  the  way  proposed.  Yet,  in  a  deeper  sense, 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FUSE  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  331 

they  are  free  to  act  or  not  to  act  in  that  way.  The  galley- 
slave  could  refuse  to  labor  at  the  oar,  accepting  punishment, 
perhaps  death,  instead;  and,  in  so  doing,  he  would  be  acting 
freely.  In  short  volitional  freedom  is  not  destroyed  by  the 
advent  of  compulsory  inducements;  and  that  freedom  is  the 
only  liberty  necessary  to  moral  action.  The  martyr  who  suf- 
fers at  the  stake  rather  than  violate  his  conscience,  and  the 
patriot  who  sacrifices  his  life  for  his  country,  disregard  in- 
ducements which  would  compel  submission  were  it  not  for  the 
strength  of  principle.  Yet  their  conduct  is  voluntary  and 
free,  and  as  such,  of  a  noble  excellence.  The  liberty  necessary 
to  moral  agency  involves  only  that  one  should  distinctly  un- 
derstand the  requirements  of  duty  and  that  he  should  have 
the  faculty  of  choosing  whether  to  act  in  accordance  with 
them  or  in  disregard  of  them. 

5.  Further:  this  radical  freedom  inseparable  from  moral 
action  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  that  freedom  which  is 
called  "spiritual"  and  which  is  exemption,  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent,  from  the  control  of  evil  inward  tendencies. 
Spiritual  liberty  is  the  condition  of  one  who  is  not  subject 
to  the  dominion  of  any  irrational  habit,  or  passion,  or  appetite, 
or  who,  as  the  apostle  puts  it  (ROMANS  VI.,  VII.),  is  de- 
livered from  "the  law"  or  the  dominating  power  "of  sin." 
The  poet  Cowper  celebrates  this  liberty  in  a  passage  begin- 
ning, 

**  He  is  the  freeman  whom  the  Truth  makes  free, 
And  all  are  slaves  beside." 

A  man  given  up  to  selfishness,  sensuality,  avarice,  ambi- 
tion, or  any  other  vice,  habitually  disregarding  and  belittling 
the  suggestions  of  principle,  becomes  the  slave  of  sin;  and 
his  slavery  is  not  the  less  real  because  it  involves  the  continual 
consent  and  co-operation  of  his  will.  A  thoroughly  bad  man 
gives  this  consent  heartily,  and  is  seldom  troubled  with 
qualms  of  conscience.  He  does  not  resist  the  power  of  evil 
but  works  with  it,  as  one  who  is  rowing  down  a  stream. 
Therefore  he  does  not  realize  the  strength  of  that  sin  which 
has  "  dominion  over  him."  But  should  he  become  spiritually 
awakened — should  his  "better  self,"  his  moral  reason,  be 
brought  to  exert  its  enlightening  and  moving  power,  then 
a  struggle  arises  within  his  soul.  He  becomes  conscious  of 
the  force  of  inward  evil.  And  if,  through  the  help  of  God, 
he  successfully  resist  that  force  and  enter  upon  the  faithful 


332  THE  MORAL  LAW.          [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

performance  of  duty,  he  finds  that  he  is  still  only  partially  a 
freeman.  He  sympathizes  with  Paul,  "  I  find  then  a  law 
that,  when  I  would  do  good,  evil  is  present  with  me.  For  I 
delight  in  the  law  of  Gk)d  after  the  inward  man,  but  I  see 
another  law  in  my  members  warring  against  the  law  of  my 
mind  and  bringing  me  into  captivity  to  the  law  of  sin  which  is 
in  my  members" 

A  being  of  perfect  character  always  chooses  the  right,  no 
matter  at  what  cost  or  sacrifice.  Some  Stoics  taught  that 
only  such  a  being  should  be  styled  virtuous  or  righteous. 
This  position  ignores  the  fact  that  the  love  of  the  right  may 
exist  in  varying  degrees  of  strength  and  that  a  degree  of 
principle  which  in  all  ordinary  circumstances  would  prefer 
the  right  may  prove  insufficient  for  a  time  to  resist  some  com- 
pulsory, insinuating  or  mind-engrossing  influence.  He  must 
be  called  a  good  man  whose  prevailing  habit  of  life  is  to 
prefer  the  right,  even  though  grievous  faults  may  be  mingled 
with  his  performance  of  duty.  The  best  of  men  during  the 
present  life  are  virtuous  only  in  this  incomplete  way.  They 
love  the  right  and  are  pursuing  it,  but  they  have  not  attained 
perfection.  Nevertheless  it  is  of  the  nature  of  virtue,  even 
of  imperfect  virtue,  never  to  be  satisfied  with  imperfection. 
The  good  man  presses  on  to  the  mark  of  his  high  calling. 
When  he  yields  to  temptation  there  is  a  sense  in  which  he 
sins  unwillingly.  He  is  conscious  of  doing  so  in  despite  of 
that  better  nature  which  usually  controls  him.  His  deep 
desire  is  to  attain  absolute  freedom  from  the  power  of  sin. 
But  while  good  men  during  the  present  time  are  not  free  from 
this  power  and  while  bad  men  are  largely  or  wholly  subject 
to  it,  this  lack  of  freedom,  furnishes  no  palliation  or  excuse 
for  the  commission  of  sin.  The  liberty  of  free  will  or  free 
agency,  on  which  moral  life  is  conditioned,  is  quite  different 
from  that  spiritual  liberty  in  which  the  saints  of  God  rejoice. 
It  involves  only  the  faculty  of  intelligent  consent  or  choice, 
whether  the  action  of  this  faculty  be  controlled  by  some  pre- 
vailing inclination  or  not. 

6.  Volitional  freedom — freedom  of  the  will — may  be,  and 
often  is,  abridged  by  the  sophistical  and  blinding  power  of 
temptation,  by  the  distracting  agitation  of  passion,  and  by 
the  weakness  of  mind  and  spirit  induced  by  suffering  and 
distress.  These  causes  tend  to  prevent  or  render  defective 
that  exercise  of  intelligence  on  which  moral  choice  depends. 
So  far  as  they  make  a  man  incapable  of  that  choice,  they  make 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FEES  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  333 

him  incapable  of  moral  conduct.     But  unless  one  loses  his 
reason  altogether,  there  remains  some  moral  capability. 

Moral  life  is  always  possible  just  so  far  as  the  perception 
and  choice  of  the  right  and  of  the  wrong  are  possible.  It  is 
conditioned  only  on  the  faculty  of  choice  with  its  inherent 
freedom. 

7.  We  have  now  to  distinguish  volitional  freedom  from  a 
liberty  which  some  identify  with  it,  but  which,  we  are  con- 
vinced, has  no  existence  except  in  philosophic  fancy.  Many 
maintain  that  the  will  is  free  for  the  reason  that  the  act  of 
choice  differs  from  all  other  events  in  being,  partially  at  least, 
exempt  from  the  law  of  cause  and  effect.  It  is  not  questioned 
that  the  will  causes  its  own  actions  and  that  volition  conforms 
to  the  rule  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause.  But  it  is 
held  that,  in  this  case,  the  same  cause,  under  absolutely  the 
same  conditions,  is  capable  of  producing  diverse  or  opposite 
effects.  We  are  told  that  the  will,  though  influenced  by 
inducements  and  desires  and  by  its  own  habits  and  tendencies, 
has  the  power  of  acting  independently  of  these  factors,  and 
even  contrary  to  the  united  influence  of  them  all.  Ordinarily, 
it  is  said,  the  will  follows  that  combination  of  motive  tend- 
encies which  occupies  the  mind  at  the  time  of  making  a 
choice.  But  it  is  contended  that  this  faculty  is  capable  of 
an  opposite  course;  in  short,  that  it  can  act  in  opposition  to 
all  influences  which  may  operate  upon  it  or  within  it.  This 
means  that  man,  in  any  case,  has  the  power  of  choosing 
exactly  the  contrary  of  what  he  does  choose,  and  that,  too, 
without  any  change  in  the  factors  affecting  his  decision. 
Accordingly  this  strange  capability  of  the  will  has  been  called 
"  the  power  of  contrary  choice."  It  is  not  taught  that  man 
can  choose  two  opposite  things  at  the  same  time,  but  only 
that,  at  the  very  moment  of  his  choosing  one,  he  has  full 
power  to  choose  the  other. 

If  one  should  assert  that  the  will  has  an  internal  nature 
whereby  it  can  form  a  choice  independently  of  external 
influences,  this  might  be  accepted  as  expressing  a  truth ;  but 
we  cannot  believe  that  this  internal  nature,  which  determines 
the  choice,  has  the  power,  without  any  change  of  conditions,  to 
cause  a  different  choice  from  that  which  actually  takes  place. 
Such  a  power  would  not  be  that  ability  to  choose  between 
alternatives  which  the  will  undoubtedly  possesses.  It  would 
be  an  ability  to  choose  one  alternative  under  precisely  the 
game  conditions,  external  and  internal,  which  have  attended 


334  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

the  choice  of  the  other.  The  doctrine  of  "the  contrary 
choice  "  affirms  also  that  if  precisely  similar  inducements  were 
presented  under  precisely  similar  conditions  of  intelligence 
and  will,  there  might  be  a  second  choice  directly  opposite  to 
the  first.  In  this  case  that  rule  of  causation  would  be  violated 
according  to  which  precisely  similar  causes  under  precisely 
similar  circumstances  are  followed  by  precisely  similar  effects. 
For  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  in  a  broad  sense  is  composed 
of  various  related  principles,  and  comprises  all  that  part  of 
ontological  truth  which  pertains  to  power  and  its  operation. 
(PERCEPTIONALIST,  Ch.  L.) 

The  doctrine  of  "  the  contrary  choice "  must  be  rejected 
because  of  its  opposition  to  our  intuitional  perceptions  of  the 
necessary  laws  of  existence.  A  cause  which  does  not  act 
according  to  law  is  a  thing  inconceivable  and  incredible. 
Experience,  too,  is  against  the  contrary  choice.  In  every  case 
of  volition  one  acts  in  view  of  inducements.  No  one  can 
choose  unless  there  be  objects  of  choice.  Even  the  Almighty 
could  not  choose  without  ends  of  desire.  Choice  consists  in 
the  adoption  of  an  object,  not  accidentally,  but  for  some 
reason;  and  no  one  ever  made  two  opposite  choices  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  state  of  mind  and  for  precisely  the  same  con- 
siderations. We  may  grant  that  objects  have  no  efficiency  to 
move  the  will;  that  they  are  merely  conditions  of  its  action; 
but  this  only  helps  to  define  the  doctrine  that  preference 
springs  from  the  will  itself,  acting  determinately  with 
its  own  efficiency  and  according  to  the  laws  of  its  own  na- 
ture. 

The  fact  that  the  will  sometimes  shows  indecision  or  in- 
determination  does  not  prove  an  ability  to  act  without  or 
against  motives  but  an  inability  to  do  so.  Whenever  man 
really  puts  forth  a  volition,  he  determines  himself  towards 
some  object,  and  this  too,  according  to  law  and  in  a  way  that 
should  admit  of  explanation.  Assuredly  so  far  as  moral  life 
is  concerned,  no  other  conception  of  voluntary  action  is  ad- 
missible. Were  it  possible  to  conceive  of  a  choice  determined 
in  any  other  way  than  by  a  preference  of  ends  or  objects,  such 
a  choice  could  have  no  moral  character.  No  act  is  virtuous 
unless  the  will  seeks  the  right,  not  without  motive,  but  be- 
cause it  is  the  right  and  in  preference  to  any  competitive  end ; 
and  no  act  is  vicious  unless  the  will  adopts  some  other  end 
in  preference  to  the  right.  A  will  which  would  choose  right 
or  wrong  without  being  governed  therein  by  its  own  prefer- 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FREE  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  £35 

ence  for  right  or  wrong,  would  not  act  either  virtuously  or 
viciously. 

The  doctrine  of  the  contrary  choice  is  a  perversion  of  the 
truth  that  there  is  always  an  hypothetical  possibility  of  a 
choice  the  opposite  of  that  which  actually  takes  place.  So 
far  as  the  general  functions  of  intelligence  and  will  are 
concerned  God  and  holy  beings  could  sin;  there  is  need  only 
of  a  change  in  the  inclination  of  their  wills.  Under  a  similar 
condition  devils  and  wicked  men  could  practise  virtue.  But 
hypothetical  possibility  is  consistent  with  actual  impossibil- 
ity; and  so  an  hypothetical  power  of  contrary  choice  is  con- 
sistent with  the  absolute  impossibility  of  such  a  choice.  A 
man  could  make  a  contrary  choice  so  far  as  the  general  ca- 
pacity of  his  intelligence  and  will  are  concerned.  But  this 
choice,  being  conditioned  on  a  change  in  the  inclination  of 
the  will  which  does  not  take  place,  is  actually  impossible. 
The  doctrine  of  the  contrary  choice  asserts  an  unconditional, 
not  an  hypothetical,  ability  to  choose  the  contrary  of  what  is 
actually  chosen;  and  is,  therefore,  an  absurdity.  (Respect- 
ing necessity  and  possibility,  real  and  hypothetical,  see  the 
PERCEPTIONALIST,  Chaps.  XX.,  XXI.) 

8.  If  volitional  liberty  do  not  imply  the  absence  of  compul- 
sory inducements,  or  a  deliverance  from  the  control  of  evil 
habits  and  sinful  tendencies,  or  an  exemption  of  volition  from 
the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  are  we  not  thrown  back  on  the 
definition  of  free  will  already  given,  namely,  that  the  will  is 
free  in  that  its  operations  result  immediately  and  exclusively 
from  its  own  efficiency?  Sometimes  we  speak  of  the  will  as 
being  attracted  by  this  object  or  by  that,  and  as  being  gov- 
erned or  determined  by  inducements.  Such  language  is  figur- 
ative. The  truth  is  that  man  as  a  self-moving  agent  chooses 
or  refuses  objects  or  ends  when  they  are  placed  before  him, 
and  the  whole  efficiency  of  this  action  lies  in  the  man  himself, 
not  in  the  objects  chosen  or  rejected.  The  enticing  power  of 
temptation  and  the  repellent  force  of  pain  lie  not  at  all  in 
those  objects  which  may  produce  gratification  or  distress  but 
solely  in  the  tendencies  of  the  soul  to  seek  pleasure  and  to 
avoid  suffering.  In  this  way  the  will — or  the  man  in  willing 
— is  self-determined  and  free. 

It  cannot,  indeed,  be  said  that  the  primary  and  essential 
action  of  the  will  is  a  determination  to  determine.     That 
would  involve  the  endless  .and  impossible  regression  whh? 
President  Edwards  ridicules.    We  do  not  assert  that  the  will 


336  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

in  every  case  determines  about  its  own  action,  but  only  that, 
in  every  case,  the  will  determines  its  own  action.  Choice 
springs  wholly  from  the  faculty  of  choice;  it  is  not  determined 
by  any  power  outside  of  that.  But  it  is  also  to  be  admitted 
that,  in  addition  to  the  simple  self-determination  of  the  will, 
there  is  a  compound  self-determination,  founded  on  the  sim- 
ple, whereby  the  will — or  the  man — may  determine  to  deter- 
mine itself.  Man  can  contemplate  himself  as  a'  free  agent  and 
can  direct  his  motive  regards  in  such  a  manner  as  to  affect  the 
development  and  exercise  of  his  desires.  In  this  way  man  is 
capable,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  self -guidance  and  self-control. 
This  reflex  operation  of  the  will  continually  mingles  with  its 
primary  action  and  should  be  always  exercised  in  the  behalf 
of  moral  principle.  Such  self-determination  does  not  inter- 
fere with  the  essential  liberty  of  volition.  Presupposing  that 
the  will  acts  according  to  its  own  preference,  it  seeks  to  guide 
that  preference  by  the  suggestion  of  motive  ideas.  This  no 
more  limits  freedom  than  any  mode  of  persuasion  does.  In- 
deed self-control  is  the  condition  of  a  desirable  liberty. 


9.  The  points  already  discussed  are  those  which  have  been 
commonly  debated  in  connection  with  the  question  of  free 
will.  But  a  topic  logically  prior  to  every  other  in  the  philoso- 
phy of  volition  remains  for  consideration.  Attention  to  it 
has  been  deferred  in  order  that  our  explanations  of  volitional 
freedom  might  not  be  charged  with  any  greater  singularity 
than  that  which  really  belongs  to  them.  We  regard  it,  how- 
ever, as  a  matter  for  astonishment  that,  while  there  has  been 
much  dissertation  during  the  past  three  generations  respecting 
the  freedom  of  the  will,  there  has  been  comparatively  little — 
almost  none  at  all — concerning  the  nature  of  the  faculty  it- 
self. Commonly  the  will  is  defined  as  the  faculty  of  choice, 
and  is  then  asserted  to  be  one  of  the  ultimate  or  radical  pow- 
ers of  the  mind ;  after  which  the  laws  of  its  activity  and  the 
question  of  its  freedom  are  discussed.  We  are  persuaded  that 
the  perplexing  philosophy  of  the  will  would  have  been  relieved 
of  some  of  its  obscurity  if  the  essential  nature  of  this  power 
had  been  made  the  subject  of  inquiry. 

Our  definition  of  the  will  as  the  faculty  of  choice  is  derived 
from  common  knowledge  and  stated  in  common  language.  It 
merely  opens  the  way  for  investigation.  The  satisfactory  in- 
terpretation of  it  calls  for  painstaking  thought.  It  is,  how- 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FREE  AGENCY  OF  FREE  WILL.  337 

ever,  sufficient  warrant  for  the  statement  that  the  action  of  the 
will  includes  all  the  activity  of  the  soul  in  choosing.  Some 
express  this  truth  by  saying  that  the  will  is  the  man,  or  the 
soul,  as  choosing  and  as  capable  of  choosing ;  an  assertion  sub- 
stantially correct,  though  one  might  object  to  it  that  a  faculty 
or  power  cannot  be  literally  identified  with  the  substance 
in  which  it  inheres.  The  fact  is  that  we  do  not  assert  an  ab- 
solute identity  but  mean  only  that  the  faculty  of  choice  em- 
braces all  of  human  endowment  that  is  engaged  in  the  act 
of  choice.  Dr.  S.  G.  Burney,  in  his  "  Studies  in  Psychology," 
has  stated  this  point  very  simply  in  the  following  words,  "  To 
say  that  the  man  wills,  that  the  mind  puts  forth  volition,  and 
that  the  will  acts,  are  different  forms  of  expressing  the  same 
thing/' 

10.  We  also  follow  Dr.  Burney  in  using  the  term  "  voli- 
tion "  for  the  action  of  the-  will  or  of  the  man  in  willing. 
This  word  is  sometimes  employed  in  a  more  restricted  appli- 
cation; but,  in  a  broad  sense,  volition  and  choice  are  syn- 
onyms which  present  the  same  thing,  though  from  different 
points  of  view.  Choice  is  the  action  of  the  will  considered  as 
directed  towards  an  object;  volition  the  same  action  consid- 
ered merely  as  proceeding  from  its  appropriate  faculty.  When 
these  words  are  applied  to  things  specifically  different,  choice 
signifies  the  formation  of  purpose  or  determination,  or  the 
purpose  when  formed ;  and  volition  that  act  of  will  which  im- 
mediately precedes  effort,  or  conation.  For  often  we  first 
form  a  resolution  or  purpose  and  afterwards,  renewing  this 
and  adding  to  it  the  judgment  that  the  time  for  effort  has 
come,  act  according  to  it.  Dr.  Burney  characterizes  these  two 
modes  of  the  will's  action  as  the  determinative  and  the  execu- 
tive. Possibly  this  latter  designation  might  be  advanta- 
geously replaced  by  the  term  "  imperative  " ;  because  the  term 
"  executive  "  may  be  judiciously  reserved  for  the  exertion  or 
work,  whether  of  mind  or  of  body,  in  which  purposes  are  car- 
ried out.  This  is  not  volition  but  only  the  consequent  of  voli- 
tion. To  identify  antecedent  with  consequent  here  would  be 
to  confound  willing  with  doing.  We  should,  however,  dis- 
criminate between  the  original  choice  with  its  resultant  state 
of  resolution  and  that  final  volition  in  which  the  original 
choice  is  renewed,  completed  and  terminated.  Both  are  modes 
of  choice  or  volition,  but  the  term  "  choice  "  is  more  frequent- 
ly applied  to  the  original  purpose  and  the  term  "volition" 
more  frequently  to  that  final  exercise  of  will  which -somewhat 

22 


338  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

resembles  an  order  or  command  that  is  to  be  immediately 
obeyed. 

Before  Immanuel  Kant  philosophers  assigned  to  the  soul 
only  two  general  faculties,  the  understanding  and  the  will,  in- 
cluding in  this  last  the  faculty  of  desire.  "  Kant,"  says  Presi- 
dent Porter,  "  introduced  the  three-fold  classification  adopted 
by  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton,  which  recognizes  the  phenomena  of 
knowledge,  of  feeling,  and  of  will,  and  giving  the  intellectual, 
the  emotive,  and  the  conative,  or  impelling,  faculties."  This 
division  does  not  distinguish  will  from  desire,  on  the  one 
hand,  or  from  exertion,  on  the  other ;  and  so  is  not  conducive 
to  clear  thinking.  Dr.  Porter  adds :  "  Professor  Thomas  C. 
Upham  was  the  first  English  writer  who  distinctly  adopted 
the  three-fold  classification  of  the  powers  of  the  soul  into  in- 
tellect, sensibility  and  will."  (MORAL  SCIENCE,  p.  59.)  Up- 
ham, however,  and  later  writers  who  adopt  that  classification, 
distinguish  volition  both  from  thought  and  from  desire, 
though  not  from  effort  or  exertion;  and  it  is  commonly 
taught,  also,  that  volition  is  a  simple  and  ultimate  mode  of 
psychical  action. 

11.  We  believe  that  the  philosophers  of  the  present  day 
make  a  mistake  in  regarding  the  will  as  an  ultimate  and  sim- 
ple power.  They  are  right  in  treating  it  as  a  distinct  faculty. 
It  is  a  power  which  performs  a  definite  work  of  its  own  and 
which  is  distinguishable  from  intellect,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
from  motivity,  on  the  other.  But  they  fail  to  consider  the 
question  whether  the  will  may  not  be  a  complex  faculty,  and 
volition  a  compound  resultant  of  the  action  of  intellect  and 
motivity.  The  affirmative  answer  to  this  question  seems  to  us 
supported  by  the  analysis  of  experience.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that 
every  choice  or  purpose  includes,  as  a  part  of  its  very  self,  the 
conception  of  some  object  to  be  sought  and  a  judgment  con- 
cerning the  means  necessary  for  its  attainment  ?  Is  it  not  also 
clear  that  the  strength  of  a  determination  or  resolution  con- 
sists in  the  general  desire  for  the  chosen  object  which  follows 
upon  the  previous  play  of  undetermined  motivity,  and  which 
is  compounded  from  those  desires  which  have  become  domi- 
nant ?  Undoubtedly  the  motivity  of  volition  differs  strikingly 
from  ordinary  desire.  It  is  more  stable,  less  emotional,  less 
distributed  among  ends,  and  more  closely  related  to  means. 
Yet  it  has  radically  the  same  nature.  It  is  like  steam  gener- 
ated from  its  latency  in  cold  water  and  carried  hither  and 
thither  through  flues  and  pipes,  and  which  now  finds  itself  at 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FREE  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  339 

work  in  the  cylinder  of  the  locomotive ;  or  like  electricity,  no 
longer  moving  in  waves  and  currents  over  the  surface  of  the 
earth  or  gathering  in  clouds  and  flashing  across  the  sky,  but 
collected  in  dynamos  and  motors  and  accomplishing  an  allot- 
ted task. 

The  older  writers  of  philosophy  perceived  the  radical  iden- 
tity of  the  faculty  of  choice  with  the  faculty  of  motive  feeling. 
They  recognize  wishing  and  willing — or  desire  and  volition— 
as  two  activities  of  one  general  power,  the  voluntas.  For  ex- 
ample, President  Edwards,  in  his  "  Treatise  concerning  Kelig- 
ious  Affections"  (Part  I.  p.  1),  says,  "  God  has  endowed  the 
soul  with  two  principal  faculties — the  one  ...  by  which  it 
discerns  and  judges  of  things;  which  is  called  the  understand- 
ing; the  other  ...  by  which  the  soul  beholds  things,  not  as 
an  indifferent,  unaffected  spectator,  but  either  as  liking  or  dis- 
liking, pleased  or  displeased,  approving  or  rejecting.  This 
faculty  is  called  by  various  names ;  it  is  sometimes  called  the 
inclination,  and,  as  it  respects  the  actions  that  are  determined 
by  it,  the  will.  .  .  .  The  affections  are  not  essentially  distinct 
from  the  will,  nor  do  they  differ  from  the  mere  actings  of 
the  will  and  inclination  but  only  in  the  liveliness  and  sensi- 
bility of  exercise/'  President  Edwards  uses  the  term  "  affec- 
tion "  for  motive  tendency  in  general.  Evidently  the  faculty 
which  he  describes,  which  "beholds  things,"  which  is  mani- 
fested in  "  liking  and  disliking  "  and  which,  "  as  it  respects 
the  actions  that  are  determined  by  it "  is  called  the  will,  is 
man's  general  endowment  of  desire  or  impulse. 

12.  It  is,  however,  to  be  remarked  that  in  addition  to  those 
desires  which  are  excited  by  objects  and  ends,  special  modes  of 
motivity  operate  in  view  of  the  action  requisite  for  the  attain- 
ment of  such  objects  as  may  gain  our  preference.  These  spe- 
cial impulses  have  the  peculiarity  of  relating  to  the  conduct  of 
one's  self  as  a  personal  agent.  How  often  do  we  speak  of  de- 
cision, or  decisiveness,  of  stability  of  purpose,  of  determina- 
tion, of  preseverance,  of  carefulness,  of  self-control,  of  ad- 
herence to  duty,  as  things  which  we  must  realize  in  conduct ! 
The  dispositions  which  aim  at  and  produce  these  qualities  of 
action,  and  wherein  we  deal  with  ourselves  as  persons,  enter  as 
special  factors  into  volition.  They  belong  to  will  as  a  faculty 
of  reflex  self-determination,  and  distinguish  the  full  exercise 
of  this  power  from  every  other  development  of  motivity.  The 
man  in  whom  these  dispositions  are  active  is  described  as  hav- 
ing a  forcible  character  or  a  strong  will,  while  another  is  spok- 


340  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

en  of  as  weak  in  character  and  will.  We  therefore  concede  to 
President  Porter  that  the  will,  as  a  specific  faculty,  contains 
elements  over  and  above  those  of  definite  thought  and  desire 
respecting  objects  and  the  means  for  their  attainment.  (MOR- 
AL SCIENCE,  sections  23,  24.)  But  we  say  that  these  added 
elements  are  themselves  modes  of  intelligent  motive  tendency. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the  will,  as  modified  by  these 
practical  dispositions,  exercises  a  power  whereby  its  own  ac- 
tion is  often  settled,  or  made  determinate.  This  power  is  not 
that  either  of  intellect  or  motivity,  but  of  effort  or  exertion. 
Its  working  in  the  economy  of  volition  is  analogous  to  that  of 
attention  in  the  economy  of  thought.  As  attention  is  not 
memory,  perception,  reason,  imagination,  nor  any  other  kind 
of  thinking  but  a  sort  of  service  which  the  conative  faculty 
performs  for  the  intellect,  and  which  in  this  secondary  way, 
becames  a  nintellectual  function,  so  that  effort  or  nisus  of  the 
spirit  whereby  our  minds  cease  from  further  debate  and  be- 
come fixed  upon  a  considered  object  and  course  of  conduct,  is 
a  contribution  which  the  conative  faculty  makes  to  the  faculty 
of  will.  We  may  form  a  preference  or  spontaneous  choice 
without  any  such  exertion,  but  such  effort  is  called  for  when 
alternative  objects  contend  with  each  other  for  our  adoption. 
In  such  cases  the  soul,  acting  on  reasons  and  seeing  the  neces- 
sity for  decision,  drops  the  consideration  of  some  objects  and 
settles  definitely  upon  others.  The  efficiency  which  man  thus 
puts  forth  in  his  own  self -guidance,  is  evidently  different  from 
that  executive  power  which  he  afterwards  employs  for  the 
realization  of  his  plans.  It  has  an  important,  though  a  sub- 
ordinate place,  in  the  faculty  of  choice.  It  is  a  necessary  ele- 
ment of  fully  developed  volition,  as  attention  is  of  effective 
intellectual  activity.  But  it  is  not  the  controlling  factor  in 
the  act  of  choice.  That  factor  can  be  found  only  in  the  exer- 
cise of  intelligent  motivity. 

The  theory  of  volition  which  has  now  been  presented  makes 
little  claim  to  originality.  It  is  essentially  a  reversion  to  the 
doctrine  commonly  held  till  within  the  last  fifty  or  sixty  years. 
It  defines  the  will  as  the  resultant  of  all  of  man's  motive  na- 
ture, and  asserts  that  this  conception  of  the  faculty  contrib- 
utes to  a  clear  understanding  of  free  moral  agency. 

13.  The  affinity  of  will  as  a  general  faculty  to  the  capability 
of  determinate  desire  is  witnessed  by  common  language,  in 
which  one  who  acts  "  according  to  his  wishes  "  is  said  to  act 
"  willingly,"  while  one  who  is  compelled  to  act  "  contrary  to 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FREE  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  341 

his  wish  "  is  said  to  act  "  against  his  will."  Willing,  here,  is 
nearly  synonymous  with  wishing.  Indeed,  the  "  will }>  of  which 
moral  quality  may  be  predicated  is  a  comprehensive  faculty. 
It  embraces  not  only  that  definite  adoption  of  an  object  and  of 
a  method  for  its  realization  which  we  commonly  call  choice 
but  also  our  determinate  desire  for  an  object  while  we  may 
be  yet  ignorant  of  its  exact  description  and  of  any  means  for 
its  attainment.  Some  say  that  this  definite  settled  desire, 
this  willingness,  this  "  readiness  to  will,"  is  itself  a  kind  of 
choice  Or  preference;  and  such  a  statement  is  not  to  be  con- 
demned. But  evidently  it  is  allowable  only  because  the  will  or 
faculty  of  choice  may  be  taken  in  a  broad  sense  for  the  total  of 
man's  motive  nature  as  acting  determinately,  whether  it  issue 
in  the  choice  of  a  particular  object  and  course  of  effort  or 
not.  Certainly,  so  far  as  morals  are  concerned,  the  essence  of 
the  will  is  simply  determinate  desire.  Hence  Moses,  wishing 
that  the  Children  of  Israel  should  act  virtuously  in  every  do- 
nation for  the  tabernacle,  said,  "Whosoever  is  of  a  willing 
heart,  let  him  bring  it  an  offering  to  the  Lord  " ;  and  the 
Apostle  Paul,  speaking  of  the  liberality  of  Christians,  says, 
"If  there  be  first  a  willing  mind  iepo0u/jLta)  it  is  accepted 
according  to  that  a  man  hath  and  not  according  to  that  he 
hath  not."  The  essence  of  virtue  is  this  will — that  is,  this  in- 
telligent, determinate,  controlling  desire — for  the  realization 
of  the  right. 

14.  In  order,  however,  to  avoid  misunderstanding  in  con- 
nection with  this  subject,  we  must  not  forget  that  narrower 
sense  of  the  word  "  will  "  in  which  the  term  sets  forth  a  power 
the  freedom  of  which  is  not  contemplated  in  the  present  dis- 
cussion. Man's  rational  and  moral  "  will,"  sometimes  called 
his  "  better  nature  "  or  his  "  true  self,"  does  not  include  all 
of  his  motive  nature  as  employed  in  choice  or  in  determinate 
desire,  but  only  his  motive  disposition  so  far  as  it  may  exhibit 
the  leadership  of  principle.  There  is  also  an  evil  "  will " 
which  seeks  to  enforce  its  own  sinful  predominance,  and  with 
which  our  better  nature — our  nobler  will — contends.  Either 
of  these  wills  may  be  subdued  by  the  other  while  yet  the  gen- 
eral faculty  of  choice  is  free.  For  since  the  subjection  either 
of  the  righteous  or  of  the  sinful  will  does  not  result  from  phys- 
ical force  but  from  the  prevalence  of  the  other  will  within 
the  soul,  man  still  acts  freely  from  the  totality  of  his  motive 
nature.  The  apostolic  statements  "  I  cannot  do  that  which  7 
would  "  and  "  when  I  would  do  good  evil  is  present  with  me," 


342  THE  MOEAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

relate  to  the  rational  will  and  not  to  the  general  faculty  of 
preference. 

15.  The  doctrine  that  choice  is  compounded  of  intellect  and 
motivity  throws  a  light  on  free  agency  which  cannot  be  ob- 
tained from  the  theory  of  a  will  which  is  not  the  outcome  of 
intelligence  and  desire.  President  Porter  teaches  truly  that 
the  free  is  the  voluntary  considered  not  simply  in  itself  but 
as  opposed  to  the  non-voluntary  and  the  involuntary.  We  can 
understand  this  if  the  voluntary  be  the  determinate  exercise  of 
motivity ;  for  we  can  see  how  volition,  as  the  working  of  man's 
motive  nature  from  its  own  efficiency,  is  self-determined.  We 
can  see,  also,  how  the  full  exercise  of  will  shows  a  double  self- 
determination ;  because  not  only  ends  and  methods  are  con- 
sidered but  also  the  reasons  for  "  making  up  one's  mind,"  that 
is,  for  decision  without  delay,  and  for  practical  exertion  if  the 
time  for  exertion  has  come.  But  when  we  are  told  that  man's 
will  does  not  follow  its  own  thinkings  and  desirings,  and  that 
it  is  a  mysterious,  unreasoning,  self-determining  power,  we  are 
bewildered.  We  ask,  Is  there  such  a  power?  And,  if  there 
were  such  a  power,  what  morality — what  merit  or  demerit — 
could  attach  to  the  exercise  of  it  ?  It  is  clear  that  only  an  in- 
telligent motive  will  can  act  rationally  and  morally. 

Our  conception  of  the  choice  faculty  explains  also  how  hu- 
man conduct  is  predictable,  and  how,  in  certain  circum- 
stances, it  may  even  be  foretold  with  certainty.  Man's  motive 
disposition,  operating  determinately  and  subject  to  man's  own 
direction,  does  not  act  without  law  but  is  a  law  unto  itself. 
One's  conduct  from  day  to  day  and  from  hour  to  hour  varies 
with  the  workings  of  his  volitional  nature.  But  this  nature, 
though  it  may  be  changed,  never  changes  without  a  cause ;  it 
abides  the  same.  Hence  we  can  say  beforehand,  "  The  lib- 
eral man  will  devise  liberal  things;  the  wicked  will  do  wick- 
edly; the  deceitful  will  act  deceitfully;  the  coward  will  show 
cowardice ;  the  honest  man  will  discharge  his  obligations ;  and 
the  pious  man  will  fear  God  and  keep  his  commandments." 
How  often  speaking  of  our  intimate  acquaintances  we  express 
absolute  confidence  respecting  the  way  in  which  they  will  con- 
duct themselves !  And  when,  as  often  happens,  we  find  our- 
selves mistaken,  we  ascribe  our  error  to  our  defective  knowl- 
edge of  the  disposition  and  circumstances  of  the  agent.  But 
were  it  possible  to  perceive  all  the  inward  springs  of  one's  ac- 
tivity and  to  estimate  their  varying  operations  under  the 
changeful  conditions  of  his  life,  we  judge  that  the  particular 


CHAP.  XXVIII.]     FREE  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  34.3 

deeds  of  individuals  might  be  foretold  as  accurately  as  their 
general  course  of  hebavior.  Hence  also  we  say,  that  the  Di- 
vine Being  has  a  perfect  foreknowledge  of  human  conduct. 

16.  This  prescience  of  events,  however,  does  not  necessitate 
them,  nor  even  cause  them  to  be  certain.  It  presupposes  their 
certainty  and  follows  upon  it.  God's  foreknowledge  does  not 
prove  that  human  volition  is  produced  by  any  agency  external 
to  man's  own  faculty  of  choice.  If  the  will  act  from  its  own 
efficiency  alone  and  according  to  its  own  law,  an  infinite  in- 
telligence may  perceive  how  a  man  will  conduct  himself  under 
any  given  circumstances.  Human  prescience  is  consistent 
with  free-agency ;  so  is  God's  foreknowledge.  Moreover  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  God's  vision  of  the  future  is  not 
correlated  with  the  antecedents  of  that  future.  He  not  only 
sees  the  end,  but  he  sees  the  end  from  the  beginning.  The 
"  punctum  stans  " — the  present  which  includes  an  eternity 
past  and  an  eternity  to  come,  is  merely  a  figurative  and  para- 
doxical device  to  support  the  statement  that  the  divine  knowl- 
edge of  all  things  is  as  perfect  as  that  of  immediate  intuition. 
God's  omniscience  is  an  intelligence  which  penetrates  the  pos- 
sible and  the  future  just  as  his  immensity  and  omnipotence 
comprehend  the  present  and  the  actual.  But  it  leaves  human 
freedom  untouched.  It  gives  no  reason  to  believe  that  man's 
volitions  are  necessitated  in  the  same  way  as  physical  events 
are  necessitated.  It  shows  only  that  man's  conduct  may  be 
infallibly  predicted  by  one  whose  knowledge  concerning  the 
laws  and  the  circumstances  of  human  life  is  absolute  and  un- 
limited. 

Nevertheless,  at  this  point  it  may  be  asked,  //  the  human 
will,  though  free  from  external  causation,  is  itself  a  cause 
which  operates  according  to  law,  is  there  not  here,  after  all,  a 
species  of  necessity  ?  Is  it  not  impossible  that  the  will  should 
not  act,  and  therefore  necessary  that  it  should  act,  according 
to  its  own  nature  and  law  ?  Those  who  answer  these  inquiries 
affirmatively  have  been  called  Necessitarians,  and  those  who 
give  a  negative  answer  have  been  styled  Libertarians ;  though 
both  parties  assert  the  freedom  of  the  will  and  deny  that  there 
is  any  fatalistic  necessity.  Contentions  on  this  subject  are  not 
likely  to  cease  very  soon,  but  they  arise  somewhat  from  differ- 
ences in  the  use  of  terms.  If  the  necessary  be  that  which  will 
take  place  no  matter  what  one's  disposition  may  be  and  which 
must  take  place  though  one's  will  be  opposed  to  it,  there  is  no 
necessity  in  voluntary  action,  but  only  a  certainty.  But  if 


344  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVIII. 

whatever  follows  inevitably  under  given  conditions  be  neces- 
sary, and  necessity  be  any  connection  of  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent which  may  be  a  ground  of  certainty,  then  there  is  a 
kind  of  necessity  here.  Every  choice  or  volition  being  the  re- 
sultant of  the  total  activity  of  man's  motive  nature,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  any  action  contrary  to  the  totality  of  one's  nature 
would  be  impossible  for  him ;  and  that  man  must  choose  as  he 
chooses.  The  necessity  thus  described  is  not  opposed  to  the 
voluntary  and  the  free.  It  is  a  necessity  that  the  will  should 
be  free  and  should  act  freely,  because,  while  there  is  no  exter- 
nal power  to  prevent  volition,  all  the  power  in  man  himself 
is  employed  in  its  production. 

The  question,  however,  recurs,  Should  the  term  necessity  be 
applied  to  this  inseparable  connection  between  man's  motive 
nature  and  his  conduct  ?  We  confess  that  we  can  find  no  bet- 
ter word,  nor  indeed  any  so  appropriate.  Therefore,  in  a  mild 
way,  we  accept  the  necessitarian  name.  At  the  same  time  we 
have  no  blame  for  those  who  maintain  that  the  will  is  not  sub- 
ject to  any  necessity  and  who  yet  believe  that  choice  does  not 
take  place  in  a  haphazard,  accidental  way,  but  according  to 
law  and  with  certainty.  This  is  the  position  of  some  who  deny 
that  they  are  necessitarians,  but  who  would  admit  that  they 
are  "  determinists"  such  as  the  venerable  Dr.  Charles  Hodge ; 
and  even  of  some  who  call  themselves  "  libertarians,"  such  as 
the  late  Dr.  S.  G.  Burney,  the  able  professor  of  theology  in  the 
Cumberland  Presbyterian  church. 

17.  Our  discussion  may  conclude  with  a  few  remarks  con- 
cerning the  relatedness  of  the  human  will  to  the  divine. 
Christians  commonly  believe  that  man's  voluntary  life  can  be, 
and  is,  affected  by  the  gracious  influence  of  God.  Perhaps  the 
following  positions  on  this  subject  may  be  accepted  as  reason- 
able. In  the  first  place,  God,  at  the  beginning,  created  man 
and  endowed  him  with  intellect  and  will.  Therefore,  al- 
though man  acts  as  a  "  first  cause,"  inasmuch  as  the  efficiency 
determning  his  volitions  lies  wholly  in  himself,  he  is  not  an 
absolutely  first  cause.  He  is  a  self -moving  cause  brought  into 
being  by  the  First  Cause  of  all.  In  the  second  place;  God 
created  man  holy  and  with  a  will  entirely  inclined  to  good. 
But,  by  reason  of  the  weakness  of  a  finite  nature,  man  was 
fallible.  Under  the  influence  of  a  powerful  tempter  our  rep- 
resentative parent  fell  into  an  estate  of  sin  and  misery.  Thus 
moral  evil,  which  entered  the  world  without  divine  interven- 
tion, is  the  perversion  of  a  life  originally  faultless.  And  in 


CHAP.  XXVIII.J     FREE  AGENCY  OR  FREE  WILL.  345 

the  third  place;  while  grace  never  injures  souls,  it  often 
changes  them  for  the  better.  For  God,  who  at  the  first  made 
man  in  his  own  image,  can  create  him  anew  in  righteousness 
and  true  holiness.  Such  a  transformation  is  not  the  destruc- 
tion of  man's  will,  but  a  restoration  of  its  excellence — a  res- 
toration intended  to  be  permanent. 

18.  The  foregoing  theory  of  volition  asserts  a  kind  of  ne- 
cessity but  also  adopts  some  libertarian  ideas  and  is  very  far 
removed  from  fatalism.  In  certain  respects  it  occupies  a  mid- 
dle ground ;  yet  it  is  not  a  compromise  between  opinions.  It 
is  the  product  of  analytic  rather  than  of  eclectic  thought. 


CHAPTEK  XXIX. 

PERSONALITY. 

1.  Personality  is  assumed  in  all  ethical  thought.  The  denial  or  mis- 
conception of  it  is  a  source  of  error. — 2.  A  person  is  (1)  an  en- 
during spiritual  substance,  endowed  with  (2)  individuality,  (3) 
rationality,  (4)  self-consciousness,  and  (5)  motive  dispositions. 
The  personality  of  madmen.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.— 3. 
The  definitions  of  St.  Thomas  and  Boethius,  of  Mr.  Locke,  and  of 
Professor  Janet,  discussed. — 4.  Free-will  or  free  agency  is  pri- 
marily and  preeminently  the  freedom  of  the  person  who  has  the 
will. — 5.  Actions  are  right  or  wrong  only  as  related  to  personal- 
ity. On  this  ground  also,  but  in  another  relation,  they  are  vir- 
tuous and  vicious.  Hence  the  origin  of  two  modes  of  moral  appro- 
bation and  disapprobation  becomes  evident.  Martineau  criti- 
cized.— 6.  Judgments  of  merit  and  demerit  explained.  Hickok 
criticized. — 7.  Moral  responsibility  defined.  The  word  "  duty  "  as 
applied  to  a  relation  signifies  the  moral  obligation  of  persons.  As 
applied  to  personal  conduct  the  word  has  two  meanings,  (1)  the 
obligated,  (2)  the  obligatory. — 8.  Motive  character  is  the  impor- 
tant aspect  of  personality.  It  is  the  origin  of  free-  will,  the  condi- 
tion of  virtue  and  vice,  and  the  basis  of  moral  responsibility. 
Prof.  George  S.  Fullerton  quoted. 

1.  PERSONALITY  is  a  fundamental  assumption  in  morals. 
The  ideas  of  freedom,  reason,  will  and  choice,  of  right  and 
wrong,  of  virtue  and  vice,  of  approbation  and  disapprobation, 
of  merit,  demerit,  reward  and  punishment,  of  duty,  and  of 
responsibility,  would  be  robbed  of  significance  if  man  were  not 
a  person.  The  very  fact  that  personality  is  a  universal  ele- 
ment of  rational  life  tends  to  bring  this  important  character- 
istic into  neglect.  As  material  substances  are  often  assumed 
without  mention  in  statements  respecting  force  and  its  opera- 
tions, so  the  spiritual  substance  is  often  silently  supposed  in 
assertions  regarding  the  laws  and  workings  of  psychical  pow- 
ers. Such  abstract  language  originates  from  the  convenience 
of  leaving  unmentioned  what  must  be  necessarily  understood. 
But  we  must  not  be  misled  by  it  into  attributing  a  separate 
existence  to  the  abstractions  mentioned.  Virtue  and  vice,  rea- 
346 


CHAP.  XXIX.]  PERSONALITY.  34.7 

son,  character  and  will,  are  only  different  phases  of  the  life  of 
persons. 

In  common  affairs,  and  while  in  contact  with  realities,  men 
think  accurately  enough  without  defining  their  conceptions. 
This  is  not  the  case  when  theorizers  are  using  ideas  to  con- 
struct a  system.  The  speculative  inquirer  who  does  not  care- 
fully determine  what  his  conceptions  represent,  is  certain  to  be 
involved  in  confusion,  if  not  in  error.  Moreover,  our  first  defi- 
nitions should  explicate  that  thought  which  belongs  to  the 
ordinary  use  of  terms.  One  should  lay  aside  all  preconcep- 
tions and  should  direct  his  scrutiny  to  the  object,  or  class  of 
objects,  which  men  have  before  them  when  they  speak  a  given 
word.  That  word  may  afterwards  be  employed  in  some  pe- 
culiar or  technical  sense ;  but  it  should  first  be  given  its  ordi- 
nary meaning.  Then,  if  it  is  to  have  a  technical  signification, 
this  too  should  be  defined ;  and  sufficient  reason  should  be  giv- 
en for  the  departure  from  common  usage. 

2.  The  following  definition  of  a  person  is  derived  from  the 
analysis  of  ordinary  thought :  A  person  is  an  enduring  spirit- 
ual being  endowed  with  individuality,  rationality,  self-con- 
sciousness, and  motive  disposition.  No  material  substance  can 
be  a  person  though  the  body  within  which  the  soul  dwells,  as 
the  outward  instrument  and  representative  of  its  occupant,  is 
sometimes  called  "one's  person."  Only  a  spiritual  being  can 
be  such  a  person  as  that  of  which  we  now  speak;  and  even  a 
disembodied  spirit  may  be  such  a  person.  Again,  a  person  is 
a  unit— an  individual.  The  idea  of  unity  seems  to  originate 
in  the  consciousness  of  one's  own  existence.  So  far  as  obser- 
vation goes,  every  physical  substance  can  be  separated  into 
parts ;  the  ultimate  atom  has  not  yet  been  discovered ;  therefore 
divisibility  is  regarded  as  a  primary  quality  of  matter.  But 
spirit  asserts  itself  to  be  a  monad.  Though  possessing  a  com- 
plex nature  it  is  conscious  that  its  various  powers  reside  in  a 
single  substance.  Sometimes  in  legal  language  an  incorpo- 
rated company  is  called  a  person,  but  this  is  a  secondary  form 
of  speech  <and  signifies  merely  that  a  certain  aggregate  or  or- 
ganization of  men  is,  in  some  respects,  to  be  dealt  with  in  the 
same  way  as  the  individual  and  literal  person  is  dealt  with. 

A  person,  also,  in  common  with  all  other  substances,  whether 
spiritual  or  material,  has  a  protracted  existence;  it  is  not 
transitory  like  a  thought  or  an  action.  Though  this  is  not  a 
prominent  element  in  our  conception  of  personality,  it  is  al- 
ways present.  Our  first  knowledge  of  time  as  a  continuous 


348  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIX. 

kind  of  entity  undoubtedly  is  obtained  in  connection  with 
the  perception  of  our  own  enduring  states  <and  of  that  yet 
more  enduring  self,  or  substance,  which  is  the  subject  of  those 
states.  This  immediate  cognition  of  the  abiding  ego  is  the 
beginning  of  memory  and  of  the  knowledge  of  one's  personal 
identity.  The  consciousness  of  one's  identity  during  a  brief 
continued  present  prepares  the  soul  to  assert  its  own  unbroken 
existence  notwithstanding  interruptions  in  the  consciousness 
of  living.  At  all  events  the  perception  of  one's  continued  ex- 
istence is  an  acknowledged  attribute  of  personality.  (Com- 
pare the  chapter  on  Consciousness  in  the  PERCEPTIONALIST.) 

In  the  next  place,  although  the  spirits  of  brutes  have  a  pro- 
tracted existence,  the  term  "  person  "  is  reserved  for  a  higher 
order  of  beings — that  is,  for  spirits  endowed  with  reason.  No 
creature  who  is  incapable  of  understanding  the  laws  of  moral 
and  social  life  and  of  intelligently  conforming  to  them  is  a 
person;  no  horse  or  ox  has  personality.  When  lunatics  and 
madmen  are  included  among  persons,  it  is  understood  that 
they  have  a  rational  nature,  though  this  may  be  undeveloped 
or  deranged.  Their  personality  is  in  posse  rather  than  in  esse; 
therefore  they  are  not  treated  according  to  the  rules  made  for 
persons.  Evidently,  also,  self-consciousness — the  faculty  cog- 
nizant of  one's  own  existence,  doings,  and  powers  of  doing — is 
an  element  of  personality.  It  is  incredible  that  any  rational 
being  should  not  be  aware  of  his  own  existence  and  of  his 
own  powers  and  their  operations.  Yet  some  philosophers  be- 
lieve that  the  mind  which  has  filled  the  universe  with  evi- 
dences of  a  marvelous  wisdom  and  knowledge  is  ignorant  of 
itself;  they  formulate  for  us  the  idea  of  an  impersonal  pan- 
theistic substance.  Such  a  conception  is  irrational  in  the  ex- 
treme. God  must  be  a  person  just  as  man  is  a  person,  except 
only  that  his  infinite  intelligence  must  yield  a  more  perfect 
self-knowledge  than  any  created  being  can  possess.  But  the 
divine  personality  of  which  we  now  speak  signifies  only  that 
God  is  a  self-conscious,  spiritual  substance.  It  does  not  refer 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity — that  there  are  three  persons  in 
one  God.  The  assertion  of  three  personal  lives  in  one  sub- 
stance introduces  a  kind  or  style  of  person  not  inconsistent 
with  that  at  present  considered,  yet  different  from  it.  The 
ordinary  person  has  one  conscious  life  resident  in  one  sub- 
stance. 

Finally,  the  possession  of  motive  character  is  a  part  of  per- 
sonality. Possibly  a  purely  intellectual  being  conscious  of  his 


CHAP.  XXIX.]  PERSONALITY.  349 

own  activity  as  a  thinking  agent  but  devoid  of  motive  ten- 
dency might  be  imagined ;  and  such  a  being  might  be  called  a 
person.  But  he  would  not  be  a  person  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  the  term.  He  would  be  incapable  of  virtue  and  vice,  be- 
cause these  are  motive  dispositions.  He  would  be  without 
will  whether  as  the  faculty  of  definite  choice  or  in  the  broader 
sense  as  the  power  of  determinate  desire.  He  would  be  insen- 
sible to  the  calls  of  duty,  interest,  passion  or  affection.  In 
short,  he  would  not  be  a  person  in  the  sense  required  by  moral 
science.  Indeed,  so  far  as  etymology  is  concerned,  the  word 
person  ("per-sona")  sets  forth  motive  character  more  than 
any  other  attribute  of  rational  beings.  Originally  the  persona 
was  the  mask  through  which  the  actor  sounded  forth  the 
words  of  his  part.  Then  it  came  to  designate  the  fictitious 
personage  represented.  After  that  it  was  applied  to  existing 
individuals  as  having  each  a  character  of  his  own. 

For  all  the  world's  a  stage, 

And  all  the  men  and  women  merely  players. 

As  You  LIKE  IT,  II.,  7. 

3.  A  person,  then,  is  an  enduring  spiritual  being,  individ- 
ual, rational,  self-conscious  and  endowed  with  motive  dispo- 
sitions. Possibly  other  points  might  be  mentioned ;  these  are 
the  essential  characteristics.  It  might  be  said  that  every  per- 
son is  a  moral  being,  but  this  is  involved  in  rationality,  self- 
consciousness  and  the  capacity  of  motive  action.  Indeed,  if 
we  remember  that  reason  has  a  practical  as  well  as  an  intel- 
lectual function,  a  person  might  be  briefly  defined  as  a  spirit 
endowed  with  reason.  The  pecularities  of  personality  arise 
from  the  possession  of  this  power.  One  cannot  disapprove  of 
the  teachings  of  Boethius  and  of  St.  Thomas,  who  said  that 
a  person  is  a  rational  substance  (subsiantia  rationalis),  or  an 
individual  substance  of  a  rational  nature  (rationalis  natures 
individua  substantia).  Mr.  Locke,  also,  says  admirably, 
"  Person  stands  for  a  thinking,  intelligent  being  that  has  rea- 
son and  reflection  and  can  consider  itself  as  itself,  the  same 
thinking  being  in  different  times  and  places."  (  ESSAY,  II., 
27,  Section  9.) 

This  conception  of  a  person  is  the  ordinary  conception  of 
the  rational  self.  Now  should  one  enlarge  this  idea  by  adding 
to  it  that  character  of  excellence  which  every  person  should 
seek  to  realize,  and  should  he  say  that  man's  great  duty  is  to 
develop  his  own  personality — his  true  selfhood — we  might 


350  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIX. 

question  the  perspicuity  of  such  language,  yet  we  could  not 
deny  that  one  should  strive  for  his  own  excellence;  especially 
for  his  own  moral  excellence.  But  should  one  go  farther  and 
say  that  the  reason  for  self-cultivation  is  not  the  best  develop- 
ment of  ourselves  as  individual  rational  beings  but  the  devel- 
opment of  ourselves  as  parts  of  an  omnipresent  spirit,  we 
would  ask  whether  such  a  doctrine  be  consistent  with  con- 
sciousness and  with  common  sense.  We  cannot  accept  the 
teachings  of  Janet,  who  says,  "  The  person  is  not  the  indi- 
vidual. The  individual  is  composed  of  all  the  special  acci- 
dents which  distinguish  one  man  from  another.  .  .  .  The  per- 
son is  the  consciousness  of  the  impersonal — the  spirit." 
(THEORY  OF  MORALS,  PREFACE,  VII.)  These  statements  are 
affected  with  pantheistic  absurdity.  The  person  is  the  indi- 
vidual; and  is  no  less  a  person  because  he  has  peculiarities  of 
his  own  as  well  as  a  nature  in  which  he  resembles  others. 
Moreover,  the  person  is  not  "  consciousness  "  but  the  being  en- 
dowed with  consciousness;  and  the  principal  things  of  which 
he  is  conscious  are  not  "  impersonal "  but  his  own  existence 
and  his  own  powers  and  their  operations.  We  acknowledge 
our  most  intimate  dependence  upon  God — that  in  him  we  live 
and  move  and  have  our  being.  Nevertheless  we  are  moral  be- 
ings not  as  parts  of  God  but  as  his  creatures,  and  as  having 
separate  personal  existence  of  our  own. 

4.  That  morality  is  a  development  of  personal  life  should 
be  constantly  borne  in  mind  and  allowed  to  qualify  every  eth- 
ical conception.     For  example,  the  liberty  essential  to  moral 
action  and  commonly  called  "  freedom  of  the  will  "  is  literally 
freedom  of  the  person — of  the  agent.    It  is  called  "  free  will  " 
in  order  to  indicate  the  part  of  human  nature  to  which  it  is 
attached.    The  agent  is  free  because,  in  the  exercise  of  his  vo- 
litional power  and  in  the  presence  of  inducements,  he  is  self- 
active  and  cannot  be  prevented  from  this  self-activity  except 
by  causes  which  remove  or  destroy  the  possibility  of  his  will- 
ing. The  same  doctrine  is  taught  when  man  is  called  a  free- 
agent,  but  not  so  unequivocally;  for  this  expression  does  not 
expressly  locate  the  freedom. 

5.  Again,  our  conceptions  of  the  right  and  the  wrong  and 
of  the  virtuous  and  the  vicious  become  clearer  and  more  exact 
when  connected  with  the  idea  of  personality.   The  distinctions 
between  virtue  and  vice,  on  the  one  hand,  and  between  right 
and  wrong,  on  the  other,  are  sometimes  treated  as  if  they 
were  one  and  the  same  distinction,  whereas  we  can  only  say 


CHAP.  XXIX.]  PERSONALITY. 

that  for  some  purposes  they  are  equivalent.  For  instance, 
ethics  might  be  defined  either  as  the  science  of  right  and 
wrong  or  as  the  science  of  virtue  and  vice.  Right  and  wrong 
are  the  primary  objects  of  moral  judgment  and  choice,  while 
virtue  and  vice  are  primarily  personal  dispositions,  and  only 
after  that,  and  secondarily,  objects  of  aim  and  effort.  It 
would  not,  therefore,  express  the  truth  to  say  that  all  moral 
life  consists  in  the  pursuit  of  virtue  and  the  avoidance  of  vice, 
unless  one  should  employ  the  words  virtue  and  vice  in  part 
metonymically  and  so  as  to  include  the  objects  which  these 
dispositions  have  in  view;  which  is  sometimes  done  in  common 
speech.  Speaking  literally,  as  we  should  speak  in  philosophy, 
the  primary  objects  of  moral  aim  and  avoidance  are  the  right 
and  the  wrong. 

In  this  connection  two  modes  of  moral  approbation  and  dis- 
approbation claim  our  attention.  For  we  may  approve  or 
disapprove  of  personal  actions,  together  with  the  ends  which 
they  seek  to  realize,  as  being  right  or  wrong,  or  of  personal 
actions,  together  with  the  dispositions  from  which  they  spring, 
as  being  virtuous  or  vicious.  The  essential  object  of  the  one 
kind  of  approbation  and  disapprobation  is  the  end  to  be  ac- 
complished as  being  right  or  wrong;  that  of  the  other  is  the 
animus  from  which  the  action  proceeds  as  being  virtuous  or 
vicious.  Approbation  of  the  first  kind  was  in  the  mind  of 
the  poet  when  he  wrote : 

"  Video  meliora,  proboque  ;  deteriora  sequor." 

The  second  mode,  in  which  excellence  of  disposition  is 
recognized,  appears  in  the  following  stanza  respecting  a  gen- 
erous deed: 

"  Such  goodness  ought  to  live  as  long 
As  men  read  stories  told  in  song, 
And  virtue  merits,  as  reward, 
The  approbation  of  a  bard. " 

The  recognition  of  both  these  modes  of  approbation  is 
necessary  to  a  clear  understanding  of  the  action  of  the  moral 
faculty.  We  should  particularly  note  that  the  approval  of 
the  right  is  naturally  prior  to  the  approval  of  that  disposi- 
tion which  seeks  the  right.  The  very  existence  of  virtue  is 
conditioned  on  the  power  of  approving  the  right  and  of  dis- 
approving the  wrong.  We  agree  with  Dr.  Martineau  when 


352  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIX. 

he  says,  "  The  approbation  or  disapprobation  which  we  feel 
towards  human  actions  is  directed  upon  them  as  personal 
phenomena";  but  we  cannot  accept  his  further  statement, 
"  It  follows  that  what  we  judge  is  always  the  inner  spring 
of  an  action  as  distinguished  from  its  outward  operation." 
On  the  contrary,  there  are  two  judgments;  first,  one  respect- 
ing "  the  outward  operation,"  considered  not  simply  in  itself, 
but  as  the  possible  object  and  aim  of  "the  inward  spring," 
and  as  being  thus  the  condition  of  a  motive  tendency  which 
may  or  may  not  put  forth  its  energy;  and,  secondly,  there  is 
a  judgment  concerning  the  actual  exercise  of  rational  motiv- 
ity,  whether  it  be  a  desire  for  the  right  or  a  desire  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  right.  Both  these  judgments  relate  to  the  person 
as  having  motive  capability,  but  the  second  more  directly,  in- 
asmuch as  it  concerns  the  actual  exercise  of  disposition. 
Moreover,  the  first  mode  of  judgment — that  directed  towards 
actions  and  the  ends  which  they  serve — commonly  contem- 
plates an  action  not  as  actual,  but  as  conceived  of  and  pos- 
sible; and  asserts  that  the  action  contemplated,  by  reason  of 
its  own  nature  or  effect,  is  right  or  wrong.  Not  Martineau 
alone,  but  other  eminent  writers  as  well,  failing  to  perceive 
two  modes  of  judgment,  recognize  that  only  which  assumes 
the  actual  exercise  of  motive  disposition.  This  mistake  has 
resulted  in  much  unsatisfactory  theorizing. 

6.  Because  the  approval  and  disapproval  of  things  right 
and  wrong  only  refers  to  possible  dispositions,  while  the  ap- 
proval and  disapproval  of  virtue  and  vice  relate  to  actual 
dispositions,  the  latter  forms  of  judgment  have  a  closer  con- 
nection with  persons  than  the  former.  They  contemplate 
the  whole  nature  of  the  moral  agent  as  actually  active,  and 
therefore  are  properly  styled  judgments  of  persons.  This 
same  completed  relaiedness  to  personality  belongs  also  to 
judgments  of  merit  and  demerit.  These  assume  the  full  ex- 
ercise of  one's  free  agency.  They  presuppose  the  approbation 
or  disapprobation  of  inward  disposition,  and  thereupon,  on 
the  ground  of  causative  righteousness,  propose  to  encourage 
moral  goodness  by  rewards  and  to  repress  moral  evil  by  pun- 
ishments. The  simplest  form  of  the  judgment  of  merit 
is  that  which  asserts  "  worthiness  of  spiritual  approbation  " ; 
because  the  esteem  of  oneself  and  of  others  is  itself  a  reward 
of  virtue.  This  is  a  desirable  end  and  one  properly  sought 
in  connection  with  the  pursuit  of  duty.  But  it  is  not,  as  Dr. 
Hickok  and  some  others  maintain,  the  fundamental  and  ex- 


CHAP.  XXIX.]  PERSONALITY.  353 


planatory  aim  of  morality.  Moral  principle  first  of  all  seeks 
the  right  —  that  is,  absolute  good  as  an  end.  After  that,  and 
because  of  that,  it  receives  our  esteem  and  praise.  It  is  in 
the  pursuit  of  the  right  that  virtue  becomes  "worthy  of 
spiritual  approbation." 

7.  The  thought  of  personality  is  involved  also  when  we 
speak  of  man  as  the  subject  of  duty,  and  of  responsibility. 
By  duty  in  this  connection  we  mean  the  obligation  of  a  per- 
son to  desire  and  to  seek  the  right;  responsibility.  is  the  liabil- 
ity of  a  person  to  be  called  to  account  if  he  disregard  the 
requirements  of  duty.  Sometimes  conduct  is  spoken  of  as 
being  obligated,  but  this  is  only  a  short  way  of  saying  that 
the  person  is  obligated  with  reference  to  his  conduct.  For 
the  obligation,  or  binding  efficacy,  of  the  right  as  an  end, 
affects,  first,  oneself  as  capable  of  desire  and  choice,  then 
one's  desire  and  choice,  and,  finally,  whatever  action  or  doing 
may  be  needful  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  right.  The 
choice  and  the  voluntary  conduct  of  a  person  are  obligated  to 
the  right  very  much  in  the  same  way  as  one's  labor  and  money 
are  legally  bound  for  the  payment  of  debts.  The  labor  and 
money,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  choice  and  conduct,  on  the 
other,  are  not  obligated  in  precisely  the  same  sense  in  which 
the  person  is  bound.  Nevertheless  his  obligation  puts  them 
in  a  new  relation;  they  are  things  in  respect  to  which  he  is 
bound  and  are  affected  and  controlled  by  his  obligation;  and 
this,  their  relationship,  is  naturally  called  their  obligation, 
or  obligatedness. 

Let  us  note,  in  passing,  that  the  word  "  duty,"  in  addition 
to  that  abstract  sense  of  moral  obligation  which  we  have  just 
considered,  has  two  concrete  significations.  According  to 
the  first  of  these  it  stands  for  any  activity  of  a  rational  be- 
ing —  for  any  desire,  choice  or  action  —  as  obligated  or  due  to 
a  right  end,  or  for  such  activity  in  general  as  due  to  the 
right  in  general.  In  other  words,  duty  is  that  which  is  due. 
This  is  its  more  proper  and  common  meaning.  According  to 
the  other  signification  duty  is  any  rational  activity  conceived 
of,  not  as  obligated,  but  as  obligatory;  as  when  we  speak  of 
the  claims  of  duty,  or  say  that  we  are  required  by  duty  to  do 
so  or  so.  For  the  very  same  action,  for  instance,  the  payment 
of  one's  debts  may  be  thought  of  either  as  due  and  obligated 
to  a  right  end,  or  as  including  a  right  end,  and  therefore  ob- 
ligatory upon  the  agent.  Hence,  also,  the  adjective  "  duti- 

13 


854  THE  MO&AL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIX. 

ful,"  as  applied  to  actions,  may  signify  either  that  an  action — 
such  as  truth-telling — is  -obligated,  or  that  it  is  obligatory. 

It  is  noticeable,  however,  that  the  term  "  duty//  as  indic- 
ative of  things  obligatory,  is  not  quite  coextensive  with 
u  the  right."  It  applies  to  right  ends  only  so  far  as  they  are 
embodied  in  actions.  The  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of 
mankind  are  right  ends,  and,  as  such,  part  of  the  right;  but 
they  are  not  duties.  On  the  other  hand,  when  we  say,  "  It 
is  man's  duty  to  choose  or  desire  the  right/'  this  choice  or 
desire,  as  the  simple  objective  embrace  of  the  right,  is  a 
duty;  but  it  is  not  as  yet  a  right  and  obligatory  thing,  any 
more  than  .absolute  good  as  such  is  the  right.  Absolute  good 
becomes  the  right  only  when  regarded  as  an  end ;  and  so  virtue, 
to  be  a  thing  right  and  obligatory,  must  become  an  end  and 
the  object  of  its  own  regards.  In  its  simple  initial  exercise, 
virtue  is  duty  only — not  the  right,  but  that  love  for  the  right 
which  is  the  deepest  of  all  duties. 

8.  Motive  character  is  the  most  important  aspect  of  per- 
sonality. Were  the  soul  not  endowed  with  motive  dispositions 
morality  would  have  no  sufficient  reason  for  existence.  Man 
is  a  moral  being,  not  simply  because  he  perceives  the  differ- 
ence between  right  and  wrong,  but  yet  more  because  he  is 
capable  of  desiring  and  choosing  the  one  or  the  other. 

Moreover,  our  treatment  of  persons  as  moral  beings  as- 
sumes not  only  that  they  have  motive  dispositions,  but  also 
that  their  life  and  conduct  proceed  from  those  dispositions. 
Our  esteem  and  affection  for  good  men  and  our  disesteem  and 
aversion  for  the  wicked  relate  entirely  to  their  inward  dis- 
positions. No  course  of  conduct,  whether  actual  or  proposed, 
excites  approbation  and  good-will  or  disapprobation  and  dis- 
like, if  it  do  not  exhibit  determinate  desire  either  for  or 
against  the  right.  All  efforts  for  the  moral  improvement  of 
ourselves  or  others  aim  at  the  betterment  of  character.  The 
moral  education  of  the  home,  of  the  school,  of  the  state  and  of 
the  church,  seeks  to  develop  right  habits  of  disposition,  and 
is  successful  only  when  these  take  possession  of  man's  nature 
and  manifest  themselves  in  his  voluntary  conduct.  The  will 
contemplated  by  moral  agencies  is  but  the  outcome  of  in- 
ward dispositions.  It  is  not  a  power  which  acts  independently 
of  all  law,  but  one  which  acts  according  to  its  own  laws,  and 
which  may  be  induced  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
duty.  Finally,  praise  and  blame,  reward  and  punishment, 
and  every  effort  of  rectoral  righteousness,  deal  with  man  as 


CHAP.  XXIX.]  PERSONALITY.  355 

the  possessor  of  a  motive  character.  These  actions  take  place 
in  view  of  the  animus  of  conduct  and  are  designed  to  influ- 
ence the  exercise  of  disposition  in  the  time  to  come.  In 
short,  rectoral  righteousness  aims  to  encourage  virtue  and 
to  discourage  vice  by  attaching  honor  and  pleasure  to  obedi- 
ence and  disgrace  and  pain  to  disobedience.  It  appeals  di- 
rectly to  our  motivities. 

Thus  human  life  is  moral  not  because  man  is  without  law, 
but  because  he  acts  according  to  his  own  mind  and  disposition. 
His  free  agency  is  not  only  consistent  with  the  efficient  exer- 
cise of  his  inotivities,  but  is  realized  in  that  exercise.  And, 
such  being  the  case,  human  conduct  is  at  once  certainly  free 
and  freely  certain.  It  is  certainly  free  because  man's  vo- 
litional faculty  is  doubly  self-determined  (Chap.  XXVIII.) ; 
it  is  freely  certain  because  self-determination  takes  place  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  man's  own  voluntary  nature.  Eewards 
and  punishments  do,  indeed,  imply  that  actions  are  not  yet 
determined  by  the  agent  and  that  their  performance  is  con- 
ditioned on  his  free  will.  But  this  is  entirely  consistent  with 
their  certainty  when  the  operation  of  the  free  will  is  taken 
into  account.  Although  punishments  and  rewards  pertain  to 
contingent  actions,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  what  is  con- 
tingent and  uncertain  from  one  point  of  view  and  under  one 
antecedent  may  be  logically  necessary  and  certain  from  an- 
other point  of  view  and  under  another  antecedent.  Indeed 
every  ordinary  antecedent  of  contingency  may,  upon  more 
perfect  knowledge,  be  completed  into  an  antecedent  of  neces- 
sity. (See  MODALIST,  Chap.  XXI.)  This  principle  holds 
good  in  respect  to  moral  conduct  just  as  it  does  in  respect  to 
all  other  cases  of  indeterminate  sequence. 

The  determinist  doctrine  of  freedom  is  well  defended  by 
Prof.  George  S.  Fullerton,  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania, 
in  the  Popular  Science  Monthly  of  December,  1900.  His 
dosing  words  are  especially  noteworthy.  He  says,  "  I  believe 
most  heartily  in  freedom.  I  am  neither  fatalist  nor  ma- 
terialist. I  hold  man  to  be  a  free  agent,  and  believe  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  justice  in  man's  treatment  of  man. 
I  refuse  to  regard  punishment  as  the  infliction  of  pain  upon 
one  who  did  not  do  the  thing  for  which  he  is  punished,  could 
not  have  prevented  it,  and  cannot  possibly  be  benefited  by 
the  punishment  he  receives*  I  view  with  horror  the  doctrine 
that  the  teacher's  desk  and  the  pulpit,  the  force  of  public 
opinion  and  the  sanction  of  law,  are  of  no  avail.  I  am  un- 


356  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIX. 

willing  to  assume,  without  evidence,  that  each  man's  breast 
is  the  seat  of  uncaused  and  inexplicable  explosions,  which  no 
man  can  predict,  against  the  consequences  of  which  no  man 
can  make  provision,  and  which  set  at  defiance  all  the  forces 
which  make  for  civilization." 


CHAPTEE  XXX. 

THE  CONFLICT  OF  DUTIES. 

1.  Duties  never  conflict,  but  the  laws  or  rules,  of  duty  sometimes 
do. — 2.  Moralists  discuss  this  subject  but  have  not  developed  any 
theory  respecting  it.  The  views  of  Janet,  Thomas  Aquinas,  the 
Jesuits,  and  the  Jansenists. — 3.  Cicero's  "  De  officiis  "  offers  a 
starting  point  for  inquiry.  His  "  honestum  "  and  "utile"a,Te 
the  morally  right  and  the  morally  expedient.  These  have  a  com- 
munity of  nature. — 4.  The  right,  as  opposed  to  the  expedient,  is 
clearly  and  unquestionably  an  absolute  good  ;  and  therefore  un- 
changeably dutiful.  The  expedient,  though  a  good,  is  only  pre- 
sumptively absolutely  good ;  and  it  may  at  times  be  found  to 
conflict  with  absolute  good.  Therefore  the  right  is  not  merely 
duty  but  always  duty  ;  the  expedient  is  duty  but  not  always 
duty.  This  is  Stoic  doctrine. — 5.  When  the  "  honestum  "  and 
the  "  utile"  conflict,  the  former  should  prevail.  This  principle 
is  self-evident,  but  the  application  of  it  is  difficult.  The  Academic 
and  Stoic  statements  of  it  differ  only  verbally.  The  precept,  Do 
not  do  evil  that  good  may  come,  explained. — 6.  While  right 
never  yields  to  expediency,  we  must  remember  that  a  rule  of 
right  is  imperative  only  so  long  as  the  case  retains  its  ordinary 
character.  In  exceptional  circumstances  the  rule  may  be 
questioned.  It  may  not  set  forth  the  absolute  good  for  those 
circumstances. — 7.  Further,  with  a  change  in  circumstances 
what  is  expedient  may  become  the  absolutely  right  ;  then  its 
subordinate  character  disappears. — 8.  When  two  aims  of  expe- 
diency conflict,  the  greater  good  is  to  be  preferred,  all  selfishness 
being  excluded. — 9.  The  conflict  of  one  "  honestum  "  with  an- 
other will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 

1.  WHAT  is  called  "  the  conflict  of  duties  "  is  literally  the 
conflict  of  laws  or  rules  of  duty,  as  these  are  conceived  of  by 
us.  A  duty  is  that  which  it  is  right  and  obligatory  to  do  and 
wrong  not  to  do.  Therefore,  if  it  were  possible  for  one  duty 
to  be  inconsistent  with  another,  it  would  be  at  the  same  time 
both  right  and  wrong  to  do  the  very  same  thing — right  be- 
cause it  is  duty,  wrong  because  it  is  opposed  to  duty.  But 
rules  or  conceptions  of  duty,  as  applied  to  a  particular  case, 
may  conflict  with  each  other,  and  then — since  they  cannot 

357 


358  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXX. 

both  be  right — it  is  necessary  for  us  to  judge  between  them, 
and  to  determine  which  rule  should  prevail. 

2.  Prof.  Janet,  speaking  of  the  "  Conflict  of  Duties/'  says, 
"  If  you  open  all  the  great  treatises  on  morals,  both  ancient 
and  modern,  you  will  hardly  find  anywhere  a  discussion  of 
this  problem."  He  declares  that  Cicero  is  almost  the  only 
philosophical  author  who  has  made  the  conflict  of  duties  the 
subject  of  specific  inquiry.  (THEORY  OF  MORALS,  Bk.  II,  Ch. 
VI.)  However,  theologians,  especially  the  great  mediaeval 
doctors,  have  given  much  attention  to  questions  of  duty. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  in  his  "  Summa  Moralis  "  (which  is  the  sec- 
ond part  of  his  "  Summa  Theologica"),  discusses  an  immense 
variety  of  such  questions,  but  each  for  itself  in  a  dialectic  way 
and  without  proposing  general  rules  of  judgment.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  those  ecclesiastical  writers  of  later  times, 
who  dealt  with  cases  of  conscience  and  developed  the  science 
of  casuistry.  The  reasonings  of  many  of  these,  being  super- 
ficial and  misleading,  brought  the  name  of  casuistry  into  dis- 
repute, as  if  it  meant  only  the  sophistical  advocacy  of  evil. 
This  disesteem  was  intensified  by  the  controversy  between 
the  Jesuits  and  the  Jansenists,  in  which  the  former,  on  the 
ground  of  paramount  duty  to  God  and  the  Church  and  hu- 
manity, justified  strange  exceptions  to  the  ordinary  rules  of 
duty,  while  the  latter  asserted  that  the  reasonings  of  the 
Jesuits  were  subversive  of  all  morality. 

There  is,  nevertheless,  a  department  of  inquiry  which,  if 
rightly  pursued,  should  redeem  the  name  of  casuistry  from 
dishonor;  and  which,  indeed,  has  not  been  wholly  neglected, 
although  few  moralists  have  made  it  the  subject  of  separate 
treatment.  Much  of  what  is  called  Practical  Ethics  considers 
difficult  questions  of  duty.  This  is  done,  not  by  segregating 
these  questions  from  the  direct  exposition  of  the  laws  of  right- 
eousness, but  by  studying  each  in  connection  with  the  specific 
law  which  seems  to  be  properly  broken  or  violated  in  some 
exceptional  case.  In  this  way  many  difficulties  are  wisely 
discussed.  It  is  also  to  be  allowed  that  it  is  better  not  to  deal 
with  ethical  perplexities  without  a  previous  examination  of 
the  right  rules  to  which  they  relate  and  of  the  reasons  for 
those  rules.  But  while  cases  of  conscience  should  be  dis- 
tributed throughout  practical  ethics,  they  may  also  be  more 
thoroughly  considered  if  gathered  under  heads  according  to 
the  laws  which  they  bring  under  debate,  the  cases  of  each  class 
being  collated  with  each  other  and  being  studied  just  as  jurists 


CHAP.  XXX.]         THE  CONFLICT  OF  DUTIES.  359 

study  cases  in  civil  law.  -  For  questions  respecting  crimes, 
torts,  debts,  contracts  and  other  obligations,  respecting  realty, 
personalty,  marriage,  divorce,  trusts,  inheritances,  and  so 
forth,  are  now  largely  settled  by  the  examination  of  co- 
ordinated judgments  and  opinions.  Only  in  some  such  way 
right  decisions,  or  those  as  nearly  right  as  possible,  can  be 
hoped  for  in  questions  of  dispute. 

Moreover,  while  the  investigation  of  the  conflict  of  duties 
belongs  to  applied  morals  and  not  to  general  abstract  morals, 
and  must  be  conducted  through  specific  practical  discussions, 
it  is  a  function  of  theoretical  ethics  to  define  the  scope  of  this 
investigation  and  to  indicate  principles  according  to  which 
its  problems  may  be  determined.  Certainly  any  system  set- 
ting forth  a  universal  doctrine  of  duty  may  be  expected  to 
yield  some  general  directions,  based  on  that  doctrine,  for  the 
guidance  of  the  judgment. 

3.  That  our  suggestions  on  this  subject  may  have  some  little 
support  from  authority,  let  us  refer  briefly  to  the  teachings 
of  Cicero.  Although  these  do  not  exhibit  deep  analysis,  they 
contain  noble  ethical  doctrines,  and  they  indicate  a  method  of 
procedure  more  distinctly  than  any  later  writings  have  done. 
Reproducing  the  views  of  Panaetius,  Posidonius  and  other 
Stoics,  whose  works  are  no  longer  extant,  Cicero  divides 
officium,  or  duty  (TO  xaOrjxov,)  into  two  kinds:  first  the 
honestum,  or  that  which  is  always  and  invariably  right 
(rd  xaropdu)p.a )  ;  and  secondly,  the  utile,  or  the  dutifully 
expedient  (TO  xaQyxov,  in  the  more  limited  sense  of  the  term). 
He  then  mentions  three  main  inquiries.  The  first  of  these 
asks,  Is  it  right  or  is  it  wrong  ? — Honestumne  esset  an  turpe  ? 
— The  second  asks,  Is  it  expedient  or  is  it  inexpedient? 
— Utile  esset  an  inutile? — And  the  third  asks,  What  shall 
we  do  in  case  the  right  and  the  expedient  appear  to  conflict? 
— Si  id  quod  speciem  haberet  honesti  pugnaret  cum  eo  quod 
utile  videretun?  The  three  books  of  the  "  De  Officiis" 
are  devoted  severally  to  these  three  inquiries.  But  the  first 
book  closes  with  a  brief  discussion  respecting  which  of  two 
honesta  is  to  be  preferred  in  case  both  cannot  be  realized, 
and  the  second  with  a  similar  discussion  when  the  choice 
must  be  made  between  two  utilia.  Thus  three  cases  of  con- 
flict are  mentioned;  first,  that  of  the  honestum  with  the 
honestum;  secondly,  that  of  the  utile  with  the  utile;  and 
thirdly,  that  of  the  utile  and  the  honestum  with  each  other. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  thought  of   Cicero  we  must 


360  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXX. 

understand  accurately  his  conceptions  of  the  honestum  and 
the  utile.  He  does  not  distinguish  these  as  the  right  and 
the  useful  often  are  contrasted  nowadays,  when  the  idea 
of  the  useful  is  dissociated  from  that  of  moral  obligation 
and  stands  for  the  beneficial,  or  advantageous,  simply  as 
such.  Cicero  discriminates  between  what  is  necessarily  or 
essentially  right  and  obligatory  and  what  is  assumed  to  be 
right  and  obligatory  because  promotive  of  some  form  of  bene- 
fit or  advantage.  His  utile  might  be  better  translated  the 
"helpful"  than  the  "useful."  It  is  poorly  expressed  in 
English  by  the  term  "expedient."  An  action  not  certainly 
known  to  be  productive  of  absolute  good  may  generally  be 
assumed  and  believed  to  be  productive  of  absolute  good 
provided  it  be  promotive  of  some  particular  benefit  or 
advantage;  and  this  is  the  case  with  the  expedient  since 
it  contributes  to  some  specific  form  of  good  and  may 
be  presumed  to  contribute  to  the  total  good  of  which 
the  case  admits.  This  being  so,  the  lionestum  (or  the  right) 
and  the  utile  (or  the  expedient),  as  the  two  forms  of  offrcium 
(or  duty),  may  be  said  each  to  participate  in  the  most  impor- 
tant characteristic  of  the  other.  For  the  morally  expedient  is 
always  right  and  obligatory  (though  not  with  an  absolute  un- 
changeableness) ;  and  the  morally  right  is  always  helpful  and 
advantageous  (though  with  a  broadness  of  reference  pecul- 
iarly its  own).  The  essential  difference  between  the 
honestum  and  the  utile  is  that  the  one  is  absolutely  good  with- 
out any  possibility  of  losing  this  character,  while  the  other  is 
held  to  be  absolutely  good  with  that  possibility  or  contingency 
added.  On  this  account  a  thing  expedient,  if  found  invari- 
ably and  necessarily  to  contribute  to  a  right  end,  ceases  to  be 
expedient  and  becomes  right  per  se;  while,  in  many  cases,  an 
action  right  or  wrong  per  se,  if  denuded  of  the  consequences 
included  within  our  full  conception  of  it,  and  thought  of 
only  in  its  immediate  operation,  is  no  longer  right  and  obli- 
gatory per  se,  but  a  proper  subject  for  the  rules  of  expediency. 
It  may  even,  through  a  change  of  relations,  assume  an 
opposite  obligation  to  that  which  belonged  to  it  at  first. 
Telling  the  truth,  which  is  the  action  of  veracity^  may  become 
actionable  slander;  while  the  killing  of  a  man,  which  is  ordi- 
narily murder,  may  become  the  dutiful  execution  of  a 
criminal. 

Cicero  expressly  asserts  this  community  of  nature  between 
the  honestum  and  the  utile.     Rejecting  the  doctrine  that  ex- 


CHAP.  XXX.]        THE  CONFLICT  OF  DUTIES.  361 

pediency  ever  really  conflicts  with  the  right,  he  accepts  the 
Stoic  view  that  whatever  is  right  is  expedient  and  that  nothing 
is  expedient  which  is  not  right. — Dubitandum  non  est  quin 
munquam  possit  utilitas  cum  honestate  contendere.  .  .  . 
Quicquid  honestum  sit,  id  utile  esse,  nee  utile  quicquam  quod 
ncn  honestum."  (DE  OFFICIIS,  lib.  III.  cap.  4.)  These 
statements  do  not  express  analytic  thought;  and  they  may 
seem  paradoxical.  But  they  are  fundamentally  correct ;  they 
spring  from  a  practical  apprehension  of  the  truth. 

4.  As  the  distinction  between  the  right  and  the  expedient 
has  not  been  mentioned  in  previous  discussions  and  is  one 
of  great  importance,  let  us  dwell  upon  it  >a  little  even  at  the 
risk  of  some  prolixity.  Some  things  are  absolutely  good  (and 
therefore  right  and  dutiful)  necessarily  and  certainly,  so  that 
they  cannot,  in  the  cases  and  under  the  circumstances  which 
they  presuppose,  be  aught  else.  Such  things  are  often  said 
to  be  right  per  se;  they  are  not  merely  duty  but  always  duty — 
KaBqicav  KO.I  ad  aa^fjuov ;  as  the  Stoics  said.  Other  things,  which  in 
themselves  are  good  in  some  private  or  limited  sphere  of  rela- 
tion, must  also  be  regarded  and  treated  as  absolutely  good  and 
entitled  to  our  dutiful  pursuit,  except  when,  under  special 
circumstances,  it  can  be  shown,  from  the  absolute  point  of 
view,  that  they  would  be  harmful  rather  than  beneficial. 
Ordinarily  such  advantages  are  not  only  consistent  with  abso- 
lute good  but  included  in  it,  as  the  part  in  the  whole;  be- 
cause absolute  good  is  the  total  good  possible  in  a  case  or  any 
part  of  that  total.  Therefore,  unless  sufficient  reason  to  the 
contrary  appear,  it  is  our  duty  in  every  case — it  is  required 
by  the  law  of  moral  goodness — to  seek  our  own  best  interests 
and  those  of  others.  At  times,  however,  we  must  sacrifice 
present  immediate  or  private  interests  to  the  absolute  good. 
Here,  then,  is  a  class  of  aims  and  actions  which  are  duty  but 
not  always  duty — as  the  Stoics  would  say,  ft^owa  dAAa  owe  ai 
Kad^Kovra.  Things  which  are  thus  right  and  obligatory  "  per 
accidens,"  or  in  a  contingent  and  probable  way,  are  the 
utilia  of  Cicero,  while  things  necessarily  and  invariably  right 
are  the  honesta.  This  distinction  is  made  with  English 
words  when  the  right  and  the  expedient  are  contrasted 
with  one  another,  though  not  always  when  these  terms  are 
used  independently. 

The  opposition  between  the  right  and  the  expedient  is  not 
that  between  what  is  right  as  an  end  and  that  which  is  right 
as  a  means  to  the  end.  A  means,  or  mode  of  action,  con- 


362  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXX. 

nected  with  a  right  end  participates  in  the  Tightness,  or  abso- 
luteness of  good,  belonging  to  the  end.  If  it  be  inseparably 
connected  with  an  end  right  per  se,  it  has  the  same  perfect 
Tightness  with  the  end,  and  does  not  differ  from  an  action 
right  per  se  except  in  our  way  of  thinking  of  it.  Even  this 
conception,  too,  may  be  changed  through  a  synthesis  of  the 
means  used  with  the  end  gained,  after  which  the  means  is 
regarded  not  merely  as  necessarily  right  but  also  as  right  per 
se — as  a  part  of  that  which  is  right  in  itself.  As  already 
said,  the  expedient,  or  utile,  though  necessarily  good, 
is  not  necessarily  right,  or  absolutely  good.  Under 
exceptional  circumstances  it  may  operate  for  evil,  in  which 
case  it  ceases  to  be  expedient,  and  becomes  wrong.  On 
the  other  hand,  as  has  been  stated,  if  it  can  be  shown  that 
some  mode  of  action  hitherto  regarded  as  expedient  is  neces- 
sarily promotive  of  absolute  good,  it  ceases  to  be  expedient 
and  becomes  right  in  the  unchangeable  way.  The  expedient 
is  known  to  be  good  and  is  presumptively  absolutely  good,  but 
it  is  not  invariably  and  certainly  such.  It  occupies  the  same 
place  in  ethics  that  contingency  does  in  logic.  For  when 
contingency  is  "unstable"  it  may  be  displaced  either  by 
necessity  or  by  impossibility.  (THE  MODALIST,  Ch.  XXI.) 

5.  The  principal  rule  of  Cicero  regarding  the  conflict  of 
duties  is  that  when  right  and  expediency — the  honestum  and 
the  utile — are  opposed,  the  right  should  always  prevail. 
Cicero  quotes  with  approval  the  precept  of  the  Academics  and 
Peripatetics :  "  quce  honesta  sunt  anteponuntur  Us  qua  vi- 
dentur  utilia"  and  also  the  stronger  Stoic  statement,  "  quid- 
quid  honestum  est,  idem  utile  videtur;  nee  utile  quidquam 
quod  non  honestum."  (DE  OFFICIIS,  lib.  III.  cap.  4.)  The 
difference  between  these  rules  is  merely  verbal;  it  arose  be- 
cause the  Stoics  restricted  the  term  utile  to  the  expedient,  or 
dutifully  advantageous,  which  alone  is  good  from  the  abso- 
lute point  of  view,  while  the  Academics  used  the  conception 
in  a  broader  way  so  that  it  covered  both  the  expedient  and 
that  ordinary  good  which  at  times  is  not  expedient.  Evi- 
dently, too,  the  rules  are  identical  in  operation.  According 
to  the  Academics,  what  seems  good,  and,  in  a  sense,  is  good, 
is  denied  to  be  expedient  and  dutiful  when  it  conflicts  with 
the  right.  According  to  the  Stoics,  what  seems  good  but 
conflicts  with  the  right  is  to  be  rejected  as  being  no  good  at 
all;  as  indeed,  it  is  not  from  the  absolute  point  of  view. 

The  reasonableness  of  subordinating  the  expedient  to  the 


CHAP.  XXX.]        THE  CONFLICT  OF  DUTIES.  353 

right  is  self-evident.  Plainly  the  contingently  right  and  good 
can  be  no  longer  binding  when  it  conflicts  with  that  which 
is  necessarily  and  .absolutely  right  and  good.  Translating 
this  into  common  language  we  say  that  no  prospect  of  advan- 
tage or  benefit  can  justify  the  doing  of  wrong  or  the  failure 
to  do  right.  This  was  the  thought  of  St.  Paul  when  he  said, 
<e  If  the  truth  of  God  hath  more  abounded  through  my  lie 
unto  his  glory  why  yet  am  I  also  judged  as  a  sinner?  And 
not  rather,  as  we  be  slanderously  reported,  and  as  some  affirm 
that  we  say,  let  us  do  evil  that  good  may  come — whose  con- 
demnation is  just  ?  "  The  "  evil "  spoken  of  by  the  Apos.tle 
is  the  infraction  of  right ;  the  "  good  "  is  that  the  pursuit  of 
which,  so  long  as  it  does  not  conflict  with  the  right,  is  desir- 
able and  expedient. 

While  the  doctrine  of  Cicero  &nd  of  Paul  respecting  ex- 
pediency cannot  be  questioned,  the  use  of  it  calls  for  much 
moral  intelligence.  In  every  case  one  must  determine 
whether  there  is  an  absolute  right  which  is  to  be  preferred  to 
the  expedient.  Cicero  gives  no  direction  here  except  that  we 
should  follow  Nature,  or  reason,  or  the  voice  of  Grod.  "  That 
a  man  should  seek  his  own  interest  through  the  robbery  of 
another  is,"  he  says,  "  more  opposed  to  Nature  than  death, 
than  poverty,  than  grief  and  the  rest  of  the  evils  which  can 
befall  one's  body  or  estate/' — Magis  contra  Naturam  quam 
mors,  quam  paupertas,  quam  dolor,  quam  cetera  quce  possint 
aut  corpori  accidere  aut  rebus  extermis.  He  adds  that  to 
spoil  and  wrong  another  for  one's  own  emolument  involves 
the  disruption  of  that  human  society  which  nature  calls  for — 
quce  maxime  est  secundum  Naturam.  (Lis.  III.  cap.  5.) 
These  words  might  be  taken  to  teach  that  one's  unreasoned 
sense  of  duty  should  be  his  guide  in  difficulties;  but  that  is 
not  their  true  meaning.  Cicero  himself  appeals  to  reason  and 
judgment  to  determine  what  things  are  right  and  what  are 
not.  He  acknowledges  that  many  things  which  appear  to  be 
right  by  Nature  at  times  become  not  right ;  for  example,  to  do 
things  promised,  to  abide  by  agreements,  to  return  trust-de- 
posits, may  cease  to  be  right  and  binding  if  they  would  work 
injury  to  the  party  to  whom  the  obligations  were  incurred. 
— '-Multa  quce  honesta  Natura  videntur  temporibus  fiunt  non 
honesta.  Facere  promissa,  stare  conventis,  reddere  deposita, 
commutata  utilitate  fiunt  non  honesta.  (LiB.  III.  cap.  25.) 

6.  In  questions  concerning  the  right  and  the  expedient  two 
things  should  be  borne  in  mind. 


364  ™E  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXX. 

First,  it  seems  clear  that  the  unchangeableness  ascribed  to 
the  ordinary  rules  of  right  pertains  rather  to  fundamental 
principles  or  aims  embodied  in  the  rules  than  to  the  rules 
themselves.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  practical  laws  of 
justice,  or  regulative  righteousness.  Each  of  these  seeks  to 
conserve  and  promote  some  radical  interest  so  far  as  that  in- 
terest consists-  with  and  forms  a  part  of  the  absolute  good  of 
men.  One  law  cares  for  human  life;  another  for  truth  be- 
tween man  and  man;  another  for  personal  chastity;  another 
for  the  rightful  possession  and  use  of  property;  another  for 
the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  needful  subordinations  of 
society.  Every  one  of  these  aims  belongs  necessarily  to 
human  welfare,  and  will  last  as  long  as  our  race  inhabits  the 
earth.  The  pursuit  of  it  is  an  unchangeable  law.  Moreover 
the  ordinary  methods  for  conserving  and  promoting  these 
interests  have  a  certain  fixity.  They  are  to  be  followed  under 
all  ordinary  circumstances.  But  in  exceptional  circum- 
stances these  methods  may  prove  inconsistent  with  absolute 
good,  and  in  .that  case  must  be  replaced  by  others.  They  are 
unchangeable  only  within  certain  limits.  In  like  manner  the 
affectional  laws  of  regulative  righteousness  require  reverence, 
good  will,  courage,  prudence,  self-restraint,  and  other  virtues 
which  always  have  been  and  always  shall  be  obligatory  upon 
men,  yet  which  may  be  exercised  in  excess  or  upon  improper 
occasions.  Since,  then,  circumstances  may  arise  in  which  the 
common  rules  of  righteousness  do  not  apply — or  at  least 
should  not  be  applied — wisdom  suggests  that  the  requirements 
of  right  be  scrutinized  -and  determined  before  any  strong 
claim  of  expediency,  and  especially  of  benevolent  expediency, 
be  rejected.  It  may  be  found  that  the  occasion  does  not 
demand  the  application  of  the  rule  of  right  and  that  no 
conflict  really  exists  between  the  right  and  the  advanta- 
geous. 

Ordinarily,  -however,  the  common  rules  of  duty  limit  the 
scope  of  expediency.  The  good  man  sweareth  to  his  own 
hurt  and  changeth  not.  To  seek  one's  own  advancement  or 
that  of  one's  friends  -or  family,  or  country  by  falsehood  and 
deceit,  by  theft  and  robbery,  by  unprovoked  violence  and  war, 
is  condemned  by  all,  and  by  none  more  loudly  than  by  those 
who  are  guilty  of  just  such  conduct.  Jacob  had  no  right  to 
deceive  his  father,  even  though  his  aim  was  to  obtain  the  ful- 
filment of  the  promise  that  "the  elder  shall  serve  the 
younger."  And  our  Saviour,  when  offered  all  the  kingdoms  of 


CHAP.  XXX.]        THE  CONFLICT  OF  DUTIES. 

the  world  if  he  would  do  obeisance  to  the  tempter,  made  the 
proper  answer:  "Get  thee  hence,  Satan;  for  it  is  written, 
Thou  shalt  worship  the  Lord  thy  God,  and  him  only  shalt 
thou  serve."  In  such  cases  as  these  the  course  of  duty  is 
plain.  One  sees  at  once  both  what  the  rule  of  right  is  and 
how  it  conflicts  with  expediency.  But  were  there  a  question 
respecting  what  strict  duty  required,  one's  course  would  not 
be  so  easily  determined. 

7.  The  other  point  to  be  considered  in  the  controversy  be- 
tween right  and  expediency,  or  more  exactly  between  what 
appears  to  be  right  and  what  appears  to  be  expedient,  is 
that  what  is  dutifully  expedient  may,  under  some  circum- 
stances, become  essentially  and  absolutely  right.  The  expedi- 
ent is  a  development  of  duty  under  that  law  of  goodness  which 
is  an  essential  and  unchangeable  part  of  morality.  Certain 
modes  of  doing  are  found  preventive  of  specific  evils  and 
promotive  of  immediate  advantages  or  benefits.  They  be- 
come duties  because  presumptively  and  probably  they  con- 
tribute to  .absolute  good.  Should  any  one  of  these  on  occa- 
sion conflict  with  the  right,  it  would  be  no  longer  expedient 
but,  absolutely  speaking,  evil  and  wrong.  But  if,  under 
other  circumstances,  it  were  seen  certainly  productive  of  good 
and  of  good  only,  it  would  no  longer  be  expedient  but  a  thing 
strictly  right  and  obligatory,  being  an  absolute  requirement 
of  the  law  of  Moral  goodness.  For  example,  liberality  is  a 
duty  governed  by  expediency,  but  if  one  can  give  to  a  worthy 
cause  without  neglecting  any  prior  claims,  and  it  becomes 
perfectly  clear  that  the  gift  will  help  to  accomplish  great 
good,  one's  duty  becomes  a  matter  of  strict  and  incontestable 
obligation.  So,  before  the  advent  of  Christianity  and  in  the 
ruder  ages  of  the  world,  even  good  men  considered  monog- 
amy a  duty  of  expediency  rather  than  of  strict  right.  But 
now,  under  the  authority  of  Christ  and  the  conditions  of  a 
higher  civilization,  a  man  is  to  cleave  unto  his  wife,  and  they 
twain  are  to  be  one  flesh. 

When  expediency  in  this  way  loses  its  identity  by  rising 
into  the  region  of  perfected  obligation,  if  it  then  appear  to 
conflict  with  the  right,  it  no  longer  does  so  as  expediency, 
but  only  as  one  alleged  case  of  Tightness  may  conflict  with 
another.  Thus  there  may  be  an  apparent  exception  to  the 
rule  that  the  expedient  should  give  way  to  the  right.  When 
Caiaphas  said,  "  It  is  expedient  (  ov^epei )  for  us  that  one  man 
should  die  for  the  people  and  that  the  whole  nation  perish 


366  T&E  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXX. 

not,"  he  advocated  the  murder  of  an  innocent  man  on  the 
ground  of  public  policy,  an  iniquitous  proposition.  Yet  he 
spake  better  than  he  knew.  The  benefit  which  the  death  of 
Christ  was  to  procure  for  mankind  was  so  great  and  so  sure 
that  his  voluntary  laying  down  of  his  life,  which,  under  other 
circumstances,  would  have  been  sinful  suicide,  became  the 
highest  conceivable  example  of  self-sacrificing  virtue.  Many 
patriots  and  heroes  might  be  mentioned  who  have  gladly 
died  for  their  country  or  their  race,  but  ia  more  than  human 
grandeur  surrounds  the  cross  of  the  Son  of  God  who  gave 
himself  for  the  salvation  of  the  world. 

8.  Further  consideration  of  the  oppositions  of  right  and 
expediency  would  lead  into-  detailed  casuistic  discussions. 
We  turn  now  to  the  conflict,  that  is,  the  apparent  conflict  of 
the  right  with  the  right  and  of  the  expedient  with  the  ex- 
pedient. One  general  principle  applies  to  both  these  cases 
of  contest,  whether  one's  choice  is  to  be  made  between 
two  forms  of  right  or  two  forms  of  expediency:  That 
course  is  to  be  preferred  which  promises  the  greater 
good.  This  principle  is  applicable  to  questions  of  ex- 
pediency with  fewer  precautions  and  qualifications  than 
when  right  appears  to  conflict  with  right.  For  this  reason 
we  shall  speak  of  expediencies  first. 

The  expedient  being  the  advantageous  or  beneficial  consid- 
ered as  presumptively  a  part  of  absolute  good,  evidently,  if 
there  be  no  conflict  with  right,  only  the  greater  of  two  alter- 
native advantages  can  be  an  obligatory  end.  If  the  other 
alternative  were  preferred,  one  would  fall  short  in  his  duty 
to  -seek  all  the  good  within  his  power.  A  specific  form  of 
this  principle  requires  that,  other  things  being  equal,  the 
good  of  the  greater  number  should  prevail  over  that  of  the 
less.  For  example,  it  is  contrary  to  duty  that  civil  govern- 
ment should  confer  privileges  upon  any  class  if,  without  detri- 
ment to  the  public  welfare,  they  can  be  conferred  upon  the 
people  generally.  In  every  case  political  policies  should  be 
framed  in  the  interest  of  the  greatest  number.  It  is>,  of 
course,  understood  that  before  two  duties  of  expediency  can 
be  the  subjects  of  choice  neither  of  them  has  been  found  to 
conflict  with  the  right.  Therefore,  though  one  may  rightly 
contemplate  the  private  benefit  of  himself  or  of  others,  he 
must  exclude  from  his  consideration  the  seeking  of  it  in  a 
selfish  or  unjust  or  reckless  manner.  Every  plan  subordi- 
nating absolute  to  private  good,  the  right  to  the  expedient, 


CHAP.  XXX.]        THE  CONFLICT  OF  DUTIES.  367 

must  be  rejected.  But  this  being  settled,  the  greater  good  for 
oneself  or  for  others  should  prevail  over  the  less. 

In  making  this  choice  the  moral  faculty  does  not  act  inde- 
pendently of  that  rational  judgment  which  determines  ques- 
tions of  advantage  and  of  disadvantage,  and  which  assigns 
different  values  to  different  presentations  of  good.  Duty  ac- 
cepts the  conclusions  of  reason  and  of  experience  concerning 
the  desirable  and  declares  that  the  more  desirable  should  be 
chosen.  In  consequence  of  this  a  considerable  part  of  virtue 
consists  in  the  wise  pursuit  of  the  best  interests  of  oneself 
and  of  others.  In  an  earlier  discussion  (CHAP.  III.)  the 
question  was  considered  how  things  naturally  good  are  given 
different  values.  We  have  now  merely  to  note  that  morality 
takes  account  of  these  values.  Cicero,  having  defined  the 
utile  as  that  branch  of  duty  which  pertains  to  the  necessities, 
supplies,  resources  and  facilities  of  life — ad  commoda  vita, 
copias,  opes,  facilitates — declares  that  strength  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  agility,  good  health  to  pleasure,  and  wealth  to  great 
bodily  power.  But  a  sound  condition  of  mind  and  body  is 
more  desirable  than  riches;  glory  and  honor,  also,  are  better 
than  riches.  These  and  similar  counsels  imply  that  advan- 
tages succeed  each  other  in  progressive  importance  and  some- 
what in  the  following  order:  first,  the  mere  pleasures  and 
comforts  of  life;  secondly,  property  and  other  external  re- 
sources ;  thirdly,  corporeal  soundness  and  capability ;  fourthly, 
knowledge  and  mental  development;  fifthly,  social  gifts  and 
practical  ability;  and  sixthly,  moral  and  spiritual  excellence. 
This  last  is  the  highest  good,  the  most  precious  and  the  most 
permanent  of  treasures.  How  the  pursuit  of  specific  advan- 
tages is  to  be  regulated  in  order  to  the  attainment  of  the  best 
results  should  be  a  leading  inquiry  in  practical  ethics. 

9.  The  most  difficult  portion  of  casuistry  -concerns  the  con- 
flict of  the  right  with  the  right,  -and  it  is  of  such  importance 
that  it  merits  a  discussion  by  itself.  We  shall  speak  of  it, 
and  of  the  rules  of  judgment  pertaining  to  it,  in  the  next 
chapter. 


CHAPTEE  XXXx, 

RULES  OF  CASUISTRY. 

1.  When  one  rule  of  duty  is  opposed  to  another,  our  first  inquiry 
should  be  concerning  the  value  of  each  rule.  One  or  other  of  the 
two  may  be  without  moral  validity.  Christ  and  the  Scribes.  The 
"  code  of  honor." — 2.  When  one  incontestable  rule  conflicts  with 
another  a  reference  to  absolute  good  must  determine  which  rule 
should  prevail.  Various  specific  canons  of  judgment  are  merely 
applications  of  this  principle.  David  and  the  shewbread.  Cicero 
quoted. — 3.  Sometimes  the  manifest  demand  of  some  weighty 
and  imperative  interest  shows  a  change  in  the  requirements  of 
absolute  good,  and  that  an  ordinary  law  must  be  superseded  for 
the  time. — 4.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  the  law,  if  ob- 
served, will  not  produce  its  usual  results  but  great  absolute — and 
therefore  wrongful — harm. — 5.  Or  when  the  rule  claiming  dom- 
inance will  secure  vastly  greater  good — in  the  absolute  point  of 
view — than  the  other.  Grotius  and  Prof.  Pollock  quoted. — 6. 
Hence  private  rights  may  be  displaced  by  public  necessities. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  quoted.  Eminent  domain. — 
7.  Hence  defensive  or  punitive  justice  may  supersede  moral 
goodness  or  regulative  righteousness,  that  is,  may  suspend  the 
operation  of  these  modes  of  duty.  Foster  quoted. — 8.  Again, 
when  the  chief  use  of  one  rule  is  to  advance  the  end  of  a  more 
fundamental  rule,  it  may  be  supplanted  by  a  better  mode  of 
attaining  that  end.  Cicero,  Our  Saviour,  St.  Paul,  and  Pres. 
Porter,  quoted.  Dr.  Van  Dyke's  Fourth  Wise  Man.— 9.  Finally, 
variation  from  a  rule  is  justifiable  when  the  end  of  the  rule, 
without  reference  to  any  other  rule,  can  be  accomplished  as 
well  through  some  new  and  better  method.  Porter  quoted. — 10. 
While  canons  of  judgment  are  helpful,  every  case  must  be 
studied  on  its  own  merits  and  with  a  single  mind  to  know  and  to 
do  the  right. 

1.  BEFORE  deciding  between  two  incompatible  modes  of 
conduct  both  claiming  to  be  laws  of  duty  we  must  first  con- 
sider whether  both  are  strictly  laws  of  duty.  As,  when  right 
and  expediency  appear  to  contend  we  must  find  that  the  one 
alternative  is  right  and  the  other  merely  expedient  before  we 
can  say  that  the  latter  should  yield  to  the  former,  so  when  two 
modes  of  conduct  both  claiming  to  be  right  and  obligatory 
are  mutually  opposed,  we  should  ascertain  whether  both  really 
are  requirements  of  duty  before  we  undertake  to  determine 
368 


CHAP.  XXXI.]  RULES  OF  CASUISTRY.  369 

between  them.  If  investigation  should  show  that  one  of  them 
was  not  a  matter  of  duty  at  all  we  would  have  no  question  to 
settle  as  between  obligatory  laws.  When  the  Pharisees  and 
Scribes  said  to  the  Saviour,  "  Why  walk  not  thy  disciples  ac- 
cording to  the  tradition  of  the  elders  ?  "  they  supposed  they 
were  pointing  out  a  breach  of  principle.  But  our  Lord  re- 
plied, "  Well  hath  Esaias  prophesied  of  you  hypocrites,  as  it 
is  written :  This  people  honoureth  me  with  their  lips  but  their 
heart  is  far  from  me.  .  .  .  Full  well  ye  reject  the  command- 
ment of  God,  that  ye  may  keep  your  own  tradition.  For 
Moses  said,  Honor  thy  father  and  thy  mother,  and  whoso 
curseth  father  or  mother,  let  him  die  the  death.  But  ye  say, 
If  a  man  shall  say  to  his  father  or  his  mother,  It  is  Corban, 
by  whatsoever  thou  mightest  be  profited  by  me,  he  shall  be 
free.  And  ye  suffer  him  no  more  to  do  aught  for  his  father 
or  his  mother — making  the  word  of  God  of  none  effect 
through  your  tradition  which  ye  have  delivered."  (MARK 
vii..,  11.)  A  Eabbinical  doctrine,  under  color  of  respect  for 
God,  encouraged  men  to  dedicate  property  to  religious  uses 
which  was  needed  for  the  care  of  aged  dependent  parents.  In 
the  judgment  of  Christ,  and  in  that  of  right  reason,  this 
never  was  a  requirement  of  duty.  It  was  a  despicable  selfish 
device  of  sanctimonious  hypocrites.  It  was  an  arrangement 
which  no  honest  mind  could  'accept  as  moral.  In  like  man- 
ner, none  of  the  requirements  of  priest-craft,  superstition  and 
heathenism,  have  more  than  the  semblance  of  obligation. 
This  is  true  also  of  various  perverted  conceptions  of  duty, 
including  that  "  code  of  honor  "  which  authorizes,  in  repara- 
tion for  insults,  real  or  fancied,  an  attempt  to  murder,  none 
the  less  criminal  because  it  may  be  accompanied  with  some 
peril  to  oneself.  In  such  cases  conscience  is  not  called  upon 
to  decide  between  conflicting  duties.,  but  simply  to  abandon 
the  wrong  for  the  right. 

2.  A  wholly  different  question  arises  when  one  incontestable 
rule  of  obligation  conflicts  with  another;  as,  for  example, 
when  David  fleeing  from  King  Saul  "  entered  into  the  house 
of  God  and  did  eat  the  shewbread,  which  was  not  lawful  for 
him  to  eat,  neither  for  them  that  were  with  him,  but  only 
for  the  priests."  Thus  David,  in  order  to  save  his  life  and 
that  of  others,  violated  what  he  acknowledged  to  be  a  solemn 
ordinance  of  God.  Finding  two  obligatory  rules  mutually 
opposed,  he  obeyed  one  rather  than  the  other.  In  such  a 
conflict  of  laws  there  is  no  real  conflict  of  duty,  but  only  the 
24 


370  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXI. 

subordination  of  one  duty  to  another  more  imperative.  The 
authority  of  the  inferior  obligation  is  not  destroyed,  but  be- 
comes latent  in  the  presence  of  the  superior  obligation.  As 
the  commands  of  the  supreme  civil  or  military  ruler  super- 
sede those  of  any  subordinate  officer  when  the  directions  of 
the  two  are  incompatible,  while  the  authority  of  the  inferior 
officer  still  exists  for  its  proper  purpose,  so  <a  more  essential 
requirement  of  duty  may  displace  one  less  essential.  And 
thus  all  parts  of  the  moral  law  are  congruous  and  -co-operative 
with  one  another,  because  each  aims  to  accomplish  its  own 
share  in  the  realization  of  absolute  good,  and  -is  limited  in 
its  operation  by  that  aim.  Every  rule  of  duty  is  fitted,  under 
given  circumstances — that  is,  under  the  circumstances  ordi- 
narily met  with — to  protect  and  promote  a  specific  form  of 
good.  But  when,  in  a  special  case,  the  prescribed  mode  of 
action  would  not,  from  the  absolute  point  of  view,  promote 
good  but  result  in  evil,  it  ceases,  for  the  time  being,  to  be  right 
and  obligatory  and  is  superseded  by  the  conduct  which  the 
case  calls  for.  Hence,  too,  an  ambiguity  arises ;  for  the  mode 
of  conduct  ordinarily  obligatory  may  be  spoken  of  as  right 
when,  for  the  occasion,  it  has  ceased  to  be  right.  Nor,  in- 
deed, can  it  be  denied  this  name  until  the  reasons  for  the  ex- 
ception have  become  perfectly  clear. 

Other  things  being  equal,  a  law  of  duty  is  to  be  honored 
in  proportion  to  the  excellence  and  importance  of  the  interest 
which  it  serves.  It  might  therefore  be  supposed  that  duties 
could  be  'arranged  in  a  scale  of  rank,  a  hierarchy  of  laws, 
according  to  which,  in  every  case,  a  superior  duty  would  take 
precedence  of  an  inferior.  This,  however,  is  not  possible, 
because  often  a  lower  form  of  good  is  imperatively  necessary 
for  the  ends  of  duty ;  in  which  case  the  pursuit  of  it  may  dis- 
place that  of  a  higher  mode  of  good;  just  as,  with  David,  the 
supply  of  extreme  bodily  wants  superseded  the  observance  of 
a  religious  law.  Though  "the  life  is  more  than  meat  and 
the  body  than  raiment "  there  are  times  when  food  or  clothing 
must  be  sought  in  preference  to  any  nobler  object.  The  life 
of  duty  may  be  likened  to  an  army  every  part  of  which  is  so 
closely  connected  with  headquarters  that  any  subaltern  may 
be  authorized  through  special  orders  to  act  independently  of 
any  instructions  except  those  of  the  commander-in-chief. 
Therefore  questions  between  contending  duties  commonly  call 
for  inquiries  respecting  the  good  and  the  evil  of  the  case  from 
the  absolute  point  of  view. 


CHAP.  XXXI.J  RULES  OF  CASUISTRY.  371 

This  agrees  with  the  teaching  of  Cicero  concerning  cases 
in  which  a  regular  requirement  of  duty  should  be  superseded. 
He  says  that  we  must  fall  back  in  such  cases  on  two  funda- 
mental rules,  first  to  injure  no  one,  and,  secondly,  to  serve  the 
common  good. — Referri  decet  ad  ea  quce  posui  fundamenta 
justitice,  ut  ne  cui  noceatur;  delude,  ut  communi  utilitati 
serviatur.  (DE  OFF.,  lib.  I,  cap.  10.)  This  cannot  mean 
that  no  private  harm  is  ever  to  be  inflicted ;  duty  sometimes 
necessitates  the  sacrifice  of  private  interests;  but  only  that 
private  welfare  is  to  be  consulted  so  far  as  the  necessities  of 
the  case  will  allow.  Nor  can  it  mean  that  the  general  welfare 
should  be  sought  inconsiderately,  but  that  it  should  be  pro- 
moted in  such  a  fashion  as  will  result  in  the  greatest  good 
and  the  least  evil  of  which  the  case  admits.  In  short  the 
words  of  Cicero  unconsciously  point  to  absolute  good  as  the 
generic  law  of  morality  and  the  ultimate  test  of  duty. 

3.  Subordinately  to  this  principle  reason  uses  some  applica- 
tions of  it  as  specific  rules  of   judgment.     Let   us   attempt 
to  formulate  some  of  these. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  evident  that  no  exception  to  any  law 
of  righteousness  can  be  justified  except  for  weighty  and 
imperative  considerations.  When  we  remember  that  every 
moral  law  naturally  conserves  or  promotes  some  fundamental 
interest,  we  see  that  the  setting  of  it  aside,  even  for  a  time, 
is  permissible  only  when  the  action  prescribed  would  produce 
evil  instead  of  good  or  when  some  great  sacrifice,  as  of  free- 
dom, property,  health  or  life,  is  indispensable  to  prevent  over- 
whelming evil  or  to  accomplish  abounding  good.  No  law  of 
righteousness  should  be  broken  except  for  what  may  be  called 
compulsory  moral  reasons.  Besides,  the  disregard  of  some 
rule  of  right,  even  when  little  or  no  benefit  directly  attaches 
to  the  observance  of  the  rule,  is  not  at  all  to  be  allowed.  Much 
inconvenience  and  suffering  should  be  endured  simply  to 
maintain  the  habit  of  obeying  the  laws  of  duty.  This  habit 
confers  disciplined  strength  upon  character,  and  is  an  inval- 
uable aid  to  human  weakness. 

4.  In  the  next  place — supposing  that  proper  regard  for 
the  law  is  cherished;  and  stating  more  positively  what  we 
have  already  said — a  rule  of  right  may  be  neglected  when  the 
observance  of  it  seems  certain  not  to  produce  good  but  great 
and  wrongful  harm.     Were  a  dagger  intrusted  to  one  for  safe- 
keeping, it  should  not  be  surrendered  to  its  owner  if  it  were 
clear  that  he  would  immediately  endeavor  to  commit  a  murder 


372  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXI. 

with  it.  Herod,  the  Tetrarch,  should  have  broken  the  oath 
and  the  promise  which  he  made  to  the  daughter  of  Herodias 
instead  of  ordering  the  execution  of  John  the  Baptist.  Jeph- 
thah  should  have  disregarded  his  vow  when  he  found  that  the 
fulfilment  of  it  would  result  in  a  cruel  wrong.  Cicero  goes 
so  far  as  to  say  that  promises  are  not  binding  if  the  perform- 
ance of  them  will  be  useless  to  him  to.  whom  the  promise  was 
made,  or  even  if  they  will  do  more  harm  to  the  promiser  than 
good  to  the  party  to  whom  the  promise  was  made. — Nee 
promissa  igitur  servanda  sunt  ea  quce  sint  us  quibus  promi- 
seris  inutilia.  Nee  si  plus  tibi  ea  noceant  quam  illi  prosint 
cm  promiseris  contra  officium  est  majus  anteponi  minori. 
(DE  OFFICIIS,  lib.  I.,  cap.  10.).  In  these  statements  Cicero 
scarcely  gives  sufficient  reason  for  the  violation  of  one's  word, 
though  perhaps  the  example  which  he  uses  in  illustration  of 
them  does.  He  says  that  a  lawyer  might  neglect  an  engage- 
ment to  appear  in  court,  in  case  his  son  were  taken  danger- 
ously sick  and  required  the  presence  of  the  father  at  home. 
Certainly  paternal  duty  in  a  case  of  life  or  death  would  justify 
the  failure  to  keep  a  'business  appointment. 

The  question  suggests  itself,  Should  marriage  engagements 
ever  be  broken?  We  think  that  they  may  rightly  be  broken 
if  it  become  clear  that  the  proposed  union  would  be  unhappy 
and  productive  of  evil  results.  But  such  a  step  should  not 
be  taken  lightly;  and  the  party  breaking  the  contract  should 
be-  liable  for  any  injury  which  the  engagement  has  done  the 
other  party,  even  though  neither  may  be  farther  injured  by 
the  failure  of  contract. 

5.  Thirdly,  one  rule  of  right  may  displace  another  when 
vastly  greater  good — in  the  absolute  point  of  view — will  be 
accomplished  by  following  that  rule  than  by  the  observance  of 
the  other.  Grotius  supports  this  principle  when  he  says  that 
reason  forbids  the  infliction  of  any  hurt  on  any  one  unless 
there  be  some  good  to  be  brought  about  by  it. — Dictat  ratio 
homini  nihil  agendum  quod  noceatur  homini  alteri,  nisi  id 
bonum  hob  eat  aliquid  propositum.  (DE  JURE  BELLI  AC 
PACIS,  lib.  2,  cap.  20.)  But  this  precept  must  be  accurately 
understood  and  must  be  used  with  care,  if  we  would  avoid 
the  -abandonment  of  the  right  for  the  expedient,  which  is 
never  allowable.  The  end  to  be  gained  must  be  more  than 
an  ordinary  advantage  or  anything  merely  desirable.  It  must 
present  itself  as  a  thing  absolutely  good — as  a  right  and  duti- 
ful end,  As  compared  with  the  competitive  form  of  good,  it 


CHAP.  XXXI.]  RULES  OF  CASUISTRY.  3^3 

must  have  that  imperative  importance  which  is  often  styled 
'*  necessity."  Under  all  ordinary  circumstances  human  life  is 
to  be  sacredly  protected,  yet  in  war  many  lives  may  be  sacri- 
fied  in  the  cause  of  justice  or  of  liberty.  In  common  law, 
also,  we  are  told  that  "  acts  done  of  necessity  to  avoid  a  greater 
harm  are  on  that  account  justified,  though  they  would  be 
otherwise  unlawful.  Pulling  (".own  houses  to  stop  a  fire  and 
casting  goods  overboard,  or  otherwise  sacrificing  property  to 
save  a  ship  or  the  lives  of  those  on  board,  are  the  regular 
examples.  There  are  also  circumstances  in  which  a  man's 
property  or  person  may  have  to  be  dealt  with  promptly  for 
his  own^  obvious  good,  but  his  consent  or  the  consent  of  any 
one  having  lawful  authority  over  him  cannot  be  obtained  in 
time.  Here  it  is  evidently  justifiable  to  do  what  needs  to  be 
done.  It  has  never  been  supposed  to  be  technically  a  trespass 
if  I  throw  water  on  my  neighbor's  goods  to  save  them  from 
fire,  or,  seeing  his  house  on  fire,  enter  on  his  land  to  help  in 
putting  it  out."  (POLLOCK  ON  TORTS,  Ch.  IV.,  Section  II.) 
In  all  such  cases  an  obvious  imperative  duty  sets  aside  that 
mode  of  action  which  is  ordinarily  obligatory. 

6.  A  fourth  precept — a  kind  of  corollary  to  those  already 
given — is  that  private  rights  may  ~be  superseded  by  public 
necessities,  that  is,  by  great  and  paramount  public  benefits. 
In  cases  of  this  kind  the  private  damage  done  should  be 
compensated  for  when  possible  from  the  public  purse;  other- 
wise the  satisfaction  of  contributing  to  the  general  welfare 
must  be  one's  consolation  for  loss  or  annoyance.  When  the 
smallpox  invaded  the  city  of  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  in  the 
year  1882,  the  authorities  of  that  place  established  a  hospital 
in  the  midst  of  the  fairground ;  after  which  for  some  months, 
as  often  as  occasion  required,  infected  clothing  was  burnt  at  a 
spot  some  four  hundred  yards  distant  from  numerous  dwell- 
ings which  surround  the  fairground.  The  fact  that  this 
burning  gave  forth  an  offensive  smoke  and  smell  formed  the 
basis  of  an  indictment  upon  which  the  authorities  of  the 
city  were  convicted  of  having  established  a  nuisance.  But 
the  case  being  appealed,  the  supreme  court  of  Tennessee  set 
aside  the  conviction  and  concluded  its  decision  as  follows: 
"  The  rule  applicable  to  such  a  case  is  that  if  the  act  was 
done  by  public  authority  or  sanction  and  in  good  faith,  and 
was  done  for  the  public  safety  and  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
the  disease,  and  such  means  used  as  are  usually  resorted  to 
and  approved  by  medical  science  in  such  cases,  and  was  done 


374  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP  XXXI. 

with  reasonable  care  and  regard  for  the  safety  of  others,  then 
the  parties  were  justifiable  in  what  they  did  and  the  parties 
inconvenienced  could  not  complain,  nor  could  the  state  en- 
force a  criminal  liability  for  results  of  temporary  incon- 
venience or  unpleasantness  that  accrue  from  the  use  of  such 
proper  and  accredited  means  for  the  safety  of  the  commun- 
ity." (REPORTED  12  Lee,  146.) 

The  most  common  case  in  which  private  rights  are  en- 
trenched upon  for  public  uses  is  that  of  "  eminent  domain." 
This  is  the  right  of  the  state  or  government  to  take  the  prop- 
erty of  a  citizen  when  it  may  be  needed  for  some  important 
purpose;  and  it  may  extend  to  the  total  extinguishment  of 
one's  title  by  the  sovereign  power  of  the  State.  Under  Eng- 
lish law  the  exercise  of  this  right  is  followed  by  the  pay- 
ment of  an  appropriate  compensation.  The  use  for  which 
the  property  is  taken  must  be  public  in  its  nature.  The 
benefit  need  not  be  universal,  but  it  must  be  a  contribution 
in  some  form  to  the  welfare  and  progress  of  the  community, 
or  of  the  district  in  which  the  property  is  situated.  For 
example,  private  land  may  be  taken  for  roads,  canals,  bridges 
or  fortifications,  or  for  the  site  of  public  edifices.  In  some 
States,  also,  as  in  New  York,  private  property  may  be  taken 
for  private  uses;  for  instance,  a  necessary  private  road  may 
be  opened  through  a  man's  farm  without  his  consent.  The 
principle  governing  such  a  case  is  kindred  to  that  of  eminent 
domain.  An  imperative  private  need  displaces  a  private 
right  because  otherwise  the  total  good  possible  in  the  case 
would  fall  far  short  of  realization.  (See  CHASE'S  BLACK- 
STONE,  p.  79.) 

The  exercise  of  this  confiscating  power  is  often  allowed 
by  statute  to  corporate  bodies  and  especially  to  municipal- 
ities. Hence  cities  lay  out  streets,  squares  and  parks,  and  con- 
struct fountains,  aqueducts,  bridges  and  other  improvements, 
in  proper  locations.  A  similar  principle  places  the  erection 
of  buildings  under  municipal  regulations,  so  that  a  man  can- 
not build  as  he  pleases  on  his  own  lot.  The  control  of  pri- 
vate property  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  was  very  energetic 
in  Paris  during  the  reign  of  Napoleon  III.  Multitudes  of 
houses  in  narrow  streets  were  torn  down  in  order  that  the 
present  grand  boulevards  might  be  opened  and  that  the  gay 
capital  of  France  might  be  rendered  more  attractive  and 
prosperous. 

7.  A  fifth  mode  in  which  one  rule  of  right  is  superseded 


CHAP.  XXXI.]  RULES  OF  CASUISTRY.  375 

by  another  occurs  when  the  methods  of  defensive  or  puni- 
tive justice  displace  those  of  moral  goodness  or  of  regulative 
righteousness.  Evil-doers  forfeit  all  consideration  inconsist- 
ent with  the  steps  necessary  for  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crime.  The  maintenance  of  the  moral  law  is  not  only 
an  absolute  duty  but  is  superior  to  any  aim  which  can  come 
into  conflict  with  it.  An  extreme  illustration  may  be  seen  in 
the  death  penalty  for  murder,  or  when  that  protection  which 
the  law  throws  around  life  is  forfeited  by  criminal  conduct. 
Foster  in  his  treatise  on  Crown  Law  (section  267)  says,  "  The 
execution  of  malefactors  under  sentence  of  death  for  capi- 
tal crimes  hath  been  considered  by  former  writers  a  species 
of  homicide  founded  on  necessity.  I  think  it  hath  with  pro- 
priety enough  been  so  considered ;  for  the  ends  of  government 
cannot  be  answered  without  it.  ...  Where  persons  having 
authority  to  arrest  or  imprison,  using  the  proper  means  for 
that  purpose,  are  resisted  in  so  doing,  and  the  party  mak- 
ing resistance  is  killed  in  the  struggle,  this  homicide  is  jus- 
tifiable. .  .  .  When  a  felony  is  committed  and  the  felon 
fleeth  from  justice,  and  a  dangerous  wound  is  given,  it  is 
the  duty  of  every  man  to  use  his  best  endeavors  for  prevent- 
ing an  escape;  and  if,  in  the  pursuit,  the  party  fleeing  is 
killed,  where  he  cannot  be  otherwise  overtaken,  this  will  be 
deemed  justifiable  homicide.  For  the  pursuit  was  not  mere- 
ly warrantable,  it  is  what  the  law  requireth  and  will  punish 
the  willful  neglect  of."  Foster  teaches,  also,  that  the  law 
justifies  homicide  which  occurs  in  the  attempt  to  prevent  fel- 
ony or  in  the  defense  of  one  who  is  feloniously  attacked.  He 
says,  "Where  a  known  felony  is  attempted  upon  the  per- 
son, be  it  to  rob  or  murder,  here  the  party  assaulted  may  re- 
pel force  by  force;  and  even  his  servant  then  attendant  on 
him,  or  any  other  person  present,  may  interpose  for  prevent- 
ing mischief;  and  if  death  ensueth,  the  party  so  interposing 
will  be  justified.  In  this  case  nature  and  social  duty  co-oper- 
ate.—A  woman,  in  defense  of  her  chastity,  may  lawfully  kill 
a  person  attempting  to  commit  a  rape  upon  her.  The  injury 
intended  can  never  be  repaired,  and  Nature,  to  render  the  sex 
amiable,  hath  implanted  in  the  female  heart  a  quick  sense  of 
honor,  the  pride  of  virtue,  which  kindleth  and  enflameth  at 
every  such  instance  of  brutal  lust.  Here  the  law  of  self-de- 
fense plainly  coincideth  with  the  dictation  of  Nature. — An 
attempt  is  made  to  commit  arson  or  burglary  on  the  habita- 
tion. The  owner  or  any  part  of  his  family,  or  even  a  lodger 


3T6  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXI. 

with  him,  may  lawfully  kill  the  assailants  for  preventing  the 
mischief  intended.  Here,  likewise,  Nature  and  social  duty 
co-operate."  (CROWN  LAW,  Section  273.)  The  "Nature" 
of  which  Foster  speaks  is  chiefly  that  practical  moral  reason 
which  perceives  the  absolute  good,  or  the  right,  in  every  case, 
and  its  requirements. 

8.  A  sixth  rule  of  judgment  in  moral  questions  is  that 
when  the  chief  use  of  one  right  end  is  to  serve  another  or 
others,  more  fundamental,  the  pursuit  of  the  former  is  sub- 
ordinate  to  that  of  the  latter;  while — as  was  said  at  the  be- 
ginning— all  specific  right  ends  are  to  be  sought  subordi- 
nately  to  absolute  good  as  the  ultimate  end  of  duty.  This 
thought  indicates  how  the  operation  of  most  moral  laws  is 
subject  to  limitations.  It  may  be  illustrated  by  the  teach- 
ing of  Cicero  respecting  the  cultivation  of  wisdom,  which,  he 
says,  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  practice 
of  justice.  Wisdom  was  regarded  by  the  ancients  as  the  first 
of  the  four  leading  virtues  and  as  being  inherently  and 
necessarily  an  aim  of  duty.  But  the  foundation  of  wisdom 
is  the  knowledge  of  our  relations  to  our  fellow-men  and  the 
importance  of  wisdom  is  that  it  qualifies  us  to  act  aright  in 
these  relations.  Justice — including  not  merely  justice  in 
the  narrow  sense,  but  also  beneficence  and  liberality — is  the 
bond  of  human  society  and  the  virtue  which  contributes  most 
to  the  welfare  of  mankind.  Therefore,  says  Cicero,  when  the 
pursuit  of  wisdom  conflicts  with  the  duties  of  justice,  preced- 
ence should  be  given  to  the  latter. — Ita  fit  ut  vincat  cogniti- 
onis  studium  consociatio  hominum  et  communitas.  (DE 
OFF.,  lib.  I.,  cap.  43.) 

In  the  Jewish  and  the  Christian  systems  of  morality  the 
observance  of  the  Sabbath  is  an  essential  point  of  duty.  We 
are  to  rest  one  day  in  the  week  from  worldly  business  and  to 
use  that  day  for  religious  worship  and  spiritual  improvement ; 
it  is  to  be  the  Sabbath  of  the  Lord  our  God.  This  institution 
is  connected  with  the  highest  welfare  of  mankind,  and  is  to 
continue  as  long  as  reverence  and  love  for  God  are  felt  on 
earth.  Yet  our  Saviour  teaches  that  the  law  of  the  Sabbath 
is  to  be  modified  as  occasion  calls  for  it  by  the  operation  of 
a  more  fundamental  law.  It  may  even  be  suspended  in  favor 
of  the  law  of  humanity.  He  says,  "  The  Sabbath  was  made 
for  man  and  not  man  for  the  Sabbath."  The  observance  of 
the  holy  day  is  to  be  subordinate  to  the  necessities  of  life, 
and  is  to  be  wisely  adapted  to  circumstances  so  as  to  secure 


CHAP.  XXXI. j  RULES  OF  CASUISTRY.  377 

from  it  the  best  possible  results.  In  like  manner  the  duty 
of  obedience  to  civil  rulers  ceases  when  they  have  become 
guilty  of  insufferable  tyranny.  For  government  was  made 
for  man  and  not  man  for  government. 

Compliance  with  any  moral  precept  is  no  longer  obliga- 
tory when  it  would  defeat  the  main  objects  for  which  the  rule 
exists.  Even  the  duty  of  caring  for  one's  life  may  be  properly 
neglected  in  the  pursuit  of  very  great  and  noble  ends.  The 
Apostle  Paul,  with  martyrdom  in  his  thought,  said,  "  I  count 
not  my  life  dear  unto  me  so  that  I  may  finish  my  course 
with  joy  and  the  ministry  which  I  have  received  of  the  Lord 
Jesus,  to  testify  the  gospel  of  the  grace  of  God."  (ACTS 
xx.,  24.) 

The  ancients  so  far  subordinated  life  to  honorable  living 
that  they  commended  suicide  in  extreme  cases.  Cicero  ap- 
plauds Cato  for  dying  when  he  could  not  otherwise  escape 
from  the  power  of  a  hated  tyrant. — Moriendum  potius  quam 
iyranni  vultus  aspiciendus  fuit.  But  Christian  philosophy 
teaches  that  a  man  may  accomplish  good  even  in  the  lowliest 
condition,  and  that  no  loss  of  worldly  prosperity  or  honor, 
nor  even  the  prospect  of  pain  and  suffering,  can  justify  self- 
destruction.  Possibly,  however,  death  by  one's  own  hand  is 
to  be  preferred  to  certain  unspeakable  tortures  and  horrors 
such  as  savages  inflict  upon  their  captives.  During  the  late 
Chinese  insurrection  it  was  reported  that  the  women  of  the 
legations  at  Pekin  were  given  pistols,  so  that  in  case  all  their 
defenders  were  slain  they  might  find  in  death  a  refuge  from 
outrage  by  the  Boxers.  Some  contended  that  such  a  course 
would  not  be  suicide,  but  a  justifiable  defense  of  personal 
honor  by  the  only  means  available.  We  think  it  would  be 
suicide,  but  find  it  difficult  to  say  that  suicide  would  be 
blameworthy  in  such  a  case. 

The  duty  of  veracity,  also,  is  limited  by  the  ends  which  it 
is  designed  to  serve.  One  must  never  bear  false  witness 
against  his  neighbor,  and  the  truth  must  be  told  in  courts  of 
justice  or  elsewhere  to  all  who  have  the  right  to  know  the 
truth.  But  there  is  no  obligation  to  impart  knowledge  by 
which  any  one  would  receive  needless  injury;  on  the  contrary 
information  should  be  withheld  in  such  a  caee.  In  extreme 
cases  we  may  even  deceive  those  who  are  seeking  to  accom- 
plish evil.  Dr.  Henry  Van  Dyke  in  his  story,  "  The  Other 
Wise  Man/'  tells  of  an  aged 'Median,  a  seeker  after  God, 
who  used  falsehood  to  turn  away  the  soldiers  of  Herod  from 


378  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXI. 

a  house  containing  children  who,  but  for  this  intervention, 
would  have  been  slaughtered.  The  virtuous  nature  of  the 
man  compelled  him  to  violate  the  rule  of  veracity,  not  indeed 
without  compunctions  arising  from  habits  of  moral  judg- 
ment, yet  in  a  way  that  secured  for  him  the  favor  of  Heaven. 
President  Porter,  also,  mentions  with  approval  the  con- 
duct of  Orria,  a  Roman  matron,  whose  husband  and  two  sons 
were  very  sick.  "  One  of  the  sons  died  just  as  the  father 
had  reached  the  crisis  of  his  disease.  The  mother  wiped 
away  her  tears  and  approached  the  sick  bed  of  her  husband 
with  a  cheerful  air.  As  he  inquired  after  her  son,  she  re- 
plied. '  He  is  better ;'  and  rushed  from  the  room  unable  to  re- 
strain her  grief."  Dr.  Porter  asks,  "Was  such  a  falsehood 
criminal  ?  "  and  replies,  "  There  are  few  who  will  say  that  it 
was."  (ELEMENTS  or  MORAL  SCIENCE,  Section  230.) 

Dr.  Van  Dyke,  in  a  preface  to  a  late  edition  of  his  story, 
comments  on  the  falsehood  of  the  wise  man  as  follows:  "I 
have  been  asked  many  times  why  I  made  the  Fourth  Wise 
Man  tell  a  lie,  in  the  cottage  at  Bethlehem,  to  save  the  little 
child's  life.  I  did  not  make  him  tell  a  lie.  What  Artaban 
said  to  the  soldiers  he  said  for  himself,  because  he  could  not 
help  it. 

"Is  a  lie  ever  justifiable?  Perhaps  not.  But  may  it 
not  sometimes  seem  inevitable  ?  And,  if  it  were  a  sin,  might 
not  a  man  confess  it  and  be  pardoned  for  it  more  easily  than 
for  the  greater  sin  of  spiritual  selfishness,  or  indifference, 
or  the  betrayal  of  innocent  blood?  That  is  what  I  saw  Ar- 
taban do.  That  is  what  I  heard  him  say.  All  through  his 
life  he  was  trying  to  do  the  best  he  could.  It  was  not  perfect. 
But  there  are  some  kinds  of  failure  that  are  beter  than  suc- 
cess." 

These  words  of  Dr.  Van  Dyke  are  an  elegant  expression 
of  Christian  sentiment,  and  a  valuable  though  unassuming 
contribution  to  ethical  thought.  We  would  add  to  them  only 
that  the  word  "  lie  "  is  a  harsh  name  for  the  untruth  told  by 
Artaban.  If  there  be  no  lie  except  when  unjustifiable  deceit 
is  used,  then  the  untruthful  assertion  of  the  wise  man  was 
not  a  lie  but  a  dutiful  falsehood. 

Some  further  remarks  by  Dr.  Porter  are  characteristically 
judicious.  He  says :  "  To  all  attempts  to  enforce  absolute 
rules  with  no  real  or  apparent  exceptions,  it  is  enough  to 
reply  that,  in  respect  to  the  rule  of  veracity  as  in  regard  to 
every  other  rule  of  external  conduct,  exceptio  probat  requ- 


CHAP.  XXXL]  RULES  OH  CASUISTRY.  379 

lam.  The  act  and  spirit  of  love  and  uprightness  should  be 
supreme  and  absolute  in  controlling  our  communications  with 
our  fellow  men.  .  .  .  The  man  who  is  controlled  by  the  law 
of  duty  will  fail  neither  in  spirit  nor  in  act  to  speak  the  truth 
in  his  heart  and  with  his  words  whenever  his  words  have  any 
importance  in  respect  to  that  confidence  which  is  a  social 
necessity  in  the  intercourse  of  man  with  man."  It  will  be 
seen  that  the  radical  end  of  the  law  is  here  set  forth  as  de- 
termining the  extent  of  its  application,  this  end  itself  being 
subordinate  to  the  supreme  law  of  "love  and  uprightness." 

9.  Finally,  variation  from  a  specific  moral  law  seems  al- 
lowable when  it  is  clear  that  the  object  of  the  law  can  be 
accomplished  as  completely  but  more  beneficently  in  some 
new  way.  It  is  our  duty  to  give  alms  to  the  needy,  but 
whenever  the  poor  can  be  encouraged  and  enabled  to  provide 
for  themselves,  we  should  go  to  pains  and  expense  in  this 
mode  of  doing  good  rather  than  in  the  other.  All  citizens  in 
proportion  to  their  means  are  under  obligation  to  share  in 
the  expenses  of  the  government.  But  the  laws  regulating 
taxation,  especially  as  regards  personal  property,  have  been 
found  very  unequal  and  unjust  in  their  operation.  It  is  es- 
timated that  not  more  than  five  per  cent,  of  the  personalty 
in  the  city  of  New  York  is  assessed,  and  that  even  this  taxation 
is  very  unevenly  distributed.  A  man  of  moderate  means  is 
more  likely  to  be  assessed  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of 
his  property  than  a  man  of  great  wealth,  while  weighty 
excuses  are  offered  for  falsehood  and  perjury.  Either  our 
laws  should  be  reformed  or  some  other  means  than  taxation 
should  be  employed,  in  whole  or  in  part,  for  the  raising  of 
public  revenue.  It  is  said  that  the  city  of  Glasgow  defrays 
all  its  municipal  expenses  from  the  income  of  the  franchises 
and  public  works  belonging  to  the  city.  The  time  may  come 
when  the  management — or  the  control — of  public  utilities 
by  the  State  will  yield  sufficient  public  revenue  without  re- 
sort to  a  demoralizing  system  of  taxation. 

Again,  the  ends  of  punitive  justice  seem  sometimes  ob- 
tainable without  exacting  the  penalty — or  at  least  the  full 
penalty — from  the  transgressor.  It  may  be  questioned 
whether  the  payment  of  a  fine  by  a  friend  while  the  evil-doer 
himself  remains  impenitent  and  defiant,  would  be  any  satis- 
faction to  justice,  even  though  a  civil  tribunal  might  ac- 
cept it  as  such.  But  were  the  payment  of  the  penalty  ac- 
companied by  the  sincere  contrition  of  the  offender  and  by  a 


380  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXI. 

well-grounded  assurance  that  there  would  be  no  repetition  of 
the  offense,  and  it  were  felt  that  the  cause  of  righteousness 
had  been  really  upheld,  penal  justice  might  make  no  further 
demands.  In  his  coronation  oath  the  King  of  England 
pledges  himself  "to  administer  justice  with  mercy"; 
which  means  not  simply  that  he  is  to  exercise  both  these  at- 
tributes, but  that  he  is  to  use  mercy  instead  of  justice  when- 
ever the  ends  of  government  are  obtainable  in  that  way.  It  is 
especially  the  duty  of  rulers  to  recognize  the  difference  be- 
tween the  inveterate  and  hardened  criminal  and  that  trans- 
gressor whose  reformation  may  be  reasonably  hoped  for. 
Frequently  the  sentence  of  the  latter  may  be  suspended  whilst 
he  is  put  under  probation  and  encouraged  to  lead  a  better 
life.  The  treatment  to  which  he  is  then  subjected  largely 
loses  its  punitive  character  and  becomes  reformatory;  and, 
should  he  respond  properly  to  good  influences,  the  liberties 
forfeited  through  wrong-doing  may  be  restored  to  him. 
When  the  laws  of  the  state  are  thus  controlled  by  benevo- 
lence and  seek  the  welfare  of  even  the  guilty,  they  most  re- 
semble the  government  of  Heaven.  For 

Earthly  power  doth  then  shew  likest  God's, 
When  mercy  seasons  justice. 

MERCHANT  OF  VENICE,  IV.,  i. 

Yet  neither  in  human  nor  in  divine  law  should  justice  be 
displaced  by  mercy  unless  at  the  same  time  the  ends  of  jus- 
tice can  be  realized.  If  the  transgressor  himself  does  not 
pay  the  full  penalty,  the  law  must  in  some  way  be  adequately 
honored  and  the  cause  of  righteousness  maintained.  Here, 
again,  let  us  listen  to  President  Porter.  After  defining  puni- 
tive justice  as  a  form  of  "  moral  love  "  which  manifests  itself 
in  hatred  for  sin,  he  continues :  "  Such  moral  love,  though 
it  be  called  justice,  may  also  desire  to  reclaim  and  recover 
to  that  moral  health  which  is  shown  in  repentance  as  mani- 
fested in  acts  of  duty.  If  now  this  recovering  pity  reclaims 
and  pardons  at  the  same  time  that  it  leaves  unquestioned  its 
just  and  energetic  displeasure  towards  evil,  it  is  just  to  par- 
don, in  the  largest  sense  of  justice,  as  it  is  to  inflict  the 
threatened  penalty.  It  may  be  questioned  whether  this  higher 
ideal  of  justice  can  often  be  safely  applied  under  the  limi- 
tations of  the  human  State,  which  must  concern  itself  chiefly 
with  external  conduct  and  can  only  indirectly  and  imperfectly 


CHAP.  XXXI.]          RULES  OF  CASUISTRY.  381 

deal  with  the  inner  life.  But  we  cannot  doubt  that  it  con- 
trols that  spiritual  kingdom  in  which  moral  relations  are  su- 
preme and  the  hearts  of  all  are  judged  by  the  discerning  yet 
pitying  eye  of  the  living  God."  (ELEMENTS  MOR.  Sci.,  Sec- 
tion 289.) 

10.  We  have  now  set  forth  seven  leading  thoughts  which 
may  serve  as  rules  of  moral  judgment.  They  have  suggested 
themselves  in  connection  with  the  teachings  of  Cicero  (which 
are  those  also  of  the  Stoics  and  Academics)  respecting  the 
honestum  and  the  utile;  but  they  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be 
derived  from  those  teachings.  The  ideas  of  Cicero  have 
served  only  as  starting  points  of  inquiry.  While  such  rules 
as  those  proposed  are  called  for  in  the  science  of  casuistry,  it 
is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  every  case  of  conscience,  like  every 
case  in  law,  must  be  settled  finally  on  its  own  merits ;  and  also 
that,  in  practice,  precepts  avail  little  if  one  be  not  governed 
by  the  single-minded  desire  to  know  and  to  do  the  right. 
Every  law  of  duty  aims  at  absolute  good.  Those  who  are  set 
on  this  supreme  end  will  find  assistance  in  rules,  and  will 
apply  the  rules  correctly.  But  the  selfish  and  unprincipled 
will  be  likely  to  adopt  sophistical  interpretations  of  their 
own. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

SOCIAL  ETHICS. 

1.  Essentially  duty  is  neither  egoistic  nor  altruistic  but  what  might 
be  called  absolutistic  or  totalistic. — 2.  Yet  the  rules  whereby 
moral  principle  is  applied  mostly  take  an  altruistic  form. 
Hence  some  erroneously  make  ethics  a  purely  sociological 
science.  Mackenzie  quoted.— 3.  The  division  of  duties  into  in- 
dividual and  social  is  not  the  same  as  the  division  of  them  into 
egoistic  (or  egoic)  and  altruistic  (or  altruic).— 4.  One  science  may 
have  topics  in  common  with  another.  This  is  especially  the 
case  when  two  investigations  both  bear  on  the  conduct  of  life. — 
— 5.  Sociology  should  be  founded  on  fact  rather  than  on  conjec- 
ture. Prof.  Giddings  quoted. — 6.  And  should  apply  ethical 
methods  and  principles  to  practical  questions. — 7.  The  word 
"  sociology  "  sometimes  designates  a  group  of  sciences  including 
anthropology,  archaeology,  ethnology,  economics,  jurisprudence, 
the  theory  of  the  State,  and  others.  But  it  often  now  denotes 
the  general  science  of  society  and  of  social  relations. — 8.  The 
family.  The  true  conception  of  marriage.  The  law  as  touching 
divorce.  The  mutual  obligations  of  husband  and  wife,  and  of 
kinsfolk.  The  directions  of  Moses  and  of  Christ. — 9.  Friendship 
as  cultivated  among  the  ancients.  Its  place  under  Christianity. 
Cicero  and  our  Saviour,  quoted. — 10.  The  obligations  of  patriotism 
and  humanity.  The  "  moral  progress  of  the  world  "  consists 
chiefly  in  the  growth  of  humanity. — 11.  The  error  of  an  extreme 
socialism.  The  world  needs  some  new  methods,  but  no  methods 
will  avail  much  unless  the  spirit  of  unselfish  justice  be  culti- 
vated. 

1.  DUTY  may  be  either  egoistic  or  altruistic :  that  is,  it  may 
be  directed  towards  oneself  or  towards  others.  The  essential 
principle  of  duty,  however,  is  neither  egoistic  nor  altruistic 
but  seeks  all  the  good  of  which  the  case  admits.  One's  duty 
to  himself  cannot  be  .considered  as  affecting  himself  only,  nor 
one's  duty  to  others  as  affecting  them  only.  The  distinction 
which  we  must  recognize  between  egoistic  and  altruistic  duty 
belongs  to  practi-cal  rather  than  to  theoretical  ethics.  It 
arises  from  contemplating  the  different  ways  in  which 
the  general  aims  of  duty  are  to  be  realized. 
382 


CHAP.  XXXII.J  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  333 

This  is  evident,  because  the  very  same  principle  may  lead 
to  both  forms  of  duty.  For  example,  the  law  of  regard  for 
truth,  in  dealing  with  others  calls  for  veracity  and  forbids 
deceit ;  in  one's  own  life  it  requires  the  cultivation  of  wisdom 
and  knowledge  and  the  cherishing  of  inward  simplicity  and 
sincerity.  The  duty  of  purity  prohibits  not  only  outward 
breaches  of  the  seventh  commandment,  but  also  the  degrada- 
tion of  one's  own  character  by  obscene  thoughts  or  deeds. 
So  completely  are  moral  actions  united  in  a  network  of 
causation  that  we  cannot  think  of  any  duty  to  others  which 
does  not  involve  duty  to  oneself,  nor  of  any  duty  to  oneself 
which  does  not  involve  duty  to  others.  The  commandment, 
r*  Thou  shalt  not  steal,"  which  primarily  refers  to  the  prop- 
erty of  one's  neighbor,  implies  also  that  one  should  not  waste 
or  misuse  his  own  property;  that  would  be  a  kind  of  steal- 
ing from  oneself;  it  inculcates  also  the  duty  of  maintaining 
for  oneself  an  honest  and  independent  spirit.  So  the  pro- 
hibition, "Thou  shalt  do  no  murder,"  relates  first  to  the 
lives  of  other  men,  but  also  forbids  suicide,  which  is  self- 
murder;  and  it  requires  further  the  suppression  of  hatred 
within  ourselves-;  for,  as  St.  John  says,  "He  that  hateth 
his  brother  is  a  murderer."  In  like  manner  the  various 
elements  of  religious  duty' — love  for  God,  obedience  to  His 
will,  reverence  for  His  name,  for  His  holy  day  and  His 
ordinances  of  worship — are  obligatory  not  only  because  of 
the  Divine  claims  upon  us,  but  also  because  the  religious 
life  is  needful  to  one's  best  welfare.  With  respect  to  the 
last  commandment  of  the  Decalogue  the  question  may  be 
raised  whether  the  duty  which  it  enjoins  is  more  altruistic 
or  more  egoistic.  Covetousness  is  a  disposition  unfriendly 
to  the  prosperity  of  one's  neighbor  and  the  opposite  of  that 
readiness  to  promote  the  welfare  of  others  which  ought  al- 
ways to  be  cherished.  But  it  is  to  be  condemned  no  less  for 
its  wretched  influence  upon  oneself  than  because  it  tends  to 
the  robbery  and  wronging  of  others. 

2.  Thus  the  distinction  of  rules  into  egoistic  and  altru- 
istic pertains  to  the  application  of  principles  rather  than 
to  the  principles  themselves.  At  the  same  time  it  is  notice- 
able that  the  great  majority  of  moral  rules  have  an  altruistic 
form.  This  has  arisen  because  men  feel  more  the  need  of 
asserting  altruistic  than  of  asserting  egoistic  morality. 
While  both  modes  of  duty  need  to  be  inculcated,  the  duty 
which  a  man  is  to  perform  towards  himself  is  not  so  likely 


384  TBE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXII. 

to  be  neglected  as  that  which  he  owes  to  other  people.  At 
least  the  effort  to  enforce  it  does  not  have  the  same  evident 
usefulness.  Hence,  though  love  and  care  for  oneself  are  a 
duty,  the  command  is  not  to  love  oneself,  but  to  love  one's 
neighbor  as  oneself — the  duty  of  rational  regard  for  one's 
own  welfare  being  supposed  or  understood.  This  peculiar 
prominence  of  altruistic  obligation  has  led  some  ethical 
writers  to  treat  of  duty  as  if  it  pertained  to  man  only  as  a 
social  being.  Such  is  the  mistake  of  those  utilitarians  who 
say  that  the  essential  aim  of  the  moral  law  is  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number.  Others,  also,  who  are  not 
utilitarians,  fall  into  error  when  they  say  that  "  Ethics  is 
a  part  of  social  philosophy."  (MACKENZIE'S  MANUAL,  Bk. 
III.,  Chap.  I.)  The  truth  will  permit  us  to  say  only  that 
the  happiness  of  the  greatest  number  is  one  great  aim  of 
duty,  and  that  many  ethical  questions  are  sociological. 

In  further  proof  that  the  moral  aim  is  not  exclusively 
altruistic  we  may  refer  to  the  great  divisions  of  the  moral 
law.  In  each  of  these  the  duty  which  we  owe  to  others  is 
accompanied  with  a  corresponding  duty  owing  to  ourselves. 
The  main  precept  of  moral  goodness  is  the  golden  rule : 
Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to  you,  do  ye 
also  so  to  them.  That  is,  Do  the  same  good  for  another  that 
you  might  reasonably  desire  for  yourself  if  you  were  in  that 
other's  place.  This  implies  that  you  yourself  have  a  claim 
for  good  not  only  from  others,  but  from  yourself  as  well.  We 
are  not  commanded  to  consider  the  good  of  others  exclusively. 
The  affectional  requirements  of  altruistic  goodness  is  thus 
stated :  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."  So 
far  is  this  from  prohibiting  self-love  that  it  presupposes  self- 
love,  and  requires  that  one's  love  for  his  neighbor  should  be 
as  sincere  and  earnest  as  that  for  himself.  Turning  from 
moral  goodness  to  the  rules  of  regulative  righteousness,  we 
find  that  every  specific  law  of  duty  has  an  egoistic  as  well 
as  an  altruistic  bearing.  Over  against  every  right  which 
belongs  to  one's  neighbor  a  similar  right  may  be  claimed  for 
oneself,  and  should  be  insisted  upon  so  far  as  needful  to 
one's  best  welfare.  The  rules,  also,  of  affectional  regulative 
righteousness  relate  primarily  to  the  proper  exercise  of  one's 
own  natural  dispositions,  and  find  their  immediate  end  in 
the  inward  excellence  and  happiness  which  this  produces. 
Then,  moral  esteem — that  preferential  principle  according 
to  which  the  good  become  the  objects  of  special  affection, 


CHAP.  XXXII.]  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  385 

while  love  and  favor  are  withdrawn  from  the  evil-minded — 
conveys  with  it  the  duty  of  rendering  oneself  worthy  of  that 
favor  which  falls  to  the  upright  and  well-disposed.  Finally, 
causative  righteousness,  the  virtue-promoting  principle,  re- 
quires one  to  take  proper  measures  for  his  own  moral  effi- 
ciency as  well  as  for  that  of  others.  In  short,  every  depart- 
ment of  the  moral  law,  in  seeking  its  own  form  of  absolute 
good,  has  an  egoistic  as  well  as  an  altruistic  development. 

3.  Another  discrimination  arising  from  the  consideration 
of  persons  as  the  objects  towards  whom  duties  are  directed 
is  closely  related  to  the   distinction  between  egoistic   and 
altruistic  obligation,  but  is  made  from  a  different  point  of 
view.     It  is  that  which  distinguishes  individual  from  social 
duty.    Every  duty  either  to  oneself  or  to  another  single  per- 
son may  be  called  individual,  or  individualistic,  because  it 
is  a  relation  between  units  of  the  family  of  being ;  while  those 
duties  which  one  owes  to  a  collection  or  organization  of 
people — to  a  family,  a  community,  a  church,  a  State,  or  any 
other  association — or  which  are  due  to  individuals  by  reason 
of  their  connection  with,  or  position  in,  an  organized  body, 
may  be  termed  social,  or  socialistic.    We  may  give  this  desig- 
nation also  to  the  duties  which  any  society  by  reason  of  its 
functions  may  owe  to  other  societies,  or  to  individuals.    This 
logical  division  sets  forth  the  fact  that  certain  duties  arise 
by  reason  of  the  union  of  human  beings  in  different  modes 
of  association  which  would  not  devolve  upon  people  apart 
from  their  social  relations,  and  the  object  of  the  distinction  is 
to  promote  clear  thinking  in  a  department  of  philosophy 
which  may  be  dealt  with  either  as  a  specific  science  or  as  an 
investigation  common  to  two  sciences — Ethics  and  Sociology. 

4.  That  the  same  subject  may  be  considered  in  two  or  more 
systems  of  thought,  need  not  be  wondered  at  if  we  contem- 
plate the  origin  of  sciences  and  the  way  in  which  each  de- 
termines its  own  sphere  of  research.    When  a  noticeable  num-  " 
ber  of  facts,  or  phenomena,  are  seen  to  have  some  radical 
similarity  and  to  be  of  special  interest  or  importance,  they 
naturally  form  a  subject  of  inquiry.    A  rational  being  desires 
to  understand  clearly  what  their  essential  nature  is,  what 
their  differences  are,  and  how  they  are  related  to  each  other 
and  to  surrounding  phenomena.     Thus  a  science  originates. 
Another  science  finds  a  reason  for  existence  in  the  cognizance 
of  another  class  of  facts  and  another  community  of  nature. 
But  inasmuch  as  every  science  seeks  to  examine  all  the  phen- 

25 


886  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXII. 

omena  properly  subject  to  its  investigation,  whether  they 
fall  within  the  scope  of  another  science  or  not,  it  follows 
that  the  territory  of  one  science  may  overlap  that  of  another, 
and  that  there  may  be  a  field  common  to  them  both.  For 
instance,  ontology,  which  discusses  the  forms  and  laws  of 
being,  introspective  psychology,  which  considers  all  the  oper- 
ations- of  mind,  and  logic,  which  is  the  science  of  rational 
conviction,  have  a  part  common  to  them  all.  One  investi- 
gation, also,  may  be  &  branch  or  an  offshoot  of  another;  as 
algebra  or  geometry  is  of  mathematics,  and  as  mineralogy 
or  palaeontology  is  of  geology. 

Every  science,  when  developed  fully  and  without  artificial 
limitation,  extends  as  far  as  its  own  fundamental  conception 
does,  and  investigates  all  the  modifications  of  that  conception 
and  their  relations.  In  this  way  it  determines  its  own  sphere. 
Moreover,  as  the  principal  characteristic  contemplated  by 
one  science  sometimes  unites  with  and  modifies  the  deter- 
minative characteristic  of  another,  it  happens  that  not  merely 
the  same  objects,  but  also  the  same  qualities  of  the  same 
objects  may  be  considered  by  two  sciences.  The  science  of 
medicine  and  the  science  of  botany  both  discuss  the  dis- 
tinguishing marks  and  the  curative  properties  of  certain 
herbs  and  roots.  Medicine  may  not  discuss  the  natural  pe- 
culiarities of  the  plants  ag  fully  as  botany,  and  botany  may 
not  treat  of  the  healing  virtues  as  fully  as  medicine,  but  it 
would  be  an  unwise  restriction  to  exclude  from  either  science 
the  truth  which  is  more  completely  stated  by  the  other.  In 
the  one  case  we  would  not  describe  the  medicines  thoroughly; 
in  the  other  we  would  fail  to  explain  important  qualities  of 
plants.  For  example,  there  are  two  kinds  of  the  sumac 
shrub,  one  of  which  is  harmless,  and  the  other  of  which 
though  beautiful  in  its  berries  and  its  leaves,  is  extremely 
poisonous.  It  should  not  be  touched  or  handled  at  all. 
What  botany  would  be  perfect  that  did  not  tell  of  the  danger- 
ous qualities  of  the  poison  sumac  ? 

Undoubtedly  the  extent  to  which  one  science  should  con- 
sider matters  which  fall  more  directly  under  the  cognizance 
of  another  science  varies  greatly.  In  every  case  the  question 
of  need  and  of  advantage  is  to  be  considered.  But  it  seems 
clear  at  least  that  those  investigations  which  bear  on  prac- 
tice should  make  a  free  use  of  each  other's  facts  and  prin- 
ciples. During  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  po- 
litical economy — economics,  as  it  is  now  called — was  treated 


CHAP.  XXXII.]  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  337 

as  if  the  only  subject  to  be  considered  was  the  production 
and  distribution  of  material  wealth  under  the  workings  of 
self-interest  and  the  law  of  supply  and  demand.  In  conse- 
quence of  this,  the  satisfactory  solution  of  economic  problems 
was  found  impossible.  The  leading  economists  of  to-day 
make  constant  use  of  ethical  and  sociological  ideas.  They 
acknowledge  the  brotherhood  of  man  as  a  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  their  science,  and  seek  to  determine  in  what  ways 
the  greatest  welfare  of  all  classes  of  persons  in  the  community 
may  be  secured.  In  like  manner,  political  science  discusses 
not  only  the  origin  of  the  State  and  the  forms  and  modes  in 
which  political  power  is  exercised,  but  also  the  ends,  and  espe- 
cially the  moral  ends,  of  government.  The  science  of  law, 
also,  becomes  wholly  unintelligible,  or  at  least  wholly  unsatis- 
factory, if  it  be  not  to  some  extent  placed  on  a  moral  basis. 
It  must,  and  it  does,  constantly  appeal  to  right  and  equity. 
It  would  have  little  value  if  it  did  not  aim  to  promote  the 
administration  of  justice.  Therefore,  also,  we  have  to  say 
that  Sociology — which  some  earnest  minds  are  endeavoring 
to  develop — must  prove  comparatively  valueless  if  it  consider 
only  the  origin,  the  necessary  conditions  and  the  natural 
results  of  human  association,  neglecting  the  moral  ques- 
tions which  arise  in  connection  with  the  different  forms  of 
social  union. 

5.  No  philosophy  of  society  can  command  respect  for  its 
authority  or  for  its  importance  unless  two  rules  be  followed 
in  the  construction  of  it.  First,  it  must  be  founded  on  fact 
rather  than  on  conjecture  or  hypothesis.  The  laws  of  man's 
association  and  intercourse  should  be  looked  for  in  customs 
and  institutions  which  now  exist  in  different  parts  of  the 
world,  or  which  have  been  known  to  exist  within  historic 
times.  The  sympathetic  fellowship  and  the  gregarious  hab- 
its of  the  lower  animals  may  also  be  profitably  studied. 
These;  too,  are  facts,  and  they  illustrate  the  rudiments  of 
society.  But  that  must  be  an  imperfect  and  unsatisfying 
sociology  which  finds  its  most  important  and  controlling 
thought  in  the  theory  that  man  was  developed  myriads  of 
years  ago  from  an  irrational  creature — that  the  primitive 
man  was  simply  "a  good  gorilla,"  happily  differentiated 
from  his  fellows — and  that  all  animals,  including  ^man, 
have  become  what  they  are  through  a  long  process  of  "  nat- 
ural selection  "—that  is,  a  process  in  which,  without  any 
direction  of  design,  the  law  of  "  the  survival  of  the  fittest " 


388  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXII. 

explains  the  evolution  even  of  moral  beings  from  proto- 
plastic ascidians.'  To  us  this  theory  is  an  unproved  and  im- 
probable hypothesis — an  hypothesis,  also,  very  remotely 
related  to  the  problems  of  society.  Therefore,  while  the  doc- 
trine of  theistic  evolution,  as  it  may  be  called,  seems  rea- 
sonable ;  while  we  may  believe  that  the  world  and  its  contents 
are  the  outcome  of  a  development  conducted  throughout 
measureless  ages;  we  cannot  place  much  value  on  such  state- 
ments as  the  following  by  an  able  professor.  Professor 
Giddings,  of  Columbia  University,  says,  "  The  earliest  men 
left  no  archaeological  remains;  they  had  not  yet  advanced 
beyond  the  use  of  sticks  and  unchipped  stones — a  fact  to  be 
remembered  in  all  discussions  of  the  antiquity  of  man.  If 
no  paleolithic  remains  earlier  than  the  late  quaternary 
period  are  found,  it  does  not  follow  that  man  did  not  exist 
until  the  late  quaternary.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  certain 
that  if  flints  were  then  chipped  by  men,  earlier  men  had  lived 
who  had  not  thought  of  chipping  flints.  Therefore  the  as- 
sociation of  the  earliest  men,  like  that  of  many  savage  hordes 
to-day,  must  have  been  conditioned  by  the  abundance  and 
accessibility  of  the  kinds  of  food  that  could  be  obtained  by 
the  hands,  aided  only  by  stick  or  stone.  The  forest  hordes 
of  Brazil  subsist  on  roots,  bulbs  and  nuts,  calabashes  and 
beans,  wild  honey,  bird's  eggs,  grubs  from  rotten  wood  and 
insects.  The  earliest  men  must  have  lived  in  much  the  same 
way,  but  perhaps  more  bountifully,  probably  adding  to  their 
resources  shell-fish  and  easily  captured  animals."  (PRIN- 
CIPLES OF  SOCIOLOGY,  p.  211.)  While  reading  this  passage 
one  naturally  asks,  Is  it  really  so  "  certain  "  that  primitive 
men  had  not  sufficient  intelligence  to  make  use  of  tools? 
IB  it  not  strange  that  the  Brazilian  savage,  after  countless 
years  of  evolution,  is  no  more  advanced  than  the  supposed 
pre-historic  man?  And  is  it  not  possible,  after  all,  that  the 
original  parents  of  mankind  were  rational  and  moral  beings, 
it  may  be  of  simple  life,  yet  superior  to  the  degraded  savages 
of  to-day? 

Moreover,  when  one  adopts  as  a  fundamental  truth  that 
man  and  mind  are  the  product  of  physical  interactions,  he 
places  the  science  of  sociology,  and  that  of  human  life  in 
general,  on  a  most  unsatisfactory  basis.  It  has  never  been 
found,  and  in  the  nature  of  things  it  never  can  be  found, 
possible  to  account  for  spiritual  activities  without  recog- 
nizing the  radical  duality  of  mind  and  matter.  Professor 


CHAP.  XXXII.]  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  339 

Giddings  thinks  that  social  phenomena  differ  from  psychical 
only  in  being  more  complex ;  which  may  be  allowed.  But  he 
also  seems  to  think  that  this  is  the  'chief  difference  between 
psychical  and  physical  phenomena;  which  cannot  be  allowed. 
He  says  (p.  417),  "  While  affirming  the  reality  of  sociological 
forces  that  are  distinctly  different  from  merely  biological 
and  from  merely  physical  forces,  the  sociologist  is  careful 
to  add  that  they  are  different  only  as  products  are  different 
from  factors;  only  as  protoplasm  is  different  from  certain 
quantities  of  oxygen,  hydrogen,  nitrogen  and  carbon;  only 
as  an  organism  and  its  co-ordinate  activities  are  different 
from  a-  group  of  nucleated  cells  having  activities  that  are 
unrelated.  ...  He  finds  nowhere  a  social  force  that  has 
not  been  evolved  in  physical  organic  process,  or  one  that  is 
not  at  every  moment  conditioned  by  physical  facts."  Spen- 
cerian  associationalism  is  in  great  vogue  at  the  present  time; 
but  it  is  too  superficial  a  doctrine  to  be  permanently  popu- 
lar among  educated  men.  We  have  discussed  it  elsewhere. 
See  Chapters  VI.,  VII.,  XXXV.  and  XXXVI.  of  the  PER- 

CEPTIONALIST. 

6.  The  second  rule  to  be  followed  in  sociological  inquiry 
is  to  devote  special  attention  to  practical  and  moral  ques- 
tions. This  thought  is  recognized  by  Professor  Giddings, 
though  in  an  imperfect  way.  He  says  (p.  403),  "  The  science 
of  ethics  examines  critically  the  elements  that  enter  into 
the  conception  of  goodness  and  the  criteria  that  are  applied 
to  experiences,  objects,  actions,  and  relations,  in  order  that 
it  may  arrive  at  a  true  notion  of  the  ideal  good.  Sociology 
must  examine  them"  (that  is,  those  elements  and  criteria) 
"  historically  and  inductively — in  their  evolutionary  aspect 
— as  a  part  of  its  study  of  the  process  of  social  choice." 
Thus  the  direct  examination  of  moral  facts  is  referred  to 
ethics,  while  sociology  is  regarded  as  an  evolutionistic  sci- 
ence concerned  only  about  the  process  whereby  ethical  life 
may  have  been  developed,  and  considering  morality  only  so 
far  as  it  may  be  related  to  this  development.  We  are  con- 
vinced that  clear  views  on  the  moral  functions  of  man  as  a 
social  being  are  to  be  obtained  through  the  direct  examination 
of  living  facts  rather  than  through  speculations  about  the 
development  of  hypothetical  races  which,  if  they  existed  at 
all,  were  half  men  and  half  monkeys.  One  might  almost  as 
well  discuss  the  morality  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  moon  as 
that  of  such  questionable  people.  Whatever  value  may  at- 


390  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXII. 

tach  to  these  captivating  speculations  respecting  the  evo- 
lution of  society,  the  fundamental  moral  ideas  of  sociology 
should  be  obtained  from  ethics,  or  from  ethical  sources,  and 
should  then  be  applied  by  the  sociologist  to  his  own  problems 
with  the  knowledge  and  intelligence  acquired  through  his 
investigation  of  social  facts.  Social  ethics  is  a  subject  com- 
mon to  ethics  and  sociology.  But  ethics  naturally  will  dis- 
cuss more  the  nature  and  ground  of  the  principles  involved, 
and  sociology  more  the  application  of  the  principles. 

7.  The  word  "  sociology  "  was  invented  by  Comte  to  des- 
ignate the  whole  philosophy  of  man  as  a  social  being.     Ac- 
cording to  this  wide  sense   sociology   included   not   merely 
that  general  science  of  society  to  which  the  name  sociology 
may  be  specially  limited,  but  also  several  sciences  which  deal 
with  specific  phases  of  associated  life,  and  which,  logically 
speaking,  are  offshoots  of  the  general  science.     Social  psy- 
chology— the  psychology  of  social  activity — is  perhaps  in- 
separable from  general  sociology.     But  anthropology,  archae- 
ology, ethnology  and  the  comparative  philosophy  of  religions 
are  gradually  substantiating  their  claims  to  a  place  among 
the  sciences;  economics,  jurisprudence  and  political  science, 
or  the  theory  of  the  State,  have  already  done  so.     Many 
ethical  questions  arise  and  may  be  thoroughly  treated  in 
connection  with  these  specific  investigations;  and,  when  any 
question  is  thus  thoroughly  dealt  with,  there  is  less  need  that 
it  should  be  discussed  under  the  generic  inquiry.     Thus  dif- 
ferent sciences  may  limit  and  modify  one  another.     For  ex- 
ample, while  a  treatise  on  practical  ethics  should  define  the 
duties  of  men  in  economic   and   in   political  relations,  the 
detailed  consideration  of  these  duties  may  be  wisely  left  to 
works  on  economics  and  on  politics:  and,  in  like  fashion,  a 
treatise  like  the  present,  which  aims  at  a  general  theory  of 
morals,  can  do  little  more  for  social  ethics  than  to  indicate 
the  leading  topics  of  this  department  of  investigation. 

8.  Foremost  among  these  are  the  duties  connected  with 
domestic  relationship.     Whatever  else  may  be  in  doubt  re- 
specting the  past  of  the  human  race,  we  may  assume  that 
there  have  been  fathers  and  mothers  and  children,  brothers 
and   sisters   and   other   kinsfolk,    from    the   earliest    times. 
Moreover  there  seems  always  to  have  been  a  strong  disposition 
for  one  man  and  one  woman  to  unite  permanently  in  fellow- 
ship and  sympathy  with  each  other,  and  in  affectionate  care 
for  their  children.    Our  Saviour  not  only  taught  the  doctrine 


CHAP.  XXXII.]  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  39} 

of  monogamy,  but  also  held  that  the  pristine  mode  of  marriage 
was  the  union  of  a  man  and  a  woman  for  life.  When  the 
Pharisees  asked  Him,  "  Is  it  lawful  for  a  man  to  put  away 
his  wife  for  every  cause  ?  "  he  answered,  "  Have  ye  not  read 
that  He  which  made  them  at  the  beginning  made  them  male 
and  female?"  (or,  as  the  words  might  mean,  and  as  the 
argument  suggests,  "a  male  and  a  female").  "And  he 
said,  For  this  cause  shall  a  man  leave  father  and  mother  and 
shall  cleave  to  his  wife;  and  they  twain  shall  be  one  flesh. 
.  .  .  What  therefore  God  hath  joined  together,  let  not  man 
put  asunder."  Of  course  our  Lord  had  not  the  advantage  of 
modern  scientific  instruction;  and  may  have  been  mistaken. 
But  evidently  (if  Matthew  and  Mark  tell  the  truth)  He 
believed  that  marriage  was  originally  and  normally  the  union 
of  one  man  and  one  woman  for  life.  He  taught  that  any 
dissolution  of  that  union,  except  for  the  extreme  violation 
of  its  vows,  was  not  to  be  permitted.  "  He  saith  unto  them, 
Moses  because  of  the  hardness  of  your  hearts  suffered  you  to 
put  away  your  wives,  but  from 'the  beginning  (mf  &p^t 
originally)  it  was  not  so."  (MATT,  xix.,  5-8;  MARK, 
x.,  2-12.) 

Without  discussing  whether  Christ  was  mistaken  or  not, 
and  whether  polygamy  and  other  marital  arrangements  may 
not  be  degenerate  deviations  from  the  primitive  institution, 
it  is  plain  that  nature  and  reason  offer  strong  considerations 
in  favor  of  the  monogamic  family,  and  that,  in  this  sense  at 
least,  a  divine  origin  may  be  claimed  for  this  institution. 
Clearly  that  personal  affection  and  esteem  which  should 
exist  between  husband  and  wife,  and  which  are  the  basis  of 
honorable  marriage,  are  stifled  by  the  air  of  a  polygamous 
household;  nor  do  such  sentiments  flourish  when  marriage 
vows  are  lightly  esteemed  or  are  made  only  to  be  broken. 
Without  the  protection  of  marriage  woman  becomes  a  de- 
graded slave.  The  foolish  doctrine,  advocated  'by  some,  of 
a  union  to  last  during  the  pleasure  of  the  parties  and  to  ter- 
minate when  either  is  tired  of  it,  falsely  promises  equality 
and  freedom.  It  really  gives  to  the  unprincipled  an  advan- 
tage over  the  defenseless,  and  opens  the  door  to  injustice 
and  wrong.  Woman  finds  her  true  sphere  when  she  is  perma- 
nently installed  as  the  bosom  friend  of  a  good  man  and  the 
mother  of  the  children  who  may  be  given  them.  In  that 
position  she  enjoys  both  equality  and  freedom.  Marriage  is 
also  the  best  provision  for  the  husband  and  father.  Then 


392  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXII. 

how  imperatively  the  welfare  of  the  little  ones,  and  their 
preparation  for  the  responsibilities  of  life,  demand  the  per- 
manency of  domestic  relations !  Without  parental  care  the 
majority  of  children  would  not  survive  their  infancy,  and 
those  that  did  would  be  wretched  objects  of  charity.  But 
the  offspring  of  virtuous  wedlock  not  only  have  their  physi- 
cal wants  lovingly  supplied,  but  are  also  advantageously 
situated  for  mental  and  moral  development.  No  other 
institution  could  take  the  place  of  the  well-ordered  family 
towards  making  the  inhabitants  of  the  world  worthy  men  and 
women.  Even  the  poorly  conducted  home,  which  may  per- 
haps fall  below  the  average,  is  more  conducive  to  this 
end  than  any  agency  would  be  that  could  be  substituted  for 
it, 

Nor  does  parental  affection  cease  when  there  may  be  no 
further  necessity  for  parental  care.  It .  follows  sons  and 
daughters  after  they  have  reached  manhood  and  womanhood, 
and  after  they  have  found  homes  and  begotten  children  of 
their  own.  It  gives  birth  to  friendships  which  continue 
throughout  life,  which  powerfully  counteract  the  natural 
selfishness  of  the  heart,  and  which  prepare  men  to  recognize 
the  brotherhood  of  humanity. 

So  great  is  the  importance  of  thoughtfulness  before  enter- 
ing upon  marriage,  and  so  great  the  necessity  that  the  union 
once  formed  should  be  perpetual,  that  divorce  should  not 
be  granted  except  for  the  most  imperative  reasons.  Our 
Saviour  names  adultery  as  the  only  sufficient  justification 
for  the  putting  away  of  one's  wife.  Elsewhere  (1  COB.  vn.,  15) 
continued  and  wilful  desertion  seems  mentioned  as  a  suffi- 
cient ground  for  the  annulment  of  the  marriage  bond,  this 
being,  like  adultery,  a  gross  violation  of  one's  vows.  No  other 
causes  than  these  seem  sufficient.  Yet  our  Lord  intimates 
that  there  may  be  cases  in  which  the  most  perfect  rule  of 
conduct  cannot  be  wisely  insisted  upon.  When  his  disciples 
said,  "  If  the  case  of  the  man  be  so  with  his  wife,  it  is  not 
good  to  marry,"  he  replied,  "All  men  cannot  receive  this 
saying  except  they  to  whom  it  is  given."  Possibly  legisla- 
tures and  courts  of  law,  dealing  with  all  kinds  of  persons, 
may  find  it  necessary  to  follow  a  less  absolute  rule  than  that 
which  commends  itself  to  the  enlightened  Christian.  In  so 
doing,  they  might  plead  Mosaic  precedent.  In  all  cases,  how- 
ever, the  State  and  its  officers  should  adopt  every  practi- 
cable measure  to  promote  the  sanctity  of  the  marriage  rela- 


CHAP.  XXXII.]  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  393 

tion.  If  the  strictest  rule  is  not  to  be  enforced  by  courts  of 
law,  it  is  because  the  effort  to  enforce  it  would  produce  more 
evil  than  good. 

The  central  duties  connected  with  the  family  are  those  of 
the  husband  and  the  wife.  The  one  is  the  natural  head  and 
public  representative  of  the  family;  the  other  is  to  be  the 
helpmeet  and  companion  of  her  husband.  Each  is  to  respect 
and  love  the  other;  but  the  duty  of  love  belongs  more  to  the 
husband  and  that  of  respect  to  the  wife.  She  is  to  "  obey  " 
her  husband,  not  in  any  slavish  fashion,  but  rather  in  ren- 
dering him  aid  in  his  plans  and  efforts  for  the  welfare  of  the 
family  and  the  accomplishment  of  his  work  in  life.  He,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  to  give  all  consideration  to  her  judgment 
and  her  wishes,  and  to  cherish  her  as  the  dearer  part  of  him- 
self. In  exceptional  cases  the  husband  may  not  be  fit  to  be 
the  head  of  the  family,  or  may  forfeit  his  right  to  that 
position,  or  he  may  use  his  authority  to  require  wrongdoing. 
Under  such  circumstances  the  wife  may  assert  an  independ- 
ence which  she  should  not  ordinarily  claim. 

The  duty  of  children  to  their  parents  is  obvious.  In  their 
early  years  they  should  implicitly  obey,  and,  throughout  life, 
they  should  love  and  honor  father  and  mother.  Also,  if  there 
be  need,  the  comfortable  support  of  parents  should  be  pro- 
vided for. 

That  brothers  and  sisters  should  live  in  love  and  harmony, 
and  that  affectionate  kindness  should  prevail  among  those 
related  by  blood  or  affinity,  is  a  teaching  both  of  nature  and 
of  morality.  The  rule  which  requires  one  to  do  that  duty 
first  which  lies  nearest  to  him  and  to  care  first  for  those  who 
are  immediately  known  to  him,  is  applicable  here.  This  rule, 
familiarly  expressed  in  the  maxim  that  "charity" — that  is, 
beneficence — "begins  at  home,"  assigns  a  particular  sphere 
of  usefulness  to  every  one  and  makes  him  specially  responsi- 
ble for  the  good  that  can  be  accomplished  within  that  sphere. 
A  carrying  out  of  this  principle  should  not — indeed  does  not 
— lessen  one's  general  good  will  towards  others.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  genuine  practice  of  its  requirements  enlarges  one's 
capacity  for  goodness.  The  aim  of  Nature  is  to  unite  all 
men  in  sympathy  and  fellowship. 

9.  Therefore,  also,  the  duties  of  friendship  should  be  recog- 
nized. Persons  whose  tastes  are  similar,  whose  dispositions 
are  congenial,  and  who  have  an  admiration  for  each  other's 
conduct  and  mode  of  life,  naturally  become  friends.  They 


394  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIL 

are  then  bound  together  by  mutual  trust  and  affection,  and 
find  that  they  can  do  more  for  each  other's  welfare  and  happi- 
ness than  if  they  were  strangers  to  one  another,  or  even  if, 
with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  each  other,  they  had  not  been 
united  in  confidence  and  love.  A  principal  advantage  of 
kinsmanship  is  that  it  suggests  and  facilitates  the  formation 
of  friendships.  Without  friendship  kinsmanship  loses  half 
its  value.  And  a  noble  friendship  cannot  be  founded  on 
kinsmanship  alone,  nor  on  any  other  external  basis,  but  is 
always  conditioned  on  sympathy,  respect  and  confidence. 

The  ancients  dwelt  more  on  the  obligation  to  cultivate 
friendship  than  the  moderns  do.  The  social  condition  even 
of  the  civilized  part  of  the  ancient  world  was  not  favorable 
to  the  development  either  of  general  benevolence  or  of  the 
best  form  of  domestic  affection.  It  was  inferior  in  this  re- 
spect to  the  state  of  things  in  the  Christian  society  of  the 
present  day.  But  among  the  cultivated  Greeks  and  Komans, 
especially  among  those  of  them  who  were  given  to  philo- 
sophical pursuits,  the  virtue  of  friendship  found  much  en- 
couragement. The  excellencies  of  this  virtue  are  fully  set 
forth  in  ancient  books,  as,  for  example,  in  the  treatise  of 
Cicero,  "  De  Amicitia."  In  Christian  writings  the  duty  of 
general  benevolence  is  more  prominent  than  that  of  friend- 
ship ;  for  which  reason  some  have  contended  that  the  religion 
of  Christ  is  opposed  to  private  attachments.  It  is  even  al- 
leged that  our  Saviour  requires  his  followers  to  suppress  af- 
fection for  father  and  mother,  for  wife  and  children,  and 
for  friends.  This  interpretation  of  our  Lord's  language  is 
entirely  untenable.  He  means  only  to  assert  that  his  own 
claims  to  our  love  and  service  are  supreme,  cand  that  we 
should  be  no  more  influenced  by  our  dearest  friends  in  oppo- 
sition to  him  than  if  they  were  our  bitterest  enemies.  (LUKE 
xiv.,  26.)  Christ  himself  in  his  own  conduct  illustrates 
friendship ;  for  he  "  loved  Mary  and  her  sister  and  Lazarus  " ; 
and  John  was  "the  disciple  whom  Jesus  loved/'  Christian- 
ity purifies  friendship  from  the  narrowness  and  selfishness 
with  which  it  is  sometimes  mingled;  and  it  discourages  any 
intimacy  which  would  obstruct  the  discharge  of  duty.  But 
it  encourages  in  every  way  the  devoted  mutual  love  of  worthy 
souls.  If  this  religion  ever  appears  to  neglect  friendship,  it 
is  only  because  the  clear  shining  of  the  sun  swallows  up  the 
light  of  lesser  luminaries. 

10.  Christianity  brings  the  duties  of  benevolence  and  be- 


CHAP.  XXXII.]  SOCIAL  ETHICS.  395 

neficence  into  a  wonderful  prominence.  Among  the  ancients 
patriotism  was  a  living  virtue,  but  humanity — the  love  of 
mankind  at  large- — was  not  much  more  than  a  high-sounding 
name.  What  is  known  as  the  moral  progress  of  the  world 
has  consisted  chiefly  in  a  growing  recognition  of  human 
brotherhood,  resulting  partly  from  the  influence  of  advancing 
civilization,  but  chiefly  from  the  teachings  of  the  cross. 
The  moral  inferiority  of  the  best  men  and  women  among  the 
Greeks  and  Komans  to  the  best  men  and  women  of  modern 
times  cannot  be  ascribed  to  any  want  of  culture  among  the 
ancients,  but  only  to  the  fact  that  the  uplifting  power  of 
the  Christian  faith  had  not  yet  begun  its  work  among  man- 
kind. The  ideals  of  Christianity  have  not  yet  found  ade- 
quate realization  anywhere.  The  ordinary  morality,  even  of 
the  most  enlightened  modern  nations,  falls  far  short  of  that 
heavenly  goodness  which  the  gospel  inculcates.  But  there 
is  cause  for  congratulation  that  higher  and  better  rules  of 
conduct  are  daily  commending  themselves  to  men,  and  are 
being  more  and  more  acted  upon  both  by  individuals  and  by 
communities.  The  duties  of  caring  for  the  sick;  of  in- 
structing the  ignorant;  of  assisting  the  needy;  of  providing 
for  the  aged  and  the  infirm;  of  defending  the  rights  of  the 
weak ;  of  giving  to  honest  industry  its  share,  not  only  in  the 
comforts,  but  also  in  the  enjoyments  of  life;  of  contributing, 
according  to  one's  ability  and  one's  resources,  to  the  general 
and  public  good;  are  steadily  gaining  a  stronger  hold  upon 
the  hearts  and  lives  of  men. 

11.  Some  who  are  devoted  to  humanitarian  aims  think 
that  these  would  be  more  fully  realized  than  they  now  are 
if  private  property  were  abolished,  or  if,  at  least,  the  manage- 
ment of  every  kind  of  business  and  the  distribution  of  the 
means  of  living  were  transferred  from  private  companies  and 
individuals  to  officials  appointed  by  the  State.  This  is  pro- 
posed by  many  who  call  themselves  Socialists.  Doubtless  no 
one  has  the  expectation  that  human  selfishness  would  imme- 
diately disappear  if  this  plan  were  adopted.  The  hope, 
rather,  is  that  the  workings  of  selfishness  would  be  greatly 
counteracted  and  defeated,  that  the  reasons  for  an  exclusive 
individualism  would  be  largely  removed,  and  that  men  under 
the  potent  influence  of  the  new  system  would  gradually  come 
to  live  every  one  for  all  and  all  for  every  one.  That  is  a 
consummation  to  be  desired.  But  the  realization  of  it 
through  the  abolition  of  separate  property,  or  through  the 


396  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXII. 

denial  of  freedom  in  the  use  of  honestly  acquired  means, 
is  visionary  and  impracticable. 

The  right  of  private  property  exists,  not  simply  for  his 
sake  who  may  own  the  property,  but  chiefly  because  the  recog- 
nition of  this  right  is  necessary  for  the  welfare  of  all.  It 
arises  out  of  that  'Subserviency  to  absolute  good  in  which 
every  right  is  rooted.  Such  being  the  case,  it  is  not  so  abso- 
lute as  to  be  free  from  all  limitations.  On  the  contrary,  it 
is  subject  to  such  qualifications  as  the  absolute  interest  of 
all  may  require,  and  therefore  also  to  the  regulation  and  con- 
trol of  proper  authority.  But  the  idea  of  the  total  abolition 
of  private  property  is  absurd.  The  state  may  enjoin  its  citi- 
zens to  contribute  to  public  purposes  according  to  some 
equitable  rule — it  may  keep,  or  bring  under  its  own  control, 
every  business  which  involves  the  use  of  a  public  franchise  or 
which  is  dependent  for  peculiar  privileges  on  legislative 
favor — it  may  curb  those  who  would  use  exclusive  rights  for 
the  upbuilding  of  grasping  monopolies — it  may  set  bounds 
to  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  or,  at  least,  to  the  transmission 
of  colossal  fortunes,  undivided  and  undiminished,  to  those 
who  have  not  earned  them.  But  at  the  same  time  public 
authority  should  protect  the  acquisitions  of  industry  and 
enterprise,  in  order  that  energetic  self-reliant  character  may 
be  developed,  and  so  that  every  man  may  be  able  both  to 
provide  for  his  own  and  to  give  to  him  that  needeth. 

What  the  world  needs  is  not  so  much  a  change  in  those 
rules  of  duty  which  are  generally  acknowledged  in  Christian 
nations  as  a  more  thorough  application  of  them  both  by 
communities  and  by  individuals.  Society  should  be  more 
thoroughly  Ooverned  by  the  spirit  of  justice  and  benevo- 
lence— by  that  unselfish  spirit  which  seeks  absolute  good  in 
every  case,  the  completest  good  of  which  the  case  admits. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

ECONOMIC  ETHICS. 

1.  The  true  definition  of  economics.  Prof.  R.  T.  Ely  quoted.  The 
great  problem  is,  How  may  human  welfare  be  best  promoted 
by  the  management  of  material  resources  ?  Hence  every  eco- 
nomic question  has  an  ethical  side. — 2.  Ethically  private  property 
is  a  trust  to  be  administered  for  human  welfare.  Dr.  Parkhurst 
quoted.  Proprietary  and  contractual  rights  are  determined  by 
law  and  may  be  modified  or  superseded  by  more  fundamental 
rights. — 3.  In  economic  ethics  the  prominent  questions  are  (1) 
altruistic  and  (2)  governmental.— 4.  Government  regulates 
economic  activity  so  as  to  restrain  selfishness  and  greed  ;  and  also 
conducts  some  forms  of  business  successfully.  The  Post-office. — 
5.  Other  enterprises  managed  by  States  and  municipalities. 
The  public-school  system,  etc. — 6.  In  addition  to  maintaining 
justice  and  order  the  State  has  positive  economic  functions.  The 
prevention  of  pauperism.  Free  instruction  in  useful  trades. — 
7.  "  Honest  money."  Free  coinage.  Superintendence  of  finan- 
cial institutions.  Savings  banks.  Land  laws.  Laws  regulating 
inheritance. — 8.  State  control  of  industry.  The  socialistic  pro- 
posal is  impracticable  ;  but  some  degree  of  government  owner- 
ship may  be  desirable.  Patent  rights.  Copyrights.  Public 
franchises. — 9.  The  public  ownership  of  great  monopolies.  Has 
society  a  right  to  "  the  economic  surplus"?  Holmes  quoted. 
Experiments  should  be  made  with  a  view  to  safe  progress. 

1.  PROFESSOR  KICHARD  T.  ELY,  of  the  University  of  Wis- 
consin, after  speaking  of  sociology  as  "  a  comprehensive  sci- 
ence, or  rather  a  group  of  sciences/'  and  of  economics  as  "  a 
branch  of  sociology,"  defines  the  latter  science  as  follows: 
"Economics  is  the  science  (1)  which  treats  of  those  social 
phenomena  due  to  the  wealth-getting  and  wealth-using  ac- 
tivity of  man,  and  (2)  which  deals  with  -all  other  branches 
of  his  life  in  so  far  as  they  affect  his  social  activity  in  this 
respect."  In  these  words  this  eminent  teacher  asserts  the 
right  to  employ  ethical  thought  in  his  science,  inasmuch  as 
the  moral  part  of  man's  life  is  interwoven  with  man's  wealth- 
getting  and  wealth-using  activity.  This  claim  is  made  more 
specifically  when  Professor  Ely  asserts  that  the  subject  of 

iju  4 


398  THE  MOHAL  LAW.  [^HAP.  XXXIII. 

economic  study  is  not  merely  material  wealth  and  its  produc- 
tion and  distribution,  but  man  in  his  relation  to  wealth.  He 
says :  "  Among  the  most  serious  of  mistakes  is  to  consider 
man  simply  as  a  producer  of  goods — one  'by  whom'  are 
all  things  of  interest  to  our  science — while  the  infinitely 
greater  truth  is  that  man  is  the  one  '  for  whom '  they  are 
produced.  Of  course  no  one  denies  this  truth;  but  men 
might  almost  as  well  deny  it  as  to  leave  it  out  of  account. 
The  result  of  such  neglect  is  that  men  devise  with  great  skill 
rules  by  which  man  may  be  made  the  best  possible  manufact- 
uring machine.  It  sometimes  quite  escapes  the  notice  of 
these  wise  men  that  in  making  of  man  the  best  possible  man- 
ufacturing machine,  they  may  make  him  a  very  poor  sort  of 
a  man ;  that  in  teaching  him  to  supply  his  wants  very  bounti- 
fully they  may  prevent  him  from  developing  and  correcting 
these  same  wants.  They  forget  that  there  are  two  kinds 
of  poverty,  one  a  lack  of  goods  for  the  higher  wants,  the 
other  a  lack  of  wants  for  the  higher  goods.  To  become  rich 
in  goods  while  losing  at  the  same  time  the  power  to  profit 
by  them  is  unfortunately  one  of  the  commonest  retrogressions 
in  human  experience.  We  do  not  mean  that  the  whole  prob- 
lem of  human  development  is  the  subject  of  economics,  but 
simply  that  manhood — rounded  human  development — is  the 
goal  of  all  social  sciences.  None  must  consider  their  sub- 
ject so  narrowly  as  to  exclude  that  object."  (OUTLINES  OF 
ECONOMICS,  Bk.  I.,  Ch.  X.) 

It  is  not  within  the  plan  of  the  present  writing  to  advocate 
any  specific  doctrines  or  any  particular  system  of  political 
economy.  That  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  ethical  instruc- 
tion. But  we  congratulate  ourselves  on  the  fact  that  the 
application  of  moral  principles  is  recognized  by  able  men 
as  a  part  of  sociological  inquiry.  Whatever  may  be  thought 
of  the  conclusions  of  Professor  Ely,  his  writings  have  the 
two  important  qualifications  without  which  no  great  progress 
can  be  hoped  for  in  any  science  concerned  with  human  con- 
duct. First,  his  discussions  appeal  for  a  justification  of  their 
suggestions  to  actual  history  and  experience  rather  than  to 
imaginary  fact;  and,  in  the  second  place,  they  are  pervaded 
throughout  with  the  ethical  spirit.  Professor  Ely's  motto, 
"  THE  MANY,  NOT  THE  FEW,"  which  appears  on  the  title- 
page  of  his  book,  bears  witness  to  this  last  characteristic;  as 
do  also  many  pregnant  sentences  with  which  his  chapters  are 
enriched.  Asserting  that  "the  most  important  economic 


CHAP.  XXXIII.  ECONOMIC  ETHICS.  399 

function  of  the  State  "  is  the  maintenance  of  tine  right  of 
private  property,  he  nevertheless  teaches  that  this  right,  as 
well  as  every  other,  exists  only  as  an  instrument  of  human 
welfare,  and  should  be  upheld  only  so  far  and  so  long  as 
it  subserves  that  end.  He  says  (p.  257) :  "All  true  rights 
are  rational  rights,  rights  which  can  show  good  reason  for 
their  claims  and  can  justify  their  existence  on  the  ground 
that  they  promote  human  welfare.  There  is  no  possible  basis 
of  human  right  except  human  welfare."  Speaking  of  ex- 
penditures for  the  comfortable  support  of  working  men  and 
their  families,  he  says  (p.  104) :  "  It  is  a  great  mistake  to 
think  of  man  only  as  a  producing  machine  and  of  the  things 
which  he  consumes  as  capital  spent  for  the  sake  of  produc- 
tion  When  goods  are  used  to  satisfy  human  wants 

directly  they  are  rendering  the  ultimate  service  which  goods 
can  render;  to  speak  of  them  in  such  cases  as  employed  in 
production  is  to  forget  the  most  important  of  all  truths-^- 
that  they  are  employed  for  the  satisfaction  of  man." 

Elsewhere  (p.  311)  commenting  on  the  duty  of  those  pos- 
sessing wealth  to  use  it  in  the  service  of  mankind  and  to 
be  themselves  laborers  for  the  world's  good,  he  says,  "  Legally 
the  wealth  is  mine,  but  morally  it  is  simply  a  new  opportunity 
for  me  to  help  in  the  progress  of  humanity;  for,  ethically, 
I  myself  am  not  my  own.  .  .  .  The  idle  man  is  morally  a 
thief.  He  receives  but  gives  nothing  in  return.  Any  man 
who  by  past  services  of  his  own  has  not  earned  the  right  of 
repose,  is  a  shameless  cumberer  of  the  earth;  unless,  indeed, 
he  is  physically  or  mentally  incapacitated  for  useful  employ- 
ment. Would  the  world  suffer  if  you  should  die?  That  is 
the  test.  If  you  merely  clip  coupons  then  no  one  would 
miss  you.  Others  would  willingly  relieve  you. — But  your 
service  need  not  'be  manual  toil."  In  another  passage,  re- 
ferring to  the  marvelous  industrial  development  of  the 
United  States,  he  says  (p.  103):  "  A  force  mighty,  and  it 
almost  seems  irresistible,  is  at  work  day  and  night,  day  and 
night,  never  ceasing,  thrusting  upon  us  more  and  more 
serious  social  problems.  These  problems  can  never  be  solved 
by  the  policeman's  club  or  the  soldier's  bullet ;  for  this  quiet 
onmoving  force  laughs  such  repression  to  scorn.  Only  right- 
eousness can  solve  them ;  for  only  in  righteousness  is  there 
power  to  enable  us  to  adjust  ourselves  to  our  new  environ- 
ment." Again,  defining  the  end  to  be  aimed  at  in  the  deter- 
mination of  salaries  and  wages,  the  professor  says  (p.  206)  : 


400  TBE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIII. 

"  Men  should  receive  according  to  their  wholesome  wants,  not 
according  to  their  strength.  The  latter  is  the  law  among 
swine.  But  the  most  indubitable  right  we  possess  is  the 
right  to  develop  our  wants;  for  this  is  the  development  of 
our  life.  A  maximum  of  wholesome  wants,  with  a  distribu- 
tion in  proportion  to  those  wants,  is  the  economic  goal  of 
society." 

The  foregoing  quotations,  taken  from  different  parts  of 
Professor  Ely's  book,  indicate  sufficiently  his  use  of  ethical 
thought,  and  the  fundamental  moral  principle  which  he 
applies  to  economic  problems.  The  law  that  human  welfare 
is  the  end  of  economic  effort  is-  the  supreme  rule  by  which 
all  other  rules  are  to  be  interpreted  and  controlled.  The 
true  end  of  economic  action  is  not  the  exclusive  good  of  any 
individual  or  of  any  class.  It  is  the  welfare  of  humanity — 
of  all  human  beings  whom  our  action  can  affect,  but  especially 
of  those  who  most  need  our  care.  Nor  are  we  to  seek  simply 
the  physical  prosperity  of  men,  but  also  the  satisfaction  of 
their  higher  wants  and  the  normal  development  of  these  wants 
in  order  that  man  may  attain  the  capacity  for  true  happiness. 
All  human  business  should  be  regulated  so  as  to  advance 
every  human  being  towards  the  best  and  noblest  life  of  which 
he  is  capable. 

2.  This  law  making  the  welfare  of  man  the  supreme  aim 
is  important  not  only  because  of  its  direct  operation,  but  yet 
more  because  of  the  light  which  it  throws  upon  every  other 
law  of  economic  duty.  While  it  does  not  set  aside  but  estab- 
lishes the  right  of  private  property,  it  conflicts  with  a  very 
common  selfish  construction  of  that  right.  It  enables  us  to 
understand  what  this  right  means  and  what  its  limits  are. 
Ethically  speaking,  private  property  is  a  trust  to  be  admin- 
istered for  our  own  good  and  that  of  others.  That  it  is  not 
an  absolute  and  irrevocable  right  is  forcibly  stated  by  the 
Rev.  Dr.  Charles  H.  Parkhurst  in  a  sermon  on  the  text, 
"  Ye  are  not  your  own."  "  Perhaps,"  he  says,  "  in  the  longer 
or  shorter  time  that  Adam  and  Eve  occupied  Paradise,  they 
congratulated  themselves-  by  calling  it  their  garden.  God 
never  gave  it  to  them  any  more  than  he  made  over  to  you  the 
plot  of  ground  that  you  call  your  garden.  The  phrase  by 
which  the  case  is  stated  in  the  second  chapter  of  Genesis  is 
worth  attending  to.  "  The  Lord  God  took  the  man  and  put 
him  into  the  Garden  of  Eden  to  dress  it  and  to  keep  it."  There 
is  nothing  there  about  God's  deeding  the  Garden  to  him,  or 


CHAP.  XXXIII.]  ECONOMIC  ETHICS.  401 

even  giving  it  to  him.  He  never  gives  anything  to  anybody ; 
for  that  would  be  to  surrender  his  own  title — to  abandon 
his  own  ownership;  which  he  never  does."  To  this  we  may 
add  that  God  himself  claims  no  selfish  ownership  of  the 
Universe,  but  is  the  manager  of  it  for  the  welfare  of  all. 
His  law  and  the  law  of  morality  have  instituted  the  right  of 
property  for  the  best  interests  of  all  concerned;  and  this 
right  may  be  limited  or  set  aside  whenever  the  maintenance 
of  it  is  inconsistent  with  those  interests. 

The  infraction  of  property  rights  by  private  persons  is 
justifiable  only  in  extreme  and  exceptional  cases,  but  nothing 
is  more  common  than  the  supersession  of  them  by  public 
authority.  The  exercise  of  "  eminent  domain,"  the  condem- 
nation of  "rights  of  way,"  the  exaction  of  requisitions  for 
necessary  uses,  the  enforcement  of  building  regulations,  the 
destruction  of  infected  animals  and  of  noxious  goods,  and, 
above  all,  the  imposition  of  taxes  and  of  duties,  often  amount- 
ing to  more  than  half  the  value  of  the  articles  assessed  and 
sometimes  to  their  entire  confiscation,  show  how  completely 
private  property  is  subject  to  governmental  authority.  It 
is  true  that  this  power  is  sometimes  used  unjustly  and  tyran- 
nically; but  its  action  always  receives  approbation  when  it  is 
necessary  for  the  prevention  of  great  evil  or  the  accomplish- 
ment of  great  good.  With  the  welfare  of  man  in  view,  the 
law  not  only  lays  heavy  burdens  on  property  but  recognizes 
new  rights  of  possession  and  abolishes  old  rights,  as  the  inter- 
ests of  society  may  demand. 

The  right  of  contract,  and  that  of  the  free  employment  of 
one's  means,  and  every  other  economic  privilege,  are  defined 
and  limited  by  their  relations  to  human  welfare.  The  courts 
will  not  enforce  agreements  which  would  perpetuate  the 
slavery  of  the  sweat-shop  or  which  would  exact  exhorbitant 
interest  from  the  poor.  The  laws  prescribe  penalties  for 
those  who  would  enrich  themselves  by  extortion  or  oppression. 
They  suppress  any  business  which  proves  a  nuisance  to  a 
neighborhood  or  to  the  community,  or,  if  this  be  found  im- 
practicable, they  seek  to  reduce  every  injurious  business  to 
the  smallest  possible  dimensions. 

3.  While  human  welfare  is  the  law  of  economic  morality, 
the  practical  application  of  this  law  brings  two  thoughts  into 
prominence.  First,  the  duties  which  chiefly  demand  our 
attention  are  altruistic,  and  relate  largely  to  the  assistance  of 
the  weak  and  needy.  Every  one  is  bound  under  ordinary 
26 


402  THE  MOEAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIII. 

circumstances  to  seek  his  own  comfortable  well-being,  but  the 
man  of  average  intelligence  does  not  need  to  be  told  to  take 
good  care  of  himself,  but  rather  to  be  reminded  at  times 
that  this  is  not  the  only  rule  of  duty.  Moreover,  while  we 
are  bound  not  to  injure  the  well-to-do,  but  to  contribute  to 
their  prosperity,  there  is  less  need  of  our  caring  for  them 
than  of  our  caring  for  others.  Commonly  interference  in 
their  affairs,  even  though  well  meant,  would  do  more  harm 
than  good.  If  the  wealthy  and  independent  ask  aid  in  some 
worthy  enterprise,  it  should  be  granted.  But  plainly,  in  such 
a  case,  we  should  be  chiefly  influenced  by  a  respect  for  the 
general  good,  because  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  an  in- 
crease of  wealth  will  prove  a  blessing  to  those  who  have  al- 
ready a  competence.  Riches,  when  acquired  too  easily  or  in 
an  unfair  way,  or  when  devoted  to  selfish  indulgence,  are 
often  a  curse  to  the  persons  and  families  who  possess  them. 
But  the  claims  of  the  poor  and  needy  cannot  be  questioned. 
We  are  especially  bound  to  aid  those  who  are  struggling  for 
an  honest  livelihood,  or  who  are  striving  to  earn  for  them- 
selves and  for  others  the  means  of  comfort,  independence  and 
respectability.  Economists  tell  us  of  a  certain  "  standard 
of  life,"  or  style  of  living,  which  ought,  if  possible,  to  be 
placed  within  the  reach  of  every  human  being.  The  aim  of 
true  economic  wisdom  is  not  "  to  make  money,"  but  to  supply 
all  the  legitimate  wants  of  man — not  merely  his  physical 
needs,  important  as  these  are,  but  also  his  social,  mental 
and  moral  wants;  for  lasting  happiness  is  impossible  for 
any  rational  being  if  his  higher  nature  be  neglected  or  sup- 
pressed. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  noticeable  that  the  principal  ques- 
tions now  calling  for  discussion  in  economics,  relate  to  the 
political  or  governmental  care  of  man's  material  interests. 
Duties  arising  from  the  private  relations  of  business  and 
industry  are  not  difficult  to  understand.  They  are  those  of 
justice,  good  will  and  mutual  helpfulness.  In  the  exchange 
of  commodities  there  should  be  honesty  and  veracity.  While 
a  fair  price  should  be  asked  and  paid,  the  seller  should 
candidly  state  the  character  and  quality  of  his  goods,  and 
the  buyer  should  incur  no  obligations  which  he  is  not  sure 
of  being  able  to  discharge.  In  the  employment  of  labor 
the  master,  instead  of  striving  to  obtain  services  for  the 
lowest  possible  wages,  should  reward  faithful  work  with 
such  compensation  as  his  business  will  warrant,  and  as  will 


CHAP.  XXXIII.]  ECONOMIC  ETHICS. 

adequately  and  honorably  remunerate  the  employee.  On  the 
other  hand  the  workman  should  be  faithful  and  willing,  not 
substituting  his  own  will  and  his  own  interests  for  those  of 
his  master.  And  every  man,  no  matter  what  his  position 
may  be,  should  render  such  help  as  he  may  both  to  his  neces- 
sitous neighbor  and  to  any  others  whom  he  can  aid  in  their 
plans  of  life. 

4.  These  principles  are  simple,  and  they  have  great  weight 
with  a  large  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  of  every  civilized 
country.  The  number  of  well-disposed  and  well-principled 
merchants,  manufacturers,  tradesmen  and  working-people  in 
the  world  is  much  greater  than  one  might  at  first  suppose. 
Were  this  economic  morality  universally  diffused,  there  would 
bo  comparatively  little  need  for  the  governmental  control  of 
economic  interests.  Unfortunately,  in  ainro&t  every  sphere 
of  employment,  some  persons  are  to  be  found  who  are  governed 
by  selfishness  and  greed.  These  necessitate  laws  for  all. 
There  is  also  a  tendency  in  great  business  organizations  to 
forget  that  humanity  which  is  sensibly  felt  when  the  relations 
of  men  are  near  and  intimate.  Hence  wrong  and  oppression 
arise;  hence,  too,  it  is  sometimes  difficult  if  not  impossible 
for  good  citizens,  without  governmental  furtherance,  to  con- 
duct business  in  the  most  desirable  way.  The  power  of  self- 
ishness to  force  its  methods  of  business  on  competitors  must 
be  counteracted  by  law.  Were  the  adulteration  of  goods  per- 
mitted ;  were  there  no  restriction  to  the  employment  of  women 
and  children;  were  business  and  manufacturing  concerns 
allowed  to  do  business  beyond  reasonable  hours  or  on  days 
which  should  be  devoted  to  recreation  or  moral  improvement ; 
in  short,  were  immunity  granted  to  any  deceitful,  overreach- 
ing or  injurious  method,  then  those  who  are  desirous  of  con- 
ducting business  in  an  honorable  way  would  find  themselves 
at  a  disadvantage,  and  would  be  almost  compelled  to  fall  in 
with  evil  courses.  Even  a  small  minority,  if  not  restrained 
by  law,  may  be  able  to  defeat  the  wishes  of  a  majority.  The 
following  letter  which  appeared  to-day  in  a  popular  New 


passing 

House  now,  to  compel  butcher-shops  to  be  closed  on  Sunday  ? 
There  are  eighteen  men  at  our  market,  and  our  boss  is  ready 
and  willing  to  close,  but  we  cannot  get  our  opposition  to  join. 
We  start  at  5  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  work  until  7  p.  mv 


404  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIII. 

and  on  Saturday  till  11  p.  m.  Why  should  we  not  be  entitled 
to  have  all  day  Sunday?  [Signed]  Employees  of  the  Mar- 
ket." 

Then  also  certain  kinds  of  business  which  cannot  safely 
be  intrusted  to  private  hands,  or  which  are  beyond  the  scope 
of  private  enterprise,  are  undertaken  by  the  government  and 
carried  on  so  as  greatly  to  promote  the  general  welfare.  The 
most  conspicuous  example  of  such  a  business  in  our  country 
is  the  postal  service.  This  carries  letters  to  every  part  of 
the  United  States  or  Canada  at  the  uniform  rate  of  two 
cents  per  ounce  and  newspapers  at  the  rate  of  one  cent  for 
every  four  ounces  or  fraction  thereof.  It  also  conveys  circu- 
lars, books,  and  other  printed  matter,  and  small  packages  of 
merchandise,  at  very  low  rates.  The  purpose  of  the  govern- 
ment in  this  enterprise  is  to  give  every  citizen  of  tha  republic, 
equally,  the  means  of  communicating  with  every  other  citizen, 
irrespective  of  any  thought  of  distance  or  expense.  Indeed, 
through  treaties  and  postal  unions,  provision  is  made  for 
sending  letters  to  any  one  in  any  part  of  the  world.  This 
vast  undertaking  could  not  be  conducted  by  any  private  com- 
pany without  State  protection  and  co-operation,  and  even 
then  it  would  not  be  managed  so  completely  for  the  general 
welfare  as  it  is  now.  The  desire  for  immediate  gain,  and  the 
necessity  for  dividends,  would  cause  the  neglect  of  our  less 
populous  regions;  and  the  expense  of  the  administration 
would  be  greater.  Salaries  would  be  paid  like  those  now 
given  by  some  great  corporations  whose  presidents  have  a 
larger  annual  remuneration  than  that  of  the  president  of  the 
United  States.  Probably,  too,  a.nong  the  expenditures  of 
such  a  company  would  be  one  for  maintaining  a  lobby  at 
Washington  in  order  to  secure  and  perpetuate  valuable  favors. 
The  object  of  the  post-office  department  is  not  to  obtain  reve- 
nue, but  to  spend  public  money  in  a  way  that  confers  a  great 
benefit  upon  all  the  people.  Nevertheless  it  wisely  makes  a 
small  charge  for  its  services,  and  the  revenue  thus  received 
covers  most  of  the  expense  of  the  enterprise. 

5.  Other  industries  conducted  by  the  State  are  the  plant- 
ing and  preservation  of  forests,  the  construction  and  stocking 
of  fish  hatcheries,  the  improvement  of  rivers  and  harbors,  the 
building  and  maintenance  of  light-houses  and  docks,  and 
the  making  of  roads,  bridges,  canals  and  aqueducts.  In  some 
parts  of  our  country  the  formation  of  darns  and  conduits  and 
the  distribution  of  water  for  irrigating  uses  has  been  under- 


CHAP.  XXXIII.]  ECONOMIC  ETHICS.  405 

taken  by  the  State.  Municipalities,  also,  exercising  political 
power,  not  only  provide  police  protection  for  the  people,  but 
also  build  and  own  water  works,  sometimes  of  a  stupendous 
magnitude,  supplying  the  inhabitants  millions  of  gallons 
daily;  and,  along  with  these,  a  system  of  sewerage,  for  the 
health  and  cleanliness  of  the  city.  Parks,  museums,  libraries, 
poor-houses,  dispensaries,  hospitals,  are  also  maintained  at 
great  expense. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  enterprise  undertaken  by 
public  authority  and  at  public  cost  is  that  of  education.  The 
American  people  are  lavishly  liberal  in  providing  free  in- 
struction for  all  the  children  in  the  land,  so  that  they  may 
become  self-respecting  and  self-supporting  citizens,  a  blessing 
to  themselves  and  to  their  country  and  their  race.  The 
traveler  visiting  our  cities  is  struck  by  the  imposing  and 
commodious  buildings  which  are  erected  for  the  young  folks 
of  every  neighborhood,  while,  as  he  drives  through  the 
country,  the  school-house  is  found  in  every  district,  however 
scattered  and  few  the  inhabitants  may  be.  Not  only  the 
children  and  youth  are  cared  for,  but  night-schools  and 
lecture-courses  are  instituted  for  all  who  may  be  desirous  of 
self-improvement.  Probably  our  system  of  free  education  is 
not  more  generally  diffused  than  similar  systems  in  other 
countries  are,  but  it  seems  to  be  more  generally  accepted  and 
used  by  all  classes  in  the  community  than  that  of  and  other 
country.  It  augurs  well  for  the  future  harmony  and  pros- 
perity of  our  people  that  the  children  of  the  poor  and  of  the 
well-to-do  sit  side  by  side  at  the  desks  and  on  the  benches  of 
our  schools.  Moreover,  ^in  this  country  more  than  in  any 
other,  the  State  nrovides  for  the  higher  education  of  youth. 
In  most  of  the  commonwealths  of  the  American  Union  not 
only  grammar-schools  and  high-schools  but  also  colleges  and 
universities,  are  supported  from  the  public  treasury.  This, 
too,  does  not  check  the  private  endowment  of  educational 
institutions ;  for  there  never  were  greater  benefactions  of  this 
kind  than  have  appeared  during  the  last  twenty-five  years. 

6.  All  civilized  governments  of  the  present  day  actively 
care  for  economic  interests.  They  do  not  confine  themselves 
to  protecting  property,  commerce  and  industry,  from  the 
machinations  of  fraud  and  the  attacks  of  violence.  The 
theory  of  some  that  public  authority  is  merely  "the  watch 
dog  "  to  drive  off  thieves  and  robbers  is  not  accepted  by  any 
political  power.  Indeed,  it  never  has  been  fully  adopted 


406  TEE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

anywhere.  Not  only  is  the  promotion  of  economic  interests 
necessarily  connected  with  the  protection  of  them,  but  the 
progress  of  civilization  renders  positive  governmental  care 
for  the  material  welfare  of  men  more  necessary  and  more 
desirable  from  day  to  day.  The  assumption  that  the  func- 
tions of  political  society  have  any  other  limitations  than  those 
resulting  from  a  respect  for  the  absolute  good  of  all  is  wholly 
gratuitous.  It  may  indeed  be  allowed  that  the  State  should 
not  undertake  any  business  which  can  be  safely  and  wisely 
left  to  private  agencies,  and  that  due  encouragement  should 
be  given  to  individual  enterprise.  Yet  undoubtedly  society 
as  politically  organized  has  a  proper  sphere  of  economic 
activity.  It  may  be  said  that,  in  addition  to  the  administra- 
tion of  justice,  government  should  exercise  four  different 
functions  concerning  the  material  interests  of  men — not,  in- 
deed, rashly  or  needlessly,  but  as  human  welfare  may  require. 
First,  it  should  seek  to  conserve  and  improve  the  conditions  of 
prosperity.  Secondly,  it  may  control  and  regulate  industry 
of  all  kinds  in  the  interests  of  justice  and  humanity. 
Thirdly,  it  may  assume  the  management  of  some  forms  of 
business  when  that  seems  necessary  and  desirable.  And 
fourthly,  it  may  collect  and  expend  revenues  for  the  promo- 
tion of  human  welfare. 

Under  these  four  heads  many  topics  are  included  which  can 
be  adequately  treated  only  by  the  political  economist.  The 
present  chapter  merely  mentions  some  questions  which  have 
won  for  themselves  more  or  less  consideration.  Among 
measures  relating  to  economic  conditions  the  care  of  the  poor 
and  the  prevention  of  pauperism  may  be  named  first.  The 
destitute  should  be  provided  for;  the  aged  and  infirm, 
especially,  should  be  kept  in  decency  and  comfort.  Many 
helpless  people  without  any  fault  of  their  own  find  themselves 
in  want ;  but  even  those  who  have  been  guilty  of  improvidence 
are  not  to  be  neglected.  Only  we  must  be  careful  not  to 
encourage  the  lazy  pauper  and  the  professional  beggar.  Suit- 
able work  should  always  be  required  of  the  able-bodied  as  a 
condition  of  his  receiving  food  and  shelter.  And  one  chief 
aim  of  charitable  effort  should  be  to  prevent  habitual  pauper- 
ism; for  this  is  an  evil  more  easily  prevented  than  cured. 
In  times  of  prosperity  free  labor-bureaus  should  assist  work- 
men to  obtain  remunerative  engagements,  and,  when  private 
employment  may  be  lacking,  laborers  should  be  given  govern- 
mental work  at  living  wages.  It  is  the  interest  and  duty  of 


CHAP.  XXXIII.]  ECONOMIC  ETHICS.  407 

society  to  provide  any  who  are  willing  to  work,  but  cannot 
find  employment,  the  opportunity  to  earn  a  living.  A  few 
years  ago,  during  "hard  times,"  the  city  of  Cincinnati  ap- 
propriated $135,000  for  the  payment  of  laborers  to  be  selected 
by  the" "  Associated  Charities"  of  the  city.  The  men  were 
usefully  employed  on  public  parks  and  highways,  and  it  was 
found  necessary  to  use  only  $75,000  of  the  appropriation. 

A  far-reaching  method  of  preventing  poverty  and  of  ad- 
vancing the  welfare  of  the  people  is  the  technical  education  of 
their  children.  The  boy  who  has  gained  some  knowledge  of 
a  trade  or  business  is  likely  to  rise  above  the  ranks  of  the 
common  laborer,  and,  even  if  he  does  not  find  opportunity 
to  do  so,  will  be  more  capable  of  caring  for  himself  and  for 
others  than  he  would  be  without  such  training.  And  the 
girl  who  has  learned  to  be  even  an  efficient  cook,  seamstress 
or  housemaiden,  can  obtain  good  wages  in  a  comfortable 
home.  For  the  mass  of  the  poorer  people  in  our  large  cities, 
and  even  in  the  rural  districts,  mere  book-learning  should  be 
supplemented  by  some  practical  education.  Industrial 
schools,  such  as  the  Tuskegee  Institute  in  Alabama,  are  doing 
much  'to  elevate  the  colored  race;  and  similar  schools  are 
improving  the  prospects  of  youth  in  our  northern  cities. 
This  sort  of  education  deserves  both  private  and  public  sup- 
port. 

7.  Some  important  duties  devolve  on  government  respect- 
ing money  as  the  common  measure  of  values  and  means  of 
exchange,  and  as  a  repository  of  accumulated  resources. 
Civilized  countries  have  always  used  silver  and  gold  as  money 
metals,  because  of  their  compact  intrinsic  value,  their  inde- 
structibility, their  convenient  divisibility,  and  the  easy  identi- 
fication of  the  coins  made  from  them.  Not  only  do  we  ap- 
praise all  kinds  of  property  in  terms  of  money,  but  all — or 
almost  all — bu sine&s  agreements  and  promises  take  the  form 
of  pecuniary  obligations.  Bank  notes  and  bills  of  exchange, 
debts  and  credits  of  every  kind,  the  deposits  in  institutions 
for  savings,  bonds  issued  by  the  government  or  by  munici- 
palities or  corporations,  and  the  policies  and  annuities  of 
insurance  companies,  have  their  value  measured  entirely  by 
that  of  the  money  they  promise  to  pay. 

When  men  form  pecuniary  agreements  which  are  not  to  be 
fulfilled  in  the  immediate  future,  they  do  so  subject  to  any 
fluctuation  which  may  take  place  in  the  value  (or  purchasing 
power)  of  money,  but  it  is  desirable  that  neither  the  creditor 


408  TEE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIII. 

nor  the  debtor  should  gain  any  great  advantage  in  this  way. 
In  forming  the  agreement  the  value  of  money  is  regarded 
as  practically  stationary;  the  expectation  is  that  the  creditor 
shall  be  paid  in  money  of  about  the.  same  value  as  that  men- 
tioned in  the  contract.  This  expectation  ought  not  to  be 
interfered  with  by  any  arbitrary  governmental  action,  as, 
for  example,  by  diminishing  the  weight  of  coin  or  by  making 
irredeemable  paper  promises  a  legal  tender.  Hence  we  say 
that  the  State  should  furnish  "  honest  money."  At  the  same 
time  governmental  measures  to  secure  a  sufficient  supply  both 
of  metal  and  of  representative  money  to  meet  the  increasing 
requirements  of  business  are  justifiable.  To  this  eonsdder- 
ation  our  system  of  national  banks  owes  its  origin.  Justice 
demands  only  that  no  promissory  money  be  allowed  to  circu- 
late which  is  not  redeemable  in  real  money,  whether  it  be 
gold  or  silver. 

Of  late  years  some  have  advocated  the  free  and  unlimited 
coinage  of  the  precious  metals  at  a  value  ratio  different 
from  that  of  these  metals  in  the  market  of  the  world.  This 
does  not  seem  advisable;  but  no  proper  objection  could  be 
made  to  free  coinage  at  the  market  ratio.  There  would  be 
some  advantage  if  the  standard  coins  of  silver  and  of  gold 
were  of  the  same  weight  exactly,  say  one  ounce  troy;  if  then 
governmental  authority  should  declare  the  ratio  which  all 
such  coins  should  bear  to  each  other  so  far  as  the  mint  issue 
for  a  term  of  years  is  concerned — say  five  years.  At  the  end 
of  this  time  the  ratio  of  the  coins  to  be  minted  during  another 
term  might  be  determined  according  to  an  average  of  market 
values.  Fractional  coins  might  be  issued  as  they  are  now. 
Under  such  a  system  unlimited  free  coinage  might  be  both 
reasonable  and  advantageous. 

Another  function  of  government  connected  with  money  is 
the  supervision  of  banks,  insurance  companies  and  like  fiscal 
institutions.  Most  states  employ  expert  bank  examiners  and 
require  public  semi-annual  or  quarterly  statements  so  that  all 
may  know  the  standing  of  these  institutions.  Special  enact- 
ments regulate  savings  banks  and  limit  the  ways  in  which 
money  intrusted  to  them  may  be  invested.  In  most  of  the 
countries  of  Europe  the  State  itself,  or  the  municipality,  re- 
ceives the  savings  of  the  people,  paying  a  small  interest  on 
the  deposits ;  and  postal-savings  banks,  operated  somewhat  as 
our  money-order  offices  now  are,  have  proved  extremely 
popular.  There  is  need  for  such  a  system  in  the  United 


CHAP.  XXXIII.]  ECONOMIC  ETHICS.  409 

States,  especially  in  the  rural  districts  and  less  populous 
portions  of  our  country.  Great  damage  is  inflicted  upon  any 
community  when  the  gatherings  of  its  industrious  poor  are 
lost  through  the  incompetence  or  rascality  of  managers. 
When  the  Freedmen's  Savings  Bank,to  which  the  enfranchised 
negroes  of  the  South  had  intrusted  millions  of  dollars,  failed, 
a  cruel  blow  was  struck  at  human  progress.  Had  all  the 
money  thus  lost  been  made  good  to  the  negroes  by  the  United 
States,  not  only  these  poor  people  but  the  country  at  large 
would  have  been  the  gainer. 

We  cannot  now  speak  of  the  subsidies,  land-grants,  bounties 
and  protective  tariffs  with  which  our  government  supple- 
ments the  incomes  of  transportation  companies,  sugar-pro- 
ducers and  manufacturing  concerns.  While  these  measures 
have  their  uses,  they  are  matters  rather  of  policy  than  of 
duty.  But  commendable  care  for  human  welfare  is  man- 
ifested in  the  land  laws  of  the  United  States.  These  are 
designed  to  distribute  the  public  domain  among  actual  hard- 
working settlers  to  the  exclusion  of  speculators  and  men  of 
wealth.  Great  good  has  been  accomplished  by  these  laws. 
Our  country,  however,  has  yet  something  to  learn  from  France, 
whose  laws  respecting  the  disposition  of  the  property,  and 
especially  of  the  real  estate,  of  deceased  persons,  have  greatly 
lessened  the  number  of  those  owning  vast  fortunes  and  added 
to  the  number  of  those  who  enjoy  a  competence. 

8.  The  control  of  industrial  business  belongs  to  the  State  in 
the  same  way  and  with  the  same  limitations  as  the  control 
of  human  affairs  in  general.  Every  business  is  subject  to 
public  regulation  just  as  far  as  justice  and  humanity  require. 
Neither  employers  nor  employed  should  be  permitted  to  dis- 
regard the  law  that  the  interest  of  every  man  connected  with 
a  business  should  be  fairly  cared  for.  The  violence  of  strik- 
ing workmen  should  be  prevented,  and  the  "  boycotting  "  of 
others  who  are  willing  to  work  is  not  to  be  tolerated.  On  the 
other  hand,  employers  should  not  be  allowed  to  exact  excessive 
labor  from  those  in  their  service  or  to  give  an  unreasonably 
low  rate  of  wages.  To  effect  these  ends  State  boards  of 
arbitration  have  been  appointed,  and  laws  have  been  enacted 
against  the  importation  of  a  cheap  degraded  class  of  foreign 
workmen.  The  subject  is  one  of  difficulty,  but  the  authority 
of  the  State  to  regulate  the  relations  between  capital  and 
labor  cannot  be  questioned. 

Just  at  present  the  right  of  laborers  to  combine  and  to 


410  THE  .MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIII. 

negotiate  concerning  their  claims  and  grievances  through 
such  agents  as  they  may  choose  is  a  matter  of  contention. 
Some  managers  of  great  corporations  say  that  they  will  treat 
with  their  employees  directly,  but  not  with  representatives 
whom  the  employees  may  appoint  unless  they  be  some  of  the 
employees  themselves.  It  seems  reasonable  that  workmen  who 
may  not  have  a  competent  spokesman  among  them,  or  who 
may  think  it  unadvisable  to  present  their  own  case,  should  be 
permitted  to  use  the  services  of  those  in  whose  talents  and 
character  they  have  confidence.  Is  it  going  too  far  to  say 
that  employers  might  properly  be  required  either  to  negotiate 
through  the  agency  chosen  by  the  workmen  or  to  accept  some 
form  of  arbitration?  So  long  as  employing  companies  are 
small  and  numerous,  their  employees  can  deal  with  them  on 
comparatively  equal  terms.  But  the  officers  of  large  corpora- 
tions are  so  'separated  from  the  body  of  the  workmen,  so  inde- 
pendent of  their  inferiors  and  so  influenced  by  the  desire 
of  reporting  dividends,  that  they  sometimes  fail  to  appreciate 
the  just  claims  of  employees. 

The  socialistic  remedy  for  labor  troubles  is  universal  gov- 
ernment ownership.  That  seems  a  chimerical  idea  and  one 
that  promises  more  evil  than  good.  But  there  is  one  kind 
of  business  establishments  which  should  be  specially  subjected 
to  public  control  and  which  may  sometimes  be  profitably  con- 
ducted by  the  government  itself.  We  refer  to  those  which 
by  reason  of  the  nature  of  the  business,  or  by  legislative  favor, 
or  both,  are  monopolies.  Patent  rights  and  the  use  of  public 
franchises  should  be  limited  by  consideration  for  the  interests 
of  the  public.  After  the  work  of  authors  or  inventors  or  the 
enterprise  of  capitalists  has  been  sufficiently  rewarded,  the 
people  in  general  should  become  heirs  of  the  advantages  which 
legislation  has  rendered  possible.  No  one  claims  that  a 
patent  right  or  a  copyright  should  last  forever;  and  few 
will  say  that  great  monopolies  should  not  be  restrained  from 
excessive  and  extortionate  profit?,  especially  when  they  owe 
their  opportunities  to  the  favor  and  protection  of  the  State. 
No  franchise  should  be  granted  in  perpetuity  or  without  con- 
ditions securing  the  interests  of  the  public.  As  we  write  the 
daily  papers  report  (March  26,  1901)  that,  "The  supreme 
court  of  Michigan  this  evening  filed  an  opinion  upholding 
the  ruling  of  Commissioner  0  shorn  that  the  earnings  of  the 
Wabash  Eailroad  in  Michigan  exceeded  $3,000  per  mile  last 
year,  and  that  the  company  must  reduce  its  passenger  fare 


CHAP.  XXXIII.]  ECONOMIC  ETHICS. 

in  Michigan  to  two  cents  a  mile."     This  decision  evidently 
carries  out  a  provision  of  a  railroad  law. 

9.  Great  difficulties  attend  the  control  of  monopolies  by 
the  State;  and  great  evils  have  arisen  in  connection  with 
monopolistic  enterprises  which  have  sought  and  obtained 
subsidies,  land-grants,  valuable  franchises,  the  pledging  of 
the  public  credit,  and  other  governmental  aids.  City  councils 
and  State  legislatures  have  been  corrupted.  Even  federal 
law-makers  and  officials  have  been  the  subject  of  disgraceful 
scandals.  Immense  fortunes  have  been  accumulated  by  a 
gigantic  swindling  of  the  public.  For  these  reasons — and  for 
others — many  advocate  the  "socialization,"  as  it  is  called, 
that  is,  the  government  ownership  and  administration,  of 
monopolies.  It  is  proposed  that  cities  should  own  not  only 
water  works  as  most  cities  now  do,  but  also  lighting  plants 
and  street  railways,  and  that  railroad,  telegraph  and  telephone 
lines  should  become  public  property.  It  is  claimed  that  these 
measures  have  been  adopted  in  some  countries  with  great  suc- 
cess. It  is  worth  considering  whether  some  experimentation 
in  public  ownership  and  management  might  not  contribute 
to  the  general  good.  It  would  certainly  help  us  to  under- 
stand whether  anything  further  might  be  done  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  public  without  wrong  to  existing  monopolistic 
enterprises.  It  might  tend  to  limit  that  "  watering  of 
stock  "  of  which  we  hear,  whereby  companies  can  go  on  pay- 
ing dividends  which  the  public  would  not  justify  them  in 
paying  upon  their  actual  investment,  while  they  keep  down 
the  wages  of  their  workingmen  under  the  pretense  of  the 
necessity  of  paying  just  interest  on  capital.  It  might  enable 
the  people  to  judge  whether,  after  all  charges  for  risk,  rent, 
interest,  wages  and  management,  were  liberally  met,  there 
would  remain  any  "  economic  surplus  "  which  should  fall  to 
the  public  rather  than  to  private  individuals. 

Some  years  ago  the  United  States  government  deliberated 
whether  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on  a  transcontinental  rail- 
way which  had  been  largely  built  at  public  expense  for  private 
profit.  Might  it  not  have  been  well  at  that  time  to  try  the 
experiment  whether  the  United  States  could  not  successfully 
manage  a  railroad?  The  private  ownership  of  great  monop- 
olies has  in  some  respects  been  of  great  benefit  to  this  country, 
but  it  has  also  been  the  chief  cause  of  that  unhealthful  con- 
centration of  wealth  which  has  been  proceeding  with  great 
rapidity  of  late  years.  A  high  authority,  Mr.  George  K. 


MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIII. 

Holmes,,  of  the  United  States  Census  Office,  made  the  follow- 
ing statement  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly  for  Decem- 
ber, 1893:  "Twenty  per  cent,  of  the  wealth  of  the  United 
States  is  owned  by  three  one-hundredths  of  one  per  cent,  of 
the  population;  seventy-one  per  cent,  is  owned  by  nine  per 
cent,  of  the  families;  and  twenty-nine  per  cent,  is  all  that 
falls  to  ninety-one  per  cent,  of  the  population."  When  we 
remember  that  true  economic  prosperity  is  a  state  of  affairs 
in  which  the  good  things  of  life  are  naturally  distributed 
among  the  greatest  possible  number  of  people,  and  in  which, 
especially,  the  industrious  citizen  may  have  his  full  share 
of  comforts  and  enjoyments,  must  we  not  support  every  pri- 
vate and  every  public  measure  which  may  tend  to  that  con- 
summation ? 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE. 

1.  Politics  and  jurisprudence  defined.  Sir  Henry  Maine  quoted. — 
2.  The  State  defined.  Holland  and  Ihering  quoted.. — 3.  The  use 
of  compulsory  power  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  political 
society,  but  is  not  the  sole  function  or  method  of  a  State.  Wolf 
quoted. — 4.  The  State  exists  for  moral  ends.  Grotius  and 
Cicero,  Hobbes,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and 
Prof.  Bluntschli,  quoted. — 5.  The  State  is  a  moral  person  only  in 
a  limited  sense.  The  commonwealths  of  our  Union  are  States 
only  in  a  qualified  sense.— 6.  Civil  law  defined.  The  philosophy 
of  command  and  authority.  Blackstone,  Austin,  and  Salmond 
quoted. — 7.  Blackstone's  definition  of  law,  as  criticized  by  Aus- 
tin, Christian,  Chase,  and  Sharswood  ;  and  as  interpreted  by  him- 
self.— 8.  Though  his  language  states  the  truth,  it  is  not  strictly 
literal.  Blackstone  and  Story  on  the  disregard  of  judicial  prece- 
dent. Blackstone's  doctrine  defended. — 9.  The  origin  of  com- 
mon law,  and  of  equity  jurisdiction.  Kent,  Markby,  and  Salm- 
ond quoted.  Law  takes  cognizance  of  external  conduct  as 
right  and  wrong  ;  and  also  of  the  animus  of  conduct  as  being  in- 
nocent or  vicious.  "  The  king's  conscience." — 10.  Private  per- 
sons may  disregard  the  law  in  certain  exceptional  cases.  Black- 
stone  quoted. — 11.  The  fundamental  principle  of  legal  morality. 
Salmond  quoted. 

1.  THE  words  "politics"  and  "jurisprudence"  are  used 
ambiguously.  Often  the  former  signifies  the  more  aggressive 
political  activity  of  a  country  or  a  community;  as  when  we 
speak  of  a  man  entering  into,  or  withdrawing  from,  politics. 
Sometimes,  however,  this  name  is  given  to  the  science  of 
civil  government  or  the  general  theory  of  the  State.  For 
example,  we  distinguish  the  "  Politics  "  of  Aristotle  from  his 
"  Ethics."  In  this  latter  signification  the  phrase  "  Political 
Science  "  has  the  advantage  of  being  unequivocal. 

Jurisprudence  sometimes  denotes  the  laws  of  a  country 
taken  collectively,  that  is,  all  those  rules  of  conduct  which 
are  adopted  or  ordained  by  the  supreme  authority  of  a  State, 
no  matter  how  they  have  been  formulated  and  issued,  whether 
by  the  decrees  of  emperors  or  by  the  action  of  legislatures 

413 


THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXIV. 

or  by  the  decisions  of  judges  and  courts.  Occasionally,  too, 
it  signifies  a  treatise  setting  forth  and  explaining  these  laws 
or  any  definite  portion  of  them.  Hence  we  hear  of  Equity 
Jurisprudence,  of  Medical  Jurisprudence,  and  of  the  Juris- 
prudence of  France  or  of  Eussia.  But  this  term  is  also  used 
to  designate  the  general  science  or  theory  of  law,  that  is, 
of  the  rules  of  conduct  sanctioned  or  enforced  by  the  supreme 
political  authority,  and  which,  as  distinguished  from  merely 
moral  or  customary  rules,  are  styled  "  positive "  law.  Sir 
Henry  Maine  says,  "  Jurisprudence  is  the  science  of  positive 
law."  This  sense  of  the  word  is  connected  with  the  original 
Latin  use  of  it,  which  indicated  merely  a  competent  practical 
knowledge  of  the  law  and  of  procedures  under  it.  Among 
the  Bomans  a  jurisconsult,  or  counselor-at-law,  was  said  to 
be  "  prudens  in  jure  civili''  or  "  juris  prudens." 

The  science  of  jurisprudence  is  inseparably  connected  with 
politics  or  the  science  of  civil  government,  and  may  be  con- 
sidered a  branch,  or  offshoot,  of  the  latter.  One's  theory  of 
law  naturally  attaches  itself  to  one's  theory  of  the  State. 
Both  investigations  belong  to  the  sociological  group  of 
sciences.  Both,  too,  involve  ethical  teachings  regarding  the 
State  and  its  laws.  This  last  point  seems  very  plain;  yet 
eminent  authors  differ  in  their  statements  respecting  it. 
Some  say  that  the  State  is  founded  simply  on  the  coercive 
power  of  society;  others  that  it  is  also  essentially  a  moral 
institution.  Some  say  that  "  the  field  of  legal  rules  of  con- 
duct does  not  coincide  with  that  of  moral  rules  and  is  not 
included  in  it"  (POLLOCK'S  JURISPRUDENCE,  p.  44);  others 
that  the  essential  spirit  of  the  law  is  to  maintain  and  to 
enforce  that  which  is  just  and  right.  These  conflicts  of 
opinion,  or,  at  least,  of  statement,  probably  arise  from  the 
fact  that  the  exact  truth  cannot  be  set  forth  without  modify- 
ing explanations.  It  may  throw  light  on  this  subject  to 
consider  briefly,  first,  the  theory  of  the  State  and  then  the 
theory  of  law. 

2.  Let  us  start  with  a  definition  applicable,  not  only  to 
developed  commonwealths^  such  as  we  ordinarily  have  in  mind, 
but  also  to  the  rudimentary  beginnings  of  political  society. 
Generalizing  from  the  fewest  number  of  essentials  we  say 
that  the  State  is  society  organized  to  act  in  every  possible 
way,  and  when  necessary  by  the  use  of  force,  for  the  protec- 
tion and  benefit  of  all  subject  to  its  care.  By  "  society  "  here 
we  mean  any  collection  of  people  not  under  the  control  of 


CHAP.  XXXIV. J    MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE.  415 

others  and  so  able  to  act  under  an  independent  supreme  au- 
thority from  within  itself.  When  Henry  M.  Stanley,  the 
explorer,  was  leading  an  expedition  in  Central  Africa,  some 
Arabs  under  his  command  committed  murder  and  en- 
tered into  plots  endangering  the  lives  of  all.  Stanley  tried 
the  ringleader  of  them,  and  had  him  hanged  in  the  presence 
of  the  whole  troop.  That  was  an  act  of  sovereign  authority 
and  such  as  the  chieftain  of  any  African  tribe  might  have 
performed  in  similar  circumstances.  In  like  manner,  when 
Abraham,"  a  pastoral  patriarch,  "  armed  his  trained  servants 
born  in  his  own  house,"  united  this  force  with  those  of  his 
confederates,  Aner,  Eshcol  and  Mamre,  and  pursued  and 
routed  the  army  which  had  taken  Lot,  his  kinsman,  captive, 
he  was  the  agent  in  an  act  of  sovereignty,  though  the  military 
organization  which  he  headed  was  only  temporary.  In  this 
case,  as  in  that  of  Stanley,  there  was  no  permanent  exercise 
of  a  supreme  authority,  and  therefore  no  State  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  word,  but  there  was  action  which  under  some 
circumstances  might  have  been  the  beginning  of  a  permanent 
political  organization. 

Commonly  a  State  is  composed  of  the  people  inhabiting  a 
given  territory  or  claiming  that  as  their  country.  This 
characteristic  arises  because  no  power  can  exercise  the  su- 
preme control  of  a  people  without  subordinating  to  itself 
every  other  power  within  the  territory  occupied  by  that 
people.  Jt  is  conceivable  that  a  nomadic  tribe,  in  wandering 
over  sparsely  settled  lands,  might  preserve  its  independence 
in  the  midst  of  other  tribes  roaming  in  the  same  region.  But 
this  condition  of  things  could  not  exist  after  the  develop- 
ment of  agriculture  and  commerce;  nor  would  it  naturally 
exist  long  under  any  circumstances.  A  developed  common- 
wealth necessarily  possesses  and  controls  a  given  territory. 
The  definition  of  Professor  Holland  is  to  be  commended :  "  A 
State  is  a  numerous  assemblage  of  human  beings,  generally 
occupying  a  certain  territory,  amongst  whom  the  will  of  the 
majority,  or  of  an  ascertainable  class  of  persons,  is,  by  the 
strength  of  such  a  majority  or  class,  made  to  prevail  against 
any  of  their  number  who  oppose  "it."  This  definition  gives 
the  determining  characteristic  of  a  State;  for  wherever  that 
characteristic  exists  we  can  say  that  a  State  exists.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  not  exhaustive ;  it  does  not  give  all  the  essen- 
tial attributes  of  the  State ;  it  is  an  adequate  definition  only 
by  way  of  suggestion.  (TiiE  MODALIST,  Chap.  VI.) 


416  TSE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

The  German  professor,,  Ihering,  expresses  himself  differ- 
ently from  Prof.  Holland,  but  practically  to  the  same 
purpose.  He  says,  "  The  State  is  the  form  of  the  regulated 
and  assured  exercise  of  the  compulsory  force  of  society." 

Though  the  best  State  is  that  which  is  composed  of  intel- 
ligent freemen,  this  excellence  is  not  necessary  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  State.  There  is  need  only  that  society  should 
be  organized  in  some  political  way.  One  or  more  persons 
must  have  possession  of  the  supreme  power  and  exercise  it 
over  society  at  large.  Hence  the  different  styles  of  govern- 
ment, democracies,  oligarchies,,  republics,  and  the  limited  and 
unlimited  forms  of  monarchy.  Moreover,  though  no  State 
can  exist  without  rulers,  it  may  be  conducted  without  any 
formal  adoption  and  promulgation  of  laws.  In  primitive 
times  the  patriarch  or  chief  of  a  tribe  ruled  his  people  ac- 
cording to  his  own  judgment.  Such  probably  was  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  "kings"  who  were  the  contemporaries  of 
Abraham.  The  first  military  conquerors  exacted  tribute  and 
submission  from  those  subjected  to  their  power,  but  left  the 
administration  of  justice  to  local  authorities  who  used  their 
own  wisdom  in  hearing  and  settling  disputes.  Customs  and 
precedents  arose  from  the  repeated  decisions  of  wise  judges. 
Prof.  Holland  is  right  in  saying  "  Morality  may  precede  but 
law  must  follow  the  organization  of  a  political  society." 
(JURISPRUDENCE,  p.  41.) 

3.  Though  Holland's  definition  of  a  State  is  correct  so 
far  as  it  goes,  two  particulars  are  needed  in  order  to  render 
it  complete.  First,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that,  although  the  State 
uses  compulsory  force  and  could  not  exist  without  the  exercise 
of  soverign  power,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  whole 
office  of  the  State  is  to  act  in  a  coercive  way.  On  the  con- 
trary, a  great  part  of  the  function  of  political  society  is  to 
address  the  patriotism,  the  public  spirit  and  the  sense  of  duty 
of  citizens,  and,  aside  from  any  thought  of  compulsion,  to 
unite  the  sentiments,  the  resources,  and  the  efforts  of  the 
people  for  the  common  good.  This  thought  is  admirably 
expressed  by  Wolf  in  his  "  Jus  Gentium  "  (PROL.,  Section  9). 
"The  State  is  a  society  of  human  beings  drawn  together  for 
the  sake  of  promoting  the  common  good  by  their  united 
powers." — Societas  hominum  communis  boni  conjunctis 
viribus  promovendi  causa  contracta  civitas  est.  The  fact 
is  that  the  State  is  formed  at  first  and  sustained  afterwards 
quite  as  much  by  interest,  affection  and  principle  as  by  force 


CHAP.  XXXIV. j    MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE. 

and  fear.  Though  these  latter  elements  are  essential,  they 
often  are,  and  always  ought  to  be,  secondary  to  the  others. 

4.  In  the  next  place,  we  must  supplement  Holland's  defi- 
nition by  saying  that  the  State  is  commonly  conceived  of, 
not  simply  as  an  organized  and  sovereign  power,  but  also 
as  existing  in  moral  relations,  as  being  bound  to  seek  justice 
and  the  common  welfare,  and  as  entitled  for  this  reason  to 
our  obedience  and  support.  This  ethical  status  may  be  con- 
sidered— as  it  certainly  is — a  necessary  property  of  political 
society.  But  a  necessary  property  can  always  be  considered 
and  treated  as  an  essential  attribute  if  we  simply  enlarge 
our  conception  of  the  object  contemplated.  Therefore  it  is 
not  surprising  if  many — perhaps  most — include  this  property 
in  their  very  notion  of  the  State.  Hence  that  noble  definition 
which  Grotius  took  from  Cicero,  "  The  State  is  the  perfect 
union  of  freemen  for  the  sake  of  justice  and  the  common 
good/' — Civitas  est  coitus  perfectus  liberorum  hominum 
juris  fruendi  et  communis  utilitatis  causa  sociatus.  (Jus 
BELLI  et  PACIS,  Cap.  I.)  Hence  Hobbes,  though  advocating 
absolutism,  does  not  consider  the  state  as  intended  for  the 
benefit  of  its  sovereign  lord,  but  as  a  common  inheritance  to 
be  ruled  by  one  in  the  interest  of  all.  "  The  commonwealth/' 
he  says,  "  is  one  Person  of  whose  Acts  a  great  multitude,  by 
mutual  covenants  one  with  another,  have  made  themselves 
every  one  the  Author,  to  the  end  he  may  use  the  strength  and 
means  of  them  all,  as  he  shall  think  expedient,  for  their 
Peace  and  Common  Defence."  (LEVIATHAN,  p.  88.)  The 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  also,  says  "  A  State  is 
a  body  of  free  persons  united  together  for  the  common  benefit, 
;o  enjoy  peacefully  what  is  their  own  and  to  do  justice  to 
others."  (CmsHOLM  v.  GEORGIA,  2  Dallas,  456.)  This 
statement  of  the  Supreme  Court  makes  no  mention  of  sov- 
ereignty and  can  scarcely  have  been  designed  as  a  complete 
definition,  but  evidently  it  sets  forth  prosperity,  peace  and 
justice  as  the  ends  for  which  political  society  exists,  and  con- 
ceives of  the  State  as  an  institution  promotive  of  these  ends. 

For  our  purpose  it  makes  little  difference  whether  the 
State  be  considered  simply  as  society  organized  so  as  to  employ 
sovereign  power  and  it  be  then  added  that  this  organization 
exists  under  moral  relations,  or  whether  the  definition  be  of 
an  organization  existing  for  moral  ends;  the  result  is  the 
same;  in  either  case  the  state  is  a  moral  entity,  and,  figura- 
tively speaking,  a  moral  person.  Literally,  political  society 
27 


418  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

is  not  a  person  but  an  assemblage  of  persons.  But,  as  this 
society  acts  as  one  body,  and  with  intelligence  and  design, 
and  can,  in  various  ways,  be  regarded  and  treated  as  a  unity, 
this  truth  may  be  expressed  by  using  the  word  "person." 
Professor  Bluntschli  even  incorporates  this  idea  in  his  con- 
ception of  the  state.  He  says,  "  The  state  is  the  politically 
organized  public  personality  of  a  given  country/' — "  Der 
Staat  ist  die  politisch  organisirte  Volksperson  eines  bestimm- 
ten  Landes."  (LEHRE  VOM  MODERNEN  STAAT,  I.,  p.  24.)  A 
commonwealth  is  a  person  only  in  the  same  way  that  any 
corporate  organization  is  a  person;  but  its  personality  is 
preeminently  ethical  because  both  those  who  act  for  the  state 
and  those  who  have  dealings  with  it  are  constantly  seen  to  'be 
in  relations  of  duty.  No  one  asserts  that  either  the  agents 
of  the  state  or  its  subjects  always  act  from  a  sense  of  duty. 
There  have  been  many  heartless  tyrants,  faithless  officials  and 
disloyal  citizens.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  ethical  nature  of 
man  belongs  to  him  in  his  political  as  well  as  in  his  other 
relations,  and  that  any  theory  of  the  state — any  politics  of 
any  kind — which  leaves  this  fact  out  of  consideration,  takes 
an  imperfect  view  of  the  subject  with  which  it  deals. 

This  doctrine  seems  too  evident  for  denial.  Yet  some 
authors  ?how  a  tendency  to  ignore  it  or  to  minimize  its  signifi- 
cance. They  represent  the  State  as  the  embodiment  of  brute 
force  rather  than  of  rightful  sovereignty,  or  they  regard  it 
simply  as  a  necessary  association  of  men  from  motives  of  self- 
interest.  When  such  writers  touch  on  the  moral  aspects  of 
civil  government,  they  seem  to  explain  these  as  the  mere  dic- 
tates of  power  on  the  one  hand  and  of  fear  and  prudence  on 
the  other.  (  We  should  never  forget  that  man  is  first  a  moral 
then  a  political  being,  and  that  the  State  with  its  rights  and 
duties  is  a  development  of  his  ethical  no  less  than  of  his 
rational  capabilities.  The  State  does  not  originate  morality 
but  is  founded  upon  it.  With  this  understanding  we  say 
that  the  State  is  bound  to  defend  itself,  its  territory  and  its 
citizens  against  foreign  aggression;  to  define  the  rights, 
privileges,  duties  and  obligations  of  itself  and  of  its  mem- 
bers; to  suppress  the  wrong  and  enforce  the  right  by  courts 
and  penalties;  and  to  take  such  measures  and  make  such 
laws  as  may  maintain  justice  and  promote  the  public  good. 
In  the  discharge  of  these  functions,  too,  the  State  may  right- 
fully claim  the  recognition  and  friendship  of  every  other 
State,  as  well  as  the  obedience  and  loyal  support  of  every 


CHAP.  XXXIV.]     MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE.  419 

person  living  under  its  care.  In  short,  political  society 
is  as  truly  a  subject  of  moral  law  as  the  individual 
man  is. 

5.  Here  it  may  be  asked  whether  the  State,  as  a  moral 
"  person,"  is  subject  to  punitive  justice  in  the  same  sense  as 
individual  men  are.     We  would  say:  Not  exactly.     Individ- 
uals who,  as  the  officers  or  the  subjects  of  a  State,  willingly 
participate  in  wrong,  are  individually  responsible  for  their 
evil-doing.     In  this  way  the  majority  of  a  political  commu- 
nity may  share  in  a  common  guilt  and  be  included  in  one  gen- 
eral punishment.     But  when   a  widespread  calamity   over- 
takes a  nation  because  of  the  wickedness  of  its  people  or 
their  rulers  and  many  suffer  who  took  no  part  in  that  wick- 
edness, this  is  not  penal  retribution  in  the  strict  and  proper 
sense,  though  it  may  be  a  necessary  and  righteous  ordering 
of  events,  and  may  be  called  punitive  justice  because  of  its 
union  with  and  its  external  resemblance  to  the  operation  of 
punitive  law.     It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  State  is  not 
a  person  literally  and  in  all  respect?,  and  that  some  things 
can  be  said  of  a  person  which  cannot  be  said  of  a  State. 
(Compare  Chap.  XXVI.  5.) 

It  may  remove  some  occasion  of  obscurity  to  observe  that 
the  word  "  State,"  as  occurring  in  the  phrase  "  The  United 
States  "  and  as  applied  to  the  several  commonwealths  of  the 
North  American  Union,  is  used  in  a  limited  sense.  It  des- 
ignates a  political  society  which  exercises  some  but  not  all 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  over  its  members.  Every  common- 
wealth in  the  Union  is  subject  in  certain  respects  to  the 
authority  and  laws  of  the  central  government;  and  this  gov- 
ernment, no  less  than  that  of  each  State,  is  limited  in  its 
functions  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  Before 
conceiving  of  the  American  people  as  a  State  in  the  full 
sense  of  "the  word — as  a  political  society  with  unrestricted 
sovereignty — we  must  combine  together  the  State  govern- 
ments, the  central  government  and  the  constitution-making 
power  of  the  people  of  the  United  States;  and  so  think  of 
the  American  State  or  nation.  And,  of  course,  this  great 
organization,  as  well  as  those  constituent  of  it,  exists  in 
ethical  relations. 

6.  The  laws  of  a  State  are  permanent  expressions  of  its  sov- 
ereign will,  and  must,  therefore,  participate  in  the  moral 
status  of  the  State.     Nevertheless,  as  jurisprudence  is  often 
discussed  separately  from  politics,  and  as  authorities  differ 


420  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

regarding  the  connection  between  morality  and  law,  some 
additional  discussion  seems  desirable. 

A  law  is  a  rule — that  is,  a  general  mode — of  conduct 
adopted  or  prescribed  by  a  sovereign  political  authority  for 
its  own  observance  or  for  that  of  others.  Most  laws  directly 
regulate  the  conduct  of  the  subjects  of  the  State,  and  rule's 
of  this  class  are  often  called  "  the  laws  "  by  way  of  preemi- 
nence. Definitions  generally  speak  of  them  only.  Such 
laws  are  of  the  nature  of  commands,  that  is,  they  are  ex- 
pressions of  the  sovereign  will  with  a  demand  of  compliance 
or  obedience.  This  demand  assumes  that  one  will  may  exer- 
cise control  over  another,  or  others,  either  through  a  simple 
imperative  force,  or  through  a  claim  to  rightful  authority,  or 
by  a  show  of  coercive  power.  In  the  first  of  these  cases,  as 
when  parents  direct  an  infant,  the  command  appeals  to  a 
sense  of  inferiority  and  dependence;  in  the  second,  as  when 
a  dying  patriarch  enjoins  his  children,  the  command  appeals 
to  a  sense  of  moral  obligation;  in  the  third,  as  when  a  con- 
queror orders  his  enemies  to  bring  their  tribute,  the  command 
appeals  to  fear  and  the  sense  of  subjection.  Command  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  counsel  or  request  and  from  every  mo- 
tive suggestion  other  than  that  of  over-mastering  will,  or 
coercive  power,  or  rightful  authority.  Blackstone  says, 
"  Counsel  is  only  a  matter  of  persuasion ;  law  is  a  matter  of 
injunction.  Counsel  acts  only  upon  the  willing;  law  upon 
the  unwilling  also."  (COMMENTARIES,  p.  44.)  In  civil  gov- 
ernment the  state  exercise  the  force  of  its  will,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  asserts  both  its  right  to  rule  and  its  determination 
to  compel  obedience.  There  may  be  an  authority  founded 
simply  on  compulsion  and  fear;  and  some  speak  of  this  as 
the  only  authority  belonging  to  the  State  and  its  laws.  We 
shall  see  that  such  teaching  arises  from  an  incomplete  ap- 
prehension of  the  truth. 

John  Austin  (1790—1859),  a  follower  of  Jeremy  Ben- 
tham,  recognizes  no  duty  or  obligation  except  the  binding 
force  of  compulsory  authority.  He  says,  "  If  you  express 
or  intimate  a  wish  that  I  shall  do  or  forbear  from  some  act, 
and  if  you  will  visit  me  with  an  evil  in  case  I  comply  not 
with  your  wish,  the  expression  or  intimation  of  your  wish  is 
a  command.  .  .  .  Being  liable  to  evil  from  you  if  I  comply 
not  with  a  wish  which  you  signify,  I  am  bound,  or  obliged, 
by  your  command,  or  I  lie  under  a  duty  to  obey  it.  Com- 
mand and  duty  are,  therefore,  correlative  terms,  the  mean- 


CHAP.  XXXIV.]     MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE.  421 

ing  denoted  by  each  being  implied  or  supposed  by  the  other. 
Wherever  a  duty  lies  a  command  has  been  signified;  and 
wherever  a  command  is  signified,  a  duty  is  imposed."  (JURIS- 
PRUDENCE, Section  19.)  This  theory  of  duty  and  obligation 
leaves  out  morality,  or  rather  explains  it  away.  It  rightly  sets 
forth  law  as  a  command  issued  by  the  State  to  its  subjects 
and  enforced  by  courts  and  penalties;  but  it  robs  the  law  of 
moral  quality.  Professor  Salmond  properly  objects  to  the 
Austinian  doctrine  that  it  "leaves  altogether  out  of  sight 
the  ethical  significance  of  law;  that  it  empties  the  conception 
of  its  ethical  content."  Then,  after  denying  that  we  can  de- 
duce the  theory  of  legal  rights,  wrongs  and  duties  from  the 
bare  conception  of  law  as  a  command  of  the  State,  Salmond 
continues :  "  The  truth  is  that  the  rules  of  action  enforced 
by  the  State  are,  in  theory  at  least,  the  rules  of  right  and 
wrong.  The  administration  of  law  is,  in  theory  at  least,  the 
administration  of  justice.  .  .  .  This  relation  between  natural 
law  and  civil  law  must  be  recognized  by  any  satisfactory 
theory  of  the  latter ;  and,  for  this  reason,  we  must  prefer  the 
definition  of  Blackstone,  which  recognizes  the  ethical  ele- 
ment, to  those  of  Bentham  and  Austin,  which  reject  it." 
(JURISPRUDENCE,  95.) 

7.  Blackstone's  definition,  to  which  Salmond  refers,  is  that 
of  municipal,  or  civil,  law.  Sir  William  says,  "  I  call  it 
municipal  law  in  compliance  with  common  speech;  for, 
though  strictly  that  expression  denotes  the  particular  cus- 
toms of  one  single  municipium,  or  free  town,  yet  it  may, 
with  sufficient  propriety,  be  applied  to  any  one  State  or  na- 
tion which  is  governed  by  the  same  laws  and  customs.  Mu- 
nicipal law,  thus  understood,  is  properly  defined  to  be  a  rule 
of  civil  conduct,  prescribed  by  the  supreme  power  in  a  State, 
commanding  what  is  right  and  prohibiting  what  is  wrong." 
(CoMM.,  p.  44.)  This  definition  was  found  objectionable  by 
Christian,  who  annotated  on  Blackstone  in  the  early  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century  and  whose  criticism  is  quoted  by 
Professor  Chase  of  the  New  York  Law  School,  as  follows: 
"  A  municipal  law  is  completely  expressed  by  the  first  branch 
of  the  definition,  '  a  rule  of  civil  conduct  prescribed  by  the 
supreme  power  in  a  State  ';  and  the  latter  branch  '  command- 
ing what  is  right  and  prohibiting  what  is  wrong '  must  either 
be  superfluous  or  convey  a  defective  idea  of  a  municipal  law. 
For,  if  right  and  wrong  are  referred  to  the  municipal  law  it- 
self, then  whatever  it  commands  is  right  and  whatever  it 


4:22  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

prohibits  is  wrong,  and  the  clause  would  be  insignificant 
tautology/7  By  this  Christian  means  that  if  Blackstone 
founded  right  and  wrong,  duty  and  obligation,  on  the  com- 
mand of  the  State,  as  Austin  does,  his  words  would  be  mean- 
ingless surplusage;  as  they  certainly  would  be.  That  was 
not  Blackstone's  theory :  so  Christian  continues,  "  But  if 
right  and  wrong  are  to  be  referred  to  the  laws  of  nature7' 
(that  is,  to  the  moral  law)  "then  the  definition  will  become 
deficient  or  erroneous.  For,  though  the  municipal  law  may 
seldom  command  what  is  wrong,  yet  in  ten  thousand  in- 
stances it  forbids  what  is  right.  It  may  forbid  an  unquali- 
fied person  to  kill  game;  it  may  forbid  a  man  to  exercise  a 
trade  without  serving  as  an  apprentice,  etc.  All  these  acts 
were  perfectly  right  before  the  prohibition  of  the  municipal 
law."  CHASE'S  BLACKSTONE,  p.  9.) 

The  reasoning  of  Christian  in  this  criticism  is  fallacious. 
It  rests  on  an  ambiguity  of  the  word  "right."  This  term 
may  signify  that  which  is  consistent  with  duty  as  well  as 
that  which  is  required  by  duty — that  which  of  itself  is  allow- 
able and  innocent  as  well  as  that  which  is  obligatory.  (CHAP. 
IV.)  That  the  law  often  prohibits  what  otherwise  would  be 
innocent  and  right  is  entirely  harmonious  with  Blackstone's 
teaching  that  the  law  always  commands  what  is  right  and  ob- 
ligatory. 

Professor  Chase  says  that  Judge  Sharswood  proposes  to 
amend  the  last  clause  of  Blackstone's  definition,  so  as  to  read, 
"  commanding  what  is  to  be  done,  and  forbidding  the  con- 
trary/' This  amendment,  however,  is  not  an  improvement. 
It  is  ambiguous.  It  may  mean  either  "  commanding  what  is 
to  be  done  as  morally  obligatory";  which  is  Blackstone's 
meaning ;  or,  "  commanding  what  is  to  be  done  as  legally 
compulsory"  which  may  be  Sharswood's  meaning,  and  which 
certainly  would  satisfy  Austin.  Perhaps  Blackstone's 
thought  would  be  more  perfectly  expressed  should  we  say, 
"  commanding  what  ought  to  be  done  and  prohibiting  the 
contrary,"  the  oughtness  here  mentioned  being  that  of  moral 
obligation.  For  Blackstone  does  not  teach  that  civil  law 
commands  only  what  the  law  of  nature  requires  and  prohibits 
only  what  is  contrary  to  that ;  he  expressly  asserts  that  muni- 
cipal law  may,  of  itself,  make  some  things  right  and  others 
wrong.  He  says,  first :  "  Those  rights  which  God  and  nature 
have  established  and  are,  therefore,  called  natural  rights, 
such  as  are  life  and  liberty,  need  not  the  aid  of  human  laws 


CHAP.  XXXIV.]    MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE.  423 

to  be  more  effectually  vested  in  every  man  than  they  are. 
...  On  the  contrary,  no  human  legislature  has  power  to 
abridge  or  destroy  them,  unless  the  owner  himself  commits 
some  act  that  amounts  to  a  forfeiture.  Neither  do  divine,  or 
natural,  duties,  such  as  the  worship  of  God,  the  maintenance 
of  children,  and  the  like,  receive  any  stronger  sanction," 
(that  is,  stronger  moral  sanction)  "from  being  also  declared 
to  be  duties  by  the  law  of  the  land/'  Then  Sir  William  con- 
tinues :  "  But  with  regard  to  things  in  themselves  indifferent, 
the  case  is  entirely  altered.  These  become  either  right  or 
wrong,  just  or  unjust,  duties  or  misdemeanors,  according  .as 
the  municipal  legislator  sees  proper,  for  promoting  the  wel- 
fare of  society  and  more  effectually  carrying  on  the  pur- 
poses of  civil  life.  Thus  our  own  common  law  has  declared 
that  the  goods  of  the  wife  do  instantly  upon  marriage  become 
the  property  and  right  of  her  husband;  and  our  statute  law 
has  declared  all  monopolies  a  public  offense.  Yet  that  right 
and  this  offence  have  no  foundation  in  nature  but  are  merely 
created  by  the  law  for  the  purpose  of  civil  society."  (CoMM., 
54,  55.)  All  this  signifies  that  the  regulations  of  the  State, 
made  in  addition  to  laws  originally  moral,  are  obligatory 
upon  us  because  "  the  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of  God," 
or,  if  you  prefer,  are  clothed,  by  natural  necessity  and  justice, 
with  the  right,  and  with  the  duty,  of  making  rules  for  the 
conduct  of  civil  life. 

8.  Blackstone's  definition  of  law,  as  interpreted  by  him- 
self, sets  forth  truth.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  admitted 
that  his  language  cannot  be  taken  in  strict  literality.  To  use 
the  words  of  Professor  Salmond,  it  sets  forth  what  the  law  is 
"  in  theory,"  and  what  it  merely  approximates  in  fact.  For 
the  rule  prescribed  by  the  supreme  power  in  a  State  does  not 
always  require  only  what  is  right  and  forbid  only  what  is 
wrong.  Sometimes  iniquitous  laws  have  forbidden  what  is 
right  and  required  what  is  wrong.  It  is  to  be  acknowledged, 
also,  that  the  laws  even  of  civilized  countries  have  never  yet 
perfectly  served  the  ends  of  justice  and  the  interests  of  hu- 
manity. The  work  of  the  legislative  reformer  always  has 
been,  and  probably  always  will  be,  necessary.  Mr.  Black- 
si  one's  words  must  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with  these 
facts,  which  were  well  known  to  him,  as  they  are  to  every- 
body. It  was  his  design  to  state  the  essential  and  proper 
function  of  the  law.  He  wished  to  teach  that  the  main 
body  of  the  laws  of  every  developed  State  do  prevent  wrong 


424  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

and  promote  justice  and  the  public  good;  and  that  this  is 
the  proper  aim  of  all  legislation.  Even  when  those  who 
should  administer  the  laws  are  corrupt  and  unprincipled,  the 
laws  themselves  are,  for  the  most  part,  the  dictates  of  justice 
and  wisdom.  Moreover,  Blackstone  uses  unqualified  lan- 
guage because  he  saw  that  the  purposes  of  judicial  interpre- 
tation might  make  it  well  to  conceive  of  an  ideal  law  which 
should  perfectly  defend  the  right  and  promote  the  good,  and 
with  which,  by  a  kind  of  legal  fiction,  existing  law  might  be 
identified.  He  would  have  both  judges  and  people  believe 
that  the  law  ever  seeks  what  is  right,  and  that  if  in  any  case, 
the  acts  of  legislatures  or  judicatories  oppose  the  right,  this 
is  the  fault  of  those  who  formulate  or  who  interpret  the  law 
or  who  speak  in  its  name,  and  not  of  the  law  itself.  He 
speaks  like  one  who  should  describe  the  sun  as  giving  perfect 
light  and  clearness,  in  disregard  of  the  fact  that  it  is  often 
clouded  and  sometimes  eclipsed. 

This  doctrine  of  Blackstone  may  be  illustrated  by  his  teach- 
ing concerning  the  force  and  use  of  legal  precedents.  "  Judi- 
cial decisions,"  he  says,  "  are  the  principal  and  most  authori- 
tative evidence  that  can  be  given  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
custom  as  shall  form  a  part  of  the  common  law.  ...  It  is 
an  established  rule  to  abide  by  former  precedents  when  the 
same  points  come  again  in  litigation.  .  .  .  Yet  this  rule 
admits  of  exception  where  the  former  determination  is  most 
evidently  contrary  to  reason — much  more  if  it  be  clearly 
contrary  to  the  divine  law.  But,  even  in  .such  cases,  the 
judges  do  not  pretend  to  make  a  new  law  but  to  vindicate  the 
old  one  from  misrepresentation.  For,  if  it  be  found  that  the 
former  decision  is  manifestly  absurd  or  unjust,  it  is  declared, 
not  that  such  a  sentence  was  bad  law,  but  that  it  was  not 
law — that  is,  not  the  established  custom  of  the  realm,  as 
has  been  erroneously  determined.  And  hence  it  is  that  our 
lawyers  are,  with  justice,  so  copious  in  their  encomiums  on 
the  reason  of  the  common  law;  that  they  tell  us  that  the 
law  is  the  perfection  of  reason,  that  it  always  intends  to  con- 
form thereto,  and  that  what  is  not  reason  is  not  law.  Not 
that  the  particular  reason  of  every  rule  in  the  law  can  be 
always  precisely  assigned,  but  it  is  sufficient  that  there  be 
nothing  in  the  rule  flatly  contradictory  to  reason;  and  then 
the  law  will  presume  it  to  be  well-founded."  (CoMM.,  p.  69.) 

Similar  language  to  that  of  Blackstone  was  employed  by 
Justice  Story.  Speaking  for  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 


CHAP.  XXXIV.]    MORALITY  AMD  THE  STATE.  425 

United  States  respecting  judicial  decisions,  he  says :  "  They 
are  at  most  only  evidences  of  what  the  laws  are  and  are  not 
of  themselves  laws.  They  are  often  re-examined,  reversed 
and  qualified  by  the  courts  themselves,  whenever  they  are 
found  to  be  either  defective  or  ill-founded,  or  otherwise  in- 
correct." (  SWIFT  v.  TYSON,  16  Pet.  1.)  "  The  law,"  evidenced 
by  recorded  decision?.,  has  only  an  ideal  existence  except  as  it 
is  derivable  from  those  decisions  themselves.  So  far  as  ethics 
is  concerned  it  makes  no  difference  whether  one  says  that  law 
commands  the  right  and  forbids  the  wrong,  or  that  all  law 
ought  to  do  so.  Either  statement  teaches  that  the  essential 
function  of  law  is  to  promote  what  is  right  and  good. 

Blackstone's  teaching  has  been  objected  to  as  encouraging 
judges  and  others  to  disregard  actual  law  whenever  in  their 
opinion  it  may  conflict  with  moral  principle.  But  his  de- 
sign was  only  to  make  a  forcible  statement  of  the  ethical  ob- 
ligation and  purpose  of  law.  He  did  not  mean  that  judges 
should  set  aside  any  clearly  established  rule,  but  only  that,  in 
cases  of  doubt,  it  should  be  assumed  that  the  actual  law 
agrees  with  the  ideal  law  and  intends  only  what  is  right  and 
good.  This  assumption  is  needed  in  judicial  interpretations, 
and,  in  cases  where  no  other  ground  of  decision  can  be  found, 
allows  an  appeal  to  the  well-known  principles  of  morality. 
But  it  does  not  lie  within  the  province  of  courts  to  alter  any 
clearly  established  law  even  though  it  may  differ  from  that 
ideal  to  which  all  law  ought  to  conform.  The  utmost  that 
judges  can  then  do  is  to  exert  what  influence  they  can  to 
have  the  actual  law  made  conformable  to  that  ideal  which 
alone  is  the  law  of  absolute  right  and  justice.  To  do  more 
than  this  would  be  to  violate  their  oath  of  office,  to  usurp 
a  power  not  given  them  by  the  sovereign  authority  of  the 
State,  and  to  introduce  arbitrariness  and  uncertainty  into  the 
administration  of  justice. 

9.  That  law  aims  not  simply  to  enforce  a  supreme  will,  as 
Austin  teaches,  but  to  maintain  right  and  to  further  the 
general  welfare,  may  be  illustrated  by  the  origin  both  of 
common  law  and  of  equity  jurisdiction.  Chancellor  Kent 
says :  "  A  great  proportion  of  the  rules  and  maxims  which 
constitute  the  immense  code  of  the  common  law  grew  into 
use  by  gradual  adoption,  and  received,  from  time  to  time, 
the  sanction  of  the  courts  of  justice,  without  any  legislative 
act  or  interference.  It  was  the  application  of  the  dictates 
of  natural  justice  and  of  cultivated  reason  to  particular 


426  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

cases."  Originally  suits  in  equity  were  conducted  before  the 
king  as  the  sovereign  source  of  justice  or  before  the  chancellor 
acting  in  the  king's  name  and  with  that  supreme  authority 
which  alone  could  supplement  and  rectify  the  imperfect 
working  of  the  common  law.  "  It  was  the  king's  conscience/' 
says  Sir  William  Markby,  "  which  was  moved  by  an  injustice; 
and,  because  it  was  one  not  remediable  by  the  ordinary  law, 
the  chancellor  received  a  commission  to  remedy  it,  some- 
times from  the  king  himself  but  sometimes  also  from  parlia- 
ment." (ELEMENTS  OF  LAW,  Section  120.)  The  king's  con- 
science here  means  simply  the  best  moral  judgment  of  the  sov- 
ereign authority.  "  In  its  origin,"  says  Salmond,  "  the  juris- 
diction of  the  chancellor  was  absolutely  unfettered  by  any  rules 
whatever.  His  duty  was  to  "  do  that  which  justice  and  rea- 
son and  good  faith  and  good  conscience  required  in  the  case." 
(JURISPRUDENCE,  89.)  This  discretionary  freedom  of  equity 
jurisdiction  has  in  the  course  of  time  been  almost  entirely 
abandoned.  Precedent  rules  now  in  chancery  proceedings  as 
much  as  it  does  in  those  of  common  law.x  And  it  is  now 
wisely  held  that  relief  from  the  imperfect  operation  of  laws 
and  precedents  must  be  sought  chiefly  from  the  legislature. 

Some  say  that  civil  law  cannot  have  ethical  character  be- 
cause it  does  not  take  cognizance  of  our  unexpressed  thoughts 
or  desires,  but  only  of  our  external  conduct.  This  assumes 
that  actions  as  such  have  no  moral  character,  whereas  they 
can  be  right  or  wrong,  though  they  cannot  be  "virtuous  or 
vicious,  without  reference  to  the  animus  from  which  they 
proceed.  (CHAP.  VI.)  Besides,  the  law  does  take  cognizance 
of  the  intents  of  the  heart  so  far  as  these  are  manifested  by 
external  conduct  or  may  be  affected  by  external  control.  It 
deals  with  man  as  an  intelligent  rational  agent  and  with  his 
life  so  far  as  it  can  be  influenced  by  the  power  and  authority 
of  the  State.  Criminal  law  relates  to  moral  guilt  or  innocence 
and  is  designed  for  the  suppression  of  wickedness.  One  im- 
portant end  of  legislative  and  judicial  action  is  to  improve 
the  moral  condition  of  mankind.  But  even  should  we  leave 
these  ends  of  causative  righteousness  out  of  view,  all  civil 
rule  should  be  pervaded  with  the  spirit  of  equity  and  bene- 
ficence, and  should  aim  at  the  absolute  good  of  those  whom 
its  action  may  affect. 

10.  As  we  have  seen,  no  judge  or  other  officer  inferior  to 
the  supreme  legislative  power,  has  the  right  to  set  aside  an 
established  law,  nor  would  it  be  wise  or  safe  to  grant  him 


CHAP.  XXXIV.]    MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE.  427 

such  a  right.  Along  with  this  principle,  however,  it  is  to  be 
remembered  that  private  individuals  are  sometimes  justi- 
fied in  disobeying  the  actual  laws  of  a  State  and  in  refusing 
demands  made  by  public  authority.  This  arises  because  the 
State  does  not  always  perfectly  fulfil  its  function  and  so  does 
not  always  command  only  what  is  right  and  forbid  only  what 
is  wrong.  When  rulers  require  what  is  contrary  to  "  the  law 
of  nature,"  as  it  is  called — that  is,  to  moral  principle — it  is 
our  duty  to  disobey  them.  "This  law  of  nature,"  says 
Blackstone,  "  is  superior  in  obligation  to  any  other.  It  is 
binding  over  all  the  globe  in  all  countries  and  at  all  times; 
no  human  laws  are  of  any  validity  if  contrary  to  this;  and 
such  of  them  as  are  valid  derive  all  their  force  and  all  their 
authority,  mediately  or  immediately,  from  this  original." 
(CoMM.,  p.  40.)  By  validity  and  authority  here  Sir  William 
does  not  mean  the  actual  constraining  and  compulsory  force 
of  a  law;  as  Austin  supposes  he  does;  but  only  its  moral 
obligation.  He  illustrates  his  thought  by  applying  it  to  the 
crime  of  murder,  and  says,  "  Those  human  laws  that  annex 
a  punishment  to  it  do  not  at  all  increase  its  moral  guilt  or 
superadd  any  fresh  obligation  in  foro  conscientiae  "  (p.  42). 

Besides  laws  commanding  immorality,  Blackstone  says 
that  another  class  of  laws  may  be  disobeyed,  though  we  are 
not  under  obligation  to  disobey  them.  He  refers  to  cases  in 
which  a  law  forbids  or  enjoins  something  which  "  is  wholly 
a  matter  of  indifference  and  where  the  penalty  inflicted  is  an 
adequate  compensation  for  the  civil  inconvenience  supposed 
to  arise  from  the  offense.  But,"  he  adds,  "  where  disobedience 
to  the  law  involves  in  it  also  any  degree  of  public  mischief 
or  private  injury,  there  it  falls  within  our  former  distinction 
and  is  also  an  offence  against  conscience."  (CoMM.,  p.  58.) 

In  the  class  of  cases  last  mentioned,  Sir  William  says, 
"  The  alternative  is  offered  to  every  man  e  Either  abstain 
from  this  or  submit  to  such  a  penalty;  '  and  his  conscience  will 
be  clear  whichever  side  of  the  alternative  he  thinks  proper  to 
embrace."  The  question  now  suggests  itself  whether,  in 
case  the  State  itself  or  its  law  attempt  great  wrong  upon  a 
person,  it  may  ever  be  morally  justifiable  not  only  to  disobey 
public  authority  but  also  to  avoid,  if  possible,  the  penalty 
for  disobedience.  If  a  sovereign  reduced  the  common  people 
of  a  certain  district  to  slavery  or  serfdom,  prohibiting  them, 
under  penalty  of  death,  from  leaving  their  farms  or  engaging 
in  other  work  than  the  appointed  slavery;  or  should  the  law 


428  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXIV. 

require  a  certain  class  of  inhabitants,  say  Jews  or  Christians, 
on  the  penalty  of  forfeiting  all  their  goods,  to  pay  half  their 
income  into  the  public  treasury,  while  other  people  should  be 
taxed  only  five  per  cent,  of  their  income;  would  the  persons 
so  wronged  be  justified  in  seeking  to  elude  both  the  excessive 
demands  of  the  State  and  also  the  penalties  attached  to  non- 
compliance  ?  We  think  they  would.  When  a  government  be- 
comes intolerably  bad,  the  oppressed  have  the  right  of  revo- 
lution provided  they  have  good  reason  to  expect  success. 
When  they  have  no  such  hope,  nothing  seems  left  for  them 
save  avoidance  and  evasion.  Society  as  a  whole  has  no  more 
right  to  commit  robbery  or  murder  than  a  single  person  has ; 
and  there  seems  to  be  a  right  to  protect  oneself  against  public 
as  well  as  aginst  private  wrong. 

We  admit  that  one  should  endure  injustice  at  the  hands  of 
the  State  if,  by  so  doing,  he  can  serve  some  great  and  worthy 
end.  But  would  it  not  sometimes  result  in  harm  rather  than 
good  to  yield  willing  obedience  to  tyrannous  laws?  We  are 
not  clear  that  even  Socrates  was  right  in  refusing  that  es- 
cape from  an  unmerited  death  which  his  friends  had  secured 
for  him.  When  he  chose  hemlock  instead  of  liberty,  he  gave 
the  Athenians  a  last  lesson  of  respect  for  State  authority 
which  may — or  may  not — have  been  effective,  but  which  he 
might  have  declined  giving  if  he  had  found  some  way  of 
serving  his  generation  better  by  living  than  by  dying. 

11.  This  discussion  may  be  closed  with  a  quotation  from 
Professor  Salmond,  which  not  only  exhibits  the  ethical  char- 
acter of  law  and  its  administration,  but  also  indicates  the 
fundamental  principle  to  which  legal  morality  appeals.  He 
is  explaining  the  difference  between  "  damnum"  or  injury 
in  our  modern  sense  of  the  word,  and  <e  injuria"  which  is 
wrongful  injury,  and  such  as  calls  for  redress.  "  Damnum 
sine  injuria,"  is  not  wrongful,  and  does  not  call  for  redress. 
For  example,  competition  in  trade  may  be  ruin  to  individual 
traders,  but  the  general  result  is  gain  to  society;  hence  such 
competition,  though  hurtful  to  individuals,  is  not  wrongful — 
it  is  "  damnum  sine  injuria/'  The  quotation  which  we  de- 
sire to  make  is  as  follows :  "  That,  in  respect  to  good  and 
evil,  the  general  may  differ  from  the  particular  consequences 
of  an  act,  and  that  an  act  is  to  be  judged  as  right  or  wrong 
from  its  general,  not  from  its  particular,  results,  are  facts 
which  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  notice.  The  purpose 
of  the  administration  of  justice  is  to  put  down  that  which  is 


CHAP.  XXXIV.]    MORALITY  AND  THE  STATE. 

absolutely  evil,  not  that  which  is  merely  relatively  so;  and 
hence  there  results  an  important  instance  of  '  damnum  sine 
injuria.'"  (JURISPRUDENCE,  160.)  Here  a  writer,  expound- 
ing-, not  ethics  but  jurisprudence,  states  the  fundamental 
aim  of  justice — that  is,  of  conservative  and  defensive  duty. 
(CHAP.  XXIII.)  Using  the  best  language  at  his  command 
he  declares  that  justice  aims  at  the  suppression  of  "  that 
which  is  absolutely  evil."  This  teaching  is  simply  a  specific 
aspect  of  the  doctrine  that  the  end  of  all  morality  is  the  reali- 
zation of  "  absolute  good." 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

THE    ETHICAL    ASPECT    OF     RELIGION. 

1.  Morality  and  religion  are  not  inseparable.— 2.  Commonly  the 
moral  life  enters  into  and  modifies  the  religious. — 8.  Religion 
also  affects  morality  (1)  by  enlarging  the  sphere  of  moral  rela- 
tions, (2)  by  adding  divine  authority  to  the  law  of  duty,  and  (3) 
by  the  expectation  of  future  rewards  and  punishments. — 4. 
Christianity  is  superior  in  ethical  power  to  every  other  religion. 
— 5.  It  gives  the  true  conception  of  God. — 6.  Its  morality  is  per- 
fect.— 7.  It  presents  a  faultless  exemplar  of  virtue. — 8.  It  reveals 
divine  love. — 9.  It  offers  just  pardon  to  the  penitent. — 10.  It 
promises  spiritual  help. — 11.  It  asserts  the  unspeakable  worth  of 
man.— 12.  It  speaks  of  Heaven  and  of  Hell.— 13.  The  hypothesis 
of  a  future  life  is  necessary  to  explain  the  divine  government 
and  to  show  the  complete  reasonableness  of  the  moral  law. — 14. 
The  promotion  of  Christianity  is  a  great  duty.  Even  those  who 
may  doubt  its  doctrine  should  support  its  morality.  Believers 
are  bound  to  use  every  proper  means  for  the  prevalence  of  their 
holy  faith.  Daniel  Webster  and  Justice  Story  quoted. 

1.  MORALITY  and  religion,  ethics  an'd  theology,  are  closely 
related,  yet  not  so  closely  that  the  one  may  not  exist  without 
the  other.  There  may  be  an  abstract  ethics  which  makes  no 
reference  to  things  divine;  and  there  may  be  a  theology 
which  ignores  the  requirements  of  duty  while  it  discourse?  on 
the  invisible  and  supernal.  Not  only  do  some  books  on  moral 
theory  leave  religious  faith  out  of  consideration,  but  some- 
times men  sincerely  respect  the  rules  of  right  and  wrong 
and  yet  profess  themselves  without  any  belief  in  God  and 
without  any  definite  expectation  respecting  a  future  life. 
Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  was  such  a  man ;  and  all  those  who  call 
themselves  agnostics  have  a  morality  without  a  religion.  On 
the  other  hand  many  heathen  myths  regarding  gods  and  god- 
desses, and  even  some  celebrated  cosmogonies,  are  devoid  of 
ethical  import.  They  are  stories  of  mighty  strife,  triumph, 
passion  and  suffering,  or  else  strange  hypotheses  concerning 
creative  energy  or  thought ;  but  they  have  no  moral  signifi- 
cance. Ordinarily,  however,  religion  and  morality  are  more 
430 


CHAP.  XXXV.]    THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.    431 
I 

or  less  combined.  Frequently,  even,  in  practice,  they  form 
but  one  system  of  faith  and  conduct,  every  part  of  which  is 
affected  both  with  theological  belief  and  with  ethical  princi- 
ple. This  union  naturally  takes  place  in  all  deeply  religious 
natures  and  is  observable  in  persons  of  the  highest  intelli- 
gence as  well  as  in  the  ignorant  and  superstitious. 

2.  That  moral  activity  should  become  incorporated  with 
religious  life  necessarily  follows  whenever  men  think  of  God 
as  an  intelligent  being  interested  in  sublunary  events  and 
especially  when  they  regard  themselves  as  existing  in  personal 
relations  with  God  or  with  those  beings  whom  they  believe 
to  rule  the  universe.     For  any  spirit  of  high  intelligence 
must  have  a  moral  nature,  and  his  connections  with  other 
beings  must  be  the  subject  of  moral  law.     A  divine  person, 
being  greater  and  wiser  than  the  inhabitants  of  earth,  is  re- 
garded as  exalted  above  them  not  only  in  character  and  in 
power  but  also  in  authority.    We  bow  to  him  as  our  superior. 
We  also  claim  from  him  that  protection  and  help  which  the 
wise  and  mighty  should  render  the  dependent  and  weak. 

Moreover,  the  moral  character  of  a  people  often  modifies 
their  religious  creed.  Indeed  the  religious  belief  of  an  indi- 
vidual is  affected  by  his  personal  tendencies.  Men  form  ideals 
according  to  their  ambitions,  their  wishes,  or  their  fears,  and 
then  persuade  themselves  that  gods  corresponding  to  these 
ideals  are  actualities.  Heathen  deities  are  mostly  the  per- 
sonification of  some  powerful  thought  or  influence.  The 
Scandinavians  were  a  daring  heroic  race;  and  they  believed 
in  Thor  and  Woden.  The  Greeks  were  creatures  of  senti- 
ment and  activity,  who  lived  in  strife  and  rivalry;  they 
worshipped  gods  endued  with  every  human  passion.  The 
Egyptians  were  submissive  slaves  of  depotism  and  sensuality ; 
they  changed  the  glory  of  the  incorruptible  God  into  an  image 
made  like  to  corruptible  man  and  to  birds  and  four-footed 
beasts  and  creeping  things.  A  desire  for  the  free  indulgence 
of  low  lusts  originated  the  Mahommedan  heaven  and  the 
'•revelations"  of  Joseph  Smith — the  Mormon.  The  ener- 
vated inhabitants  of  India,  weary  of  life,  seek  Nirvana,  or 
unconscious  absorption  into  Deity,  as  their  chief  end,  and 
adopt  a  religion  of  inaction  and  contemplation.  The  prac- 
tical money-loving  Chinese,  content  themselves  with  the  pre- 
cepts of  Confucius,  and  burn  incense  at  the  shrines  of  their 
ancestors. 

3.  On  the  other  hand,  a  people's  religious  faith  greatly 


432  ^HE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXV. 

influences  their  mode  of  living;  so  that,  in  many  cases,  it  is 
difficult  to  say  whether  religion  is  more  controlled  by  moral- 
ity or  morality  by  religion.  Three  principal  ways  may  be 
mentioned  in  which  moral  life  is  affected  by  the  belief  in 
things  unseen. 

First  of  all,  the  sphere  of  moral  obligation  is  enlarged 
when  we  take  into  consideration  the  world  of  spirits.  Without 
religion  duty  would  be  limited  to  our  earthly  relations;  with 
it  we  are  led  to  reverence  things  divine  and  to  seek  the  spirit- 
ual welfare  of  ourselves  and  others.  An  immortal  god  is 
exalted  above  dependence  on  human  aid  for  the  supply  of  his 
wants  and  for  protection  against  evil.  One  would  no  more 
think  of  contributing  to  his  needs  than  the  peasant  does  of 
rendering  aid  to  some  great  king  or  emperor.  Yet  moral 
goodness  recognizes  that  the  most  elevated  have  personal 
claims  on  the  lowly.  Even  though  we  cannot  confer  practical 
benefits  on  a  superior,  it  is  our  duty  to  cherish  a  desire  for 
his  happiness  and  to  rejoice  in  that  happiness  if  it  exists. 
This  is  especially  incumbent  on  us  if  the  superior  being  be 
virtuous  and  worthy  of  our  respect.  He  may,  for  this 
reason,  deserve  our  supreme  affection.  Then,  also,  a 
knowledge  of  the  world  to  come  imposes  new  duties  upon 
us  in  respect  both  to  our  eternal  prospects  and  to  those  of 
our  fellow-creatures.  We  are  led  to  regard  the  present 
life  as  a  probation  and  preparation  for  an  endless  state  of 
existence.  We  recognize  the  duty  of  living  as  immortal 
beings  should,  and  of  providing  for  a  life  beyond  the  grave. 

In  the  next  place,  religion  strengthens  moral  life  ~by 
adding  divine  authority  to  the  simple  claim  of  duty.  Men 
acknowledge  the  right  of  deity  to  command  their  service, 
and  regard  this  right  as  arising  not  merely  from  controlling 
power,  but  yet  more  from  the  fact  that  the  divine  government 
is  in  the  interest  of  righteousness.  Among  the  ancients  the 
priests  and  the  oracles  were  the  agencies  through  which  the 
gods  were  supposed  to  direct  mortals  in  matters  of  import- 
ance. Probably  a  dread  of  the  displeasure  of  the  gods  and  a 
desire  for  their  help  was  more  influential  than  reverence  for 
them  and  confidence  in  their  righteous  rule,  but  undoubtedly 
these  latter  considerations  were  entertained  by  the  more 
thoughtful  heathen.  And  the  Hebrews,  who  were  distin- 
guished from  the  rest  of  mankind  by  their  belief  in  the  one 
only  true  and  living  God,  completely  identified  the  divine 
will  with  the  requirements  of  morality.  They  held  that  the 


CHAP.  XXXV.]    THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.     433 

law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect  and  his  judgments  true  and  right- 
eous altogether.  With  them  the  course  of  duty  was  that 
prescribed  by  the  divine  authority.  "  Let  us  hear  the  con- 
clusion of  the  whole  matter/7  said  the  preacher ;  "  fear  God 
and  keep  his  commandments;  for  this  is  the  whole  duty  of 
man."  Indeed  this  regard  for  the  Supreme  Being  and  his 
sovereign  law  seems  to  enter  into  every  developed  conscience. 
When  the  good  man  is  tempted,  he  says,  "  How  can  I  do  this 
great  wickedness  and  sin  against  God  ?"  (GEN".  xxxix»,  9.) 

Finally,  most,  if  not  all,  religions  influence  the  life  of 
duty  through  their  doctrines  respecting  rewards  and  punish- 
ments. Mankind  generally  believe  that  the  wrongs  of  the 
present  state  shall  be  righted  in  another  world,  and  that, 
after  death,  the  just  and  the  unjust  shall  receive  happiness 
or  misery  according  to  their  deserts.  Hence  the  Tartarus 
and  Elysium  of  the  ancients,  and  those  solemn  judges, 
Ehadamanthus,  Minos  and  others,  who  determined  the  fate 
of  departed  souls.  It  is  to  be  admitted  that  the  pains 
and  the  pleasures  which  different  systems  of  faith  assign  to 
the  unseen  world  are  largely  imaginary.  Perhaps,  at  first, 
they  were  only  the  figurative  icpresentation  of  things  not 
clearly  or  surely  known;  yet  the  moral  sense  of  men  forms 
a  reasonable  expectation  that  a  course  of  patient  goodness 
during  this  present  time  will  be  rewarded  by  a  state  of  bless- 
edness hereafter,  and  that  a  course  of  grasping  selfishness 
or  of  determined  wickedness  will  lead  to  future  misery  and 
ruin.  Upon  the  supposition  of  another  life  of  which  our 
earthly  life  is  a  beginning,  it  is  impossible  to  suppress  the 
anticipation  of  goocLand  evil  consequent  upon  our  present 
conduct. 

4.  The  advocates  of  the  Christian  religion  claim  that  it 
is  superior  to  all  others  in  the  excellence  of  its  precepts  and 
in  its  influence  over  those  by  whom  it  has  been  sincerely 
adopted.  When  Christianity  is  compared  with  Mohamme- 
danism and  its  bloodthirsty  butcheries;  with  Brahmanism 
and  its  degrading  idolatries;  with  Buddhism  and  its  lifeless 
forms;  with  Confucianism  and  its  stereotyped  worldliness; 
with  Mormonism  and  its  abominations;  with  the  ineffectual 
teachings  of  infidelity  or  of  superstition;  or  even  with  the 
culture  of  abstract  ethics  or  philosophic  morality;  we  find 
a  power  in  the  religion  of  the  Nazarene  which  we  do  not 
find  elsewhere.  The  effectual  working  of  this  power  does 
not  appear  in  all  who  profess  the  Christian  faith,  but  it  is 
28 


434  THE  MORAL  LA  W  [CHAP.  XXXV. 

seen  in  Jesus  Christ  himself  and  in  those  true  believers  of 
whom  Christ  said,  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them." 
The  fruits  of  Christianity  are  love,  joy,  peace,  long-suffering, 
goodness,  meekness,  temperance,  faith;  against  which  there 
is  no  law. 

The  perfect  combination  which  Christian  faith  makes  with 
moral  principle  has  led  some  philosophers  to  assert  that  re- 
ligious thought  is  the  essential  source  of  ethics,  and  that 
there  can  be  no  ethical  science  except  that  which  is  distinc- 
tively Christian.  We  should  not,  however,  confound  the  de- 
velopment of  moral  enlightenment  and  power  with  the  first 
construction  of  ethical  doctrine.  There  may  be  a  correct 
abstract  theory  of  right  and  wrong  independently  of  religious 
principle.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  true  morality  tends 
towards  religion  and  finds  its  completion  in  religious  faith 
and  life.  For  the  consideration  of  things  eternal  not  only 
strengthens  the  moral  motive,  but  also  helps  to  an  under- 
standing of  important  ethical  problems. 

5.  As  the  glory  of  Christianity  lies  chiefly  in  its  moral  or 
spiritual  results,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  inquire  in  what 
way  this  religion,  when  held  in  its  purity,  exerts  its  acknowl- 
edged influence  for  good.  One  element  of  the  power  of  Chris- 
tianity is  that  it  imparts  a  true  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Be- 
ing. The  conceptions  of  deity  entertained  by  both  ancient 
and  modern  polytheists  have  been  utterly  unfit  for  moral  use. 
They  have  sprung  from  the  imaginations  of  men  under  the 
influence  of  fears,  hopes  and  passions;  not  from  reason  and 
knowledge.  Nor  has  philosophy,  apart  from  Christianity, 
ever  succeeded  in  gaining  any  adequate  comprehension  of 
God.  A  study  of  ancient  theories  shows  that  in  the  old 
time  "  the  world  by  wisdom  knew  not  God."  Plato's  "  Idea  " 
was  an  unintelligible  abstraction.  Aristotle's  npurov  KIVOW, 
or  First  Cause,  was  an  impersonal  and  distant  power. 
The  Stoics  made  God  the  soul  of  the  world — a  semi- 
unconscious  being  scarcely  distinguished  from  the  laws  of 
Nature.  Other  systems  were  still  less  satisfactory.  God 
was  air,  fire,  ether,  the  infinite,  or  some  other  widely  diffused 
substance  or  force,  out  of  which  the  universe  has  sprung. 
Modern  philosophy,  except  so  far  as  it  has  affiliated  with 
Christianity,  is  not  much  superior  to  the  ancient.  The 
"  positive "  school,  who  base  all  knowledge  on  associated 
sensations  or  "  feelings,"  develop  agnosticism.  The  idealists, 
who  make  all  existence  the  evolution  of  thought,  tend  to- 


CHAP.  XXXV.]    THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.     435 

wards  pantheism.  Those  more  sober  thinkers  who  accept  the 
common  beliefs  of  mankind  have  a  more  rational  conception 
of  deity,  but  sometimes  conceive  of  God  as  far  removed  from 
his  creatures  and  from  intervention  in  their  affairs.  Such 
thinkers  are  called  deists;  they  make  God  simply  the  great 
lawgiver  of  Nature.  The  true  God  is  not  only  infinite,  al- 
mighty and  personal,  but  also  a  holy  being,  a  loving  father, 
a  living  and  active  friend,  whose  providence  is.  continually 
engaged  in  beneficent  designs.  To  serve  such  a  being  with 
reverence  and  devoted  affection  is  the  most  solemn  duty  and 
the  most  elevating  experience  possible  for  a  finite  spirit. 

6.  A  second  cause  of  Christianity's  efficiency  for  good  is 
the  perfection  of  its  morality.     The  precepts  of  Christ  are 
high,  spiritual  and  heart-searching.    They  are  even  too  lofty 
for  human  realization.     This  results,  not  from  any  want  of 
wisdom  in  them,  but  from  the  weakness  of  our  race.     The 
ethics  of  the  Old  Testament,  set  forth  in  the  decalogue  and 
in  the  laws  of  Moses,  is  a  noble  scheme  of  duty,  requiring  us 
tc  love  God  with  all  our  hearts  and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves ; 
but  it  is  eclipsed  by  the  brightness  of  the  Gospel.     Our  Sa- 
viour's interpretations  of  the  law  of  God  seem  rather  to  have 
been  inspired  from  Heaven  than  to  have  been  devised  on 
earth.    He  not  only  enjoins  absolute  purity  of  heart  and  an 
unreserved  acceptance  of  the  rules  of  righteousness,  but  he 
expects  a  readiness  to  lay  down  one's  life  in  the  service  of 
God  or  for  the  cause  of  humanity.    We  must  love  our  enemies, 
do  good  to  them  who  hate  us  and  pray  for  them  who  despite- 
fully  use  us  and  persecute  us.     The  spirit  of  Christianity  is 
a  combination  of  moral  faultlessness  with  energetic  goodness 
and  tender  benevolence.     It  is  sometimes  indicated  by  the 
word  "holiness,"  a  term  peculiar  to  the  true  religion,  and 
expressive  of  the  most  complete  spiritual  excellence.     This 
disposition  is  referred  to  in  the  Old  Testament  in  the  com- 
mand, "  Be  ye  holy ;  for  I,  the  Lord  your  God,  am  holy  " ; 
but  it  receives  its  clearest  exemplification  in  the  character 
of  Jesus  the  Christ. 

7.  This  brings  to  mind  a  third  source  of  the  moral  power 
of  Christianity,  namely,  it  presents  to  us  a  faultless  exemplar 
of  virtue.    The  Scriptures  teach  that  the  Lord  Jesus  was,  in  a 
special  sense,  the  Son  of  God,  and  that  he  was  ?o  united  to 
his  father  in  nature  and  in  life  as  to  be  the  representative 
of  God  on  earth.     He  himself  said,  "  He  that  hath  seen  me 
hath  seen  the  father,"  and  again,  "I  and  my  father  are 


436  THE  MORAL  LA  W.  [CHAP.  XXXV. 

one."  Most  Christians  believe  that  he  was  in  some  very  lit- 
eral sense  "  God  manifest  in  the  flesh."  He  claimed  for 
himself  many  of  the  attributes  of  deity,  as  the  power  of 
miracles,,  the  authority  to  forgive  sin,  the  right  to  the  abso- 
lute devotion  of  the  hearts  and  lives  of  men,  and  the  office 
of  that  sovereign  judge  by  whom  the  final  destinies  of  men  are 
to  be  determined.  Believers  in  all  ages  have  reverenced  the 
exalted  lordship  of  Christ  and  have  felt  this  to  be  a  very 
powerful  as  well  as  a  very  moving  mode  of  the  divine  su- 
premacy. 

But,  apart  from  the  doctrine  of  his  divinity,  the  life  of  our 
Saviour  as  a  man  was  the  most  impressive  exhibition  of  moral 
excellence  that  the  world  has  yet  seen.  His  conduct,  as  re- 
corded in  the  Gospels,  is  marked  by  an  actual  nobility  and 
goodness  far  transcending  the  best  ideals  of  virtue  that 
moralists  have  ever  framed.  His  love  for  righteousness  and 
his  hatred  for  iniquity  were  intense  and  unqualified.  In  his 
soul  reverence  for  God  and  submission  to  the  divine  will 
were  absolutely  controlling  principles.  His  benevolence  to- 
wards others,  his  compassion  for  the  suffering,  and  his  pity 
for  even  the  worst  transgressors,  were  unbounded.  His  life 
was  a  miracle  of  goodness,  and  was  surpassed  only  by  the 
heavenly  magnificence  of  his  death,  when  he  endured  the 
cross  for  mankind,  the  just  for  the  unjust,  that  we  might 
live.  Thus  Christ  set  us  an  example,  that  we  should  walk 
in  his  steps.  When  he  says,  "  Follow  me,"  he  calls  us  to  the 
noblest  career  of  which  rational  beings  are  capable. 

8.  A  fourth  source  of  the  power  of  Christianity  is  that 
it  is  a  revelation  of  divine  love.  "  Herein,"  says  the  Apostle 
John — "herein  is  love,  not  that  we  loved  God,  but  that  he 
loved  us,  and  sent  his  son  to  be  the  propitiation  for  our  sins." 
(I.  JOHN  x.,  10.)  The  inhabitants  of  Christian  lands  are  so 
accustomed  to  the  story  of  the  cross,  that  they  cannot  realize 
its  amazing  and  tender  attractiveness.  But  with  what 
wonder,  in  apostolic  days,  the  message  of  Heaven's  love  must 
have  been  received  by  those  who  till  then  had  sat  in  darkness 
and  in  the  shadow  of  death!  Till  that  time  they  had  wor- 
shipped selfish  and  immoral  divinities.  They  now  realize 
that  a  being  of  unspeakable  dignity  and  of  infinite  compassion 
has  come  to  earth,  and  has  sacrificed  himself  for  their  re- 
demption. They  are  overwhelmed  by  this  manifestation  of 
love.  In  our  own  day  a  similar  impression  is  made  when 
any  worshiper  of  idols,  or  any  disciple  of  Mohammed, 


CHAP.  XXXV.]    THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.     437 

Zoroaster,  Buddha  or  Confucius,  is  brought  to  see  and  to  ap- 
preciate the  wonders  of  the  Gospel.  In  the"  best  of  other 
religions  the  divine  goodness  is  but  a  speculative  doctrine ;  in 
Christianity  the  fact  that  "  God  is  love  "  shines  like  the  sun 
in  the  heavens.  The  believer  is  made  to  feel  that  this  love 
is  great  beyond  conception;  that  its  height  and  depth  and 
length  and  breadth  surpass  human  knowledge.  A  sense  of 
this  love,  shed  abroad  in  the  heart,  excites  a  deep  trust  in 
God  as  our  heavenly  father  and  adoring  gratitude  to  God 
and  to  the  Redeemer  whom  God  has  sent.  The  Apostle  Paul 
expresses  this  sentiment  when  he  says,  "  I  live  by  the  faith  of 
the  Son  of  God  who  loved  me  and  gave  himself  for  me."  GAL. 
II.,  20),  and  also  in  the  title  which  Paul  gives  himself,  "the 
slave  "  or  "  bondman  "  of  Jesus  Christ.  (6  Ifaov  Xpiarov  rfovfof.) 
He  considered  himself  no  longer  his  own  but  Christ's  pur- 
chased servant.  The  same  sentiment  is  still  cherished  among 
believers,  as  the  following  verse  of  a  hymn  may  testify  : 

O  glorious  suffering  Son  of  God, 

May  I  thy  faithful  servant  be — 
Thy  slave  bought  with  thy  sacred  blood 

And  cruel  agony  1 

9.  A  fifth  source  of  the  power  of  Christianity  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  death  of  Christ  reveals  not  only  the  love  of  God 
l)ut  also  the  divine  hatred  for  sin,  and  is,  in  a  sense,  a  satis- 
faction to  the  divine  justice.  The  death  of  Christ  did  not 
take  place  according  to  the  ordinary  rule  of  rectoral  right- 
eousness ;  for  this  requires  that  the  transgressor  should  suffer, 
and  does  not  contemplate  any  sacrificial  substitute.  The 
atonement  of  the  cross  appears  to  have  been  an  extraordinary 
arrangement  whereby  the  essential  end  of  punitive  justice — 
that  is,  the  vindication  of  God's  righteous  government — 
might  be  effected  without  the  destruction  of  the  believing 
sinner.  This  certainly  is  the  meaning  of  those  Scriptures 
which  represent  Christ  as  rendering  a  satisfaction  to  the 
divine  law  in  the  behalf  of  his  people.  He  himself  said 
that  he  came  to  give  his  life  "  a  ransom  for  many."  We 
are  told  that  "  he  bore  our  sins  in  his  own  body  on  the  tree," 
and  that  we  have  "  redemption  through  his  blood,  even  the 
forgiveness  of  sins."  He  is  the  "lamb  of  God"  who  was 
"  slain  for  us."  Paul  says  that  "  Christ  hath  redeemed  us 
from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being  made -a  curse  for  us;"  and 
that  sinners  are  "justified  freely  through  the  redemption 


4-38  THE  MORAL  LAW.  | CHAP.  XXXV. 

that  is  in  Christ  Jesus;  whom  God  hath  set  forth  to  be  a  pro- 
pitiation through  faith  in  his  blood,  to  declare  his  righteous- 
ness for  the  remission  of  sins  that  are  past  .  .  .  that  he 
might  be  just  ancl  the  justifier  of  him  which  belie veth  in 
Jesus."  (ROM.  in.,  23-26.)  The  justification  here  men- 
tioned is  plainly  the  righteous  pardoning  of  those  who  truly 
accept  the  Gospel;  and  the  belief  spoken  of  is  not  a  mere 
intellectual  conviction  but  the  principle  of  a  new  life.  It  is 
that  faith  which  overcomes  the  world,  which  works  by  love, 
and  which  purifies  the  heart.  In  short,  the  salvation  of  the 
Gospel  is  conditioned  on  that  heart-felt  acceptance  of  the 
truth  which  is  accompanied  by  a  radical  reformation  of  heart 
and  life. 

The  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  that  God 
is  a  being  of  infinite  goodness  and  compassion  and  therefore 
need  not  be  rendered  willing  to  save  the  penitent,  is  founded 
on  a  misconception.  The  Scriptures  represent  the  sacrifice  of 
Christ  as  arising  from  the  exceeding  pity  of  God  for  sin- 
ners and  from  his  desire  that  they  should  be  saved.  The 
sufferings  of  Christ  show  God's  hatred  for  sin.  They  illus- 
trate— as  Paul  says,  they  "  declare  "- — the  principle  of  right- 
eousness that  "the  wages  of  sin  is  death."  But  they  also 
reveal  that  God  has  found  a  way  for  the  righteous  forgiveness 
of  transgression,  and  that  he  is  infinitely  ready  to  receive 
the  repentant  sinner.  Believing  these  things,  men  are 
brought  to  hate  those  evil  ways  which  necessitated  the  sacri- 
fice of  God's  only  begotten  Son,  and  are  filled  with  peace  and 
joy  and  confidence  in  God.  They  can  say,  with  the  Apostle 
Paul,  "  Who  is  he  that  condemneth  ?  It  is  Christ  that  died, 
yea,  rather,  that  is  risen  again,  who  sitteth  at  the  right  hand 
of  God  and  ever  liveth  to  make  intercession  for  us."  A  holy 
faith  displaces  guilty  fears,  and  inspires  hope  and  courage. 

10.  A  sixth  source  of  the  power  of  Christianity  is  the 
promise  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  be  the  "paraclete." — or  com- 
forter and  helper — of  God's  people.  Our  Saviour,  referring 
to  his  ascension,  said  that  he  went  to  his  father  expressly  to 
send  down  this  Spirit;  by  whose  aid  souls  are  led  into  truth 
and  strengthened  for  duty.  The  apostles  and  prophets  were 
inspired  bv  this  messenger  to  be  the  oracles,  or  mouth-pieces, 
of  God;  and  all  believers  look  to  him  for  help  to  understand 
the  way  of  life  and  to  accomplish  their  high  calling.  A 
consciousness  of  his  indwelling  presence — of  the  "commun- 
ion of  the  Holy  Ghost" — increases  the  Christian's  sense  of 


CHAP.  XXXV.]     THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.    439 

duty,  and  makes  him,  however  humble  he  may  be,  strong 
to  resist  tetmptation,  patient  under  afflictions,  and  expectant 
of  blessing  in  the  midst  of  the  sorest  trials  and  in  the  extrem- 
ities of  death  itself. 

11.  But  the  most  noticeable  mode  in  which  Christianity 
has  exerted  moral  power,  and  in  which  its  influence  upon 
society  increases  from  day  to  day,  has  been  its  assertion  of 
the  inexpressible  value  of  humanity.  The  Gospel  of  Christ 
gave — and  still  gives — to  the  world  the  highest  possible  con- 
ception of  the  worth  of  man,  and  that,  too,  in  a  way  which  im- 
presses this  truth  upon  the  public  at  large,  and  not  merely 
upon  those  who  are  philosophically  inclined.  In  heathen 
and  unchristian  countries  and  in  many  professedly  Christian 
lands,  dignities  and  emoluments  have  been  lavished  on  the 
few  at  the  expense  of  the  many.  The  poor  and  ignorant, 
indeed  all  dependent  for  their  living  on  their  daily  labor, 
have  been  treated  as  if  they  existed  only  for  the  service  of 
their  more  fortunate  neighbors.  Under  some  religious  creeds 
the  common  people  are  regarded  as  different  in  nature  and 
origin  from  the  superior  orders;  and  under  some  political 
constitutions  the  lives  of  thousands  have  been  sacrificed  to 
the  interests  of  one  man  or  of  a  ruling  class  of  men.  More- 
over, those  philosophies  which  have  inculcated  general  benevo- 
lence, have  failed  to  impress  men  with  the  living  importance 
of  this  principle;  they  have  merely  refined  the  feelings  of 
some  select  disciples.  Christianity  declares  aloud  the  infinite 
preciousness  of  those  immortals  for  whom  the  Saviour  died. 
It  makes  the  great  end  of  life  to  be  the  temporal  and  the 
eternal  happiness  of  every  individual  soul.  Our  Lord  him- 
self gives  the  divine  estimation  of  humanity  in  those  well- 
known  words,  "  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  only 
begotten  Son  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not 
perish  but  have  everlasting  life."  (Jontf  in.,  16.)  This  con- 
ception of  God's  desire  to  bless  and  save  every  inhabitant  of 
the  world  has  given  direction  to  the  labors  of  Christians  for 
the  last  two  thousand  years,  and  is  to-day  the  central  thought 
of  all  evangelical  and  missionary  operations.  It  is  the 
fruitful  parent  of  a  thousand  forms  of  benevolence.  It  is 
affecting,  and  changing  for  the  'better,  every  department  of 
man's  activity — not  merely  his  religious  and  domestic,  but 
also  his  industrial  and  commercial,  his  social,  and  his  politi- 
cal, life.  It  has  established,  and  is  establishing,  the  kingdom 
of  God  on  earth. 


440  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXV. 

12.  In  the  seventh  place,  and  finally,  we  may  notice  an 
influence  which  Christianity  has  in  common  with  other 
systems  of  religion  in  that  it  foretells  a  happy  future  for  the 
righteous  and  a  dreadful  perdition  for  the  impenitent.  The 
doctrine  of  future  rewards  and  punishments  does  not  have 
so  central  and  prominent  a  place  in  Christianity  as  the  doc- 
trine of  God's  love  and  salvation  has;  yet  it  is  distinctly 
taught,  and  that,  too,  by  the  merciful  Saviour  himself.  His 
words  are  a  solemn  warning  concerning  the  just  and  necessary 
consequence  of  the  rejection  of  God  and  righteousness. 
(f  Fear  not,"  he  says,  "  them  which  kill  the  body  and  after 
that  have  no  more  that  they  can  do.  But  I  will  forewarn 
you  whom  ye  shall  fear :  Fear  him  which,  after  he  hath  killed, 
hath  power  to  cast  into  hell ;  yea,  I  say  unto  you,  fear  him." 
(LuKE  xii.,  4.)  Our  Lord,  also,  describing  his  own  course 
at  the  final  judgment,  says,  "  When  the  Son  of  Man  shall 
come  in  his  glory  and  all  the  holy  angels  with  him,  then 
shall  he  sit  upon  the  throne  of  his  glory ;  and  before  him  shall 
be  gathered  all  nations.  .  .  .  Then  shall  the  king  say  unto 
them  on  his  right  hand,  Come,  ye  'blessed  of  my  father, 
inherit  the  kingdom  prepared  for  you  from  the  foundation 
of  the  world.  .  .  .  Then  shall  he  say  also  unto  them  on  the 
left  hand,  Depart  from  me,  ye  cursed,  into  everlasting  fire 
prepared  for  the  devil  and  his  angels." — (MATT,  xxv.,  41.) 
Doubtless  much  biblical  language  respecting  future  blessed- 
ness and  wretchedness  is  figurative;  but  this  does  not  make 
it  meaningless.  Christ's  words  expressed  his  belief  in  real- 
ities. Moreover,  there  is  nothing  figurative  in  such  state- 
ments as,  "  He  that  beli'eveth  on  the  Son  hath  everlasting 
life;  and  he  that  believeth  not  the  Son  shall  not  see  life; 
but  the  wrath  of  God  abideth  on  him."  (JOHN  in.,  36.) 

Some  cannot  accept  these  teachings;  nor,  indeed,  any  re- 
ligious doctrines  which  involve  the  supernatural.  But  this 
is  an  extreme  position.  In  our  view,  nothing  is  more  natural 
than  a  supernatural  religion;  that  is,  nothing  is  more  rea- 
sonable and  to  be  expected.  At  the  same  time  we  hold 
that  theological  doctrines  are  no  more  to  be  received  with- 
out proof  than  scientific  doctrines  are.  But  at  present 
we  are  not  concerned  with  the  evidences  of  Christianity, 
nor  even,  to  any  great  extent,  with  the  reasonableness  of  its 
tenets.  We  have  only  been  endeavoring  to  explain  the  prac- 
tical moral  influence  of  this  faith.  Whether  a  system  whose 
operation  for  good  has  been,  and  is,  so  powerful,  is  not  really 


CHAP.  XXXV.]    THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.    441 

sustained  by  rational  evidence,  is  a  question  worthy  of  consid- 
eration ;  that  inquiry,  however,  is  not  within  the  scope  of  our 
present  undertaking. 

13.  Reverting  to  the  philosophy  of  religion  in  general  we 
must  observe  that  some  belief  in  a  future  state  of  existence 
and  in  a  righteous  divine  government  seems  necessary  to  the 
solution  of  a  perplexing  moral  problem.  Why,  it  is  asked, 
is  the  duty  of  extreme  self-sacrifice,  including,  it  may  be,  the 
surrender  of  life  itself,  sometimes  imposed  upon  the  virtuous 
man  ?  Self-preservation  is  said  to  be  the  first  law  of  nature ; 
and  it  certainly  is  a  duty  devolving  upon  us  all.  No  one 
has  the  right  to  expose  himself  recklessly  to  ruin.  The 
drunkard,  the  opium  eater,  the  fashionable  devotee  of  pleas- 
ure, who  undermine  their  own  health  by  their  excesses,  are 
guilty  of  sinful  self-destruction.  The  voice  of  duty  says  to 
every  one  "  Do  thyself  no  harm."  In  some  of  our  States  an 
attempt  at  suicide  is  punishable  by  fine  and  imprisonment. 
At  the  same  time  cases  arise  in  which  one  must  subordinate  his 
own  interests  to  those  of  the  public  and  even  sacrifice  his  life 
for  the  welfare  of  his  country  or  for  the  cause  of  righteousness. 
Leonidas,  Regulus,  Arnold  Winkelried,  are  examples  in  point. 
History  honors  the  names  of  many  heroes  who  have  cheerfully 
faced  death  for  their  fatherland.  In  such  cases  there  is  a 
conflict  of  interests,  but  there  is  not  really  a  conflict  of 
duties.  The  higher  duty  sets  aside  and  supersedes  the  lower. 
Christian  martyrs,  in  both  ancient  and  modern  times, 
have  acted  rightly  when  they  have  obeyed  God  rather  than 
man — testifying  to  their  faith  in  Jesus  when  they  knew  that 
death  would  be  the  penalty  for  their  faithfulness.  We  ap- 
prove such  conduct. 

But  the  question  arises,  Is  there  not  something  strange 
and  wrong  in  the  system  of  things  which  calls  for  such  self- 
sacrifice?  If  the  universe  is  governed  by  moral  goodness, 
ought  not  the  welfare  and  happiness  of  the  righteous  to  be 
fully  arranged  for  under  the  plans  of  a  divine  providence? 
No  satisfactory  answer  to  these  inquiries  seems  possible  ex- 
cept on  the  theory  that  death  does  not  end  all,  and  that  the 
earthly  life  is  only  a  preparation  for  a  heavenly  one.  When 
we  are  told  that  present  sacrifice  is  necessary  to  test  and  de- 
velop virtue,  and  that  it  is  rewarded  by  eternal  gain  hereafter, 
we  see  how  the  system  under  which  we  live,  with  all  its 
mysterious  trials,  may  be  the  best,  not  only  for  the  general 
good  of  all,  but  also  for  the  particular  good  of  the  individual. 


442  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXV. 

It  was  on  the  basis  of  this  expectation  that  the  apostle  said, 
"  Our  light  affliction,  which  is  but  for  a  moment,  worketh  out 
for  us  a  far  more  exceeding  and  eternal  weight  of  glory." 
(II.  COB.  iv.,  17.)  This,  too,  is  the  hope  held  out  in  our 
Saviour's  words,  "  He  that  keepeth  his  life  shall  lose  it,  but 
he  that  loseth  his  life  for  my  name's  sake  and  the  Gospel's, 
the  same  shall  find  it."  In  the  eternal  plan  of  God  all 
things  work  together  for  the  good  of  those  who  love  him. 
The  ages  to  come  shall  show  that  the  welfare  of  the  righteous 
and  the  welfare  of  the  universe  are  one. 

14.  If  religion  in  its  best  development  be  an  embodiment 
of  the  noblest  moral  principle,  it  is  plain  that  causative 
righteousness  calls  upon  us  to  promote  this  form  of  life  in 
ourselves  and  in  others.  Indeed,  since  genuine  piety  results 
in  every  kind  of  goodness,  it  should  be  cultivated  on  every 
moral  ground.  The  consistent  Christian  is  not  only  the 
honest  man,  but  also  the  practical  philanthropist.  As  the 
Apostle  James  says,  "Pure  religion  and  undefiled  before 
God  and  the  Father  is  this,  to  visit  the  fatherless  and  widows 
in  their  affliction  and  to  keep  oneself  unspotted  from  the 
world/' 

It  may  be  asked,  however,  whether  one  who  has  no  belief 
concerning  God  and  no  expectation  of  an  hereafter,  should 
favor  the  religious  life  in  others.  Certainly  one  cannot  be 
expected  to  propagate  a  system  of  faith  which  he  believes  to 
be  false.  At  the  same  time  the  practical  moral  workings  of 
a  system  which  one  cannot  theoretically  accept,  may  have 
claims  on  his  consideration.  If  the  choice  be  between  Chris- 
tianity with  righteousness  and  heathenism  or  infidelity  with 
immorality,  there  is  little  question  which  we  should  favor. 
But  the  fact  is  that  the  real  atheist  is  an  eccentric  rarity; 
even  the  agnostic  absolutely  sure  that  God  cannot  be  known 
is  not  often  found.  The  honest  doubter  has  generally  a 
wavering  belief.  His  mental  posture  is  expressed  by  Cicero, 
who,  after  asserting  his  own  confident  expectation  of  im- 
mortality, said  that,  even  though  this  belief  were  un- 
founded, he  would  rather  live  and  die  in  the  assurance  of  it, 
than  in  the  expectation  of  ending  his  life  in  blank  nothing- 
ness. 

But,  whatever  may  be  said  of  agnostics,  the  duty  of  those 
who  believe  in  the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ  and  admire  its 
divine  morality  is  very  clear.  They  should  give  it  every  sup- 
port within  their  power.  No  one  will  dispute  this  statement, 


CHAP.  XXXV.]    THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  RELIGION.     443 

so  far  as  private  effort  is  concerned,  'but  some  may  question 
whether  the  body  politic  should  take  any  action  in  further- 
ance of  Christianity.  To  us  it  seems  only  right  that  the  State 
should  favor  true  religion  as  well  as  every  other  agency  of 
human  welfare.  From  the  nature  of  the  case  public  author- 
ity cannot  wisely  advance  the  interests  of  one  denomination  or 
sect  of  Christians  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  Besides,  the 
abuses  which  have  grown  up  in  churches  established  and  con- 
trolled by  the  State  indicate  that  the  organized  work  of  pro- 
moting religion  is  best  carried  on  by  voluntary  -associations. 
All  this  may  be  true,  while  yet  the  State  should  favor  Chris- 
tianity in  every  proper  way.  The  right  position  on  this  sub- 
ject is  that  of  Daniel  Webster  in  the  Girard  will  case,  which 
is  that  also  of  the  best  judicial  authorities  both  in  England 
and  America.  It  is  that  "Christianity — general  tolerant 
Christianity — is  the  law  of  the  land."  This  means  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  State  not  only  to  observe  the  rules  of  Chris- 
tian morality  but  also  to  favor  and  promote  the  Christian 
religion  in  every  reasonable  way.  For  a  chief  rule  of  the 
Gospel  is  that  we  should  contribute  to  the  establishment  of 
God's  kingdom  on  earth  by  every  means  at  our  command. 

Let  us  quote  also  the  teaching  of  Justice  Story  in  his 
Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  He 
says  (Sec.  1871),  "The  promulgation  of  the  great  doctrines 
of  religion ;  the  being  and  attributes  and  providence  of  one 
Almighty  God;  the  responsibility  to  him  for  all  our  actions, 
founded 'upon  moral  freedom  and  accountability;  a  future 
state  of  rewards  and  punishments;  the  cultivation  of  all  the 
personal,  social,  and  benevolent  virtues  ;^these  never  can 
be  a  matter  of  indifference  in  any  well-ordered  community. 
It  is  difficult  to  conceive  how  any  civilized  society  can  well 
exist  without  them.  And,  at  all  events,  it  is  impossible  for 
those  who  believe  in  the  truth  of  Christianity  as  a  divine 
revelation  to  doubt  that  it  is  the  especial  duty  of  government 
to  foster  and  encourage  it  among  all  the  citizens  and  sub- 
jects. This  is  a  point  wholly  distinct  from  that  of  the  right 
of  private  judgment  in  matters  of  religion  and  of  the  freedom 
of  public  worship  according  to  the  dictates  of  one's  own  con- 
science." 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE. 

1.  Though  Christianity  is  not  a  philosophy,  it  harmonizes  with  the 
Stoic  theory  respecting  a  well-ordered  life. — 2.  The  "  Nature  " 
mentioned  by  the  Stoics  is  that  constitution  of  things  in  which 
man  lives,  and  of  which  he  himself  is  a  prominent  part. — 3.  To 
understand  their  doctrine  we  must  inquire  how  enjoyment  and 
suffering  arise  (1)  from  our  spiritual  constitution,  (2)  from  our 
physical  conditions. — 4.  Spiritual  nature  originates  pleasure  (1) 
in  the  action  of  its  powers  or  capabilities,  (2)  in  the  apprehended 
realization  of  tilings  desired  or  desirable.  The  fundamental  ca- 
pabilities of  spirit  enumerated. — 5.  Spiritual  nature  is  a  source 
of  pain  (1)  when  the  exercise  of  its  powers  is  obstructed  or  over- 
strained or  disordered,  (2)  when  we  are  disappointed  or  grieved 
by  untoward  events.  There  are  positive  as  well  as  negative 
causes  of  mental  distress. — 6.  Bodily  pleasures  and  pains  cannot 
be  connected  with  the  essential  qualities  of  matter.  But  they 
originate  from  our  physical  constitution  and  the  operation  of  its 
powers. — 7.  In  what  sense  are  pleasure  and  happiness  natural,  or 
harmonious  with  Nature,  while  pain  and  distress  are  unnatural, 
or  at  variance  with  Nature  ? — 8.  First,  in  that  the  primary  oper- 
ations of  spiritual  life  tend  towards  happiness  and  away  from 
misery.  Every  painful  mode  of  spiritual  life  is  either  secondary 
or  abnormal. — 9.  Secondly,  because  the  primary  desires  of  spirit 
seek  enjoyment  and  shun  suffering.  Anger  or  resentment  is  a 
secondary  motivity. — 10.  Thirdly,  because  the  arrangements  of 
physical  nature  are  promotive  of  pleasure  and  limitative  of  pain. 
But  in  respect  to  man  this  principle  must  be  taken  with  a  special 
qualification. — 11.  Man's  own  reason  is  a  part  of  that  Nature  to 
which  his  life  must  conform  in  order  that  he  may  be  happy. — 12. 
This  is  especially  true  of  that  Moral  Reason  which  in  every  case 
perceives  and  seeks  absolute  good. — 13.  So  far  as  the  teachings 
of  Nature  and  of  Reason  are  correct  they  represent  the  mind  and 
will  of  God.  This  was  taught  by  the  Stoic  identification  of  God 
and  the 'Universe. — 14.  An  illustration  of  the  problem  presented 
by  human  life. 

1.  CHRISTIANITY  is  not  a  philosophy.     It  is  a  system  of 

faith  constituted   from  historical   facts,   religious   doctrines 

and  practical  teachings.     All  of  these  doubtless  harmonize 

with  one  another;  but  they  were  not  given  to  the  world  by 

444 


CHAP.  XXXVI.J      A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE.  445 

Jesus  and  his  apostles  in  theoretical  form.  They  appear  be- 
fore us  very  much  as  the  phenomena  of  the  natural  world 
do.  Like  these  they  may  be  made  the  subject  of  speculative 
inquiry;  after  which  we  may  have  a  philosophy  of  the 
Christian  system. 

As  this  religion  proposes  to  lead  men  in  the  way  both  of 
duty  and  of  happiness,  a  radical  part  of  the  philosophy  ex- 
planatory of  it  must  be  a  theory  of  happiness  and  of  duty. 
That  philosophy  of  life,  however,  which  we  are*  now  about  to 
state,  has  not  been  suggested  by  any  analysis  of  Christian 
doctrine,  but  by  the  study  of  more  ancient  teachings.  After 
obtaining  but  little  light  from  the  Academic  and  Peripatetic 
theories  of  wisdom  and  virtue,  we  were  surprised  to  find  that 
the  Stoic  conception  of  a  rightly-ordered  life  grew  more  and 
more  satisfactory  the  more  it  was  considered.  The  language 
of  the  Stoic  masters  is  somewhat  obscure  and  their  teachings 
paradoxical;  but  their  main  positions,  rightly  interpreted, 
seem  entirely  reasonable. 

2.  Zeno,  Cleanthes,  Chrysippus  and  their  successors  held 
that  the  virtuous  man  and  the  happy  man  are  one,  and  that 
in  order  either  to  be  happy  or  to  be  virtuous  we  must  "  live 
according  to  Nature."  though  this  teaching  has  always 
commended  itself  to  serious  thinkers,,  it  is  so  indefinite  that 
it  has  failed  of  general  acceptance  and  has  not  proved  phil- 
osophically available.  To  understand  it  one  must  know  what 
is  meant  by  "  Nature  "  and  what  is  meant  by  "  According  to 
Nature."  The  fragments  which  have  come  down  to  us  from 
the  ancient  writers  do  not  explain  these  points ;  which,  never- 
theless, are  capable  of  being  understood. 

First,  it  is  clear  that  the  "  Nature  "  now  to  be  considered 
is  not  a  constitution  of  things  which  excludes  social  and 
moral  development.  Uncivilized  and  savage  races  are  some- 
times said  to  exist  "in  a  state  of  Nature";  as  animals  and 
vegetables  do  in  an  island  that  has  never  yet  been  inhabited. 
Some  cynics,  perverting  the  Stoic  doctrine,  regarded  this  as 
the  excellent  life.  But  the  Nature  conceived  of  by  these 
Cynics  is  simply  a  condition  of  affairs  unaffected  by  social 
and  industrial  civilization.  It  is  the  natural  as  opposed  to 
the  instituted  and  the  artificial.  Nor  do  we  now  mean  by 
"Nature"  the  material  and  visible  universe;  although  the 
word  sometimes  has  that  signification,  as  when  one  is  said  to 
admire  the  beauties  or  to  study  the  laws  of  Nature.  ^ 

The  Nature  of  which  the  Stoics  spoke  is  that  abiding  con- 


446  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXVI. 

stitution  of  things  in  which  man  finds  himself  and  of  which 
his  own  being  with  its  bodily  and  its  psychical  powers  forms 
a  prominent  part.  Out  of  this  underlying  constitution  with 
its  permanent  components  and  conditions  the. laws  of  all  good 
and  of  all  evil  arise.  Some  such  thought  as  this  in  regard 
to  the  trials  of  life  is  expressed  by  the  author  of  the  book  of 
Job,  when  he  says,  "  Affliction  cometh  not  forth  of  the  dust, 
neither  doth  trouble  spring  out  of  the  ground."  For  these 
words  teach  us  that  tribulation  and  sorrow  are  not  accidental 
things  nor  yet  the  product  of  causes  foreign  to  the  life  of 
spiritual  beings.  They  come  into  existence  according  to  law 
and  in  a  way  that  may  be  understood. 

3.  In  order  to  perceive  how  the  laws  of  life  are  rooted  in 
Nature  we  must  first  consider  the  sources  of  pleasure  and 
pain,  of  happiness  and  misery.    This  will  show  us  the  origin 
of  good  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word.     After  that  we 
shall  see  also  how  absolute  good,  or  the  right,  can  be  called  a 
dictate  of  Nature. 

4.  The  constitution  of  things  under  which  we  live  is  two- 
fold, partly  corporeal,  or  material;  partly  spiritual.     Which 
of  these  aspects  of  Nature  shall  we  study  first?     Certainly 
the  spiritual;  because  suffering  and  enjoyment  are  psychical 
things.     Even  when  produced  by  bodily  causes,  they  are  ex- 
perienced, not  by  the  body,  but  by  the  soul.     Considering 
carefully  the  constitution  of  spiritual  beings  with  reference 
to  enjoyment  and  suffering,  we  find  that  the  former  cornects 
itself  with  (1)   the  normal  exercise  of  certain  fundamental 
powers  or  capabilities  of  spirit,  and  with  (2)  the  apprehended 
realization  of  the  ends  of  motivities  (or  desires)   related  to 
those  capabilities;  while  suffering  attends  (1)  the  restrained 
or  overstrained,  or  disordered  exercise  of  our  powers,  or  (2) 
the  perceived  occurrence  of  events  of  an  opposite  character  to 
those  in  which  our  radical  motivities  find  satisfaction.     In 
other  words,  the  pleasures  of  spirit  arise  partly  from  the  ex- 
ercise of  its  essential  powers  in  a  healthful  and  harmonious 
way  about  their  proper  objects,  and  partly  from  the  appre- 
hended realization  of  the  aims  kept  in  view  by  our  fundamen- 
tal motive  tendencies,;  while  the   sufferings   of  spirit  arise 
partly  from  the  restraint,  disorder  or  over-exertion,  of  our 
primary  capabilities,  and  partly  from  the  soul's  failure  to 
find  satisfying  objects,  or  from  its  contact  with  objects  or 
events  antagonistic  to  its  fundamental  seekings.     This  doc- 
trine was  stated  in  a  previous  discussion  which  considered 


CHAP.  XXXVI.]      A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE.  447 

the  nature  of  happiness  and  misery  (Chap.  II.),  but  the 
present  inquiry  concerns  the  fundamental  source  of  these  ex- 
periences. That  we  have  indicated  this  correctly  will  be- 
come more  apparent  if  we  review  in  detail  the  radical  capa- 
bilities of  the  human  spirit. 

The  powers  of  thinking  and  knowing  are  essential  parts  of 
our  constitution.  Hence  there  is  enjoyment  in  thinking  and 
knowing.  And,  this  being  tasted,  the  desire  arises  for  mental 
occupation  and  information;  in  the  apprehended  satisfaction 
of  which  desire  there  is  additional  enjoyment. 

In  one  part  of  our  life  we  exercise  efficiency  and  the  con- 
trol of  instrumentalities;  accordingly  we  have  pleasure  in 
the  possession  and  use  of  power.  Therefore  we  also  seek  these 
things  as  an  end,  and  rejoice  when  we  attain  them. 

We  are  born  into  the  companionship  of  others  and  can 
sympathize  with  them,  as  they  with  us.  In  agreement  with 
this  there  are  social  pleasures.  There  are  also  social  desires 
and  a  peculiar  contentment  when  these  are  gratified. 

We  are  surrounded  by  the  order  and  wisdom,  the  beauty 
and  sublimity,  of  the  universe.  In  correspondence  with  this 
we  are  delighted  to  perceive  these  things.  We  then  naturally 
aspire  to  live  in  contemplation  of  the  grandeurs  and  excel- 
lencies of  the  world;  and  are  happy  when  such  aspirations 
are  realized. 

Reason  enables  us  to  distinguish  the  good  and  the  bad — 
what  is  to  our  profit  and  what  is  to  our  injury.  We  have 
enjoyment  in  skillfully  pursuing  the  one  and  carefully  avoid- 
ing the  other.  To  obtain  the  good  and  to  escape  the  bad 
become  the  ends  of  rational  motivity;  and  we  find  solid 
satisfaction  in  vanquished  adversity  and  established  pros- 
perity. 

A  sympathetic  concern  of  one  spirit  for  another  is  a  primi- 
tive endowment  of  our  nature.  In  connection  with  this  we 
rejoice  in  the  welfare  of  others  and  in  their  deliverance  from 
evil.  On  these  aims  altruistic  affection  is  founded ;  the  reali- 
zation of  them  results  in  the  happiness  of  gratified  benevo- 
lence. 

An  intimate  personal  acquaintance  with  one  in  whom  es- 
timable and  amiable  qualities  are  seen,  results  in  feelings  of 
admiration  and  regard;  and  when  some  close  or  tender  re- 
lation is  formed  between  the  persons,  there  is  natural  affec- 
tion, or  there  is  the  love  of  complacency.  Hence  the  pleas- 
ures of  friendship,  of  true  marriage,  and  of  domestic  life. 


448  ?HE  MOKAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXVI. 

Hence  also  the  longing  for  the  esteem  of  others,  and  the 
joy  of  possessing  that  esteem. 

Once  more,  man  is  a  moral  being,  the  subject  of  perceptions 
and  sentiments  impelling  him  to  virtuous  conduct.  These, 
when  they  fully  control  one's  activities,  produce  peace  and 
contentment.  They  also  are  accompanied  with  strivings  after 
moral  advancement;  and  moral  excellence,  when  attained,  is 
the  chief  source  of  blessedness — indeed  the  indispensable 
source. 

Thus  the  exercise  of  every  fundamental  capability  and  the 
satisfaction  sought  by  every  motivity  of  spirit,  this  satisfac- 
tion following  on  the  apprehension  of  a  desirable  result, 
whether  it  be  actually  desired  or  not,  are  attended  with  en- 
joyment. 

5.  Evidently,  also,  suffering  arises  (1)  when  through 
some  obstruction  or  disorder,  or  from  the  want  of  suitable 
objects  or  opportunities^  or  because  of  a  burdensome  load, 
our  powers  do  not  act  with  freedom  and  ease,  but  with  diffi- 
culty; and  (2)  when  our  motivities  fail  of  the  satisfaction 
desired,  or  when  we  encounter  results  or  experiences  which 
are  undesirable.  Contemplating  all  these  sources  of  trouble, 
we  see  that  they  sometimes  act  in  a  negative  and  at  other 
times  in  a  positive  way.  (1)  What  merely  restrains  or  dis- 
appoints is  irksome.  To  be  debarred  from  knowledge  or 
from  doing;  to  be  kept  in  weakness  or  in  poverty;  to  be  se- 
cluded in  darkness  or  in  loneliness;  to  be  deprived  of  friendr 
ship  or  of  honor;  to  be  without  suitable  objects  of  affection 
or  to  lose  them  or  be  denied  them;  to  be  neglected  in  one's 
interests  or  rights,  or  to  see  others  neglected;  to  witness  the 
moral  deficiency  of  others  or  to  realize  one's  own — these 
things  cause  discomfort  and  grief  to  any  normally  consti- 
tuted person.  (2)  But  many  causes  of  mental  distress  are 
more  than  mere  counteractives  of  good ;  they  are  positive ;  they 
have  an  evil  efficacy  of  their  own.  M'an  suffers  not  only  from 
fettered  exertion,  but  also  from  undue  or  improper  exertion ; 
not  merely  from  the  weakness,  but  also  from  the  disorder,  of 
one's  faculties ;  not  only  from  deprivation  of  power  and  influ- 
ence, but  also  from  the  oppression  of  a  tyrant  or  task-master; 
not  merely  from  loneliness,  but  also  from  superabundant  or 
disagreeable  society;  not  merely  from  the  absence  of  things 
fair  to  see,  but  also  from  the  presence  of  the  horrible  and 
ugly.  Often  one  not  only  experiences  the  loss  of  goods  and 
of  the  means  of  prosperity,  but  is  overwhelmed  with  distress- 


CHAP.  XXXVI.]     A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE.  449 

ful  misfortunes;  a  man  may  not  only  be  deprived  of  friends 
and  dear  ones,  but  may  become  the  object  of  aversion  and 
dislike,  and  may  himself  become  a  misanthrope.  When  one 
is  bereft  of  honor,  he  is  for  the  most  part  subjected  to  dis- 
grace; and  the  moral  sense,  when  it  fails  to  cheer  with  its 
approbation,  invariably  disheartens  by  its  disapproval.  In 
short,  mental  sufferings  frequently  arise  from  positive  causes; 
not  simply  from  the  obstruction  of  our  activities  and  the 
disappointment  of  our  desires.  Such  causes  are  the  active 
opposites  of  those  which  give  us  pleasure. 

6.  Turning  now  to  the  material  part  of  that  universe  in 
which  we  live  we  find  that  the  causes  of  corporeal  pleasure 
and  pain  do  not  connect  themselves  with  the  fundamental 
qualities  of  matter  as  those  of  mental  enjoyment  and  suffer- 
ing do  with  the  native  capabilities  of  spirit,  while  yet  they 
evidently  arise  out  of  the  actual  constitution  of  our  bodies 
and  of  the  world  about  us.     That  physiological  structure  in 
which  the  soul  dwells  is  endowed  with  powers  of  nutrition 
and  growth  and  life,  and  with  organs  of  motion  and  of  sense. 
The  healthful  action  of  these  powers  and  organs  affords  pleas- 
ure ;  whereupon  we  have  appetites  and  corporeal  desires ;  and 
these  when  gratified  give  an  added  satisfaction.     The  world 
around  us,  als/o,  is  replete  with  objects  which  stimulate  and 
occupy  our  activities,  with  supplies  for  our  bodily  wants,  and 
with  the  causes  of  agreeable  sensations.     Moreover,  unpleas- 
ant and  painful  experiences  arise  from  the  diseased  action  or 
the  abusive  exercise  of  our  bodily  functions,  and  from  physi- 
cal operations  repugnant  to  our  senses  and  to  our  corporeal 
desires.     Evidently  an  analogy  exists  between  the  origin  of 
mental  and  that  of  physical  pleasures  and  pains.     In  each 
case  these  depend  on  the  mode  in  which  the  powers  and 
functions  of  body  or  soul  are  exercised,  and  on  the  way  in 
which  our  desires  are  gratified  or  offended.    But  the  analogy 
relates   chiefly   to   the   pleasantness   and   unpleasantness   of 
mental  and  bodily  functions. 

7.  An  exception  to  the  rule  that  pleasure  accompanies  the 
normal  and  pain  the  abnormal  exercise  of  a  power  will  be 
noticed  under  the  next  head  of  discussion.     For  the  Stoics 
teach  not  only  that  pleasure  and  pain  arise  from  radical  con- 
ditions in  Nature,  but  also  that  those  causes  which  produce 
pleasure  are  more  natural — more  in  accord  with  the  constitu- 
tion of  things  under  which  wo  live — than  those  are  which 
produce  pain;  and  this  point  calls  for  explanation. 

29 


450  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXVI. 

One  might  say  that  as  pleasure  arises  from  ascertainable 
causes  and  not  by  accident,  it  results  according  to  Nature. 
But  this  use  of  language  would  not  indicate  any  difference 
between  the  origin  of  pleasure  and  that  of  pain,  inasmuch  as 
the  latter  no  less  than  the  former  can  be  traced  to  ascertain- 
able causes.  The  Stoics  taught  that  virtue  is  the  supreme 
good,  or  cause  of  happiness,  and  that  it  consists  in  a  life  ac- 
cording to  Nature.  This  implies  that  good  and  hap_piness 
belong  to  a  life  conformable  to  Nature  and  that  evil  and 
misery  attend  a  life  at  variance  with  Nature.  In  the  lan- 
guage of  Ueberweg  the  Stoics  held  that  "pleasure  is  the 
•natural  result  (brcybnnjfia)  of  successful  endeavor  to  secure 
what  is  in  harmony  with  our  nature."  So  the  questions  pre- 
sent themselves,  What  is  the  meaning  of  this  phrase  "  accord- 
ing to  Nature?"  and,  In  what  sense  do  those  causes  which 
produce  happiness  agree  with  that  constitution  of  things 
under  which  we  live,  while  those  which  produce  pain  are  re- 
pugnant to  it?  In  answer  to  these  queries  we  shall  state  a 
few  propositions  which  seem  reasonable,  without  attempting 
any  extended  proof  of  them. 

8.  First,  it  appears  that  the  primary  or  essential  operations 
of  that  part  of  Nature  which  is  internal  and  spiritual  do  not 
produce  suffering,  but  enjoyment.  When  we  consider  the 
primary  capabilities  of  spirit — those  manifested  in  intellec- 
tual or  aesthetic  activity;  those  employed  in  business  and 
practical  labors;  those  which  show  themselves  in  social  life; 
those  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasures  and  comforts; 
those  which  consider  interests  and  strive  for  their  advance- 
ment; those  occupied  in  beneficence  and  altruistic  effort;  those 
in  which  personal  esteem  is  the  dominant  factor ;  and  those  of 
which  a  sense  of  right  and  a  love  of  moral  excellence  are  the 
chief  elements — we  find  that  the  normal  working  of  our 
powers  and  tendencies  (in  which  each  accomplishes  freely 
its  own  function)  is  accompanied  with  pleasure.  But  the 
abnormal  operation  of  any  capability,  when  it  is  oppressed 
or  overdriven,  or  affected  with  disease,  or  out  of  harmony 
with  other  powers  or  with  one's  environment,  produces  pain. 
The  capabilities  of  spirit  form  a  sort  of  society  in  which  each 
member  is  fitted  for  a  certain  place  and  for  a  certain  work  in 
that  place.  Pleasure  arises  for  each  and  for  all  from  the 
harmonious  and  successful  performance  by  each  of  its  proper 
task.  The  obstruction  or  violation  of  this  law  of  life  causes 
distress.  Since  then  each  power  yields  enjoyment  while  per- 


CHAP.  XXXVI.]      A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE.  451 

forming  its  own  proper  function,  happiness  may  be  said  to 
attend  an  activity  according  to  Nature,  and  unhappiness  an 
activity  contrary  to  Nature. 

Now  we  encounter  the  fact,  already  considered  in  a  pre- 
vious discussion  (Chap.  II.,  14),  that  the  exercise  of  some 
natural  capabilities,  as  those  of  fear,  grief,  disappointment, 
resentment,  a  sense  of  the  ugly  or  disagreeable,  and  the  feel- 
ing of  being  wronged,  are  essentially  painful.  This  fact 
would  conflict  with  our  theory  of  happiness  but  for  one  cir- 
cumstance. The  experiences  to  which  it  refers  have  a  second- 
ary character  and  are  related  to  the  law  of  pleasure  and  pain 
in  an  exceptional  way.  The  capacity  for  them  is  a  kind  of 
necessary  attachment  to  the  capacity  for  their  opposites. 
Often,  too,  though  painful  in  themselves,  they  serve  some 
end  of  good.  As  bodily  pains  warn  against  bodily  dangers; 
as  the  comfort  of  rest  follows  the  weariness  of  labor;  as 
hunger  compels  one  to  take  needful  nourishment;  so  fear 
and  sorrow  and  dissatisfaction  contribute  to  our  escape  from 
misery  and  our  attainment  of  happiness.  Moreover,  every 
one  of  life's  troubles,  if  properly  used,  becomes  the  means  of 
high  spiritual  advancement. 

Remarks  kindred  to  the  above  apply  to  the  fact  that  pleas- 
ure sometimes  attends  the  extreme  and  abnormal  use  of 
our  capabilities.  This,  also,  is  an  attachment  to  our  capacity 
for  true  happiness.  But  it  is  unnatural  in  that  it  sets  forth 
not  the  complete  and  permanent  working  of  Nature,  but  a 
temporary  gain  to  be  followed  bv  enduring  loss ;  and  in  that 
it  tends  not  to  the  development  but  to  the  destruction  of  one's 
original  capability  of  good. 

9.  In  the  next  place  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  fundamental 
desires,  or  motivities,  of  spirit  universally  aim  at  enjoyment 
in  one  form  or  another,  and  urge  us  to  the  pursuit  of  it. 
Not  one  of  them  seeks  as'  an  end  the  pain  or  evil  of  oneself 
or  of  others.  No  human  being  desires  pain  for  its  own  sake, 
but  always  enjoyment  or  happiness.  Men  do  sometimes,  in 
anger  or  resentment,  seek  to  inflict  suffering  on  others; 
and  this  feeling  may  degenerate  into  hatred  or  enmity.  But 
all  inimical  feelings  are  secondary  formations;  they  are  only 
attachments  to  the  primary  tendencies  of  life.  They  arise 
when  prior  aims  have  been  obstructed,  and  are  directed  to 
the  removal  or  suppression  of  obstruction.  So  far  as^suffer- 
ings  are  the  objects  of  primary  desire,  they  are  the  objects  of 
aversion  and  not  of  pursuit.  '  Pleasurable  activity  alone  can 


452  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXVI. 

be  considered  conformable  to  the  fundamental  promptings 
of  spirit. 

10.  When  we  turn  to  that  aspect  of  Nature  which  is  ex- 
ternal to  us  and  which  is  either  material  or  manifested 
chiefly  through  material  agencies,  we  find  that  its  arrange- 
ments and  workings  are  on  the  whole  promotive  of  enjoyment 
and  limitative  of  suffering.  In  arguing  this  point  the  rela- 
tions of  the  soul  to  the  body  and  its  relations  through  the 
body  to  the  outward  world  may  be  considered  together,  as 
they  are  intimately  related.  By  means  of  bodily  organs  the 
soul  is  capable  of  numberless  agreeable  sensations;  and  these 
organs  are  constantly  used  in  man's  intellectual  and  practi- 
cal activities.  At  the  same  time  the  physical  universe  is 
replete  with  means  for  gratifying  the  senses,  with  objects  to 
interest  tihe  mind,  and  with  opportunities  of  employment 
and  achievement.  Thus  man's  corporeal  endowments  and 
his  material  surroundings  en-courage  him  to  seek  a  life  of 
happiness. 

But,  while  this  is  so,  no  one  can  assert  that  the  conditions 
of  earthly  life  are  fitted  to  produce  unalloyed  enjoyment. 
The  utmost  that  can  be  claimed  is  that  they  ordinarily  give 
the  expectation  of  a  comfortable  experience,  always,  however, 
mingled  with  trials,  exposed  to  accidents,  hardships  and  dis- 
eases, and  terminating  at  last  in  weakness  and  dissolution. 
Were  bodily  enjoyment  the  whole  end  of  man's  existence 
certainly  that  end  is,  as  a  rule,  very  imperfectly  realized. 
Nature's  bestowal  upon  us  of  the  capabilities  and  means  of 
enjoyment  are  proof  of  the  goodness  of  her  disposition  only 
on  the  hypothesis  that  the  evils  of  life  are  the  unavoidable 
conditions  or  the  necessary  instrumentalities  of  the  greatest 
attainable  good.  In  the  case  of  the  lower  animals  such  a 
supposition  is  not  unreasonable.  Their  experience,  in  what  is 
for  them  a  state  of  Nature,  seems  fairly  comfortable  and  en- 
joyable. The  pains  and  necessities  to  which  they  are  subject 
are  needful  stimulants  to  action  and  dissuasives  from  danger. 
The  plan  of  their  life,  under  the  impelling  and  guiding  power 
of  appetite  and  instinct,  appears  to  yield  them  much  satis- 
faction, together  with  a  minimum  of  -suffering.  Their  exist- 
ence is  probably  transitory,  as  their  nature  seems  unfitted  for 
immortality ;  but  they  have  their  creature  comforts  while  life 
lasts ;  and  their  death  is  probably  a  painless  ending. 

In  the  case  of  "the  rational  animal"  more  thought  is 
needed  than  in  the  case  of  the  brute  to  show  that  earthly  life 


CHAP.  XXXVI.]     A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE.  453 

is.  designed  for  his  best  happiness.  We  may  allow  that  man's 
disagreeable  experiences  act  as  deterrents  from  injurious 
courses;  we  may  maintain  that  the  average  human  life  con- 
tains many  gratifications  and  enjoyments;  yet  the  multiplied 
distresses  of  mankind  compel  the  admission  that  if  Nature 
had  in  view  simply  our  temporal  good,  she  has  only  partially 
accomplished  her  purpose.  This  consideration  does  not  dis- 
prove that  Nature  aims  at  human  happiness,  but  it  suggests 
that  Nature  has  not  arranged  to  satisfy  man  from  material 
resources  (this  being  either  impossible  in  itself  or  inconsist-' 
ent  with  higher  aims)  and  that  man's  temporal  well-being 
is  to  some  extent  subordinated  and  even  sacrificed  to  a  greater 
welfare. 

11.  This  brings  us  to  another  point  without  which  the 
Stoic  contention  respecting  the  best  life  cannot  be  understood. 
It  is  that  mans  own  reason  is  a  part  of  that  Nature  to^  which 
he  must  conform  if  he  would  live  happily  and  well.  This 
point  was  taught  by  Zeno,  Cleanthes  and  Chrysippus  even 
more  strenuously  than  the  general  doctrine  of  which  it  forms 
a  part.  It  is  the  key  to  the  general  doctrine.  The  rational 
faculty  is  not  only  part  of  that  constitution  of  things  to 
which  we  belong,  but  it  is  the  only  medium  through  which 
man  may  be  kept  in  sympathy  with  Nature  and  her  laws. 
It  is  the  instrument  whereby  we  apprehend  and  apply  the 
suggestions  of  Nature.  Without  Nature,  Keason  would  be  use- 
less, being  bereft  of  light  and  guidance,  but  without  Reason 
Nature  could  not  be  a  rule  for  human  conduct.  Reason  forms 
her  precepts  after  considering  the  aims  of  particular  motiv- 
ities  and  in  view  of  the  necessities  and  opportunities  of  our 
environment.  She  stands  not  for  herself  alone,  but  for  all  the 
components  of  Nature,  whether  internal  or  external,  accord- 
ing to  the  proper  claims  of  each.  Life  must  be  a  failure  if 
the  counsels  of  this  guide  be  counteracted  or  ignored.  So  far 
as  human  beings  are  concerned,  we  should  not  teach  absolutely 
that  Nature  aims  to  make  them  happy,  but  only  that  Nature 
aims  to  make  those  happy  who  live  according  to  reason.  Those 
who  do  not  live  according  to  reason  do  not  live  according  to 
Nature ;  and  it  would  be  impossible  for  Nature  to  make  them 
happy. 

Hence  it  is  not  maintained  that  it  is  the  intent  of  Nature 
to  give  the  wise  man  a  perfect  felicity  during  the  present  life, 
but  only  to  give  such  comfort  and  satisfaction  as  may  con- 
sist with  his  lasting  good.  The  conception  of  happiness 


£54  THE  MORAL  LAW.  [CHAP.  XXXVI. 

which  reason  uses  is  limited  to  the  attainable  and  the  endur- 
ing. It  includes  only  those  gratifications  which  the  wise 
man  may  wisely  seek  and  hope  for.  And,  although  the  por- 
tion of  the  wise  may  for  the  present  be  mingled  with  sorrows 
and  disappointments,  he  does  not  regard  these  as  ultimate 
evils,  but  rather  as  the  necessary  instruments  of  welfare. 
For  all  things  are  working  together  for  his  good. 

12.  Moreover,  the  reason  of  which  the  Stoics  spoke  is  not 
content  with  any  partial  view  of  life  and  its  practical  rela- 
tions.    Especially  it  does  not  confine  itself  to  the  consider- 
ation of  one's  own  interests.     Keeping  in  view  the  true  order 
of  all  things  ( fawpwv  TT/V  TUV  oAwv  aMjBetav  /cat  ra£ iv  )  •  it  pursues  the 
befitting  and  the  right  (  TO  nadfjuov,  TO  KardpOu/ua  )  y  and  so  is  the 
origin  of  virtue. 

This  absolute  exercise  of  reason,  though  it  does  not  aim 
at  private  interests,  is  consistent  with  rational  regard  for  the 
particular  good  of  oneself  and  one's  friendc.  Indeed,  as 
we  have  seen  in  the  discussion  concerning  happiness,  right 
reason  is  necessary  to  one's  own  best  good.  (CHAP.  II.,  6.)  In 
other  words,  virtue,  which  is  the  highest  mode  of  conformity 
to  Nature,  because  it  ic  the  realization  of  the  law  of  the 
absolute  reason,  also  confers  upon  its  possessor  the  highest 
happiness. 

13.  One   other  statement   completes   the    Stoic    doctrine. 
The  conception  of  Nature  entertained  by  Zeno  and  his  fol- 
lowers was  pantheistic.     Or  perhaps  we  should  say  it  was,  in 
a  confused   and   imperfect   way,   theistic.      They   held   that 
"  the  working  force  in  the  universe  is  God ;  that  the  beauty 
and  adaptation  of  the  world  can  have  come  only  from   a 
thinking  mind  and  prove,  therefore,  the  existence  of  Deity  " 
(Ueberweg).     Their  maxim  that  "God  and  Nature  do  noth- 
ing     foolishly"      (60edf  /cat  r]  <j>vci$  bvdev  fidrrjv  irdiovoiv)       teaches 

that  the  operations  of  Nature  are  governed  by  wisdom  and 
virtuous  goodness.  In  his  hymn  to  Zeus,  Cleanthes  Fays, 
"  Nothing  takes  place  without  Thee,  0  Deity,  except  that 
which  men  do  through  their  own  want  of  reason.  But  even 
that  which  is  evil  is  overruled  by  Thee  for  good,  and  is 
made  to  harmonize  with  the  plan  of  the  world."  "The 
Stoic  theology/'  says  Weber,  "  is  a  kind  of  compromise  be- 
tween pantheism  and  theism.  God  is  identical  with  the 
universe,  but  this  universe  is  a  real  being,  a  living  God,  who 
has  a  knowledge  of  things  (  vov? ),  who  governs  our  des- 
tinies (  np6voia  Jj  who  loves  us  (  QrtMpvrroc  )  and  desires  our 


CHAP.  XXXVI.]      A  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LIFE.  4.55 


good      (Kq&fumitk,     fyefapoe,     evnourrutog      avdpuTroi^    ;      without, 

however,  participating  in  human  passions."  Evidently 
this  God  who  pervades  Nature  is  a  personal  and  almighty 
spirit  by  whom  all  things  consist  and  in  whom  all  creatures 
live  and  move  and  have  their  being.  Thus,  in  declaring 
that  man  should  live  according  to  Nature,  the  Nature  within 
us  and  the  Nature  around  us,  the  Stoics  added  a  divine 
authority  to  the  laws  of  life  formulated  by  human  reason. 
For  they  regarded  Nature  as  manifesting  the  mind  and  will 
of  God.  Christianity  differs  from  Stoicism  in  this  teaching 
only  in  presenting  a  more  satisfactory  conception  of  the 
Supreme  Being, 

14.  So  far  as  we  know,  nothing  better  than  the  Stoic 
philosophy  of  life  has  been  developed  either  in  ancient  or 
in  modern  times.  But  it  is  to  be  confessed  that  the  problem 
to  which  it  relates  is  a  complicated  one,  and  includes  some 
distracting  elements.  It  calls  for  the  consideration  of  human 
life  in  all  its  aspects  and  connections.  It  is  affected  with  a 
special  complexity  because  Nature  deals  with  man  not  simply 
as  a  rational,  but  also  as  an  imperfect  being.  It  is  necessary 
that  the  destructive  tendencies  of  selfishness  and  passion 
should  be  counteracted  and  overcome. 

The  argument  showing  that  Nature  seeks  the  happiness  of 
rational  beings  may  be  compared  to  the  reasoning  through 
which  an  intelligent  observer  may  come  to  understand  the 
purpose  of  an  ingenious  machine.  If  <an  Arab  chief  saw 
for  the  first  time  the  movements  of  a  locomotive,  he  would 
soon  perceive  that  the  essential  use  of  such  an  engine  is  to 
draw  cars  or  coaches  along  a  railway.  The  action  of  the 
piston-rod  in  making  the  wheels  revolve  and  the  strength  of 
the  coupling  devices  by  which  the  passive  members  of  the 
train  are  attached  to  the  locomotive,  are  proofs  of  this  design. 
Such  a  conclusion  would  not  be  invalidated  by  the  fact  that 
the  engine  occasionally  pushes  backwards  instead  of  pulling 
forwards,  this  reverse  action  being  only  incidental  to  the 
main  end  to  be  accomplished.  Nor  would  the  Arab's  judg- 
ment be  altered  upon  seeing  that  the  train  is  supplied  with 
brakes,  intended  to  resist  its  rushing  progress  and  to  bring 
it  to  a  standstill.  The  box  above  the  boiler  from  which  a 
gritty  stream  is  let  down  through  tubes  in  front  of  the 
wheels,  may  excite  surprise  ;  for  the  action  of  the  sand  on  the 
rails  and  wheels  is  wearing.  But  it  is  needful  to  prevent  tho 
wheels  slipping  on  an  upward  grade.  The  intense  flame 


456  TH.E  MORAL  LAW.  fCHAP.  XXXVI. 

passing  through  the  boiler  tubes  will  certainly  in  time  con- 
sume them.  But  it  is  indispensable  for  the  generation  of 
steam.  If  any  part  of  the  machine,  a  lever,  a  valve,  a  rod 
or  a  rivet,  be  imperfect  or  ill-adjusted;  if  the  furnace  do  not 
yield  sufficient  heat  or  the  axle  boxes  are  not  supplied  with 
oil;  there  is  jarring  friction  and  waste;  and,  if  the  difficulty 
be  not  remedied,  great  loss  or  damage  may  ensue.  Finally, 
the  use  of  the  mighty  motor  is  attended  with  dangers,  some 
arising  from  the  incompetence  of  employees;  others  from 
the  insecurity  of  the  roadbed  and  of  the  country  to  be  trav- 
ersed; others  from  that  liability  to  mishap  and  breakage 
which  is  inherent  in  every  human  mechanism.  Hence,  on 
some  occasions  all  progress  is  obstructed,  and,  on  others, 
passengers  and  freight  are  overtaken  by  ruinous  accidents. 
Notwithstanding  these  things,  the  main  purpose  of  the  in- 
vention is  seen  to  be  not  regression  nor  retardation,  nor 
loss  nor  injury,  but  the  comfortable  passage  and  safe 
transport  of  men  and  goods  from  one  point  to  another. 
Moreover,  this  judgment  of  intelligence  does  not  assert  that 
the  locomotive  is  able  to  accomplish  its  mission  itself  and 
without  oversight,  but  only  that  it  does  so  under  the  manage- 
ment of  competent  men  and  while  these  men  observe  the 
directions  of  their  superiors. 

This  illustration  of  the  Arab's  judgment  concerning  a 
locomotive  shows  how  the  end  of  a  complicated  mechanism 
can  be  seen  only  when  all  the  parts  of  it  are  considered,  and 
when  its  main  working  can  be  distinguished  from  those 
incidents  which  are  necessitated  by  the  conditions  under 
which  it  operates.  But  the  arrangements  of  the  universe 
affecting  man's  destiny,  and  their  relation  to  the  course 
which  wisdom  calls  on  him  to  pursue,  are  far  more  difficult 
to  comprehend  than  the  functions  of  any  mechanical  in- 
vention can  be.  The  philosophy  of  happiness  and  misery,  of 
good  and  evil,  might  be  the  subject  of  an  extensive  treatise. 
Nevertheless  we  are  convinced  that  any  satisfactory  theory 
of  wisdom  and  virtue  must  ally  itself  with  the  Stoic  doctrine 
that  man's  chief  good  is  to  be  realized  by  his  living  in  har- 
mony with  Nature,  with  Reason,  and  with  God. 


INDEX 


The  references  given  below  indicate  the  pages  on  which  any  sub- 
ject is  mentioned  or  on  which  any  authority  is  cited.  They  are 
especially  intended  to  cover  all  definitions  and  all  quotations.  But 
each  of  them  may  be  wisely  supplemented  by  consulting  one  or 
more  of  those  synopses  which  have  been  prefixed  to  the  several 
chapters  of  the  treatise. 

ABSOLUTE  GOOD,  8,  251-256,  273,  280,  285-287,  313-325,  429  ;  vir- 
tue the  supreme  absolute  good,  290-299. 

Academics  and  Peripatetics,  the,  362. 

Actions,  17  ;  moral,  58-66,  327  ;  attemptive,  60 ;  intentiouable,  64  ; 
desiderative,  or  dispositional,  62,  173  ;  right  or  wrong,  and  vir- 
tuous or  vicious,  63,  173  ;  practical  and  affectional,  65. 

Actualistic  and  hypothetical  perceptions,  227-229. 

Affection,  82,  86-88,  90,  111,  122,  339. 

Affectional  and  practical  duty,  65,  249,  265,  275,  279,  281. 

ata^a/c,  or  sense,  23.     See  Sense. 

Alexander,  Prof.,  on  moral  ideals,  149. 

Altruism,  88-90,  96, 102,  382,  401. 

Analysis  and  induction,  129. 

Anger,  305-307. 

Appetite  and  instinct,  78,  110. 

Approbation  and  disapprobation,  351. 

A  priori  and  Common-sense  Intuitionalists,  219. 

Aristippus,  138. 

Aristotle,  22,  23,  29,  70,  132,  138,  153,  192,  271,  322,  434. 

Atomists,  the  ancient  evolutionists,  137. 

Atonement,  the  doctrine  of  the,  307-310. 

Austin,  John,  a  Benthamite,  420. 

Authority,  191,  196-204,  265.  273. 

Authority  ethics,  6,  137,  177-204,  322. 

BACON,  Lord,  131. 

Bain,  Prof.,  an  authority  moralist,  143. 

Beauty,  defined,  119. 

Belief,  for  conviction,  technically  defined,  51,  52. 

Beneficence,   rational,   contrasted  with    benevolent  affection,  93, 

250  •  moral,  a  specific  form  of  moral  principle,  94,  168,  d94. 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  139,  142,  147,  183. 
Blackie,  Prof.,  on  utilitarianism,  320. 
Blackstone,  Sir  Wm.,  374,  420,  421,  422,  424,  427. 


458  INDEX. 

Bluntschli,  Prof.,  on  the  State,  418. 
Boethius,  on  personality,  349. 
Bonitarianism,  a  suggestion,  140. 
Bowne,  Prof.,  148,  149,  153,  321. 
Bradley,  Prof.,  an  Hegelian,  148. 
Burney,  Dr.  G.  S.,  337,  344. 
Butler,  Bp.  Joseph,  109,  161,  202,  275. 

CALDERWOOD,  Prof.,  on  pleasure  and  pain,  19. 

"  Cardinal  "  virtues,  212,  240,  289. 

Casuistry,  358,  368. 

"  Categorical  imperative,"  the,  6,  143,  147,  199.     See  Oughtness. 

Cause,  final,  defined,  67,  71  ;  cause  in  general,  71  ;  occasional,  11?  ; 

first,  344,  434. 

Charnock,  Stephen,  on  the  moral  law,  188. 
Chase,  Prof.,  N.Y.  Law  School,  on  Blackstone,  421. 
Chastity,  duty  of,  264,  273. 
Choice,  faculty  of,  336.    See  Will 
Christ,  Jesus,  the,  on  tradition,  369  ;  on  marriage,  391  ;  the  founder 

of  Christianity,  435-440. 
Christian,  Prof.,  on  Blackstone,  421. 
Christianity,  140,  433-443,  444. 
"  Christian  Science,"  131. 

Cicero,  4,  211,  240,  260,  358-363,  367,  371,  372,  376,  381,  394,  417. 
Clarke,  Samuel,  an  a  priori  intuitionalist,  212,  230. 
Clifford,  on  "  tribal  self,"  89. 
"  Code  of  Honor,"  369. 
"  Common  Sense,"  6,  56,  219,  224,  324. 
Commotive  virtue,  66,  250,  254,  266,  271. 
Compulsion,  or  coercion,  191,  194. 
Conception,  technically  defined,  51,  52  ;  process  of,  181,  295,  304- 

305. 

"  Conflict  of  Duties,"  254,  269,  274,  357-381. 
Confucius,  his  "  superior  man,"  25  ;  on  benevolence,  248. 
Conscience,  and  the  moral  sense,  56,  220. 
Contempt  and  disdain,  123. 
Contracts,  obligation  of,  265,  273,  401. 
"  Contrary  choice,"  power  of,  333. 
Conviction,  technically  defined,  51,  52. 
Corporate  body  not  a  person,  347,  418. 
Cowper,  the  poet,  331. 
Criterion,  defined,  206. 
Critical  method,  the,  132. 

Cud  worth,  Ralph,  an  a  priori  moralist,  212,  219,  229,  230. 
Cumberland,  Bp.,  his  theory,  188. 

DARWIN,  Charles,  in  his  "  Descent  of  Man,"  144,  184. 

David,  King,  and  the  shewbread,  369. 

Decalogue,  the  Mosaic,  263,  269,  383. 

Definitions,  need  of,  347. 

Demerit,  or  ill-desert,  302,  309. 

Derivative,  or  deductive,  method,  the,  133,  201. 

DesCartes,  Rene,  158,  212,  219. 

Desert  of  approbation,  or  merit,  157,  278. 


INDEX.  459 

Desirable,  often  means  rationally  desirable,  26  ;  modes  of  the,  27, 

Desire,  or  motive  feeling,  76. 

Desuetude,  law  of,  107. 

Determinism,  the  theory,  344. 

Dialectic  method,  the,  133. 

Dignity,  or  worth,  the  sense  of,  30-34,  81,  157. 

Dogmatists,  and  their  method,  6,  72,  131,  225. 

Duty,  the  word,  177,  182,  209,  353  ;  modes  of,  383-385. 

Duty  ethics,  6,  205-234,  323. 

"  Duty  for  duty's  sake,"  210. 

ECLECTICISM,  and  the  eclectic  method,  132. 

"  Economic  surplus,"  the,  411. 

Economics,  a  branch  of  Sociology,  386,  397. 

Education,  public,  405.  407. 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  116, 166,  168,  255,  335,  339. 

Egoism,  139  ;  not  necessarily  selfish,  382. 

Egotism,  Aristotle's,  154. 

Ely,  Prof.  R.  T.,  397-400. 

Emotions,  or  the  Sensibilities,  20,  97,  118-127. 

Ends,  or  "  final  causes,"  42,  67-74,  117,  182,  206/240,  254,  304,  814. 

Enjoyment,  or  pleasure,  10,  445-453. 

Entity,  the  elements  of,  228. 

Envy  and  jealousy,  defined,  91. 

Epicurus  and  Epicureanism,  27,  35,  138,  161,  325. 

Esteem,  or  respect,  277  ;  desire  for,  30,  81  ;  moral  esteem,  8,  !W3, 

277-281,  292. 
Eudaemonism,  137,  214. 
evtiaipovia,  or  prosperity,  12,  138. 
Eudaimonics,  the  science  of,  38. 
Evolutionism,  agnostic  and  theistic,  137,  184,  387. 
Experience  and  experiential  perceptions,  231. 
Expedient,  the  dutifully  (TO  naOfjuov  in  its  limited  application),  359. 

"  FAIR  DEALING  "  (rb  taUv),  209. 

Faith,  a  duty,  266. 

Fall,  the  doctrine  of  the,  307-312. 

Fear  and  terror,  123. 

Foster,  Dr.  (Prof,  of  Theology),  310. 

Foster  on  Crown  Law,  quoted,  375. 

Franchises,  public,  396. 

Franck,  M.  Ad.,  on  duty,  180. 

Free-agency,  or  free-will,  326-345,  350,  355. 

Freedom,  right  to,  264,  273. 

Friendship,  duty  of,  393. 

Fullerton,  Prof.  G.  S.,  on  free-agency,  355. 

GIDDINGS,  Prof.,  on  prehistoric  man,  388,  389. 

God  46,  48,  124,  166,  187-189,  203,  227,  263,  274,  279,  292,  298,  307- 

312,  323,  343,  348,  400,  454. 
Good  defined  variously,  13,  115,  142  ;  rational,  17,  251,  290,  305,320  ; 

moral   18,  189,  274,  299.  (in  the  Kantian  sense)  216  ;  "greatest 

apparent,"  115,  328.     See  also  under  Absolute. 


460  INDEX. 

Goodness,  Moral,  8,  242-245,  248-257,  271-274,  291. 
Gratitude,  a  development  of  altruism,  82. 
Green,  Prof.,  an  Hegelian,  148. 
Grotius,  quoted,  372,  417. 

HABIT,  defined,  102  ;    facilitative,  distinguished  from  incentive. 

103-107. 

Hamilton,  Sir  Wm.,  on  our  psychical  powers,  19,  338. 
Happiness  and  misery,  12,  10-38,  444-456. 
Hatred,  its  origin,  111. 
Haven,  Pres.,  on  moral  Tightness,  221. 
Hedonism,  27,  72,  137. 

Hegel,  his  pantheistic  ethics,  134,  147, 156,  175. 
Hickok,  Pres,,  on  the  moral  end,  147,  152,  157,  161. 
Hobbes,  Thomas,  on  the  origin  of  morality,  183 ;  on  the  State,  417, 
Hodge,  Dr.  A.  A.,  quoted,  301,  324. 
Hodge,  Dr.  Charles,  quoted,  189,  190,  202-204,  344. 
Holland,  Prof.,  his  conception  of  the  State,  415,  416. 
Holmes,  G.  K.  (census  report) ,  412. 
Homologic  law,  the,  233. 

Honestum,  the,  or  strictly  right,  211,  359-381. 
Hooker,  Richard,  on  the  will  of  God,  188. 
Hopkins,  Pres.  Mark,  17,  161, 166-168, 170,  255,  322. 
Hutcheson,  F.,  founder  of  Scotch  Philosophy,  157. 

"  IDEA,  THE,"  175,  210. 

"  Ideas,  innate,"  229. 

Ideal  of  character,  148,  149, 152. 

Ideals,  have  no  literal  existence,  68. 

Ihering,  Prof.,  defines  the  State,  416. 

Ill-desert,  (1)  of  sin,  (2)  of  persons,  302. 

Immutable  morality,  214,  224-234. 

Indignation  and  anger,  84,  305-307. 

Inductive  method,  the,  49,  74,  129,  135,  314. 

Instinct,  as  motive,  76,  110. 

Intuition,  53,  131,  201,  219,  231-233,  295,  305. 

Intuitionalists,  the,  6,  72,  218-221,  268. 

JACOBI,  on  the  rigor  of  Kant,  215. 

Janet,  Prof.,  18,  147,  151,  153,  154,  157,  185,  252,  321,  350,  358. 

Jansenists  and  Jesuits,  358. 

Jure,  de,  and  de  facto,  39,  47. 

Jus  and  jura,  261.     See  Regulative  righteousness. 

Justice,  73,  270,  428,  429  ;  punitive,  247,  300-312  ;  distributive,  260. 

Justitia  generalis,  or  righteousness  in  general,  243,  259. 

Justinian,  on  justice,  259. 

KANT,  Immanuel,  143, 147,  212-218,  221,  230,  268,  323,  338. 

KaOqKov,  TO,  and  TO  KaT6p6u/u,a,  211,  259. 

Kent,  Chancellor,  on  common  law  and  equity,  425. 

Kirchmann,  his  theory,  185. 

Knox,  John,  and  the  Queen  of  Scots,  197. 


INDEX.  461 

LAW,  39,  46,  198,  207,  235-247 ;  causational,  logical  and  practical, 

237  ;  moral,  239,  268,  316,  324 ;  political,  414,  419-429. 
Legal,  an  ambiguous  word,  46-48,  190. 
Leibnitz,  a  perfectionist,  31,  33,  147. 
Libertarianism,  343. 
Life,  denned,  2  ;  moral,  3. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  "  firmness  in  the  right,"  41. 
Locke,  John,  52,  188,  212,  349. 

Love,  "  rational,"  250;  benevolent  and  moral,  43,  249,  279,  447. 
Love,  the  passion  of,  analyzed,  122,  271. 
Luther,  Martin,  before  Charles  V.,  200. 


MAINE,  Sir  Henry,  on  jurisprudence,  414. 

Malebranche,  Pere,  a  disciple  of  DesCartes,  212. 

Mackenzie,  Prof.,  4,  147,  151,  153,  206-208,  215,  260,  321,  384. 

Markby,  Sir  Wm.,  on  "  the  king's  conscience,"  426. 

Marriage,  a  moral  necessity,  264,  372,  391. 

Martensen,  Bp.  ,  on  religion  and  morality,  203. 

Martineau,  Dr.  James,  162-165,  168,  172,  322,  351. 

McCosh,  Pres.,  on  intuition,  53,  231. 

Medietas,  or  /zeo-dr^.  the,  of  Aristotle,  271,  322. 

Meng-tseu,  the  disciple  of  Confucius,  249. 

Methods,  ethical,  7,  128-135. 

Michigan,  Supreme  Court  of,  on  railroads,  410. 

"  Middle  of  the  Road"  Populists.  322. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  139,  143,  150,  218,  230,  430. 

Modalist,  the,  a  logic,  181,  233,  355,  362,  415. 

Money,  155  ;  State  regulation  of,  407. 

Monopolies,  subject  to  State  control,  411. 

Moses,  the  lawgiver,  249,  263,  269,  293. 

Motivity,  technically  defined,  75  ;  motivities.  the,  75-117,  349,  354  ; 

classified,  76  ;  the  rational,  defined  and  divided,  84. 
Motivity  ethics,  5,  43,  137,  160-176,  321. 
Muirhead,  Prof.,  his  "Manual,"  176. 

»  NATURE,"  24,  70,  112,  210,  376,  393,  445-456. 

"  Nature  of  things,"  the,  227,  233. 

Necessitarianism,  343. 

Necessitv  moral,  distinguished  both  from  compulsion  and  from 
literal  necessity,  192-195,  330  ;  and  identified  with  moral  obli- 
gation, 195  ;  actualistic  and  hypothetical  necessity,  227-234  ; 
ontological  and  cosmological  necessity,  232-234. 

Nelson,  Horatio,  his  love  of  esteem,  31. 


,  7,4.48.  , 

Obligatoriness,  distinguished  from  Tightness,  7,  45,  18/3,  d!7, 
Occam,  William  of,  on  God's  authority,  187. 
Offlcium  (TO  KattijKov,  in  the  broad  sense),  211,  359. 

from  Tightness,  45,  47,  142,  KB, 

200,  301. 


462  INDEX. 

PALEY,  Dr.  William,  an  authority  moralist,  188. 

Panaetius,  Posidonius  and  other  Stoics,  359. 

Parental  and  filial  duty,  893. 

Parkhurst,  Dr.  C.  H.,  on  property  rights,  400. 

Parmenides,  the  Eleatic,  175. 

Passion,  defined,  122. 

Paul,  the  Apostle,  29,  41,  178,  202,  332,  341,  363,  377,  437,  442. 

Paulsen,  Prof.,  an  authority  moralist,  187. 

Peabody,  the  philanthropist,  73,  93. 

Perceptionalist,  the,  a  text-book  in  Mental  Science,  20,  26,  175,  233 

237,  334,  389. 

Perfectionism,  5,  43,  136,  146-159,  160,  169,  210,  320. 
Person  arid  personality,  346-356. 
Personality,  principle  of,  30,  81,  147,  377. 
Plato,  on  pleasure,  22,  29,  114 ;  a  perfectionist,  147,  210. 
Pleasure,  denned,  10;  discussed,  11,  114,  446-453. 
Politics,  denned.  413. 

Pollock,  on  Torts,  373  ;  on  Jurisprudence,  414. 
Porter,  Pres.  Noah,  18,  303,  338,  340,  342,  378,  380. 
Practive  and  Commotive  virtue,  250,  267,  279. 
Price,  a  "  Common  -sense  "  moralist,  219. 
Pride  and  vanity,  82,  124. 
Principle,  motive,  85  ;  moral,  96,  113,  267. 
Problem,  "  the  ethical,"  205,  225. 
Propensities,  the,  80,  81,  82,  111. 
Property,  desire  for,  82  ;  right  of,  264,  396,  400,  440. 
Property  as  related  to  attribute  and  essence,  181. 
"  Punctum  stans,"  the,  343. 

Punitive  justice,  247,  285,  300-312,  375,  379,  419,  433. 
Pythagorean  definition  of  virtue,  the,  290. 

RATIONALISTS  and  Intuitionalists  (a  division  of  the  Duty  School) 

218. 

Rationalized  and  rationated  motivities,  99,  100. 
Realism,  175,  236. 
Reason,  defined,   51 ;  the  moral   reason,  51-57,  100,   105,   315  ;   the 

speculative  or  discursive  and  the  intuitive  or  practical,  53,  105, 

219,  227.  295 ;  as  motive,  54,   84,  92,  99,  117,  170,  176,  211,  216  , 

affected  by  habit,  105. 

"Regressive  and  progressive"  methods,  the,  181. 
Reid,  Dr.  Thomas,  a  Common-sense  dogmatist,  219,  224. 
Religion  and  morality,  430. 
Remunerative  and  punitive  righteousness,  285. 
Resentment  and  hatred,  82,  91,  92. 
Responsibility,  defined,  353. 
Reverence  and  respect,  123,  169,  172,  266. 
Revolution,  right  of,  196-199. 
Right,   the,   3,   39-50,   182,   240,  354  ;  Greek  and  Latin  names  for, 

209  ;   right   and   wrong,   3,  49,   174,  224,  429  ;  same  as  absolute 

good,  8,  313-325,  429;  as  opposed  to  the   dutifully   expedient, 

359-367,  368-881. 
Righteousness,   73,    174,   243,    258 ;   regulative,  8,    243-245,  258-276  ; 

causative,  8,  242.  245,  281-287  :  rectoral.  245-247,  352,  375. 
Rightness,  Moral.  7.  39-50,    171,    173,    180,    199,    225    324    350    422 

See  Right.  tJie. 


INDEX.  463 

Right  per  se  and  per  accidens,  73,  360. 

"  Right  reason,"  same  as  moral,  100,  369. 

Rights  and  a  right  (jura  and  Jus),  261,  262,  273,  274. 

SABBATH,  law  of  the,  263,  269,  376,  383. 

Salmond,  Prof.,  quoted,  421,  423,  426,  428. 

Satisfaction,  technically  defined,  21,  115,  125. 

Schiller,  on  Kant,  218. 

Schoolmen,  the,  classify  duties,  241,  289. 

Schools,  the  public,  73,  405,  407. 

Sciences,  the  origin  and  mutual  relations  of,  080. 

Scott   W   E.  D.  on  mocking-birds,  101. 

Self    the  personal,  346-356  fthe  better,  175,  222,  331,  341    347,  349 

Self-interest,  a  rational  motivity  and  different  from  sell-love,  db, 
93  •  moral,  or  virtuous  prudence,  96,  166. 

Self-love,  88,  139,  166,  250,  382-385. 

Self-regulation,  169,  250,  255-257,  266,  271,  282-284 

Sense  (aioOqois)  frequently  indicates  perception,  6.  55,  219;  some- 
times, emotional  or  motive  feeling,  121 ;  sometimes  a  bodily 

Sentimental,  or  contemplative,  school,  the,  131. 

Seth,  Prof.  James,  his  book,  174,  205. 

Shaftesburv,  Lord,  a  Common-sense  moralist,  188,  4l\t. 

Shakespeare,  31,  33,  70,  125,  265,  349,  380. 

Sharswood,  Judge,  on  Black  stone  422 

Side: wick   Prof.  Henry,  139,  144,162,  165,  168,  207,  226. 

Smith     Adam,    his    theory,   221  ;  his  impartial  and  disinterested 

spectator,  218,  223. 
Social  (or  socialistic)  duty,  385. 
Social  propensity,  the,  80. 
Socialism,  395,  410. 
Sociology.  387,  390,  397. 
Socrates,  116,  158,  428. 


. 

Stanley,  Henry  M.,  executes  murderers,  415. 
Standard,  a,  denned,  206. 


business-enterprises,  404,409. 
Stephen,  Leslie,  on  moral  ideals,  14U. 

&«^^ 

Story,  Justice,  on  legal  precedent,  424  ;  on  Christianity,  « 

Sublimity  and  beauty,  119. 

Submission,  the  grace  of,  266 

Substance,  material  and  spiritual,  £», 

Suicide,  with  the  Ancients,  377.  900000*20 

Summum  bonum,  the,  37,  138    145,  211,  288-299,  3^0. 

Surprise  and  astonishment,  121.  ^  .  th     latter  of 


altruistic  affection,  102. 


464  INDEX. 

TAXATION  and  public  revenue,  379. 

Tennessee,  Supreme  Court  of,  373. 

Theosophy,  a  sentimental  cult,  131. 

Thomas  Aquinas,  St.,  211,  241,  349,  358. 

Thought,  or  conception,  technically  defined,  51,  52. 

Totalism,  an  ethical  theory,  318. 

Trinity,  the  doctrine  of  the,  348. 

UNITED  STATES  Supreme  Court,  defines  the  State,  417. 

"  Universals,"  useful  non-entities,  236. 

Upham,  Prof.  Thomas  C.,  338. 

Utile,  the,  or  dutifully  expedient  (opposed  to  the  honestum).  211. 

359-367. 
Utilitarianism,  5,  26,  72,  136-145,  206,  218,  320. 

VALUE,  defined,  28,  36. 

Van  Dyke,  Dr.  Henry,  on  excusable  falsehood,  377. 

Vanity  and  pride,  82,  124. 

Veracity,  264,  265,  273. 

Vice  and  vices,  100,  173,  292. 

Virtue  (virtus)  33  ;  moral,  37,  177-179,  211,  288-299,  332 ;  not  knowl- 
edge, 116  ;  not  the  ultimate  moral  end,  156-159  ;  its  relation  to 
moral  Tightness,  63,  173-174 ;  sometimes  not  distinguished  from 
right  conduct,  220,  301 ;  same  as  effective  moral  principle,  or 
the  controlling  desire  (or  will)  for  the  right,  96,  107,  244,  341, 
354.  See  Summum  bonum. 

Virtues  of  natural  disposition,  the,  96,  173.    See  Affectional  duty. 

WARBURTON,  Bp.,  says,  "  Law  implies  a  lawgiver,"  188. 

Wayland,  Dr.  Francis,  founds  morality  on  relations,  212. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  "  general  tolerant  Christianity,"  443. 

Welfare  and  well-being,  defined,  16. 

Whewell,  Prof.,  on  Tightness  and  wrongness,  163  ;  on  the  supreme 
rule,  207,  221 ;  his  five  categories  of  duty,  241 ;  his  broad  use  of 
the  term  "  Moral  Goodness,"  243. 

Will,  the,  its  nature  analyzed,  336-340  ;  its  definition  by  Pres. 
Edwards,  339  ;  its  action  as  the  faculty  of  choice,  340  ;  its  more 
general  operation  as  merely  determinate  desire,  116,  341,  354 ;  the 
rational  and  moral  will,  or  better  self,  341  ;  the  relation  of  the 
human  will  to  the  divine,  342-345  ;  the  freedom  of  the  will,  326- 
345,  354-356;  Kant's  "goodwill,"  same  as  virtue,  or  moral 
principle,  214,  218. 

"  Wise  man,"  the,  13,  25,  290,  316. 

Wit  and  humor,  distinguished,  120-121. 

Wolf,  the  disciple  of  Leibnitz,  147  ;  on  the  State,  416. 

Wollaston,  a  duty  moralist,  188. 

Wrong,  the  morally,  40,  49,  173. 

ZENO,  Cleanthes  and  Chrysippus,  the  Stoics,  445,  453. 


BOOKS     B  T 

Edward    John   Hamilton,    D.D. 

Late  Albert  Barnes  Professor  of  Intellectual  Philosophy  in 

Hamilton  College,  New  York. 

FOR  SALE  BY 

Funk  &  Wagnalls  Company,  New  York  &  London 

THE  HUMAN  MIND 

A  Treatise  in  Mental  Philosophy 

No  other  book  of  the  kind  by  an  American  author  was  ever  more 

favorably  received.      The  work  has  become  a  standard 

authority  with  those  who  adhere  to  orthodox  views. 


OPINIONS  AND  REVIEWS. 

He  is  evidently  animated  with  the  love  of  truth  in  general,  and  of  meta- 
physical truth  in  special.  He  has  not  written  in  haste,  but  has  followed  out 
many  of  the  separate  and  manifold  lines  of  thought,  which  must  be  traced  by 
a  careful  thinker. — N.  7".  Tribune. 

The  chapters  on  the  classification  of  the  powers  of  the  mind,  on  belief, 
judgment,  knowledge  j  on  contingency  and  probability ;  on  the  calculation  of 
chances  ;  on  perception,  memory,  and  imagination — are  all  of  them  as  inter- 
esting as  they  are  able. — N.  T.  Herald. 

Dr.  Hamilton's  book,  of  course,  challenges  comparison  with  the  standard 
works  of  Presidents  McCosh  and  Porter.  Probably  more  strictly  original 
matter  is  contained  within  these  pages  than  can  be  found  in  the  treatises  of 
either  of  the  metaphysicians  mentioned. — N.  T.  Observer. 

The  work  is  one  of  the  most  comprehensive,  elaborate,  and  intelligent 
treatises  on  the  subject  of  which  it  treats  that  has  been  presented  to  the  public 
for  a  long  time. — Presbyterian. 

The  more  we  have  examined  this  treatise  on  the  various  special  subjects 
to  which  it  relates,  the  more  impressed  are  we  with  the  soundness  of  his  views, 
the  justness  of  his  expositions,  and  the  clearness  of  his  statements. — Advance. 

Dr.  Hamilton  belongs  to  the  school  of  intuitional  psychology.  He  has, 
however,  wrought  independently,  and  has  thought  through  for  himself  the 
great  problems  with  which  he  deals.  His  style,  I  may  also  add,  is  admirably 
clear. — PRES.  F.  L.  PATTON. 

I  find  in  it  the  ripe  thought  and  expression,  with  the  thoroughness  and 
vigor  of  treatment,  which  can  come  only  from  the  long  study  and  elaboration 
of  one  who  is  at  home  in  dealing  with  questions  pertaining  to  the  human 
intellect. — REV.  DR.  ATWATER. 

I  have  read  many  of  his  discussions  with  great  interest,  and  have  scarcely 
been  able  to  lay  down  the  book  since  I  first  opened  it. — PROF.  B.  N.  MARTIN. 

Large  8vo,  Cloth,  722  pp.      Price,  $4.00,  Post-paid. 

[SEE  NEXT  PAGE} 


The  Perceptionalist 

or  Mental  Science 

A    UNIVERSITY   TEXT-BOOK 

By  EDWARD  JOHN  HAMILTON,   D    D. 
A     REVISED      AND      ENLARGED      EDITION 

Perceptionalism  maintains  "  that  what  men  call 
their  -perceptions  are  true  -perceptions  of  those  very 
things  which  they  say  that  they  perceive."  This 
conclusion  is  the  general  result  of  a  thorough 
analytic  study  of  the  operations  of  the  intellect : 
it  is  not  a  dogmatic  assertion.  The  Perceptionalist 
is  prefaced  by  a  dissertation  on  the  essential  points 
of  its  epistemology,  and,  after  that,  covers  the 
range  of  Mental  Science. 


OPINIONS  AND  REVIEWS. 

It  may  be  safely  adopted  as  a  text-book,  especially  as  it  takes  account  of 
those  later  movements  in  philosophy  which  have  their  basis  in  physiology. — 
Christian  Advocate,  N.  T. 

We  share  in  the  expectation  expressed  in  the  closing  sentence  of  the 
preface,  that  "  Perceptionalism  will  be  the  philosophy  of  the  future  in  these 
United  States. ' ' — Standard. 

This  book  resists  and  exposes  the  materialistic  and  agnostic  speculations 
which  have  done,  and  are  doing,  so  much  harm  in  our  day  ;  and  it  sets  forth 
the  fundamental  principles  of  a  true  psychology  in  plain  and  conclusive  terms. 
—  New  York  Observer. 

The  book  is  clear,  strong,  and  sound  to  the  core. — D.  W.  FISHER,  D.D., 
President  of  Hanover  College,  Ind. 

By  far  the  best  account  we  have  of  "  acquired  perception."  There  is 
equal  carefulness  in  the  development  of  other  topics,  which  I  have  not  yet  been 
able  to  study  to  the  same  degree. — JOSEPH  T.  DURYEA,  D.D.,  Omaha,  Neb. 

I  have  examined  "  Mental  Science."  I  am  inclined  to  adopt  it  as  a  text- 
book, beginning  next  fall.  —  W.  T.  STOTT,  D.D.,  President  of  Franklin 
College,  Ind. 

It  contains  a  sound  and  useful  philosophy.  — JAMES  McCosn,  D.D., 
LL.D.,  late  President  of  the  College  of  New  Jersey. 

The  reasoning  is  so  clear,  consistent,  and  logical,  that  it  stands  out  before  us 
without  a  flaw.  —  R.  K.  SMOOT,  late  Moderator  of  the  Southern  Presbyterian 
Church. 

I2mo,  Cloth,  452  pp.      Price,  $2.00,  Post-paid. 

\SEE  NEXT  PAGE] 


THE  MODALIST; 

Or,  The  Laws  of  Rational  Conviction 
A  TEXT-BOOK  IN  FORMAL  OR   GENERAL  LOGIC 

By    EDWARD  JOHNHAMILT  ON,    D.D. 

This  book  makes  it  clear  beyond  all  question 
that  only  modal  propositions  and  syllogisms  ex- 
press the  radical  action  of  the  mind  in  reasoning  — 
TO*  eV  TT,  ^vXB  Aoyov,  as  Aristotle  calls  it.  It  also  simpli- 
fies the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  modality.  The 
pure  syllogism  which  alone  is  given  in  modern 
books  is  a  secondary  and  verbal  form  of  thought. 


OPINIONS  AND  REVIEWS. 

"  The  Medalist"  is  evidently  the  work  of  a  writer  who  has  studied  logic 
with  great  care  and  pleasure,  and  I  think  will  prove  a  valuable  text-book  with 
the  Professor's  aid  to  the  student  in  studying  it. —  PROF.  HENRY  COPPEE, 
Lebigh  University. 

It  is  clear,  not  needlessly  technical,  and  if  used  under  the  guidance  of  a 
competent  teacher,  can  not  fail  to  prove  eminently  valuable. — The  Con- 
gregationaliit. 

The  student  of  logic  to-day  demands  clearness,  conciseness,  a  true  deter- 
mination of  its  spheres  and  scopes,  and  a  sound  system  of  metaphysics  on  which 
to  build.  This  is  what  Dr.  Hamilton,  the  able  professor  of  intellectual  phi- 
losophy of  Hamilton  College,  has  successfully  undertaken  to  provide  in  "The 
Modalist,"  the  name  indicating  that  the  reintroduction  of  modality  is  charac- 
teristic of  the  new  logic. — New  England  Journal  of  Education. 

His  discussion  of  the  new  analytic  and  of  contingency  in  the  twenty-first 
and  two  following  chapters  is  extremely  interesting,  and  his  criticism  of  Euler's 
diagrams  and  of  Hamilton's  notation  is  acute.  While  somewhat  minute,  it  is, 
on  the  whole,  the  best  text-book  in  logic  we  have  seen  in  the  English  language. 
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